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SUMMARY 
The South African Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’) has introduced strict liability for 
harm caused by defective consumer goods. This represented a radical reform of South African 
product liability law, which had developed in the form of the fault-based Aquilian action. Section 
61 of the CPA imposes strict liability on the producer, importer, distributor and retailer for harm 
resulting from unsafe goods, product failures, defects or hazards or inadequate instructions or 
warnings accompanying goods.  
It is argued that a statutory strict liability regime requires comprehensive and logically coherent 
regulation which should, in the interest of legal certainty, remain as consistent as possible with 
the existing common law rules. The CPA’s product liability framework gives rise to legal 
uncertainty in a number of respects.   
The study comprises a comparative analysis the CPA’s product liability framework with 
reference to its common law background and similar regimes in the USA, EU and Australia, 
identifying relevant principles, conclusions and rules to assist South African courts and 
practitioners in the interpretation and application of the product liability framework. Further, the 
study examines to what degree section 61 liability extends the scope of common law liability for 
harm caused by defective goods. Finally, the study investigates the likely practical impact of 
section 61 by reviewing judicial, semi-judicial or administrative handling of product liability 
claims in South Africa since introduction of the CPA compared to the experience in foreign 
jurisdictions.   
The study undertakes applied comparative research, which involves critically evaluating the 
differences and similarities between the South African and foreign product liability frameworks 
and drawing conclusions on the theoretical and likely practical impact of strict product liability in 
South Africa. The efficacy of the CPA’s product liability framework is measured against the 
following criteria: (i) the CPA’s legislative purposes (ii) fairness in balancing competing interests 
of consumers and the supply chain (iii) legal certainty, and (iv) flexibility to adapt to a changing 
consumer marketplace and technological advancements.  
It is argued that the legal uncertainty arising from aspects of the CPA’s product liability 
framework can to an extent be remedied by way of purposive interpretation, in so far as this is 
permitted by principles of statutory interpretation, having regard to the legislative policy 
underpinning the CPA and, where appropriate, similar frameworks in foreign legal systems. 
Further, recommendations are made for legislative amendment.   
The study concludes that introduction of strict product liability has been a significant step in the 
right direction in aligning South African consumer law with that of its international trading 
partners and will prompt higher levels of product safety generally. Further, it is likely that section 
61 will increase the number of product liability claims due to the extended scope of liability and 
that the new judicial, semi-judicial and administrative bodies created under the CPA will deal 
with the vast majority of claims. However, it is the duty of the courts and legislature to provide 




Die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming 68 van 2008 (‘CPA’) het skuldlose aanspreeklikheid 
ingevoer vir skade veroorsaak deur defektiewe verbruikersgoedere. Dit behels ‘n radikale 
regshervorming aangesien Suid-Afrikaanse produkaanspreeklikheid voorheen ontwikkel het in 
die vorm van die skuldgebaseerde Aquiliese aksie. Ingevolge artikel 61 van die CPA is 
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vervaardigers, invoerders, verspreiders en kleinhandelaars skuldloos aanspreeklik vir skade 
versoorsaak deur onveilige of defektiewe goedere, produkfalings en onvoldoende waarskuwings 
of instruksies verskaf saam met goedere.  
Dit word geargumenteer dat ‘n statutêre raamwerk vir skuldlose aanspreeklikheid omvattende 
en logies samehangende regulering benodig, wat, ter wille van regsekerheid, so na moontlik 
eenvormig behoort te wees aan die bestaande gemeenregtelike raamwerk. Die CPA se 
raamwerk vir produkaanspreeklikheid bring in verskeie opsigte regsonsekerheid mee.  
Die studie onderneem ‘n regsvergelykende analise van die CPA se raamwerk vir 
produkaanspreeklikheid met verwysing na die gemeenregtelike agtergrond en soortgelyke 
raamwerke in die VSA, EU en Australië, en identifiseer relevante beginsels, gevolgtrekkings en 
reëls as riglyne vir Suid-Afrikaanse howe en regspraktisyns by die interpretasie en toepassing 
van die raamwerk vir produkaanspreeklikheid. Die studie ondersoek ook die mate waarin artikel 
61-aanspreeklikheid die omvang van gemeenregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir skade veroorsaak 
deur defektiewe produkte uitbrei. Ten slotte oorweeg die studie die waarskynlike praktiese 
impak van artikel 61 by wyse van hersiening van judisiële, semi-judisiële en administratiewe 
hantering van produkaanspreeklikheidseise in Suid-Afrika sedert inwerkingtrede van die CPA 
met vergelyking van die ervaring in ander regstelsels.    
Die studie behels toegepaste, regsvergelykende navorsing, en in besonder  ‘n kritiese analise 
van die ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die raamwerke vir produkaanspreeklikheid in Suid-
Afrika en ander regstelsels, op grond waarvan gevolgtrekkings gemaak word rakende die 
teoretiese en waarskynlike praktiese impak van skuldlose produkaanspreeklikheid in Suid-
Afrika. Die effektiwiteit van die CPA se raamwerk vir produkaanspreeklikheid word gemeet aan 
die volgende kriteria: (i) die CPA se wetgewende doelstellings; (ii) billikheid in die balansering 
van kompeterende belange van verbruikers en die voorsienersketting; (iii) regsekerheid; en (iv) 
buigsaamheid om aan te pas by ‘n veranderende verbruikersmark en tegnologiese 
ontwikkeling.   
Die studie voer aan dat die regsonsekerheid wat onstaan uit aspekte van die CPA se raamwerk 
vir produkaanspreeklikheid in ‘n mate reggestel kan word deur ‘n doeldienende interpretasie van 
die raamwerk se bepalings sover die beginsels van statutêre interpretasie dit toelaat, met 
verwysing na die CPA se onderliggende doelstellings en waar gepas, soortgelyke raamwerke in 
ander regstelsels. Sekere wetswysigings word voorgestel.   
Die studie se gevolgtrekking is dat invoering van skuldlose produkaanspreeklikheid ‘n 
belangrike stap was om Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikersreg in lyn te bring met dié van sy 
internasionale handelsvennote en sal lei tot ‘n algemene hoër standaard van produkveiligheid. 
‘n Verder bevinding is dat die aantal produkaanspreeklikheidseise waarskynlik sal vermeerder 
weens die uitgebreide omvang van aanspreeklikheid, en dat die meerderheid van eise 
gehanteer sal word deur die nuwe judisiële, semi-judisiële en administratiewe liggame geskep 
deur die CPA. Dit is egter die plig van die howe en wetgewer om duideliker riglyne aan hierdie 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
On 31 March 2011, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’) came into effect in 
South Africa. According to its Preamble, the CPA has been enacted for the purpose of, 
inter alia, promoting and protecting consumers' economic interests, protecting consumers 
from hazards to their well-being and safety and developing effective means of redress for 
consumers. 
 
One way in which the CPA purports to achieve its legislative purpose is by introducing 
strict liability for the supply of defective consumer goods. Section 61 of the CPA imposes 
strict liability for harm resulting from unsafe goods, a product failure, a defect or hazard in 
any goods, or harm caused due to inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the 
consumer.1 Strict liability is joint and several and may be incurred by a South African 
producer, importer, distributor or retailer while the plaintiff need not establish negligence 
on the part of any of these suppliers.2        
   
Prior to the introduction of the CPA, product liability in South Africa developed under the 
negligence-based law of delict. The introduction of a statutory strict liability regime requires 
comprehensive and logically coherent regulation which should, in the interest of legal 




                                                          
1 Section 61(1). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ (2006) 
Stell LR 17 at 417. 
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1.2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESEARCH AIMS  
1.2.1 Scope of Liability: Different Actions and Concurrence  
Section 2(10) of the CPA provides that: 
“no provision of this Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from 
exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law.”  
 
Further, section 76(1) of the CPA deals with the powers of courts to enforce consumer 
rights under the CPA and provides as follows: 
“In addition to any other order that it may make under this Act or any other law, a 
court considering a matter in terms of this Act may –  
(a)  order a supplier to alter or discontinue any conduct that is inconsistent 
with this Act; 
(b)  make any order specifically contemplated by this Act; and  
(c)  award damages against a supplier for collective injury to all or a class of 
consumers generally, to be paid on any terms or conditions that the 
court considers just and equitable and suitable to achieve the purposes 
of this Act.”        
    
It would appear from these provisions that the statutory remedies afforded by the CPA are 
intended to co-exist with common law remedies and cannot limit or restrict the scope of 
existing common law protection afforded to consumers. If this is the case, it follows that 
liability for damages for harm caused by defective goods may arise from breach of 
contract; and/or delict; and/or section 61 of the CPA, depending on which actions’ legal 
requirements are met. 
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This study aims to establish to what degree strict liability under section 61 of the CPA 
extends the scope of common law liability for consequential damages for harm 
caused by product defects. 
 
This study aims to present a comparative analysis of section 61 and common law 
actions for consequential damages arising from harm caused by product defects. The 
analysis identifies where common law and section 61 liability for consequential damages 
overlap and supplement each other’s scope. The analysis is structured with reference to 
the respective actions’ scope of application, elements or requirements and defences. 
 
Drawing distinctions between legal remedies is of practical relevance where a claimant is 
presented with a choice of actions, in other words, where there is a concurrence of 
actions. For instance, a claimant would need to consider the legal requirements to 
succeed with each action, when the limitation period for each action commences and the 
type or scope of relief available under each action. For purposes of this study, concurrence 
of actions refers to concurrence in the ‘true’ or ‘narrow’ sense, which denotes:  
 concurrence of actions in the same field or area of the law, in this case, the law of 
obligations; 
 concurrence of actions which have a similar goal and consequences, in this case, the 
recovery of consequential damages for harm caused by defective goods; and 
 concurrence of actions between the same persons, in this case, the consumer/user of 
the defective good and the supplier of the defective good.4 
                                                          
4 Van Aswegen Die Sameloop van Eise om Skadevergoeding uit Kontrakbreuk en Delik (1991) 6-7 and 
authorities cited here; Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 63. For South African cases 
involving concurrence of actions in the narrow sense, see, for instance: Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; 
Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A); MEDIA 24 Ltd 
v Grobler 2005 (6) SA 328 (SCA); SM Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 
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1.2.2 Scope of Liability: Interpretation of Section 61 of the CPA  
Regrettably, the current formulation of the section 61-liability provisions creates legal 
uncertainty in a number of respects, particularly as regards the test or standard for product 
defectiveness, the scope of goods that are covered and the extent of damages 
recoverable. The strict liability provisions under the CPA incorporate concepts or 
definitions that are either confusing, redundant or nonsensical. This study aims to 
interpret the strict product liability provisions under the CPA against their common 
law background and with reference to similar provisions in foreign legal systems 
and to offer suggestions for legislative amendment.  
 
The study argues that the interpretation and application of the CPA can be shaped by 
relevant and satisfactory principles, conclusions and rules that have already crystallised in 
Australia, EU and US law. Accordingly, the study aims to provide South African lawyers 
and Courts with detailed and focussed comparative material to assist in the 
interpretation and application of section 61 of the CPA, in addition to existing South 
African literature regarding product liability.  
 
The author has extensive practical experience in product liability litigation as a solicitor in 
the State of Victoria, Australia. Where possible, the study aims to provide useful, practical 
examples of the interpretation and application of federal and state strict product liability 






                                                                                                                                                                                                
1019 (SCA); Pinshaw v Nexus Securities (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 510 (C); Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank Ltd 
2008 (5) SA 630 (SCA). 
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1.2.3 Impact of Wider Liability   
Finally, this study aims to comment on / investigate the likely practical impact of section 
61 on litigated product liability claims in South Africa and the more general impact on 
industry with respect to management of product safety risk and consumer complaints. This 
is done by reviewing the South African experience in judicial, semi-judicial or 
administrative handling of product liability claims since introduction of the CPA and 
comparing this with the experience and trends in foreign legal systems where strict product 
liability has applied for a number of decades.  
 
 
1.3 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH TOPIC 
1.3.1 Strict product liability: A Global phenomenon  
A comparative study conducted in 2003 to assess the degree of uniformity among various 
countries’ product liability regimes, recorded a broad trend worldwide toward greater 
consumer protection.5 The importance of this agenda in many jurisdictions is reflected in 
the creation of a special product liability regime, i.e. an area of law with principles and 
rules differing from general tort or contract.6 The clear majority of countries examined in 
which product liability is recognised as a distinct field, have codified the core elements of 
the subject through special legislation, either in the form of a separate product liability act, 
as a section in a more comprehensive consumer protection act, or a set of special product 
liability rules included in the torts chapter of a civil code.7 
 
 
                                                          
5 Reimann ‘Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?’ (2003) AmJCompL 51 at 751, 759. 
6  760.  
7  761. 
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In the early 1960’s, the principle of strict liability in tort for harm caused by a product defect 
emerged for the first time from a series of judgments in the United States.8 In one of the 
landmark decisions, Greenman v Yuba Power Products Inc, 9 the Supreme Court of 
California imposed a general, strict liability upon the manufacturer in tort even though the 
case was in fact brought as a claim for breach of warranty. The Court acknowledged that:  
“although strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or 
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment 
of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is 
not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, the refusal to permit the 
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products 
make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties 
but by the law of strict liability in tort.”10 
 
In 1965, the American Law Institute subsequently published the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts,11 containing in section 402A a model version of strict tort liability, which was adopted 
by the majority of American jurisdictions at the time.12 This faultless liability was based on 
the central notion of a product reaching the consumer “in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous.”13  
 
In a comment to section 402A, the Restatement (Second) introduced a test for product 
defectiveness, stating that “the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics”. This formulation 
                                                          
8  Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 596. 
9  377 P 2d 897 (1963) 
10 901 (Traynor J). 
11 (1965). 
12 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 598. 
13 Section 402A(1) Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
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was used by many American courts as the basis for applying what came to be known as 
the ‘consumer expectations test.’14   
 
Furthermore, particularly in the context of design defects, courts developed a ‘risk-utility 
defence’, comprising of a weighing of the costs and benefits of product innovation on 
society. Section 402A in its first form essentially represented a strict liability regime, 
tempered with negligence elements and extensive provision for defences.  
 
With the introduction of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in 1998, section 402A was 
replaced by a new formulation of liability which differentiates between manufacturing 
defects, design defects and products which are defective due to inadequate instructions or 
warnings. Pursuant to section 1 of the Restatement, “one who is engaged in the business 
of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect”. Under section 
2(a) to (c) liability is set out separately for each type of defect. Whereas manufacturing 
defects are subject to strict liability, a comment to section 1 of the Restatement 
acknowledges that this not suitable for design defects and failures to warn, therefore the 
law returns to “a reasonableness test traditionally used in determining whether an actor 
has been negligent.” 
 
This re-introduction of negligence elements in United States product liability signifies 
changing policy. Whereas initially, consumer protection was the main driving force for the 
imposition of strict liability, the American regime has become noticeably more conservative 
                                                          
14  Reimann ‘Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?’ (2003) AmJCompL 51 at 713. 
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over the last two decades, seemingly in an effort to increase industry protection against 
allegedly overblown liability rules.15 
 
In Europe, extensive law reform debates during the 1970’s culminated in the adoption by 
the EEC Council of a Directive on Product Liability16 (‘the EU Directive) in 1985. The EU 
Directive introduced strict product liability to the European Community, a move which was 
driven in part by public demands in the aftermath of the Thalidomide tragedy, as well as, 
albeit to a lesser extent, pressure for harmonization of laws within the EEC.17    
 
In terms of article 1, a producer is liable for damage caused by a defect in his product. A 
product will be considered defective under the EU Directive, “when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including 
the presentation of the product, the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the 
product would be put and the time when the product was put into circulation.”18 On face 
value, the EU Directive employs a ‘consumer expectations test’ for determining product 
defectiveness. However, a closer look at the circumstances to be taken into account under 
article 1, such as the ‘reasonably’ expected use and time it was put into circulation, also 
reveals elements resembling a ‘risk-utility’ approach.19  
 
It is argued that consideration of these factors reintroduces elements of negligence to the 
enquiry.20 For example, what could reasonably be expected in the context of product use 
is essentially a question of foreseeability, which arguably reintroduces the concept of 
                                                          
15  Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 600.  
16  (85/374/EEC). 
17  Reimann ‘Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?’ (2003) AmJCompL 51 at 502. 
18  Article 6(1). 
19  Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 601. 
20  Wedderburn ‘The Consumer Protection Act 1987’ (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 614, 617. 
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reasonable care.21 Furthermore, the inclusion of a “development risks defence” in the EU 
Directive, 22  which allows the producer to escape liability by proving that the state of 
knowledge at that time “was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be 
discovered”, diminishes the purported ‘strictness’ of the liability. If this defence is 
interpreted to mean that the person has merely to prove that reasonable care was 
exercised, then liability is no longer being imposed for foreseeable, and unforeseeable 
risks and consequently is not strict.23    
 
Application of a “consumer expectations test” has presented difficulties in foreign 
jurisdictions. It has been extensively criticised in literature mainly because it fails to 
“provide the interpreter with an objective standard against which the safety of a product 
can be assessed.”24 It has been described as “impenetrable to analysis”, given that people 
routinely miscalculate risks; therefore, a legal standard cannot coherently or fairly be 
based on such a volatile standard.25  
 
Nevertheless, the framework provided by the EU Directive, which has been implemented 
by all EU member states in their respective national legal systems, has also served as a 
model for strict product liability regimes in countries across Eastern Europe, the Far East 
and Latin America. 26  South Africa is no exception, with much of the product liability 
provisions of the CPA closely following the wording of the EU Directive and the 
corresponding product liability section of the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987, which 
                                                          
21  Wedderburn ‘The Consumer Protection Act 1987’ (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 614, 617. 
22  Article 7(e) of the Directive gives Member States the option of including this defence. 
23  Stapleton ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ (2000) 
Washburn LJ, 39 at 363, 369. 
24  Clark ‘The Conceptual Basis of Product Liability’ (1985) Modern Law Review, 48 at 325. 
25  Stapleton ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ (2000) 
Washburn Law Journal 39 at 376, 377. 
26  Reimann ‘Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?’ (2003) AmJCompL 51 at 761. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
implements the EU Directive. 27  The alternative approach to this, being a risk-utility 
analysis, seems to be dominant in the United States, although American Courts have often 
combined this approach with a consumer expectations test.28  
 
Regardless of which test is adopted to establish product defectiveness, it is clear that 
foreign strict product liability regimes are not absolutely strict. Reintroduction or retention 
of negligence elements as mentioned above, whether done overtly like the US 
Restatement or more subtly like the EU Directive, raises the question whether the CPA, 
which closely follows the EU Directive model, has truly introduced product liability worthy 
of being labelled “strict”. 
 
1.3.2 The Policy Underlying Strict Product Liability 
The initial move towards strict product liability in tort, as it emerged from American case 
law in the 1960’s, was supported by a number of policy considerations based on notions of 
fairness and economic efficiency. In one of the landmark US product liability decisions, 
Greenman v Yuba Power Products Inc,29 Justice Traynor stressed that manufacturers are 
best placed to absorb the risks of injury and to spread the costs, either by means of 
insurance or by adjusting the prices of their products. This links in with the utilitarian or 
efficiency-based argument in favour of strict liability, namely that: 
“the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those 
who are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution 
of the losses when they do occur...”30     
    
                                                          
27  Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ 
(2006) Stell LR 17 at 413. 
28  769. 
29  377 P2d 897 (1963) 901 (Traynor J). 
30  Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 161 A 2d 69 (1960) 81. 
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It is argued that shifting or allocating the risk of loss to the ‘deep pocket’ manufacturer is 
economically and morally justified given that the loss could be catastrophic to the 
individual consumer.31 
 
Given that the ultimate consumer or end user of a product is rarely able to fully analyse a 
product’s safety and therefore necessarily trusts that it will not be hazardous, it is in the 
general interest of public protection that the manufacturer bear the risk of injury.32  
 
Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs who were clearly harmed by defective products to prove 
negligence on the part of the manufacturer in many cases presents an insurmountable 
obstacle to obtaining redress. It was reasoned that strict liability would assist plaintiffs in 
circumstances where proof of negligence and establishing causation would be difficult or 
impossible.   
 
It was further reasoned by American courts that strict liability would lead to increased 
product safety given that manufacturers, faced with the risk of strict liability, would take 
additional precautions at the various stages of the production process.33 In other words, 
strict liability would provide an incentive for collective investment in improved product 
safety. 
 
The rationale for strict product liability as a means of increasing consumer protection can 
also be supported by an argument based in behavioural economics, namely that 
consumers or product users systematically make judgement errors and suboptimal 
                                                          
31  Stapleton ‘Product Liability (1994) 93-94. 
32  Jacob E. Decker & Sons v Capps 164 SW 2d 828, 829 (1942). 
33   Philips v Kimwood Machine Co, 525 P 2d 1033, 1041-2 (1974). This view is also put forth in an 
explanatory comment on the Restatement (Third) on Torts: Product Liability, which states that a strict 
liability regime creates stronger safety incentives than a fault-based system, under which sellers may in 
some cases escape liability for their harmful products. 
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decisions when assessing product risks and using products. Behavioural economics, a 
field which “combines cognitive psychology and experimental economics in its empirical 
approach to human decision making”, has impacted significantly on legal theory in the last 
two decades.34 While an in depth discussion of this field is beyond the scope of this study, 
it is necessary to provide a brief overview of some of the key cognitive biases and 
heuristics identified in this field that seek to explain or predict how consumers make 
decisions. 
 
The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ refers to cognitive biases such as judgement errors 
and biased perceptions, which depart from the so-called ‘rational choice theory’ in 
economics. In short, it recognises that persons take certain shortcuts in their reasoning 
that could lead to suboptimal decision-making. The leading theoretical formulation of 
bounded rationality is ‘Prospect Theory’,35 which puts forward the following key insights:36 
 
 Decisions are made based on a reference point. In other words, persons would not 
measure total welfare levels, rather relative changes in the status quo.  
 When persons consider whether to risk a loss for the chance of a gain, the potential 
losses are weighted more heavily than the potential gains.  
 Persons are risk averse when choosing between gains and risk seeking between 
losses.  
 Persons tend to under-weigh large probabilities and overweigh small probabilities.  
 
                                                          
34  Hacker ‘More behavioural vs more economic approach: explaining the behavioral divide between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2016) Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39 at 359. 
35  Kahnemann & Tversky ‘Prospect theory, an analysis of decision under risk’ (1979) Econometrica 47 at 
263. 
36  Hacker ‘More behavioural vs more economic approach: explaining the behavioral divide between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2016) Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39: at 360. 
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Other relevant decision-making biases identified under bounded rationality theory include 
optimism bias, confirmation bias and the availability heuristic.37 Optimism bias refers to a 
cognitive bias whereby persons believe they are less exposed to the risk of a negative 
event happening to them compared to others.38 Confirmation bias refers to a cognitive bias 
which causes a person to search for, interpret, favour and remember information in a way 
that confirms that person’s existing beliefs or views, while giving relatively less 
consideration to alternative possibilities. 39  The availability heuristic refers to a mental 
shortcut whereby a person relies on immediate examples that come to the person’s mind 
when assessing a certain topic or decision, which may lead to a tendency to base 
decisions heavily on more recent information.40 
 
The concept of ‘bounded willpower’ refers to the incapacity of persons to adhere to their 
own plans.41 At the moment of decision-making, persons often exhibit what is referred to 
as a ‘present bias’ which causes persons to act in favour of immediate gratification rather 
than longer term maximisation.42 
 
The notion of ‘bounded self-interest’ refers to a departure from the assumption that 
persons’ economic behaviour is only driven by self-interest. 43  Experimental economic 
studies have shown that persons are also driven by ‘other-regarding’ norms such as 
fairness and would make monetary sacrifices in order to enforce those norms.44  
                                                          
37  Ibid.  
38  O’Sullivan ‘The neural basis of always looking on the bright side’ Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and 
Neuro Sciences 8(1) at 12. 
39  Plous The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (1993) 223. 
40  Esgate & Groome An Introduction to Applied Cognitive Psychology (2005) 201. 
41  Sunstein Behavioural Law and Economics (2000) 15. 
42   Hacker ‘More behavioural vs more economic approach: explaining the behavioral divide between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2016) Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39 at 361. 
43   Sunstein Behavioural Law and Economics (2000) 16. 
44   Hacker ‘More behavioural vs more economic approach: explaining the behavioral divide between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2016) Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39 at 361. 
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The concept of ‘cognitive capacity limits’ recognise that persons have limited capacity to 
process any amount of information in a given time and not all information persons are 
confronted with will enter their working memory.45 According to this concept, when all 
cognitive channels of information processing are used, any further information results in 
information overload, which leads to a marked deterioration in the quality of a person’s 
decisions. 46  Further, limited working memory can also be linked to persons’ limited 
capacity to pay attention to everything around them. It is also recognised that persons 
often have unlimited faith in their attention capabilities, creating an illusion of attentiveness 
and control.47    
 
In the context of product liability and consumer protection, the question is whether these 
cognitive biases and heuristics are more likely to cause consumers to accurately estimate, 
over-estimate, or under-estimate the safety or risks posed by products. If consumers 
systematically underestimate product risks, then product safety levels produced by an 
unregulated market cannot be trusted to reflect desired levels of investment in product risk 
reduction. In other words, the law has to intervene to ensure that consumers are 
adequately protected against themselves. 
 
While consumer decision-making biases and heuristics are relevant in analysing the 
efficacy of any consumer protection instrument, their use in the analysis ought to be 
qualified. It is argued that importing the identified biases and cognitive limits into legal 
analysis requires a further level of justification given the intrinsic uncertainty of the results 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
45   361-362. 
46   Eppler & Mengis ‘The Concept of Information Overload: A review of literature from organisation science, 
accounting, marketing MIS and related disciplines’ (2004) Info. Soc’y 325,326; Edmunds & Morris ‘The 
Problem of Information Overload in Business Organizations: a review of literature’ (2000) International 
Journal of Information Management 20 at 17, 19.  
47   Chabris & Simons The Invisible Gorilla: And other ways our intuition deceives us (2010) 7. 
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of empirical studies.48 The reason for this is that almost every empirical study showing a 
bias in one direction can be opposed by a study that found a bias to the contrary.49 
Further, it is uncertain how the many biases and heuristics would interact which means it is 
often very difficult or impossible to predict how persons would be biased in a particular 
case and if so, in what way.50   
 
The spread of strict product liability around the world was indicative of a general move 
towards greater consumer protection. However, in the eighties and nineties, the United 
States began to experience mounting pressure to increase industry protection.51 Courts 
began to take a more restrictive view on manufacturers’ liability and moved away from high 
damages awards of their own accord.52 
 
A number of arguments for abandoning strict product liability and returning to a type of 
modified or ‘stricter’ negligence standard have been raised in literature.53 For instance, it is 
questioned whether manufacturers are truly best positioned in all cases to assess the risks 
of their products. Some risks simply cannot be avoided, which is often the case with latent 
design defects. It follows that, if a manufacturer knows he will be held strictly liable for any 
harm caused by his product, he may be inclined to take excessive precautions and load 
prices to such an extent that he is forced out of the market or discouraged from developing 
                                                          
48   Hacker ‘More behavioural vs more economic approach: explaining the behavioral divide between the 
United States and the European Union’ (2016) Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 39: at 363, citing Rizzo & 
Whitman ‘The knowledge problem of New Paternalism’ (2009) BYU L. Rev. 905; Klass & Zeiler ‘Against 
endowment theory: experimental economics and legal scholarship’ (2013) UCLA L. Rev. 2 at 61; 
Schwartz ‘Regulating for Rationality’ (2015) Stan. L. Rev. 67 at 1373. 
49   363, citing Rizzo & Whitman ‘The knowledge problem of New Paternalism’ (2009) BYU L. Rev. at 951-
955. 
50   364. 
51  Reimann ‘Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?’ (2003) AmJCompL 51 at 760. 
52  Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 606. 
53   606-607. 
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new products.54 In other words, strict product liability may not only stifle innovation but 
result in reduced access to consumer goods. In the South African context, overregulation 
of certain consumer goods may prevent a large proportion of disadvantaged consumers 
from accessing those goods.  
 
It is further argued that, from an insurance perspective, manufacturers are not always best 
positioned to evaluate specific risks and take out the appropriate insurance cover for those 
risks. 55  For instance, in the case of property damage, the consumer who owns that 
property has more information regarding the value and use of the property to enable him to 
take out appropriate insurance cover for that property. Strict product liability would require 
manufacturers to take out third party liability insurance while household property would 
often be covered by first party insurance, which leads to an unnecessary and wasteful 
double insurance of the property damage loss.56 This criticism is however limited to the 
case of property damage and in practice, the first party insurer can often recover an 
amount paid out by it from the manufacturer’s liability insurer by way of a subrogated claim 
where it is established that the property damage was caused by a product defect.   
 
Despite these criticisms, the policy considerations and arguments in support of strict 
product liability provide a strong justification for the imposition of such liability, reflected in 




                                                          
54  Hodges ‘Development risks: unanswered questions’ (1998) 61 MLR 560. 
55  Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 606-607. 
56  607. 
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1.3.3 The Move Towards Strict Product Liability in South Africa 
In 2003 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Wagener & Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd,57 a case 
involving a defective batch of a pharmaceutical product, confirmed the application of the 
fault-based product liability principles as developed under the law of delict. 
Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the manufacturer had wrongfully caused harm 
by selling the defective products, it declined to hold the manufacturer liable without proof of 
fault. Once again, the difficulty of proving negligence in the manufacturing of complex 
products such as pharmaceuticals was evident. 
 
The plaintiffs argued that South African law had reached a stage where product liability 
should be developed in line with the strict liability regimes prevailing in American and 
European jurisdictions. The court carefully considered the arguments presented in favour 
of developing the common law. However, following the failure of the appellants to 
demonstrate the case for strict liability based on suggested inadequacy of the Aquilian 
remedy,58 the Court concluded: 
“as to the argument that strict liability had to be imposed for commercial reasons, 
that it was preferable that this should be done by way of legislation after due 
Parliamentary process and investigation so as to produce a comprehensive set of 
principles, rules and procedure. Single instances of litigation could not possibly 
provide for the depth and breadth of investigation, analysis and determination 
necessary to produce, for use across the manufacturing industry, a cohesive and 
effective structure by which to impose strict liability.”59 
 
                                                          
57   2003 4 SA 285 (SCA). 
58  Par 24. 
59  Par 26, 37. 
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The Court voiced its concern regarding judicial law-making in this complex field by listing a 
number of important aspects pertaining to a strict product liability system which would 
have to be addressed by the Legislature, a body far more equipped to do so, including: 
“1. What products should be included (or perhaps it is easier to specify what 
should be excluded) when it comes to determining the extent of the liability? 
 
2.  Is a manufacturer to include X, the maker of a component that is part of the 
whole article manufactured by Y; and which is liable if the component is 
defective?  
 
3. Does defect mean defect in the making process only or, in the case of a 
designed article, also a defect of design? Should it include the failure, 
adequately or at all, to warn of possible harmful results?  
 
4. Should the liability be confined to products intended for marketing without 
inspection or extend even to cases where the manufacturer does, or is legally 
obliged to, exercise strict quality control?  
 
5.  What relevance should the packaging have - should liability, for example, be 
limited to cases where the packaging precludes intermediate examination or 
extend to cases where the manufacturer stipulates that a right such as a 
guarantee would be forfeited if intermediate examination were made?  
 
6. Is a product defective if used innocuously on its own, but which causes 
damage when used in combination with another's product?  
 
7. What defences should be available?”60  
 
 
Following the Wagener61 judgment, it was clear that the time had indeed come for product 
liability reform in South Africa. In addition to the general arguments in favour of strict 
product liability relating to economic efficiency, fairness, and collective investment in 
                                                          
60 [35]. 
61 Wagener & Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 4 SA 285 (SCA). 
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product safety, discussed above in 1.3.2, further arguments in the particular context of 
South Africa included the following:62 
  
 The sophisticated state of the South African manufacturing industry justifies the 
imposition of strict liability for defective products, regardless of whether a contractual 
relationship exists between the consumer and the manufacturer. 
 
 Manufacturers who produce and circulate potentially harmful products on a large scale 
via intermediaries such as distributors and retailers, are not held strictly liable, whereas 
individual craftspeople who produce limited amounts of goods are held strictly liable.  
 
 The fact that the vast majority of South African manufacturers do not sell directly to the 
public means that the strict liability of manufacturers for consequential damages due to 
latent product defects, as developed at common law in Kroonstad v Westelike Boere 
Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha & Anor, 63  would not be available to many 
consumers. 
 
 Increasing commercial pressure from South Africa's global trading partners, who have 
introduced strict product liability, to align with international product liability trends. 
 
Finally, it was argued that notions of fairness and justice, which are emphasised by the 
Constitution of South Africa, may form the basis for the development of “new boni mores to 
assist the development of the common law to protect vulnerable consumers against 
dangerous or defective products, by imposing strict liability on manufacturers for 
consequential damages irrespective of privity of contract.”64 
                                                          
62  McQuoid-Mason Consumer Law in South Africa (1997) 108-110. 
63  1964 (3) SA 561 (A). 
64  McQuoid-Mason Consumer Law in South Africa (1997) 109. 
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These policy considerations and arguments ultimately became the driving forces for the 
introduction of strict product liability in South Africa.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
1.4.1 Applied comparative research 
This study is conducted by way of applied comparative research, which involves (a) 
critically evaluating the differences and similarities between the South African and foreign 
strict product liability frameworks and (b) drawing objective conclusions with respect to the 
theoretical and likely practical impact of strict product liability in South Africa.  
           
When conducting comparative research, it is important to remain cognisant of the 
fundamental differences between legal systems, such as the economic and political policy 
considerations that have shaped legislative regimes in those jurisdictions and foreign 
courts’ approach to statutory interpretation and judicial law-making. It may not always be 
as simple as merely transplanting concepts and developments in foreign jurisdictions into 
South African law. However, comparative research nevertheless provides valuable 
guidance to South African courts in the interpretation of a new statutory regime, 
particularly where that regime creates legal uncertainty in some respects and foreign 
jurisdictions have decades of experience in applying similar regimes, as is the case with 
strict product liability.   
 
 
Given that the South African legal system has elements of both the Roman/Germanic/civil 
law systems and Anglo/American or common law systems, comparative research involving 
systems from both legal families would be useful in gaining a better understanding of the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 27 
strict product liability regime introduced by the CPA and would contribute to a sensible 
development of South African product liability law.  
 
 
The study examines strict product liability in Australia and the US, as representative of the 
approach followed in common law legal systems. Examination of strict product liability in 
civil legal systems focuses on the EU Directive65 and the national laws of selected EU 
member states that have implementing the EU Directive, in particular, the United Kingdom 
and Germany. The United Kingdom, being a common law legal system bound to 
implement the EU Directive, serves as a unique comparator.66   
 
The comparative legal material provided throughout the study is supplemented with 
practical examples drawn from the author’s own experience. As noted above, the author 
has extensive practical experience in product liability litigation as a solicitor in the State of 
Victoria, Australia.           
   
1.4.2 Theories of statutory interpretation 
The analysis of the strict liability provisions under the CPA requires an understanding of 
the established principles or theories of statutory interpretation in South Africa. Whilst a 
comprehensive review of these theories is beyond the scope of this study, it is necessary 
to briefly reference the main theories of statutory interpretation recognised and the main 
approaches to statutory interpretation followed by South African courts. Importantly, the 
principles of statutory interpretation also provide guidance as to when it would be 
appropriate to consider comparative research and the limitations of using foreign 
comparators to inform South African legislative instruments.  
                                                          
65   85/374/EEC. 
66   As at the date of submission of this dissertation, the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the European 
Union has not had any effect on the United Kingdom’s obligations in respect of the EU Directive.  
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According to the literalist approach, the focus in determining the legislature’s intention 
ought to be primarily on the literal meaning of the provision. 67  The primary rule of 
interpretation is that, if the plain meaning of the wording is clear, that meaning should be 
equated to the legislature’s intention and should be given effect to (‘the plain meaning 
approach’).68 If the plain meaning of the wording is ambiguous, vague or misleading, or if a 
strict literal interpretation would result in absurd results, then courts may deviate from the 
literal meaning to avoid an absurdity (‘the golden rule’).69 As noted by Innes J in his classic 
formulation of the golden rule in Venter v R,70 “the context and such other considerations 
as the Court is justified to take into account” may warrant deviation from the literal 
meaning of a legislative provision. Arguably, the judge’s reference to “such other 
considerations” may include reference to comparative research to provide guidance as to 
the sensible interpretation of a provision and the likely intention of the legislature, however, 
this would admittedly be a last resort under a strict literalist approach. It is worth noting that 
courts have been slow to find that legislative provisions are ‘absurd’.71  
 
A pure literalist approach leaves very little room for judicial law making as courts are seen 
as merely mechanical interpreters of legislative provisions, to the exclusion of 
consideration of other aspects which may assist in clarifying the intention of the 
legislature.72 Despite these criticisms, the majority of courts still follow the ‘plain meaning’ 
                                                          
67  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 93; 102. 
68  103-4 and various authorities cited there. 
69  The classic formulation of this rule is found in Venter v R 1907 TS 910 914-915 and has been repeatedly 
confirmed by courts subsequently. 
70  Venter v R 1907 TS 910. 
71  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 104 citing for example: Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd 
v Distillers Corp (SA) Ltd 1962 1 SA 458 (A); Bolo v Royal Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1969 3 SA 102 (E); 
Sobukwe v Minister of Justice 1972 1 SA 693 (A).  
72   Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 93; 103-105. 
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approach. In Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd73 the court 
held that, while the intention of the legislature is the primary rule of interpretation,  
“…it must be accepted that the literal interpretation principle is firmly entrenched in 
our law and I do not seek to challenge it.”74 
 
According to the purposive approach, the purpose or object of the legislation is the 
prevailing factor in the interpretive process.75 The approach allows for the context of the 
legislation, including socio-economic factors and underlying policy, to be taken into 
account in determining the purpose of the legislation. 76  The purposive approach 
incorporates the so-called ‘mischief rule’ according to which the purpose of legislation is to 
suppress mischief. This rule requires courts to consider four questions: 
 What was the common law position prior to the legislation? 
 What mischief or defect was not provided for by the common law? 
 What remedy has the legislature chosen to address the mischief or defect not 
addressed by the common law? 
 What is the true reason for the remedy provided by the legislation?77 
 
Closely linked to purposivism is contextualism, pursuant to which it is argued that the 
purpose of a provision can only be determined by looking at it in context.78 In University of 
                                                          
73  1990 (1) SA  
74   At 944A. See also Swanepoel v Johannesburg City Council, President Insurance Company Limited v 
Kruger[1994] ZASCA 80; 1994 (3) SA 789 (AD) at 6 where the court again expressed support for the 
literal approach, stating that: “…these rules of statutory exegesis are intended as aids in resolving any 
doubts as to the Legislature’s true intention. Where this intention is proclaimed in clear terms either 
expressly or by necessary implication, the assistance of these rules need not be sought.” 
75   Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 96. 
76   115. 
77   Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 (1) SA 842 (A) 852-853; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000) at 247.  
78   Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 97. 
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Cape Town v Cape Town Bar Council,79 Rabie CJ held that the court has to examine all 
the contextual factors in determining the legislature’s intention, irrespective of whether or 
not the words are clear and unambiguous. 80  Relevant contextual factors may include 
looking at the language of the entire provision and the entire statute, as well as the 
statute’s matter, its apparent purpose and scope and its background.81 The purposive 
approach arguably provides greater scope for courts to seek guidance from comparative 
research in order to give context to the remedy chosen by the South African legislature to 
address the mischief and the true reason for that remedy, especially where a very similar 
remedy has been enacted in a foreign jurisdiction. However, as noted above at 1.4.1, 
comparative research should be treated carefully as foreign law is a product of policy 
considerations and legal traditions peculiar to that foreign jurisdiction and may be 
misleading when applied without qualification in the South African context. 
 
 
The purposive approach allows courts to modify or adapt the initial meaning of the 
legislative text to harmonise it with the purpose of the legislation.82 In other words, the role 
of the courts is more flexible and they are not merely mechanical interpreters of the 
legislation.  
 
Although case law shows that South African courts’ approaches to statutory interpretation 
vary from a narrow, literalist approach to broader purposivism, depending on the facts of 
the case and the legislation under consideration, the prevailing judicial approach to 
statutory interpretation in South Africa appears to be what is termed the ‘literalist-cum-
                                                          
79  [1986] ZASCA 86. 
80  At 18. 
81  Jaga v Dönges; Bhana v Dönges, NO & Another 1950 (4) SA 653 at 662G-H; S v Nel 1987 4 SA 276 (O) 
290F-J. 
82  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 97. 
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intentionalist’ approach. 83  According to this approach, the true aim of statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and that the legislature meant 
to express its intention in the language of the provision. It is considered that the intention 
of the legislature can be determined by interpreting the language of a provision and that 
the “words must be attributed their ordinary, literal, grammatical meaning.”84  
 
While the purposive approach is recognised by courts as an accepted method of statutory 
interpretation, courts have made it clear that it is only appropriate where the language 
used in the provision lets the interpreter down,85 in other words, where it is unclear or 
ambiguous. In Standard Bank Investment Corporation v Competition Commission and 
Others, Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Competition Commission and Others86 the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal did not reject the purposive method of 
interpretation, but held that it was not necessary in the particular case given that the 
language of the relevant statutory provision was clear.  
 
As discussed later in this study, the CPA contains a number of interpretation provisions 
suggestive of a purposive approach.87 These provisions should be considered in light of 
the prevailing approaches taken by South African courts to statutory interpretation 





                                                          
83 106-107. 
84 Randburg Town Council v Kerksay Investments (Pty) Ltd 1998 1 SA 98 (SCA) 107A-B.  
85 Goldberg v P J Joubert Ltd 1960 1 SA 521 (T) 523D. 
86 [2000] ZASCA 20; 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA). 
87 See 4.1.2 below. 
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1.4.3 Criteria for evaluating efficacy of the CPA’s strict product liability framework 
In light of the policy considerations underlying consumer protection instruments and strict 
product liability in particular, as discussed above at 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, this study evaluates 
the efficacy of the strict product liability framework introduced by the CPA against the 
following criteria:           
  
 Does the framework achieve the underlying legislative purposes of the CPA including 
the promotion of consumer protection and consumer access to redress?  
o Does the framework assist plaintiffs in obtaining redress by alleviating the burden 
of proof in establishing liability against manufacturers and suppliers of defective 
products? 
o In defining the standard for product defectiveness, does the framework properly 
take into account the cognitive biases and heuristics of consumers when choosing 
products, interpreting instructions/warnings and forming expectations regarding a 
product’s safety. For instance, does the framework take into account the effects of 
bounded rationality and cognitive capacity limits on the efficacy of mandatory 
product warnings and disclosures?  
o Is the framework likely to result in a greater collective investment by the supply 
chain in product safety? In other words, will the framework create a general 
incentive to the supply chain to review and improve its manufacturing and quality 
control processes so as to increase overall product safety levels? 
 
 Does section 61 strike a fair balance between competing interests of consumers and 
the supply chain? 
o In answering this question, the policy directive of increasing consumer protection 
must be weighed up against the potential effects of overregulation, such as stifling 
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of innovation and overinvestment in safety, resulting in reduced consumer access 
to certain goods.  
o Does the framework provide for a fair apportionment of liability between 
manufacturers and non-manufacturing suppliers, such as retailers or distributors, 
of defective products? 
 
 Does the framework provide adequate legal certainty to consumers, the supply chain 
and courts? 
o Applying the prevailing theories of statutory interpretation in South Africa, does the 
framework provide sufficient clarity as to all of its key elements, such as the scope 
of goods covered, potential claimants and defendants, when goods are considered 
defective, the type of harm covered, the defences available and what damages are 
recoverable?  
 
 Does the framework provide adequate flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing 
consumer marketplace and technological advancements resulting in new products, new 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
At common law, harm caused by a product defect may give rise to various causes of 
action. Depending on the particular facts of the case, a plaintiff may be able to recover 
contractual or delictual damages against a supplier of a defective product, claim 
replacement or repair of the product or a reduction in purchase price. In some instances, 
the facts may give rise to a concurrence of common law actions, providing the plaintiff with 
a choice of remedy.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an outline of the scope of common law liability for 
damages in South Africa, focussed specifically on harm caused by product defects. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive review of the relevant common 
law remedies and their development. Rather, this chapter concentrates on particular 
elements of common law liability for product defects which are important for the future 
interpretation and application of section 61 of the CPA and its implications for 
consequential damages claims. The outline serves as a necessary background for 
purposes of analysing section 61 later in this study.  
 
This chapter aims to offer a more detailed, focussed common law background on product 
liability in South Africa for the specific purpose of analysing section 61, in addition to 
existing South African literature regarding product liability in general.   
 
2.2 CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT DEFECTS 
At common law, contractual liability for the sale of a defective product generally arises on 
the basis of: 
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 breach of a warranty (express or implied warranty) that the product is sold free from 
defects,88 or  
 misrepresentation by the seller that the product is free from defects.89 
 
The defect may relate to the quality of the product, the manufacturing process or design of 
the product, the absence of sufficient warnings as to dangerous features of the product or 
inadequate instructions as to safe and proper use.90 It is of course possible that a product 
may simultaneously have more than one of these deficiencies, for instance, an unsafe 
design feature coupled with inadequate safety warnings or instructions to consumers 
regarding that design feature. 
 
The scope of contractual remedies for product defects is limited by the doctrine of privity of 
contract. The law of contract will only aid the purchaser who stands in a direct contractual 
relationship with the seller of the defective product, whether it be a retailer, distributor, 
importer or the manufacturer of the product.91 This effectively excludes third parties or 
innocent bystanders harmed by the defective goods, for instance, a donee or a member of 
the purchaser’s household.92  
 
Theoretically, there are mechanisms by which breach of warranty may be extended 
beyond its usual scope of application. For example, the rules of agency or the stipulatio 
alteri (agreement for the benefit of a third party) may permit the inference that a 
manufacturer provided a warranty to the ultimate consumer through the distributor or 
                                                          
88  Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease (2014) 195; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and 
Lease (2013) 78. 
89  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014); Loubser & Reid Product 
Liability in South Africa (2012) 23. 
90  Van Niekerk & Schulze The South African Law of International Trade: Selected Topics (2006) 116.  
91  Christie & Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2011) 269. 
92  Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 367; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in 
South Africa (2012) 23-24. 
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retailer, resulting in a contractual relationship between the manufacturer and consumer.93 
However, it should be noted that in practice, these mechanisms are generally of limited 
value to the consumer given that the manufacturer generally determines the scope of the 
warranty it offers with its product.94  
 
Where the person harmed by a product defect stood in a direct contractual relationship 
with the supplier of the product, the common law generally provides the following 
remedies: 
 an action in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty;95 
 an action in delict for pre-contractual misrepresentation;96 
 aedilitian actions for the existence of a latent defect in the product or the seller's false 
pre-contractual statements bearing on the quality of the product.97  
 
2.2.1 Breach of Contract 
2.2.1.1 Express warranties 
Where the parties to a contract of sale expressly agree that the product being sold shall 
possess certain qualities, whether relating to quality, function, durability or other attributes, 
the contract contains an express warranty.98 The seller may also make representations 
                                                          
93  Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 24.  
94  23. 
95  Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease (2014) 195; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and 
Lease (2013) 78. 
96  Bradfield The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 341; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in 
South Africa (2012) 122; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 186. 
97  Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease (2014) 193; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and 
Lease (2013) 80; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 186. 
98  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 372. 
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regarding the product during pre-contractual negotiations with the buyer which, if later 
incorporated into the contract, constitutes such a warranty.99  
 
If the seller delivers a product that lacks or falls short of the stipulated qualities, the 
warranty is breached and the purchaser will have the general remedies for breach of 
contract.100 This may include a claim for a reduction in purchase price, cancellation and 
restitution and contractual damages, including consequential loss. 101  The purchaser’s 
claim for damages pursuant to the actio empti is assessed according to the general 
principles of contractual damages, i.e., to place the purchaser in the same financial 
position that he or she would have been in had the contract been performed properly 
(positive interest).102 Liability for consequential loss is limited by what was reasonably 
foreseeable by the parties at the time of conclusion of the contract.103  
 
A seller is strictly liable for breach of warranty and, as such, it is irrelevant whether the 
seller had taken all reasonable steps to detect or prevent the defect.104 Further, neither 
impossibility at formation of the contract nor supervening impossibility exclude liability for 
breach of warranty.105 
 
In practice, express product warranties incorporated into contracts of sale are usually 
limited to a certain time period following the sale. Express warranties are often also limited 
                                                          
99   Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 186; Loubser & Reid Product liability in 
South Africa (2012) 25. See also below at 2.2.2 for discussion of misrepresentation.  
100  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in LAWSA 3 ed (2014) 372; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in 
South Africa (2016) 186; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 78; 
Mackeurtan Mackeurtan’s Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984) 160. 
101  Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 198-199; 200-201; Mackeurtan Mackeurtan’s Sale of Goods in 
South Africa (1984) 160. See generally, Christie’s Law of Contract (2011) chapters 13, 14.   
102  Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 642; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of 
the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 78; Mackeurtan Mackeurtan’s Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984) 
160. See generally, Christie’s Law of Contract (2011) chapters 13, 14.  
103   Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 651-655; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law 
of Contract in South Africa (2012) 338. 
104  Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 25. 
105  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 372. 
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to certain aspects of a product, for instance, a “warranty on parts and accessories only.” 
Further, reliance on product warranties would generally be excluded in cases where the 
product has been damaged by misuse or negligence of the purchaser or another person 
after the product left the seller’s control. With the exception of contracts of sale where the 
buyer and seller negotiated the terms, most consumer products that come with an express 
product warranty would have a carefully worded warranty that is limited in scope as it is 
determined solely by the party providing that warranty. 
 
In addition to the general remedies for breach of a contractual term relating to the quality 
of the product, the purchaser may also have aedilitian remedies where the seller made a 
false pre-contractual statement bearing on the quality of the product or sold the product 
with a latent defect. 106  The aedilitian remedies allow the purchaser, in appropriate 
circumstances, to claim cancellation and restitution or a reduction in the purchase price.107  
 
2.2.1.2 Implied warranties 
Where a seller did not expressly warrant that the product shall possess certain qualities, 
the seller may nevertheless be bound by an implied warranty term to that effect. 
Warranties may be implied into a contract of sale from the express terms and the facts 
surrounding the agreement between the purchaser and seller (tacit terms), by custom or 
trade usage or by operation of law (ex lege).108   
 
                                                          
106 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 193, 208; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2016) 344; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 80. See also, 
discussion of the aedilitian remedies below at 2.2.3.  
107 Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 80. 
108 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 358; Hutchison & Pretorius 
The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 244; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 
(2016) 186 – 205. 
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A tacit term is a term that the purchaser and seller did not expressly agree upon, but which 
they both understood to form part of their contract.109 A discussion of the various tests 
applied by courts in determining whether a term may be implied into a contract is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, it is important to note that courts are generally slow to 
read a tacit term into a contract and would only do so where it is “necessary to give 
efficacy to the contract”110  and where the implied term is capable of clear and exact 
formulation.111 Purchasers may of course be prevented from seeking to rely on an implied 
warranty where the written terms of the contract of sale prevents any terms as to the 
quality of the product, other than the express terms, to be implied.  
 
A warranty may be implied by common law or statute into contracts generally or into all 
contracts of a specific class and is a binding naturalium of the contract, unless varied or 
excluded by the parties.112 Variation or exclusion of an ex lege term is generally permitted, 
subject to certain statutory exceptions.113 Of particular importance in the context of product 
liability are certain residual obligations of a seller implied into contracts of sale by the 
common law, namely:    
“…to warrant that the product is fit for its common use, or, in appropriate 
circumstances, to warrant that the product is suitable for the specific purpose for 
which it was sold, and to ‘warrant’ against latent defects in the product.”114  
 
If, for instance, the seller of a defective product warranted to the buyer that the product 
was free of latent defects and such a defect caused the buyer harm, the buyer may have a 
                                                          
109   Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 247. 
110  Reigate v Union Manufacturing (Ramsbottom) [1918] 1 KB 592 (CA) at 605. See also: Alfred McAlpine & 
Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration [1974] 3 All SA 497, 1974 (3) SA 506 (A). 
111  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 372; Bradfield Christie’s 
The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 203-204 and the authorities cited there.  
112  Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 237.  
113  244-245. 
114  Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 67.  
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cause of action against that seller for breach of contractual warranty as well as a delictual 
claim for damages. In practice, sellers often exclude this warranty against latent defects by 
including a so-called voetstoots clause in the contract of sale.115  
 
Where a seller delivers a defective product in breach of one or more of the implied 
common law warranties, the purchaser will have the general remedies for breach of a 
contract of sale pursuant to the actio empti.116 If the product is sold with a latent defect or 
the seller makes false statements regarding the quality of the product prior to the sale 
(dictum et promissum), the purchaser may also invoke the aedilitian remedies.117 
 
Warranties may also be implied into contracts by statute. In what has been described as 
“the most expansive legislative incursion into the law of contract so far“118 the CPA has 
introduced a range of new implied terms into contracts and has reduced the circumstances 
in which parties may exclude these statutorily implied terms and those implied by common 
law.119  
 
2.2.1.3 Remedies for Breach of Contract  
Where a seller performs pursuant to a contract of sale by delivering a product in a 
defective condition, the seller commits breach of contract in the form of positive 
malperformance. 120  The remedies for positive malperformance are aimed at either 
                                                          
115    See discussion at 2.2.1.4 below. 
116    Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 195, 198-199; 200-201; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of 
the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 67.  
117   Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 193, 208; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2016) 344; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 80. See also, 
discussion of the aedilitian remedies below at 2.2.3.  
118    Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 246. 
119    For an overview of statutory warranties implied by the CPA that are relevant to this study, see 4.1.3 
below. 
120    Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 404; Bradfield Christie’s 
The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 585; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2012) 294. 
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rescission or fulfilment of the contract.121 Regardless of whether the purchaser elects to 
rescind or affirm the contract, he or she may be entitled to claim consequential damages 
for loss suffered due to the breach.122  
 
2.2.1.3(i) Rescission 
The purchaser may rescind the contract of sale if a cancellation clause in the contract 
permits him or her to do so for that particular type or degree of malperformance, whether 
serious or not.123 Where the contract of sale does not contain a cancellation clause, the 
purchaser is only entitled to rescind if, in light of the nature of the product sold, the defect 
is sufficiently serious.124 In essence, the purchaser’s right to rescind arises “only if the 
breach is so serious that one cannot reasonably expect him or her to abide by the contract 
and be satisfied with damages alone.”125 
 
A review of the authorities regarding the question of when a breach is considered material 
enough to justify cancellation of a contract is beyond the scope of this study. However, it 
should be noted that materiality of the breach is essentially a value judgment by the court  
involving a balancing act of the competing interests of the contracting parties in order to 
treat them fairly in the circumstances.126 In other words, in the context of the sale of a 
defective product, a purchaser would not necessarily be entitled to claim cancellation of 
                                                          
121 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 405, 407; Hutchison & 
Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 294; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in 
South Africa (2016) 616. 
122 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 149-152; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2012) 297. 
123 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 607; Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Maroun 1973 (3) SA 779 (A). 
124 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 295-6. Case law provides numerous 
formulations of the test to measure the degree or seriousness of the defect in performance. The test is 
objective and involves a value judgment by the court, taking into consideration the competing interests of 
the seller and purchaser, what is reasonable and fair in the circumstances and the fact that rescission is 
an extraordinary remedy. See also: De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
(1992) 179. 
125  Singh v McCarthy Retail Ltd t/a McIntosh Motors 2000 (4) SA 795 (SCA) 803 at [12], [15]. 
126  [15]. 
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the contract. The purchaser would have to satisfy the court that the product defect 
breaches a term which “goes to the root of the contract”.127   
 
2.2.1.3(ii) Fulfilment of the contract 
Where the defect in the product sold is not sufficiently serious to entitle the purchaser to 
rescission or where the purchaser does not wish to rescind the contract, the purchaser can 
elect one of the following remedies: 
 
 The purchaser accepts the defective product as partial performance and claims, as 
fulfilment of the contract, damages for the difference between the value of the defective 
product supplied and the value of the product without a defect.  
 
 The purchaser rejects the defective product and claims performance of a defect-free 
product (specific performance), alternatively damages in lieu of specific performance 
(surrogate damages).128 
 
Damages in lieu of performance (surrogate damages) should be distinguished here from 
damages awarded for any consequential loss resulting from a breach of contract. For 
instance, a buyer of a defective product that caused harm to that buyer’s person or 
property may be able to claim delivery of a defect-free product or damages to the value of 
a defect-free product and in addition, damages for the consequential harm caused by the 
                                                          
127 Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun 1973 (3) SA 779 (A) 784. 
128 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 405; Hutchison & Pretorius 
The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 296. See cases cited in De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1992) at 178. 
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product. However, both types of contractual damages are assessed according to the same 
general principles for contractual damages,129 which are discussed below at 2.2.1.3(iii). 
 
2.2.1.3(iii) Damages 
In addition to rescission or specific performance of the contract, the purchaser of a 
defective product may claim damages for any financial loss, including consequential loss, 
resulting from the breach. 130  Contractual damages are measured according to the 
purchaser’s positive or expectation interest (positive interesse). 131  The purpose of 
contractual damages is to place the purchaser, as far as possible, in the position they 
would have been had the contract been properly performed.132  
 
In order to claim contractual damages, a purchaser of a defective product will have to 
satisfy the following requirements:133 
 the seller breached the contract of sale by delivering a defective product; 
 the purchaser suffered financial or patrimonial loss; 
 there is a factual causal link between the breach and the loss suffered; 
 there is a legal causal link, i.e. the loss is not too remote from the breach. 
 
                                                          
129 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 198-199; 200-201; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law 
of Sale and Lease (2013) 67; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 296. 
130 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 418. 
131 Minister van Landbou-tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A). See also generally: Lubbe ‘The 
assessment of loss upon cancellation for breach of contract’ (1984) SALJ 101 at 616; Hutchison ‘Back to 
basics: reliance damages for breach of contract revisited’ (2004) 121 SALJ 51. 
132 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 642; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of 
Contract in South Africa (2012) 331. See also e.g. Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated 
Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 at 22; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 
(3) SA 670 (A) 687. The law is unsettled as to what is covered by positive interest. Case law shows a 
tendency at times to associate loss of profit from the transaction (expectation loss) with a contractual claim 
and out-of-pocket expenses (reliance loss) with a delictual claim. However, it is argued that a claim for 
positive interest should enable the purchase to recover for both loss of profit from the transaction as well as 
any expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. See discussion in Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract 
in South Africa (2016) 642 - 647. See also: Tweedie v Park Travel Agency (Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) 
SA 802 (W) 808-9.  
133  Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 334. 
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The factual causation requirement is determined by means of the conditio sine qua non or 
‘but for’ test.134 If, but for the seller’s breach in supplying a defective product, the purchaser 
would not have suffered the loss, there is a factual causal link between the breach and 
loss. A purchaser of a defective product would have to prove this link on a balance of 
probabilities.135 
 
The legal causation requirement queries whether the causal connection between the 
breach and loss is close enough to justify contractual liability.136 The distinction between 
general damages and special damages is relevant here, as explained by Corbett CJ in 
Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd: 
“To ensure that undue hardship is not imposed on the defaulting party…the 
defaulting party's liability is limited in terms of broad principles of causation and 
remoteness, to (a) those damages that flow naturally and generally from the kind 
of breach in question and which the law presumes the parties contemplated as a 
probable result of the breach, and (b) those damages that, although caused by the 
breach of contract, are ordinarily regarded by the law as being too remote to be 
recoverable unless, in the special circumstances attending the conclusion of the 
contract, the parties actually or presumptively contemplated that they would 
probably result from the breach.” 137 
 
Applying the above distinction in the context of sale of a defective product, a purchaser 
who incurred costs to repair or replace a defective product will be able to recover these 
costs as general damages. However if, for instance, the product defect caused a loss of 
production for the purchaser, this special loss would not be recoverable if the seller could 
                                                          
134 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 337. 
135 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 642. 
136 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley (1990) 1 All SA 498. 
137 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) at 687. See also Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 655. 
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not have foreseen that the product would be used in the purchaser’s own manufacturing 
processes. 
 
The mitigation rule presents a further limitation to damages recoverable for breach of 
contract. Pursuant to this rule, the innocent party cannot merely sit back and allow his or 
her losses to accrue; the innocent party is expected to take reasonable steps to prevent or 
limit the losses.138  For instance, where a purchaser of a consumable or non-durable 
product notices a defect, the purchaser is not permitted to let the product go to waste 
completely and should attempt to limit his or her loss by reselling the product at a lower 
price or to a different market, or seek to put the product to use in a manner other than 
originally intended. In this scenario, the purchaser may recover reasonable expenses 
incurred to carry out any mitigation steps.139  
 
In practice, a contractual claim for damages may prove fruitless in circumstances where 
the seller is merely a retailer, importer or distributor of a defective product manufactured 
overseas and that retailer, importer or distributor is impecunious and uninsured. 
 
2.2.1.4 Exemption from liability: The voetstoots clause 
A seller may generally contract out of liability for some or all defects in a product or for 
misrepresentation regarding the quality or condition of the product, unless prohibited by 
statute.140 Framed widely enough, an exemption clause may provide a complete defence 
                                                          
138 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 152-153; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2016) 655; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 340, citing Victoria 
Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 22. 
139 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 340. 
140 Kerr & Glover ‘Sale’ in LAWSA Vol 24, 55 (2010); Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and 
Lease (2013) 79; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 287. See also: Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v 
Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd 2005 (6) SA 1 (SCA) pars 58-59.  
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against a contractual or delictual claim based on the existence of a product defect or 
misrepresentation, with the exception of fraud.141   
 
The most common example of an exclusion or exemption clause in contracts of sale is the 
so-called voetstoots or ‘as is’ clause, which excludes the seller’s warranty against latent 
defects in the product and stipulates that the product is sold ‘as is’.142 Often exemption 
clauses in contracts of sale will also exclude the seller’s liability for any misrepresentation 
regarding the condition or quality of the product and that the seller does not accept the risk 
of the presence of any defects.143 An exemption clause between a seller and a purchaser 
does not bind subsequent purchasers or other product users who suffer harm as a result 
of the product defect.144  
 
The common law prohibits sellers from contracting out of liability for fraud.145 For instance, 
if a seller is aware of a defect in a product and deliberately conceals this knowledge of the 
defect from the purchaser with an intention to deceive, the seller would not be able to rely 
on any voetstoots clause in the contract of sale to escape liability.146 In this scenario, the 
purchaser may have remedies for fraudulent misrepresentation by the seller, which are 
discussed below at 2.2.2. 
 
 
                                                          
141 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 32-33. The scope of an exemption clause depends 
on its interpretation. Although general rules of construction apply, courts will interpret such clauses 
restrictively. See: Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) 452 (SCA) at [40] per Lewis AJA. 
142 Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 79.  
143 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 287; Loubser & Reid ‘Product Liability in South Africa’ 33; 
144 Combrinck Chiropraktiese Kliniek (Edms) Bpk v Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1972 (4) SA 
185 (T); Loubser & Reid ‘Product Liability in South Africa’ 35.  
145 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 334; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Fibrespinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 794 (A) 803. 
146 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 287-288; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale 
and Lease (2013) 79-80. 
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2.2.2 Misrepresentation 
2.2.2.1 Types of Misstatements in a Contractual Context  
In the law of contract, a misrepresentation is defined as a “false statement of past or 
present fact, not law or opinion, made by one party to another before or at the time of the 
contract concerning some matter or circumstance relating to it.”147 A misrepresentation can 
be categorised as fraudulent, negligent or innocent.148 The state of mind of the representor 
determines, to an extent, the remedies available to the representee.149  
 
Misrepresentation should be distinguished from other types of misstatements that may be 
made during pre-contractual negotiations, such as warranties, opinions, statements as to 
the future, statements of law, puffs (simplex commendatio) or dicta et promissa.150 In some 
cases, the categories of misstatement may overlap, providing the purchaser with a choice 
of remedies.151 
 
2.2.2.2 Remedies for Misrepresentation 
2.2.2.2(i) Rescission and restitution 
Where the seller’s misrepresentation relating to the product has misled and induced the 
purchaser to enter into the contract of sale, the purchaser generally has the option of 
cancelling the contract and claiming restitution and in addition, claim damages for loss 
                                                          
147 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 116; Wright v Pandell 1949 (2) SA 279 
(C). 
148  Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 317. 
149 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 341 - 344; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law 
of Contract in South Africa (2012) 117. 
150 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012)117-120. 
151 117; Prima Toy Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Rosenberg 1974 (2) SA 477 (C) 484.   
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resulting from the misrepresentation. 152  The contractual remedy of rescissions and 
restitution are discussed above at 2.2.1.3. 
 
2.2.2.2(ii) Damages 
The type of misrepresentation made (fraudulent, negligent or innocent) is relevant to the 
damages recoverable.153 
 
A seller who deliberately misleads a prospective purchaser with the aim of inducing him or 
her into an unfavourable contract (fraudulent misrepresentation), may be liable in delict 
under the actio legis Acquiliae for any resulting loss suffered by the purchaser. 154  A 
fraudulent misrepresentation does not need to be material in order to claim damages.155 
To succeed with the Aquilian action, the purchaser would have to prove that: 
 the seller made a representation; 
 which was, to the knowledge of the seller, false; 
 which the seller intended the purchaser to act upon; 
 which induced the purchaser to act; and  
 resulted in the purchaser suffering loss.156 
 
In other words, if the seller deliberately conceals from the prospective purchaser the fact 
that the product to be sold has a defect, inducing the purchaser to buy that product, the 
purchaser may be able to claim delictual damages if he or she suffers harm due to that 
                                                          
152    Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 315; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of 
Contract in South Africa (2012) 122. 
153    Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 317; Glover Kerr’s Law of 
Sale & Lease (2014) 226; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 341 - 344. 
154    Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 85; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2016) 344. 
155    Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 126. 
156    Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 85; Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South 
Africa (2016) 345; Trust Bank of SA Ltd v Coetsee 1981 (1) SA 1131 (A) 1145; Ruto Flour Mills (Pty) 
Ltd v Moriates 1957 (3) SA 113 (T); Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 (1) SA 434 (A).  
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product defect. It may prove difficult in these cases for a purchaser to establish that the 
seller did have knowledge of the product defect, especially where that seller was a mere 
retailer or distributor, as opposed to the manufacturer.   
 
Damages are assessed according to the usual delictual principles, in other words, the 
defrauded purchaser is entitled to be placed in the financial position he or she would have 
been in had the fraudulent misrepresentation not been made. 157  The purchaser may 
recover consequential loss resulting from the fraudulent misrepresentation, provided the 
loss is not too remote.158  
 
Where the purchaser elects to rescind the contract and claim restitution, the damages 
recoverable are usually only for wasted costs and other consequential losses.159 If the 
contract of sale is upheld, the purchaser’s damages may include loss resulting from the 
transaction itself.160 In this case, it is important to determine whether the circumstances 
indicate dolus dans or dolus incidens:  
 If the purchaser would never have entered into the contract, had it not been for the fraud 
(dolus dans), the purchaser is entitled to be placed in the financial position he or she 
would have been if he or she had never contracted with the seller. The purchaser’s net 
loss would equal the purchase price paid minus the actual or fair value of the goods at 
the time of purchase.161  
 
                                                          
157 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 345-346; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law 
of Contract in South Africa (2012) 126; Trotman v Edwick 1951 (1) SA 443 (A) at 449. The principles for 
assessment of delictual damages are discussed below at 2.3.1.1(ii).  
158 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Coetsee 1981 (1) SA 1331 (A) 1145. 
159 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 127. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Trotman v Edwick 1951 (1) SA 443 (A) 449.  
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 If the purchaser would have entered into the contract notwithstanding the fraud, perhaps 
only on different terms (dolus incidens), the purchaser’s damages would equal the 
extent to which the representation inflated the seller’s performance, i.e. the actual 
purchase price paid minus the price the purchaser would have paid but for the 
misrepresentation (the putative price).162 
 
A negligent misrepresentation inducing a contract is actionable in delict, provided the 
elements of the Aquilian action are satisfied.163 Where the seller negligently makes a 
misrepresentation relating to the quality of the product that induces the purchaser to buy 
the product, the purchaser may invoke the Aquilian action unless that misrepresentation is 
incorporated into the contract as a warranty, in which case the purchaser may recover 
contractual damages for breach.164 Delictual damages for negligent misrepresentation are 
assessed according to the same general principles applied in the case of fraudulent 
misrepresentations.165  
 
Where a seller made an innocent misrepresentation inducing the purchaser to enter into 










                                                          
162 Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 127-128.  
163 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 321; Bayer South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A); Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 
(A). 
164 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 30. 
165 Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 344; Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of 
Contract in South Africa (2012) 131. The principles for assessment of delictual damages are discussed 
below at 2.3.1.1(ii). 
166 Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 321. 
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2.2.3 Aedilitian Remedies for Dicta et Promissa and Latent Defects 
In addition to the general common law remedies available for misrepresentation and 
breach of contract, the purchaser of a defective product may also invoke the aedilitian 
remedies in cases where the seller: 
 sold a product with a latent defect, or 
 made a false pre-contractual statement (dictum et promissum) bearing on the quality 
of the product sold.167  
 
The aedilitian remedies are generally restitutionary in nature and, depending on the 
circumstances, will allow the purchaser to claim either a price reduction with the actio 
quanti minoris or cancellation of the contract with the actio redhibitoria.168  
 
In special cases, an aedlilitian action may coincide with a claim for consequential damages 
where a defective product is sold, for instance, where:  
 the seller gave an express warranty that the product was defect free; 
 the seller had knowledge of the latent defect in the product;  
 the seller is a manufacturer or a merchant seller who publicly professed special 
knowledge of the product.169 
 
2.2.3.1 Dicta et Promissa 
The purchaser may invoke aedilitian remedies where the seller made false, material, pre-
contractual statements bearing on the quality of the product and going beyond mere praise 
                                                          
167 Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (2013) 180; Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & 
Lease (2014) 226. 
168  Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 211, 217; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale 
and Lease (2013) 83 - 84. 
169 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 27; Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of 
Sale and Lease (2013) 83 - 84. 
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and commendation (dicta et promissa), which had the effect of inducing the purchaser to 
contract or agree to a higher price.170 Whether the seller’s pre-contractual statement went 
beyond mere praise or commendation depends on the factual circumstances of each 
case.171  
 
It is not a requirement for aedilitian relief on the basis of dicta et promissa to show that the 
seller was aware that his statements are false.172 However, if the seller knowingly and 
deliberately made false statements in an effort to induce the purchaser to contract, the 
purchaser may claim consequential damages for fraud.173  
 
2.2.3.2 Latent defects   
The common law imposes a duty on a seller to disclose and assume responsibility for all 
latent defects in the product sold.174 A product is defective if it has "an abnormal quality or 
attribute which destroys or substantially impairs the utility or effectiveness of the res 
vendita, for the purpose for which it has been sold or for which it is commonly used.175  
 
In determining whether the product defect is latent, courts have applied varying tests, 
asking whether the defect was ‘easily visible’ or whether the defect was reasonably 
discoverable upon inspection by an ordinary purchaser.176  
                                                          
170 Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 397 (A) at 417H-418A. 
171 418B-C. Courts will consider various factors, including: whether the statement was made in answer to a 
direct question by the purchaser; whether the statement was material to the known purpose for which the 
purchaser was buying the product; whether the statement was fact or opinion and whether it would be 
obvious, even to gullible persons, that the seller was merely singing the praises of its wares (at 418B-C). 
172 Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 47; Voet 21.1.10; Pothier Vente par 
213. 
173 Ibid; Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract’ in Joubert et al (eds) LAWSA vol 9, 3 ed (2014) 319. 
174 Mackeurtan Mackeurtan’s Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984) 126. 
175 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Constructions Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) at 683H.  
176 Bradfield & Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 77 at footnote 541, discussing 
Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Constructions Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A); Waller v Pienaar & 
Another 2004 (6) SA 303 (SCA) at [15.6]. It is unclear whether the test would be different where the 
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Whether the seller had knowledge of the latent defect in a product is irrelevant to the 
seller's liability, which arises from the mere fact that there was a defect at the time of 
sale.177 However, the seller’s state of mind may impact on the scope of liability.178  
 
In circumstances where the purchaser was or should have been aware of the latent defect, 
the aedilitian remedies are not available.179 However, if the purchaser merely suspected a 
latent defect, the purchaser is not precluded from bringing an aedilitian action against the 
seller.180  
 
A seller will not be liable for latent defects in the product sold in circumstances where:181  
 the seller warned the purchaser of the defect; 
 the purchaser obtained knowledge of the defect from a source other than the seller; 
 the seller expressly contracted out of the warranty against latent defects; or 
 it is clear from the particular circumstances that the purchaser assumed the risk of any 
latent defect in the product. 
 
2.2.3.3 Latent Defects, Manufacturers and Merchant-Sellers 
In special circumstances, the purchaser may recover consequential damages from a seller 
for a latent defect in the product. Pursuant to the so-called Pothier rule, consequential loss 
may be recoverable where:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
purchaser has expert knowledge of the product sold or engaged an expert to inspect the product prior to 
the sale (see Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Constructions Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) at 684A-
C). 
177 Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 78.  
178 Ibid; Mackeurtan Mackeurtan’s Sale of Goods in South Africa (1984) 138-9.  
179 SA Wood Turning Mills (Pty) Ltd v Price Bros (Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) SA 263 (T).  
180 Robertse v Rustenburg Boeren Ko-operatiewe Vereniging 1919 TPD 263 at 265. 
181 Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 78; J K Jackson (Pty) Ltd v Salisbury 
Family Health Studio (Pvt) Ltd 1974 (2) SA 619 (RA) 623. 
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 the seller is the manufacturer of the product; or  
 the seller is a merchant who publicly professes to have attributes of skill and expert 
knowledge in relation to the kind of products sold.182  
 
Liability for consequential loss resulting from latent defects will attach unless the seller has 
expressly or by implication contracted out of it.183 Courts appear to regard the remedy as 
contractual in nature.184 This means that the purchaser is not required to establish fault on 
the part of the manufacturer or merchant seller.  
 
It is worth noting that the notion ‘manufacturer’ has been interpreted broadly by courts to 
include those sellers who do not necessarily ‘manufacture’ a certain product per se, but 
who have ‘produced’ it as a by-product of another production process.185 For example, a 
seller who is in the business of quarrying rock from a riverbed and converting it into lime 
for the construction industry and who creates, as a by-product of this process, sand and 
dolomitic aggregate, which also have commercial value. If these by-products are sold and 











                                                          
182 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 202 - 208; Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of 
Sale & Lease (2013) 84; Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 447 (SCA) at [48]. 
183 Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 79; See discussion at 2.2.1.4 
above. 
184 Wagner v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) [22]; Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd 
v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 447 (SCA) [48].Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 203; 
Bradfield and Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease (2013) 85. 
185 Glover Kerr’s Law of Sale & Lease (2014) 202. 
186 D & H Piping Systems (Pty) Ltd v Trans Hex Group Ltd 2006 3 SA 593 (SCA) 32-36. 
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2.3 DELICTUAL LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT DEFECTS  
2.3.1 The Aquilian Action  
At common law, harm or loss caused by a product defect may be actionable on the basis 
of contract or delict.187 As noted above at 2.2, the doctrine of contractual privity limits the 
scope of contractual remedies to situations where a direct contractual relationship exists 
between the person who suffered harm and the supplier of the defective product. This 
effectively excludes third parties, for instance, family members, donees, employees of the 
purchaser or mere bystanders from suing in contract, even though harm to the third party 
might have been entirely foreseeable.188 In the absence of a contractual relationship, the 
plaintiff’s recourse would be a claim in delict against the manufacturer of the defective 
product.189  
 
The delictual remedy for harm caused by a defective product is the fault-based Aquilian 
action.190 The basis for manufacturer’s liability was explained by the Appellate Division in 
Ciba-Geigy (Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd191 as follows:  
“If a manufacturer produces and markets a product without conclusive prior tests, 
when the utilisation thereof in the recommended manner is potentially hazardous 
to the consumer, such negligence on the part of the manufacturer may expose him 
to delictual liability to the consumer. Where the consumer does not acquire the 
product directly from the manufacturer, and the manufacturer is thus a third party, 
such liability amounts to what is sometimes termed ‘product liability’. A contractual 
nexus between the manufacturer and the consumer is not required. Although the 
historical origin of the manufacturer’s liability is an agreement between the 
                                                          
187 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 367; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in 
South Africa (2012) 38.  
188 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 367. 
189 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 93.  
190 Wagener & Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 4 SA 285 (SCA) at 19; Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v 
Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 3 All SA 362 (SCA) at 36. 
191 2002 (2) SA 447 (SCA). 
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manufacturer and the distributor, the liability, which arises from the manufacture 
and distribution of the product, extends via the other contracting party to any third 
party who utilises the product in the prescribed manner and suffers damages as a 
result thereof. It follows as a matter of course that a manufacturer who distributes 
a product commercially, which, in the course of its intended use, and as the result 
of a defect, causes damage to the consumer thereof, acts wrongly and thus 
unlawfully according to the legal convictions of the community.”192 
 
To succeed with the Aquilian action, it must be established that the defendant wrongfully 
and negligently caused harm by producing or distributing a defective product, in breach of 
its duty of care to the consumer.193 The elements of the Aquilian action, in the context of 
harm caused by a defective product, are discussed below.  
 
2.3.1.1 The Elements of Aquilian liability 
2.3.1.1(i) Conduct 
In the context of manufacturer’s liability, the relevant juridical conduct is the voluntary 
control and supervision exerted over, and organisation of the complex process of industrial 
production.194 Industrial production encompasses the design process, manufacturing and 
distribution of the product. As automatisation increases in the production process, the role 
of human activity in the process shifts from direct, physical involvement to control and 
organisation of the process, however, this makes the manufacturer’s conduct no less 
individualistic and voluntary.195  
 
                                                          
192 [64], [66]. 
193 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 93; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (2012) 248. 
194 De Jager ‘Die grondslae van produkte-aanspreeklikheid ex delicto in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg’ (1978) 
THRHR, 41 at 353. 
195 Ibid. 
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In the case of a distributor, wholesaler or retailer, the relevant juridical conduct may involve 
taking delivery of the product, transportation, storage, packaging, repackaging and on-sale 
of the product. During this process, the distributor or retailer handles the product and may 
have the opportunity to conduct inspections or quality controls prior to on-sale to a 
subsequent supplier or the ultimate consumer. 
 
2.3.1.1(ii) Harm and damages 
The law of delict recognises two general categories of harm: patrimonial and non-
patrimonial harm.196  Patrimonial harm is defined as a negative impact on a person’s 
financial estate and falls into three general categories: financial loss associated with 
personal injury; financial loss associated with property damage and pure economic loss 
(not associated with personal injury or property damage).197  
 
Where a product defect caused patrimonial harm, the plaintiff’s remedy lies in the lex 
Aquilia. The purpose of Aquilian damages is to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she 
would have been in had the delict not been committed.198 The extent of patrimonial harm is 
assessed by means of a comparative method known as the ‘sum-formula’ or ‘negative 
interesse formula’.199 This method compares the plaintiff’s actual position as a result of the 
delict to the hypothetical position that the plaintiff would have obtained had there been no 
delict. 200  The negative difference between the two positions constitutes the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
196 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 229; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa 
(2012) 49-50. 
197 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 50. 
198 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 192. 
199 Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2012) 72. 
200 Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA) at [15].  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 60 
patrimonial harm.201 Once the extent of the harm is assessed, a court can ascribe a 
monetary value to that loss.  
 
Where a product defect results in property damage, the starting point for assessing loss is 
the sum-formula.202 This formula is supplemented by one of the following tests: diminution 
in market value or reasonable repair costs.203 If property was damaged, the plaintiff has to 
prove the difference in market value of the property prior to and after the delict. 204 If 
property was completely destroyed, the loss equals the market value of the property at the 
time of destruction.205 Where it is too difficult or impossible to determine the market value 
of the damaged property, an alternative is to determine the reasonable repair costs.206 The 
reasonable repair costs method would not be suitable in circumstances where the property 
was severely damaged or destroyed, such that the repair costs would be more than the 
value of the property prior to the harm.207 In the context of a defective product that causes 
harm to a plaintiff’s person or property, any loss resulting from damage to the defective 
product itself, if that defective product was owned by the plaintiff, would also be 
recoverable by way of the Aquilian action.  
 
Where a product defect caused personal injury, a plaintiff may seek to recover past and 
future medical expenses, rehabilitation costs, psychiatric expenses, past loss of earnings, 
future loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity. 208  Where a defective product has 
                                                          
201 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 237-238. 
202 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2010) 417. 
203 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 195. 
204 Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmacy (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) SA 111 (C). See also: Potgieter, Steynberg & 
Floyd Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2012) 420 - 421. 
205 Ibid; Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 195. 
206 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 417. 
207 Erasmus v Davis 1969 (2) SA 1 (A) at 18E-G.  
208 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 254; De Jongh v Du Pisano NO 2005 5 SA 457 (SCA); 
Singh v Ebrahim (1) [2010] 3 All SA 187 (D). 
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injured or killed a breadwinner, the dependants may seek to recover loss of past and 
future support.209  
 
A product defect may also cause a plaintiff non-patrimonial harm, which is not recoverable 
with the Aquilian action.210 Non-patrimonial harm refers to all forms of harm that cannot be 
quantified in monetary terms and can be broadly subcategorised as pain and suffering or 
infringement of personality rights.211 A plaintiff who was physically injured due to a product 
defect may experience physical and psychological pain associated with that injury and loss 
of amenities of life.212 Compensation for pain and suffering can be recovered by means of 
the Germanic remedy, also known as the action for pain and suffering.213 The process of 
quantifying damages for non-patrimonial harm is often speculative and based on courts’ 
general discretion as there are no set principles in this regard. 214  Courts may seek 
guidance from comparable cases where available.215  
 
2.3.1.1(iii) Causation 
A plaintiff who has suffered harm due to a defective product has to prove a causal link 
between the defendant’s conduct, for instance the manufacture or distribution of the 
defective product, and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.216  
 
                                                          
209 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 421. 
210 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 192. 
211 Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2012) 103.     
212 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 260 - 261;  
213 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 424. 
214 Ibid. For a general discussion of the principles or factors considered in quantifying damages for non-
patrimonial harm, see for instance: Boberg The Law of Delict: Vol I Aquilian Liability (1984) 535-547; 
Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2012) 495. See also: Road 
Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 4 SA 164 (SCA).  
215  Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 (A) 535-536. 
216  Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 53. 
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In the law of delict, the element of causation involves two separate enquiries, namely 
factual causation and legal causation,217 as described by the Appellate Division in Minister 
of Police v Skosana:218 
“Causation in the law of delict gives rise to two rather distinct problems. The first is 
a factual one and relates to the question as to whether the negligent act or 
omission in question caused or materially contributed to…the harm giving rise to 
the claim. If it did not, then the second problem becomes relevant, viz whether the 
negligent act or omission is linked to the harm sufficiently closely or directly for 
legal liability to ensure or whether, as it is said, the harm is too remote. This is 
basically a juridical problem, in which considerations of legal policy may play a 
part.”219  
  
The primary test for factual causation is the conditio sine qua non or so-called ‘but for’ 
test.220 According to this test, there is a factual causal link if, but for the defendant’s 
conduct, the harm would not have occurred.221 The onus is on the plaintiff to show, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary condition of the 
harm.222 
 
Proving factual causation in a product liability claim often presents a significant obstacle to 
plaintiffs, particularly in the case of complex products, as it requires plaintiffs to collect 
sufficient technical information about the product, the accident circumstances and the 
conduct of the parties involved. To alleviate the plaintiff’s burden of proof, the doctrine of 
                                                          
217  Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 175. 
218 1977 1 SA 31 (A). 
219 [34] - [35]. See also: International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 700.  
220 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 180; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (2012) 71. Although the starting point, this test is not suitable in all cases. Courts will consider the 
circumstances and relevant policy to determine whether to deviate from the traditional test and, if so, 
which test. Alternative tests may involve a common sense approach or consideration of material 
contribution. See the authors’ discussion at 77-84. 
221 Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 2001 (1) SA 111 (SCA) at [32]. 
222 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 71. 
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res ipsa loquitur may theoretically be invoked to create an inference of fault where: (a) the 
product defect has been proved; (b) the defendant had exclusive control of the product 
and (c) the accident was of such a kind that would ordinarily not occur without fault.223 It is 
worth noting that case law on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is limited and is yet to be 
applied in a product liability case brought under the Aquilian action.224 Therefore, whilst 
theoretically possible, the doctrine seems to be of little assistance to plaintiffs in this 
context.  
 
Particular problems relating to factual causation may arise depending on the nature of the 
product and the type of defect. Where a manufacturing defect not only harmed the plaintiff 
but damaged or even destroyed the product itself, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to 
collect the necessary evidence to prove the causal link. For instance, a faulty electrical 
appliance that caused an entire house to burn down or a faulty vehicle severely damaged 
in a collision. In the context of an alleged design defect, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to 
prove that an alternative design or safety enhancements would have eliminated the risk of 
harm where no such alternative design was available on the market, and the safer 
alternative is merely hypothetical. Further, it may be exceedingly difficult to establish a 
factual causal link between a product defect and harm where there are competing, equally 
plausible theories unrelated to the defective product as to the cause of the harm. For 
example, if a plaintiff is exposed to asbestos products at his place of employment over a 
period of time and was also subject to atmospheric low-level exposure to asbestos for a 
prolonged period, it may be difficult to prove that exposure to the asbestos products was 
the factual cause, on balance of probabilities, of the plaintiff’s asbestos-related disease.  
  
                                                          
223  Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 (2) SA 647 (A) at 662. 
224  Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 109. 
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Once factual causation is established, the next question is whether the wrongful conduct, 
in this context the supply of a defective product, and the harm are linked sufficiently closely 
to justify legal liability.225 Legal causation is a normative mechanism through which legal 
liability is limited to those consequences that can fairly be attributed to the defendant.226 As 
explained by the Appellate Division in International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley:227 
 
“…demonstration that the wrongful act was a causa sine qua non of the loss does 
not necessarily result in legal liability. The second enquiry then arises, namely, 
whether the wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely or directly to the loss for legal 
liability to ensure or whether, as it is said, the loss is too remote. This is basically a 
juridical problem in the solution of which considerations of policy may play a part. 
This is sometimes called ‘legal causation.”228 
 
Over the years, courts have developed several tests for legal causation. These include the 
direct consequences test, the reasonable foreseeability test, the novus actus interveniens 
concept and the adequate cause test.229  
 
According to the ‘direct consequences’ theory, the test for legal causation will be met if the 
harm was a direct result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, irrespective of whether that 
result was foreseeable. 230  The chain of causation may be broken by a novus actus 
interveniens, such as an act of God or a third party.231  
 
                                                          
225   Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 181; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 
202; Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 SA 1 (A) 16. 
226   Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 90. 
227   1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 
228   [700]. 
229   Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 181; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 
204. 
230    Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 132, 134. 
231    Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 184; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 
(2012) 104. 
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Pursuant to the ‘foreseeability’ theory, liability is limited to those consequences of the 
defendant’s actions which he or she could reasonably have been expected to have 
foreseen.232 To establish legal causation under this theory, it does not have to be shown 
that the defendant reasonably foresaw the exact or precise consequences of his or her 
actions; the defendant merely had to foresee the general nature or the kind of harm which 
actually occurred.233  
 
A third, less frequently used theory is that of ‘adequate cause’. This theory incorporates 
both factual and legal enquiries and considers whether the defendant’s conduct is 
adequately or appropriately linked with the harm which is alleged to have been caused.234  
 
In the criminal case of S v Mokgethi,235 the Appellate Division adopted a flexible test 
encompassing all the existing tests for legal causation and based on policy considerations 
based on reasonableness, fairness and justice. The court held that the existing tests for 
legal causation would not be abolished, but that they could be applied as subsidiary tests 
depending on the facts of the case.236 Shortly after this decision, the Appellate Division 
applied the same flexible approach to delictual liability.237 In Fourway Haulage SA (Pty Ltd 
v SA National Roads Agency Ltd238 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the flexible 
test and clarified the relationship between this test and the subsidiary tests.239  
 
                                                          
232    Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 208-210; Boberg The Law of Delict: Vol I Aquilian 
Liability (1984) 442-445; Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 
198; Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 165. 
233 Masiba v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1982 (4) SA 333 (C) 342; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v 
Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A) 768; Smit v Abrahams 1992 (3) SA 158 (C) 163-164. 
234 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 186; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 
208-209; Smith v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 162.  
235 1990 (1) SA 32 (A). 
236 92. 
237 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) 680 A. 
238 2009 (2) SA 150 (SCA). 
239 [34]-[35]. 
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In the context of legal causation in a product liability claim, a defendant manufacturer may 
seek to show that, after a defective product failed and caused harm to the plaintiff, a 
subsequent intervening event caused further harm to the plaintiff for which the 
manufacturer should not be liable. For instance, a plaintiff suffers serious injuries in a 
motor vehicle accident due to a defect in the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff then undergoes 
surgery and suffers further harm due to medical negligence. In this scenario, there is a 
factual causal link between the manufacturer’s supply of a defective vehicle and the 
plaintiff’s ultimate harm as he or she would not have suffered that harm at the hand of the 
negligent surgeon had it not been for the defective vehicle. However, the surgeon’s 
negligence resulting in further harm to the plaintiff would break the chain of legal causation 
in relation to that further harm. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court has recently delivered a judgment regarding the 
appropriate test for factual causation in Lee v Minister of Correctional Services.240 Before 
discussing this judgment, it is necessary to draw a distinction between those cases where 
the facts are able to support factual causation on a balance of probabilities and those 
cases where factual causation is ambiguous in that there are two or more competing, but 
independent potential causes of the harm and insufficient evidence to pinpoint the true 
cause(s) on a balance of probabilities. 241  Some common law jurisdictions expressly 
distinguish between these two types of cases and approach the factual causation test 
differently in ambiguous causation cases. The reason for this is that the ‘but-for’ test for 
factual causation would never favour the plaintiff in ambiguous causation cases as the 
plaintiff is unable, by definition, to establish the cause of harm on a balance of 
                                                          
240 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). 
241 Such cases are termed in US literature as ‘ambiguous cause-in-fact cases’. See eg. Knutsen ‘Ambiguous 
Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A Multi-Jurisdictional Approach’ (2003) Texas International Law 
Journal vol 38, 249. 
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probabilities.242 A formal distinction between more straightforward and more ambiguous 
factual causation cases is not made in South African law, however, the Appellate Division 
in Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd243 has alluded to this distinction.244  
 
The Lee case is an example of such an ambiguous factual causation scenario. This case 
involved a delictual claim by the plaintiff against the Minister of Correctional Services on 
the basis that he contracted pulmonary tuberculosis (‘TB’) during his detention in prison 
from 1999 to 2004 whilst awaiting trial due to poor prison health management. He was 
released in 2004 upon acquittal. The main legal question in this case turned on factual 
causation, namely whether or not proper prison health management would have prevented 
the plaintiff contracting TB or whether the infection was simply an unavoidable risk faced 
by prisoners, even under proper prison health management. At first instance, the High 
Court245 approached the factual scenario as a straightforward factual causation case and 
applied the traditional common law ‘but-for’ test to determine factual causation. The High 
Court found in favour of the plaintiff, stating that: 
“On the totality of the evidence, I am accordingly satisfied that it is more probable 
than not that the plaintiff contracted TB as a result of his incarceration in the 
maximum security prison at Pollsmoor.”246 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA)247 dealt with the factual scenario as an 
ambiguous factual causation case and unanimously applied the traditional ‘but-for’ test to 
determine factual causation, finding in favour of the defendant. The SCA held that:  
                                                          
242 Veldsman ‘Factual causation: One size does not fit all’ (2013) De Rebus 247. 
243 1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 915.  
244 Veldsman ‘Factual causation: One size does not fit all’ (2013) De Rebus 32 at 247.  
245 Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2011 (6) SA 564 (WCC). 
246 [236]. 
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“The difficulty that is faced by Mr Lee is that he does not know the source of his 
infection. Had he known its source, it is possible that he might have established a 
causal link between his infection and specific negligent conduct on the part of the 
prison authorities. Instead he has found himself cast back upon systemic 
omission. But, in the absence of proof that reasonable systemic adequacy would 
have altogether eliminated the risk of contagion, which would be a hard row to 
hoe, it cannot be found that but for the systemic omission he probably would not 
have contracted the disease. On that ground I think that the claim ought to have 
failed.”248   
 
Before the Constitutional Court,249 all judges unanimously agreed that the SCA’s judgment 
achieved an unjust outcome. However, there was disagreement among the judges as to 
the correct test for factual causation.  
 
The minority in the CC found that the SCA had correctly applied the traditional common 
law ‘but-for’ test and that the common law should be developed in such a way that an 
unjust result, such as the SCA’s judgment, is avoided in the future. The minority judgment 
considered foreign case law dealing with ambiguous cause-in-fact cases, and concluded 
that they would have remitted the proceeding to the trial court so that the common law 
could be developed. 
 
In contrast, the majority in the CC held that the SCA had incorrectly applied the traditional 
‘but-for’ test for factual causation and that the common law need not be developed in order 
to achieve a just outcome in this case. However, it is argued that the majority judgment did 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
247 Minister of Correctional Services v Lee 2012 (3) SA 617 (SCA). 
248 [64]. 
249 Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). 
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develop the common law, even if only obiter, in relation to ambiguous factual causation 
cases.250 The majority, per Nkabinde J, supported the High Court’s judgment, stating that: 
“There was thus nothing in our law that prevented the High Court from 
approaching the question of causation simply by asking whether the factual 
conditions of Mr Lee’s incarceration were a more probable cause of his 
tuberculosis, than that which would have been the case had he not been 
incarcerated in those conditions. That is what the High Court did and there was no 
reason, based on our law, to interfere with that finding.”251  
 
The majority judgment of the CC seems to support the so-called ‘material contribution to 
risk’ approach, recognised by some common law jurisdictions as a solution to the 
inadequacy of the ‘but-for’ test in ambiguous factual causation cases. 252  Generally 
speaking, a ‘material contribution to risk’ approach allows factual causation to be made out 
against a defendant where the plaintiff can show that a negligent act by that defendant, out 
of a number of negligent acts by multiple defendants or other causes, materially increased 
the risk of injury, without proving actual ‘but-for’ causation. This approach is typically 
applied in cases where it is impossible to determine which defendant(s) or causes, out of a 
number of defendants or causes, were responsible for the harm. The majority in Lee, per 
Nkabinde J, stated: 
“It would be enough, I think, to satisfy probable factual causation where the 
evidence establishes that the plaintiff found himself in the kind of situation where 
the risk of contagion would have been reduced by proper systemic measures.”253 
 
                                                          
250 Veldsman ‘Factual causation: One size does not fit all’ (2013) De Rebus 32 at 247.  
251 [55]. 
252 Veldsman ‘Factual causation: One size does not fit all’ (2013) De Rebus, where a discussion is provided 
of the application of this approach in the USA, the UK and Canada. 
253 [60]. 
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The minority judgement criticises this ‘material increase in risk’ approach, inter alia, on the 
basis that it may have the effect that a very small increase in an existing significant risk 
could result in liability,254 thereby opening the floodgates of litigation.  
 
Based on the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Lee it appears that, in ambiguous factual 
causation cases where a plaintiff’s harm may plausibly have been caused by a defective 
product and another, unrelated negligent act or cause, a plaintiff may establish factual 
causation against the defective product supplier simply by showing the defective product 
had increased the risk of harm. However, the Constitutional Court does not make it clear 
whether the contribution to the risk of harm ought to have been a material or substantial 
increase in risk, or whether a minuscule increase in risk would be enough to establish 
factual causation in these cases. Judicial clarification would be welcomed in this regard. 
 
2.3.1.1(iv) Negligence  
In the context of product liability, the element of fault is generally negligence, as it would 
be a rare scenario where a manufacturer intentionally harmed consumers by putting 
defective products into circulation.  
 
The element of negligence involves a duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm.255 
Negligence is assessed by measuring the defendant’s conduct against the standard of 
care a reasonable person would have applied in the same circumstances.256 The most 
                                                          
254 Per Cameron J at [105]-[108]. 
255 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 148; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 
(2012) 46.  
256 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 143; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 
166. 
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frequently cited test for negligence was formulated by the Appellate Division in Kruger v 
Coetzee:257 
“For the purposes of liability culpa arises if - (a) a diligens paterfamilias in the 
position of the defendant - (i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his 
conduct injuring another in his person or property and causing him patrimonial 
loss; and (ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and 
(b) the defendant failed to take such steps.”258 
 
The test in Kruger v Coetzee incorporates a foreseeability requirement in the abstract or 
general sense. The test was reformulated in Mukheiber v Raath259 where the Supreme 
Court of Appeal incorporated a more specific foreseeability requirement:   
“For the purposes of liability culpa arises if (a) a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant (i) would have foreseen harm of the general kind that actually 
occurred; (ii) would have foreseen the general kind of causal sequence by which 
that harm occurred; (iii) would have taken steps to guard against it, and (b) the 
defendant failed to take those steps.”260  
 
However, these tests are no more than guidelines or approaches to assessing negligence. 
In Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 261  the 
Supreme Court of Appeal followed a more general approach: 
“In the ultimate analysis the true criterion for determining negligence is whether, in 
the particular circumstances, the impugned conduct falls short of the standard of 
the reasonable person. Dividing the inquiry into various stages, however useful, is 
no more than an aid or guideline for resolving this issue.” 262 
 
                                                          
257 1966 (2) SA 428 (A). 
258 [430].  
259 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA). 
260 1077E-F. 
261 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA).  
262 839F. 
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In determining whether the harm was foreseeable, courts will take into account all the 
circumstances of the case and particular considerations such as:263 
 the likelihood that a person in the plaintiff’s position would have suffered harm; 
 whether the kind of harm that occurred was reasonably foreseeable; 
 whether the general manner in which the harm occurred was reasonably foreseeable; 
 the likelihood of the harm occurring;  
 the likely extent of the harm.  
 
In the context of product liability, a court would therefore consider whether, from the 
manufacturer’s perspective, it was reasonably foreseeable that a particular defect in a 
product would cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff. In considering foreseeability, courts 
may, for example, have regard to the state of scientific knowledge reasonably available or 
accessible to manufacturers at the time the product was put on the market to enable a 
defect to be identified prior to circulating the product. Courts may also have regard to the 
manner in which the plaintiff used the product. If a plaintiff misused a product in such an 
extreme way, it may be held that it was not reasonably foreseeable by manufacturers that 
a product would be used in such a way, and therefore, the harm was not reasonably 
foreseeable. Further, if the harm caused to the plaintiff was so unusual, for instance, a 
highly idiosyncratic and rare adverse reaction to a pharmaceutical product, it may be found 
that the harm suffered was not reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances.  
 
If it is found that the harm was reasonably foreseeable, the second part of the negligence 
enquiry is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have done anything to 
                                                          
263 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 47-48 and case law cited here; Neethling, 
Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 156 and case law cited here. 
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prevent the harm.264 In this regard, courts assess what preventative steps were reasonably 
available and practicable in the circumstances.265 In determining reasonable measures 
that could have prevented the occurrence of foreseeable harm, courts have considered 
factors such as:266  
 whether the degree of risk of harm and extent of the consequences required more 
extensive protective measures; 
 whether the social utility of the risk-creating conduct justifies the extent of the risk of 
harm; 
 the cost and burden of adopting possible precautionary measures weighed up against 
the risk of harm; 
 the likelihood of the preventative measures succeeding in preventing the harm.  
 
 
In the context of product liability, the reasonable preventability enquiry would involve 
asking whether the defendant-manufacturer failed to take reasonable care in its design, 
production or quality control processes to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to 
consumers of the product. Here, courts may again give consideration to the state of 
science and technology reasonably available and accessible to manufacturers to improve 
their production or quality control processes and whether the costs of adopting those 
improved methods would be justified given the reduction of risk it would achieve. Courts 
would generally consider what was reasonably foreseeable and preventable at the time 
the product was put on the market.267  
 
                                                          
264  Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 162; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 
156; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 124. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A); Cape Metropolitan Council v Graham 
2001 (1) SA 1197 (SCA); Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 179. 
267 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 49.  
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More specifically, breach of a manufacturer’s duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm to 
consumers of a product may involve, for instance, a failure to: 
 comply with relevant design or safety standards or regulations; 
 conduct adequate safety testing prior to making the product commercially available; 
 ensure that product components or ingredients are sourced from reputable suppliers 
and comply with safety standards or regulations;  
 adopt adequate quality control measures such as product inspection or sampling, 
regular audits of production lines or processes; 
 provide adequate product information, instructions for safe use or warnings of potential 
risks in using the product. 
 
A wholesaler, distributor or retailer further down the supply chain may also owe a duty of 
care to conduct quality controls prior to on-supply of products to consumers, particularly in 
cases where that non-manufacturing supplier had the opportunity to inspect the products 
while in its possession or control.  
 
Where the plaintiff had the opportunity to inspect the product prior to use, the foreseeability 
requirement may present difficulties in establishing negligence. For example, in A Gibb 
and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell Timber Supply Co (Pty) Ltd268 the plaintiff was a 
building contractor who purchased scaffolding boards from a building supplies merchant. A 
patent defect in one of the boards caused injury to an employee of a subcontractor and the 
plaintiff sought damages from the merchant. The question of negligence turned on whether 
the merchant had a duty to exercise reasonable care by inspecting the scaffolding boards 
individually before supplying them to the plaintiff. The court held the merchant was not 
                                                          
268 1975 (2) SA 457 (W). 
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negligent. On the facts, the harm was not foreseeable as a reasonable timber merchant 
would have expected a building contractor to inspect the scaffolding boards for defects 
prior to use. 
 
Establishing negligence on the part of a manufacturer often presents a weighty or 
insurmountable evidential burden. Expert evidence is often required to establish that the 
manufacturer could reasonably have foreseen the harm and taken reasonably available, 
practicable and economically feasible measures to prevent it. However, consumers are 
generally unfamiliar with the technicalities of production processes or the scientific 
knowledge or technology applied and available at the relevant time. Manufacturers 
generally have more financial and informational resources available to produce expert 
evidence in defence of their production processes and products. For instance, in the 
context of a pharmaceutical product, the manufacturer would produce substantial amounts 
of evidence regarding its scientific research and development, clinical trials and quality 
control processes to show that it had taken reasonable steps in ensuring its product, which 
has social utility, was as safe as reasonably possible.269 
  
This informational and financial imbalance between plaintiffs and manufacturers in the 
practical conduct of product liability claims is also problematic in the context of establishing 









                                                          
269 See for instance, the case of Wagener & Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 4 SA 285 (SCA), involving a 
pharmaceutical product.  
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2.3.1.1(v) Wrongfulness 
Wrongfulness refers to the unreasonable causing of harm.270 It signifies that the harm 
caused is sufficiently unreasonable or unacceptable for the law of delict to impose liability, 
provided the other requirements are also met.271 It adds a value or policy-based dimension 
to the test for delictual liability and involves judicial discretion in determining the scope of 
protection afforded to various rights and interests, the scope of responsibility to act and 
overall policy considerations as to whether the law of delict should intervene. 272 
Wrongfulness was described as follows by Brand AJ in Le Roux v Dey:273 
“In the more recent past our courts have come to recognise, however, that in the 
context of the law of delict: (a) the criterion of wrongfulness ultimately depends on 
a judicial determination of whether – assuming all the other elements of delictual to 
be present – it would be reasonable to impose liability on a defendant for the 
damages flowing from specific conduct; and (b) that the judicial determination of 
that reasonableness would, in turn, depend on considerations of public and legal 
policy in accordance with constitutional norms. Incidentally, to avoid confusion, it 
should be borne in mind that, what is meant by reasonableness in the context of 
wrongfulness has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the defendant's 
conduct, but it concerns the reasonableness of imposing liability on the defendant 
for the harm resulting from that conduct.”274 
 
The test for wrongfulness is an ex post facto assessment of objective reasonableness 
involving a balancing act of all relevant circumstances including those not foreseeable by 
the actor, general reasonableness, the legal convictions of the community, the boni mores 
                                                          
270 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 75; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (2012) 140.  
271 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 35; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 70.      
272 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 72; H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 BCLR 127 
(CC) 67; Loubser ‘Unlawfulness in the South African law of delict: Focus areas in the debate’ in Boezaart 
& De Kock (eds.) Vita perit, labor non moritur, Liber memorialis (2008) 117 at 143.  
273  2011 (3) SA 274 (CC).   
274 [122].  
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and public policy.275 The wrongfulness analysis is an open and structured process of 
judicial reasoning and the criteria applied in this process can be reduced to the following 
considerations:276  
 Was a right of the plaintiff infringed? Harm actively caused to person or property is 
prima facie wrongful, whereas the causation of pure economic loss or emotional shock 
is not. 
 Did the defendant breach a legal duty to the plaintiff not to cause harm or to prevent 
harm? The particular circumstances of the case may dictate that the defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty. For example, where the defendant had control over a dangerous 
object or situation, the defendant was aware of danger, the defendant had professional 
knowledge, or the parties were in a relationship imposing responsibility on the 
defendant.   
 Did the defendant breach a statutory duty to the plaintiff not to cause harm or to prevent 
harm? If the statute’s aims are consistent with those of delictual liability, breach of 
statutory duty may establish wrongfulness.  
 The nature of the defendant’s conduct. Causation of harm by a positive act is more 
readily considered wrongful than harm caused by omission. Physical causation of harm 
is more readily deemed wrongful than verbal causation of harm.  
 The nature of the defendant’s fault or state of mind. Wrongfulness will logically be more 
easily established where the harm was caused intentionally as opposed to negligently. 
A motive to cause harm often points to wrongfulness.  
 
                                                          
275 Boberg The Law of Delict, vol 1 (1984) 269-270; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 36, 40; 
Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 144-145. 
276 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 40-41; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 
(2012) 42 and authorities cited.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78 
In the context of product liability, wrongfulness would denote the unreasonable causing of 
harm by a defective product. By putting into circulation ‘potentially harmful things’, a 
manufacturer infringes the rights of others not to be exposed to danger without warning, 
which amounts to a breach of duty by the manufacturer to refrain from exposing the world 
so such ‘hidden snares’.277 The legal duty owed by a manufacturer is described by Van der 
Merwe and De Jager as: 
“...a general duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that defective products do not 
reach the market or, if they do, to withdraw them from the market, or to take other 
steps to ensure that no harm ensues from the presence of the product on the 
market. The criterion of reasonableness coupled with the community's concept of 
what behaviour is reasonable in given circumstances is flexible enough to take into 
account such factors as the type of product, the nature of the manufacturer's 
business enterprise, the customs and practices prevailing in a particular trade or 
industry, the amount of knowledge and expertise of potential purchasers and users 
of the product, abnormal use, and the specific stage in the production process 
during which a defect originated. The last-mentioned factor may influence the 
duties of a manufacturer in different ways. At the stage of planning or design, the 
manufacturer must take into account the most recent knowledge available in his 
field.”278 
 
If the harm caused by the product defect is purely economic, wrongfulness will depend on 
whether the defendant had a legal duty not to cause such harm, as the negligent causing 
of pure economic loss is not prima facie wrongful.279 Whether a legal duty exists is matter 
for judicial discretion, involving considerations of public or legal policy consistent with 
constitutional norms.280  
                                                          
277 Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) referring to Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 1932 SC (HL) 
31.  
278 Van der Merwe & De Jager ‘Products Liability: A Recent Unreported Case’ (1980) SALJ, 97 at 83, 88-89. 
279 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) at [38]. 
280 Ibid, citing Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 (2) SA 150 (SCA) at 
[12]; Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 75. 
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Defectiveness of a product is considered by some authors to form part of, or to be 
inherently linked to the wrongfulness enquiry, as the harm resulting from the use of a 
product is not necessarily wrongfully caused.281 It is argued that the concept of a ‘defective 
product’ plays a normative role in the process of assessing whether harm causing by the 
production and supply of a product should be branded wrongful.282 In other words, a court 
would need to consider a harmful product from a hindsight perspective in an objective 
manner, taking into account the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and society in 
general, when deciding whether a product is defective and for which liability should arise. 
Consider, for example, a pharmaceutical product which has certain side-effects or risks of 
harm, but nevertheless has great social utility. A court may hold in this case that the social 
utility of the product’s medical benefits outweighs the product’s risks and therefore, the 
harm suffered by a consumer of the product was not wrongful in the circumstances. If a 
court were to impose liability in these circumstances, manufacturers may cease to supply 
the product, thereby depriving society of its benefits. Linking product defectiveness to the 
element of wrongfulness is an important filter to liability so as to ensure an appropriate 
balance is struck between consumers, manufacturers and the interests of society at large. 
 
At common law, no separate rules have crystallised in respect of different types of product 
defects. In Herschel v Mrupe,283 the court referred to defective products as ‘potentially 
harmful things’. Nearly half a decade later, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ciba-Geigy 
(Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd284 described a defective product causing harm as a 
‘potentially hazardous’ product. It would be extremely difficult to draw a universally 
                                                          
281 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 344; Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the 
Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ Stell LR 17 at 419. 
282 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 40.  
283 1954 (3) SA 464 (A). 
284 2002 (2) SA 447 (SCA) par [64] at 470B-C/D and [66] D/E-G. 
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applicable dividing line indicating when products are so flawed that they should be 
considered ‘defective’ in a legal sense. Therefore, courts apply a flexible test for 
defectiveness, involving consideration of a range of relevant factors. As Van der Merwe & 
De Jager 285  explain, courts approach the defectiveness enquiry by applying general 
principles, essentially asking whether the product is ‘unreasonably dangerous’. They argue 
that:   
“The test is flexible enough to take into account such factors as the type of 
product, the nature of the manufacturer's business enterprise, the customs and 
practices prevailing in a particular trade or industry, the amount of knowledge and 
expertise of potential purchasers and users of the product, abnormal use, and the 
specific stage in the production process during which a defect originated. The last 
mentioned factor may influence the duties of a manufacturer in different ways. At 
the stage of planning or design, the manufacturer must take into account the most 
recent knowledge available in his field.” 286 
 
Specific factors relevant to the assessment of product defectiveness and wrongfulness, as 
outlined by Loubser & Reid,287 may include: 
 the production standards intended for the product by the manufacturer; 
 production standards prescribed by legislation for the product; 
 the possibility that the producer could reasonably have eliminated the harmful effect of 
the product by an alternative manufacturing process, design or otherwise, taking into 
account factors such as the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the product, and the 
proportionality of the risk of harm and the cost of prevention; 
 the magnitude of the risk that the harm will materialise as a result of the product 
condition; and the possible extent of harm; 
                                                          
285 Van der Merwe & De Jager ‘Products Liability: A Recent Unreported Case’ (1980) SALJ, 97 at 88. 
286 88-89. 
287 Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 45. 
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 the way in which, and the purposes for which, that product has been marketed, 
packaged and displayed; 
 any instructions for, or warnings in relation to the product;  
 the use of any trade description or mark; 
 the things that might reasonably be expected to be done with that product; 
 the time when the product was manufactured and supplied.  
 
These factors would of course have to be assessed from a hindsight or ex post facto 
perspective. It may be argued that consideration of the possibility of reasonably eliminating 
the harmful effect of the product amounts to the ‘reasonable preventability’ enquiry for 
purposes of establishing negligence. However, if this factor is considered objectively from 
a hindsight perspective having regard to general risk-utility factors, introduction of 
negligence-elements can be avoided in the defectiveness/wrongfulness enquiry. 
 
The factors relevant to defectiveness in the wrongfulness enquiry and the respective 
weight carried by each factor would logically depend on the specific facts of each case and 
the nature of the product and defect alleged by the plaintiff. For example, in the case of an 
allegedly defective pharmaceutical product, the hazards of which require advanced 
scientific knowledge, magnitude of the risk of harm and the warnings and dosage 
instructions accompanying the product would carry much weight in the assessment.  
 
A range of statutes and regulations set standards or benchmarks for product quality or 
safety. Examples of product types that are regulated by sector-specific legislation and 
regulations include foodstuffs, cosmetics and disinfectants, 288  agricultural products, 289 
                                                          
288 Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act 54 of 1972. 
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fertilisers and farm feeds,290  liquor,291  meat292  and medicines, related substances and 
blood products.293 Contravention of statutory production standards is only relevant to the 
question of defectiveness and whether causing of harm was wrongful in the 
circumstances.294 Unless it is clear that the intention of the statute as a whole is to impose 
strict civil liability for breach, a plaintiff will have to establish fault on the part of the 
defendant.295  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare 
Ltd, 296  a case involving an allegedly defective local anaesthetic, recognised that 
wrongfulness and defectiveness may present a considerable barrier to plaintiffs, even 
under a strict product liability system:  
“As counsel for the respondent correctly pointed out, even if strict liability applied, 
a plaintiff would still have to prove not only that the product was defective when 
used but defective when it left the manufacturer's control. In the case of a medical 
product, for example, that burden would in any event probably require expert 
evidence involving, no doubt, some complexities of scientific analysis. It might also 
be difficult for a plaintiff to acquire for examination the remaining portions of the 
administered product or unused samples from the same consignment as that from 
which the administered product came. Moreover, there would be the same need to 
prove factual and legal causation as exists when liability is fault-based.”297 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
289 Agricultural Product Standards Act 119 of 1990.  
290 Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947.  
291 Liquor Products Act 60 of 1989; Liquor Act 59 of 2003.  
292 Meat Safety Act 40 of 2000.  
293 Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965; National Health Act 61 of 1947.  
294 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 54-55. 
295 55. 
296 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA). 
297  [19]. 
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With respect to the relationship between wrongfulness and negligence, the test for both of 
these elements involves the application of a reasonableness standard.298 Boberg explains 
the distinction between reasonableness in the context of wrongfulness and 
reasonableness in the context of negligence as follows:  
“Where wrongfulness is in issue, the question is whether it was objectively 
unreasonable for the actor to bring about the consequence that he did, judged ex 
post facto and in the light of all relevant circumstances including those not 
foreseeable by the actor or beyond his control. Here the emphasis is upon the 
effect of the actor’s conduct, and a finding of wrongfulness expresses the law’s 
disapproval of the result that he produced. With negligence, on the other hand, the 
enquiry is whether the actor himself behaved unreasonably, judged in the light of 
his actual situation and what he ought to have foreseen and done in the 
circumstances that confronted him. Here the emphasis is upon the actor’s role in 
bringing about a consequence that has already been branded wrongful, and a 
finding of negligence expresses the law’s disapproval of the part that he personally 
played in producing it.”299 
  
Boberg’s analysis is disputed with respect to the idea that wrongfulness is always an ex 
post facto assessment, that is, assessment with a hindsight perspective.300 For instance, 
Fagan301 questions whether the legal duty in the context of wrongfulness is a duty not to 
cause harm or simply a duty not to be negligent. If it is the latter duty, then the elements of 
wrongfulness and negligence arguably overlap to a great extent.302 If it is a duty not to 
cause harm, it is unclear how this duty should be framed in order to distinguish it from the 
negligence standard.  
                                                          
298  Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 74; Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 
(2012) 50. 
299  Boberg The Law of Delict, vol 1 (1984) 269-279. 
300 Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) SALJ, 122 at 90; also Fagan Negligence in 
Zimmermann, Visser & Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and 
Obligations in South Africa and Scotland (2004) 498. 
301 ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ 122 (2005) SALJ 90.  
302 Loubser Unlawfulness in the South African Law of Delict: Focus area in the debate in Boezaart & De 
Kock (eds) Vita perit, labor non moritur, Liber memorialis (2008) 117 at 133.  
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In the context of manufacturer’s liability, the wrongfulness assessment has been bound up 
with the duty to refrain from “putting into circulation potentially harmful things”, as it was 
framed by the Appellate Division in Herschel v Mrupe.303 The existence of this legal duty 
depends partly on the standard for defectiveness, which in turn depends, at least partly, on 
the proportionality of risk of harm and the cost of prevention of that risk.304  
 
Courts in product liability cases have accepted that negligence is assessed based on what 
was reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the reasonable person in the 
manufacturer’s position. 305  However, courts have not formulated the standard for 
wrongfulness in detail, being the standard for determining the existence of a legal duty for 
purposes of wrongfulness.306 The reason for this may be that the focus in product liability 
cases has been predominantly on the question of negligence.307   
 
Loubser & Reid308 suggest that the basis for the distinction between the duty not to be 
negligent and the duty not to cause harm wrongfully can be inferred by analogy with cases 
involving liability of local authorities for failure to maintain public facilities or infrastructure, 
resulting in injury.309 In these cases, negligence would be assessed based on what was 
reasonably foreseeable and preventable by a local authority, considering the reasonably 
attainable maintenance inspection procedures, the cost of repairs and the degree of risk 
and potential harm involved. For purposes of wrongfulness, the fact that the state of 
disrepair was not reasonably foreseeable by the local authority, perhaps due to 
                                                          
303 1954 (3) SA 464 (A); Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 51. 
304 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 51, citing as an example of a proportionality 
analysis: Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 (4) SA 347 (A) 361H/I-362A/B; 363C.  
305  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 344-345; Boberg The Law of Delict, vol 1 (1984) 194. 
306 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 51. 
307 Ibid. 
308 51-53.  
309 See, for example: Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 (3) SA 1049 (SCA); Cape Town Municipality 
v April 1982 (1) SA 259 (C); Mostert v Cape Town City Council 2001 (1) SA 105 (SCA).  
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informational or organisational constraints, is not decisive. If the local authority had control 
over the infrastructure, had responsibility for its repair and the repair was physically and 
financially feasible, but the need for the repair was not reasonably foreseeable, then the 
failure to repair and prevent harm may be wrongful, but not negligent. Likewise, causing 
harm to an unforeseeable plaintiff could be considered wrongful, but not negligent.310  
 
Building on this analogy, Loubser & Reid 311  suggest an “imputation of foreseeability” 
approach with respect to product liability. Pursuant to this approach, the harm caused by 
designing a potentially harmful product might not be reasonably foreseeable, however, 
based on a cost/benefit analysis and consideration of other factors relevant to determining 
wrongfulness, the harm may be regarded as reasonably preventable. It follows that the 
harm caused by the product in this instance could be considered wrongful, but not 
negligent, as reasonable foreseeability is a prerequisite for negligence.  
 
The basis for this imputation of foreseeability approach draws on the so-called “imputation 
of knowledge” doctrine, which had some support in American product liability cases. The 
doctrine was applied by American courts with the aim of establishing a theoretical basis for 
strict liability by abandoning the requirement of foreseeable risk and imputing knowledge of 
danger or risk to the manufacturer.312 Loubser & Reid313 argue that a distinction between 
wrongfulness and negligence based on what they term the “imputation of foreseeability” 
approach could be applied in all product liability cases and may be of practical relevance 
when considering strict liability under the Consumer Protection Act.  
 
                                                          
310 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v De Villiers 1949 (1) SA 474 (C).  
311 Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 52-53. 
312 Miller & Goldberg Product Liability (2004) 365-366.  
313 Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 53.  
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It may be argued that the terminology of an imputation of “foreseeability” risks blurring the 
theoretical distinction between negligence and wrongfulness in that foreseeability falls 
squarely within the realm of the negligence element. In the context of a strict product 
liability regime, courts may therefore have a tendency to steer clear of any reference to 
negligence-related terminology such as foreseeability and preventability so as to 
emphasise the fundamental distinction between these two bases for liability. If, however, 
the imputation of foreseeability is understood properly as being an imputation based on a 
conclusion that the harm was reasonably preventable from a hindsight reasonableness 
perspective, it is arguably possible to apply this approach without reintroduction of a 
negligence element to the enquiry.  
 
2.3.1.2 Defences in the context of product liability  
2.3.1.2(i) Consent (volenti non fit iniuria) 
According to the Roman and Roman-Dutch principle volenti non fit iniuria, consent can 
justify the causation of harm.314 This principle applies equally to situations where a person 
consents to specific harm intentionally caused for a lawful purpose (e.g., medical 
procedures), as to situations where a person accepts the risk of harm associated with a 
dangerous activity (e.g. participation in a contact sport).315  
 
Consent to intentional harm for a lawful purpose may provide a defence to a manufacturer 
where it can be shown that the consumer-plaintiff was willing to suffer the product’s 
harmful side-effects in order to gain an overall health benefit.316 Further, consent to the risk 
of harm, also referred to as voluntary assumption of risk, may provide a defence where the 
                                                          
314 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 121; De Groot 3 35 8; Voet 47 10 4.  
315 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 112-113; Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 
(2005) 140; Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 (4) SA 764 (A) 775.  
316 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 148.  
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consumer was willing to run the risk of suffering potential side-effects of a product.317 A 
consumer who deliberately ignores instructions or warnings accompanying a product or 
deliberately misuses a product, could be regarded as having voluntarily assumed the risk 
of harm.318  
 
To succeed with the defence of consent, it must be shown that the plaintiff validly 
consented to the harm or risk of harm associated with the product. The characteristics and 
requirements for valid consent can be summarised as follows:319 
 Consent can be given unilaterally by the plaintiff. 
 Consent can be given verbally or tacitly by conduct. However, consent must be 
indicated externally in a clear, manifest way. 
 Consent must be given prior to the occurrence of harm. 
 The consenting party must be capable of expressing his or her will, i.e. the mental ability 
to understand his or her actions. 
 Consent must be given without any moral, social or economic pressure. 
 The consenting party must have full knowledge of the nature and extent of the harm or 
risk of harm. 




In the last instance, consent must be lawful in that it must align with reasonableness, the 
boni mores and legal convictions of the community.320 For instance, consent to a form of 
                                                          
317 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 121. 
318 See, for instance, examples discussed in Miller & Goldberg Product Liability (2004) par 17.111. 
319 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 115 - 118; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (2012) 164 - 166. 
320 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 123; Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South 
Africa (2012) 166. 
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harm that contravenes a statute would be contrary to the legal convictions of the 
community and unlawful.321  
 
Where it can be shown that a manufacturer was negligent in supplying a defective product, 
courts are generally reluctant to accept that the plaintiff consented to the manufacturer’s 
negligence. 322 While recognising consent as a defence in principle, courts are more 
inclined in these circumstances to view the plaintiff’s voluntary exposure to the risk of harm 
as contributory negligence.323 Damages can then be apportioned according to the extent 
of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in order to achieve a fair result.324 
 
2.3.1.2(ii) Contractual exemption or limitation 
A prior agreement not to claim damages for harm caused by the conduct of another, 
(pactum de non petendo in anticipando), may preclude a plaintiff from recovering damages 
for harm negligently caused by a product defect.325 This should be distinguished from 
consent, in that a pactum de non petendo is contractual whereas consent is unilateral 
conduct by the consenting person.326 
 
A contractual provision that purports to exclude liability for harm intentionally caused would 
be contrary to public policy and invalid, whereas exclusion of negligence or even gross 
negligence may be valid.327 It is worth noting that courts have questioned whether clauses 
                                                          
321 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 118. 
322 Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 140.  
323 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 151; see also Miller & Goldberg Product Liability (2004) 
par 17.111.  
324 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 125. 
325 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 67; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Deliktereg (2014) 
119. 
326 Loubser & Reid Product Liability in South Africa 152. 
327 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 67; Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 807; Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Roberts 
Constructions (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 All SA 146 (SCA) 30.  
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excluding liability for negligent causation of personal injury or death are not invalid due to 
being contrary to public policy, informed by constitutional norms and values.328  
 
In the context of product liability, a manufacturer may, as the law currently stands, supply a 
product pursuant to a sale agreement whereby it validly excludes liability for any 
negligence, or even gross negligence, on its part in respect of the production of a defective 
product, the quality control processes, the warnings, instructions or labelling information 
accompanying the product.   
 
2.3.1.2(iii) Contributory responsibility   
The Apportionment of Damages Act329 (‘ADA’) allows for apportionment of damages in 
cases where the defendant can show that another party or parties contributed to the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff. The co-contributor(s) may be the plaintiff (contributory negligence), 
other defendant or defendants (joint wrongdoers) or a combination of these.   
  
Section 1(1)(a) of the ADA provides that a court may reduce damages “to such an extent 
as the court may deem just and equitable having regard to the degree in which the 
claimant was at fault in relation to the damage.” 
 
In the context of product liability, contributory negligence may be raised, for instance, 
where a plaintiff misused a product, tampered with it, failed to maintain the product or 
ignored warnings or instructions accompanying the product. If contributory negligence is 
established, a court may reduce the amount of damages in accordance with the plaintiff’s 
contribution to the harm.  
                                                          
328  Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 67, citing Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 
2010 4 All SA 96 (KZD) 36 and the court’s obiter comments regarding policy factors that would point to 
invalidity of such exemption clauses. 
329 34 of 1956.  
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Section 2 of the ADA provides a right of recovery between concurrent wrongdoers. A court 
may apportion damages between concurrent wrongdoers on the basis of what the court 
deems ‘just and equitable’, having regard to the degree in which each joint wrongdoer was 
“at fault in relation to the damage suffered by the plaintiff.”330  
 
A plaintiff who is harmed by a defective product may choose to sue the manufacturer and 
another party or parties in the supply chain, such as the retailer or distributor of the 
product. If it can be established that more than one defendant contributed to the harm, 
they are joint wrongdoers, and a court will apportion damages in accordance with each 
defendant’s contribution to the harm.  
A case of joint wrongdoers may also arise where, for instance, a product incorporates 
various components, some or all of which the manufacturer sourced from other suppliers. 
If the cause of the product defect can be traced to a particular component, the 
manufacturer would seek to argue that the supplier of that component is partly at fault.  
 
2.4 CONCURRENCE OF COMMON LAW ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES 
In modern legal systems, the notion concurrence is generally understood in two senses.331 
In the ‘broad’ sense, it refers to the ‘simultaneous applicability’ of two or more legal rules to 
one factual situation.332 Under this definition, the parties are not necessarily in a direct 
contractual relationship. Concurrence in the ‘narrow’ sense, or ‘true’ concurrence, occurs 
                                                          
330 Sections 2(6)(a), 2(7)(a) & 2(8)(a). 
331 See Chapter 1, par 1.3.2. and discussion by Van Aswegen Die Sameloop van Eise om Skadevergoeding 
uit Kontrakbreuk en Delik (1991). 
332 Van Aswegen Die Sameloop van Eise om Skadevergoeding uit Kontrakbreuk en Delik (1991) 6-7 and 
authorities cited here; Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 63. For South African cases 
involving concurrence of actions in the narrow sense, see, for instance: Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; 
Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A); MEDIA 24 
Ltd v Grobler 2005 (6) SA 328 (SCA); SM Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2000 
(4) SA 1019 (SCA); Pinshaw v Nexus Securities (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 510 (C); Holtzhausen v ABSA 
Bank Ltd 2008 (5) SA 630 (SCA). 
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where different legal rules apply to the same factual situation, between the same persons, 
and where those rules have similar aims and consequences.333  
 
The controversial question posed by narrow contract/delict concurrence is whether a 
claimant can recover patrimonial loss resulting from breach of contract by means of a 
delictual action. In other words, when does the existence of a contract between the parties 
exclude an action in delict for patrimonial loss and when does an independent delictual 
duty not to cause such harm arise outside the contractual terms?334 
 
Under South African common law, a plaintiff generally has a choice between claiming 
damages ex contractu or ex delicto where breach of contract results in the unlawful and 
culpable causation of harm, or he can institute these claims in the alternative.335 However, 
the delictual remedy would only be available alternatively where the claimant can prove 
that a legally recognised interest, which exists independently of their contract with the 
defendant, has been unlawfully and culpably infringed. 336  This is known as the 
“independent delict test”, essentially asking whether the defendant owed the claimant a 
duty of care outside the realm of their contractual relationship.337  
 
Whether a court will recognise a concurrent delictual claim for damages within a 
contractual setting is a question of wrongfulness, asking whether general reasonableness, 
boni mores, the legal convictions of the community, and ultimately policy, dictate that a 
                                                          
333  Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 63. 
334  Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 190. 
335 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 64; Neethling, Potgieter, Visser Deliktereg (2014) 279. 
336 Ibid. See Kohler Flexible Packaging (Pinetown) (Pty) Ltd v Marianhill Mission Institute 2000 1 SA 141 (D) 
145; Otto v Santam Versekering Bpk 1992 3 SA 615. 
337 Holtzhauzen v ABSA Bank Ltd 2008 (5) SA630 (SCA).  
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concurrent duty of care exists in delict.338 A number of key policy considerations can be 
gleaned from case law on this question. 
 
The consideration of potential indeterminate liability becomes relevant where recognition 
of delictual liability would expose the defendant to a multiplicity of claims by an 
indeterminate number of plaintiffs, or a limited number of claims that are unable to be 
quantified.339 In both cases, insurability is relevant. Where there is a risk of multiplicity of 
actions, the indeterminate volume of claims may render the risk of loss uninsurable at a 
reasonable cost.340 Where an individual claim is unquantifiable, it is arguable that each 
plaintiff is best positioned to foresee the extent of its loss and protect itself adequately. The 
defendant would often not even be able to estimate the plaintiff’s potential loss. The risk of 
opening the floodgates of liability is a particularly weighty factor in cases of pure economic 
loss. 
 
Courts would be reluctant to recognise concurrent delictual liability where adequate 
alternative means of protection from the risk of loss were reasonably available to the 
plaintiff.341 The question is whether the plaintiff could reasonably have been expected to 
protect itself by other means, such as contractual arrangements with third parties or by 
obtaining proper insurance cover.342  
 
The most frequently cited policy consideration for excluding concurrent delictual liability is 
based on the notion that, where the parties’ relationship is governed by contract, the law 
                                                          
338 Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2010) 190. 
339 Stapleton ‘Duty of care and economic loss: a wider agenda’ (1991) LQR, 07 at 254. 
340 Hutchison & Van Heerden ‘The contract/tort divide seen from the South African perspective’ (1997) Acta 
Juridica 109-110. 
341 111-112; Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 64. 
342 Hutchison & Van Heerden ‘The contract/tort divide seen from the South African perspective’ (1997) Acta 
Juridica 112. 
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should not superimpose a further form of liability as the parties had the opportunity to 
comprehensively regulate where the risk of loss lies.343 Imposition of delictual liability may 
circumvent contractual terms governing arbitration of disputes and limitation of liability.  
 
Courts have also raised concerns over legal uncertainty regarding the applicable standard 
of care against which a defendant’s conduct should be measured where concurrent 
delictual liability is recognised. It is not entirely clear how the delictual standard of the 
bonus paterfamilias would be determined or whether it could be higher or lower than the 
contractual standard. From a commercial perspective, it may be undesirable to hold a 
party to a higher standard in delict than what he agreed to in contract. 
 
Courts have recognised concurrent contractual and delictual claims in cases involving 
property damage or bodily harm.344 Concurrent contractual and delictual actions are also 
possible in cases of pure economic loss, provided the delictual action is based on an 
independent duty not to cause such loss, as distinct from a duty deriving from the 
contract.345  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION: Does the common law provide adequate protection for harm 
caused by product defects? 
Van Eeden argues that, due to the particular requirements for establishing liability under 
common law remedies, many suppliers and manufacturers of defective products in South 
Africa have “effectively enjoyed virtual immunity from liability for product defect claims.”346  
 
                                                          
343 Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA).  
344 Midgley et al ‘Delict’ in LAWSA vol 15, 3 ed (2016) 64; Loubser & Reid The Law of Delict in South Africa 
(2012) 192-193.  
345 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A). 
346 Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 372. 
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As outlined in this chapter, the common law remedies available to persons who have 
suffered harm due to defective products are subject to numerous theoretical limitations in 
scope and present particular practical difficulties in obtaining redress, mainly due to 
demanding evidentiary burdens of proof in respect of causation, fault and defectiveness of 
products, exacerbated by the informational and financial imbalances existing between 
manufacturers and plaintiffs. The limitations and difficulties posed by common law 
remedies identified in this chapter are summarised as follows:  
 Due to the doctrine of privity of contract, contractual damages claims for breach of 
contract or pre-contractual misrepresentation against the supplier of a defective 
product are only available to consumers who stand in a direct contractual relationship 
to the supplier. This excludes bystanders or other third parties who suffer harm as a 
result of a defective good sold to a consumer.  
 Contractual privity prevents a consumer from bringing a claim directly against a 
manufacturer where the defective product was supplied to the consumer by a 
distributor or retailer further down the supply chain.  
 Standard contractual warranties relating to the quality of products are often limited in 
scope given that they are determined solely by the party providing the warranty, as 
opposed to negotiation. 
 It may be difficult for a purchaser to establish that there was an implied contractual 
warranty as to the quality of a product in the contract of sale. Courts are reluctant to 
imply tacit terms into contracts of sale and would only do so where necessary to give 
efficacy to the contract. Further, contracts of sale often expressly exclude any implied 
terms as to the quality of the product sold. 
 Sellers often exclude the common law implied warranty that a product sold is free of 
latent defects by including a voetstoots clause in the contract of sale.  
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 Contractual claims for damages do not enable a consumer to recover damages for 
non-patrimonial harm, such as pain and suffering damages.  
 In order to claim contractual damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish 
factual and legal causation between the defective product sold and the harm suffered. 
It may not always be possible for a plaintiff to recover consequential damages by way 
of a contractual claim, as distinguished from harm caused directly by the product 
defect, as the consequential harm suffered may be too remote to satisfy the legal 
causation requirement. 
 A contractual or delictual claim for damages may be precluded by a contractual 
exclusion or exemption clause. 
 A contractual claim for damages may prove fruitless in circumstances where the seller 
is merely a retailer, importer or distributor of a defective product manufactured 
overseas and that retailer, importer or distributor is impecunious and uninsured.  
 The remedies for pre-contractual misrepresentation by a seller that a product is free 
from defects are only available to the purchaser who was induced into the contract of 
sale by that misrepresentation. Third parties who are injured by a defective product 
have no contractual recourse against a seller who made a fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation as to the defect-free nature of the product.  
 The aedilitian remedies are only available to consumers who stand in a direct 
contractual relation to the manufacturer or merchant-seller of the defective goods.  
 The Aquilian action’s requirements of fault and causation often presents a very difficult 
or impossible burden of proof for plaintiffs. This is particularly so in the case of 
products of a complex or technical nature. Plaintiffs are generally unfamiliar with the 
technicalities of production processes or the scientific knowledge or technology 
available at the relevant time. In practice, there is often a marked informational and 
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financial imbalance between plaintiffs and manufacturers in that manufacturers 
generally have more financial and informational resources available to produce expert 
evidence in their defence. 
 A bystander who was injured by a defective product being used by another person 
may have difficulty establishing that the manufacturer of that product owed him or her 
a duty of care for purposes of negligence.  
 While courts may assist a plaintiff by applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in cases 
where the facts justify an inference of negligence, judicial application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine is limited in South Africa and is yet to be applied in a product liability 
case brought under the Aquilian action. 
 Where the plaintiff had the opportunity to inspect the product prior to use, the 
foreseeability requirement may present difficulties in establishing negligence under the 
Aquilian action.  
 Plaintiffs may be contractually precluded from claiming delictual damages for harm 
negligently caused by a product defect. 
 Where the plaintiff stood in a direct contractual relationship with the supplier of a 
defective product, a court may refuse to allow a concurrent delictual claim for pure 
economic loss where the plaintiff is unable to show that the supplier owed an 
independent duty not to cause such loss, as distinct from a duty deriving from the 
contract. 
 
In light of these limitations of, and difficulties posed by common law remedies, coupled 
with South African courts’ refusal to develop delictual law to the point of recognising strict 
product liability, it is clear that the scope of protection afforded by the common law to 
persons harmed by defective goods was indeed inadequate, warranting statutory 
intervention.   
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comparative outline of selected foreign strict product 
liability regimes, focussed specifically on elements of these regimes which are relevant 
and applicable to the interpretation of the South African strict product liability regime 
introduced by section 61 of the CPA. In analysing the various possible interpretations of 
the section 61 provisions in Chapter 4 below, the study cross-references the relevant 
Australian, European and American legal developments in this field, as outlined in this 
chapter. A comprehensive review of the literature regarding the selected foreign regimes is 
beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight and 
home in on selected elements of these regimes that are of particular relevance in light of 
the provisions and concepts incorporated into the CPA’s product liability framework. 
 
This chapter aims to offer a more detailed, focussed legal comparison of these foreign 
strict product liability regimes for the specific purpose of assisting South African courts and 
lawyers in the future interpretation and application of certain elements section 61, in 
addition to existing South African literature regarding product liability in general.  
 
The majority of countries in which product liability has developed as a distinct field of law 
have sought to codify the core elements of liability.347 Today, product liability in these 
jurisdictions generally rest on three building blocks: (a) special (mainly statutory) regimes 
creating liability for defective products; (b) general tort principles; (c) and contractual 
warranties.348 The global trend toward improved consumer protection and strict, or stricter, 
product liability has resulted in the adoption of either free-standing product liability statutes, 
                                                          
347  Reimann 'Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?' (2003) Am. J. Comp. L. 51 at 759. 
348 762. 
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more comprehensive consumer protection statutes or the introduction of special liability 
provisions to the general tort sections of civil codes.349  
 
One of the key elements of a strict, no-fault product liability rule is the defectiveness 
standard against which products are measured. As Loubser & Reid350 point out: 
‘Under a fault-based system, the negligence requirement acts as an important filter 
in the evaluative process to decide whether liability should be imposed. If the 
requirement of negligence is discarded to create strict liability, the question 
whether the product defect was reasonably foreseeable or discoverable is no 
longer relevant.’ 
 
Generally speaking, strict liability requires proof of a product defect, damage, and the 
causal link between them. In the absence of negligence, the most important ‘filter’ to strict 
liability arguably becomes the standard against which products are measured to determine 
defectiveness. Although there is considerable variation in the formulation of the 
defectiveness standard, most legal systems rely on one of two broadly definable 
approaches:  
 A consumer expectations standard, asking what persons are generally entitled to expect 
of a product’s safety; or  
 A risk-utility analysis, involving a broad balancing of all relevant factors asking whether 
the product risks outweigh its utility.351 
 
With respect to the defectiveness standard, this chapter examines the ‘consumer 
expectations test’ as formulated in the European Directive on Product Liability, the 
                                                          
349 758. 
350 Loubser & Reid 'Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique' 
(2006) Stell LR 17 at 422. 
351 Reimann 'Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?' (2003) Am. J. Comp. L. 51 at 759. 
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interpretation of this standard in selected EU member states as well as the equivalent test 
contained in the Australian Consumer Law. This is contrasted with the widespread 
rejection of the consumer expectations standard in the United States in the context of 
design and inadequate warning or instruction defects in favour of a risk-utility analysis. The 
differences between these two standards are discussed below. 
 
Apart from the concept of defectiveness, this chapter analsys further key aspects of these 
foreign strict product liability frameworks including the scope of parties liable, the potential 
claimants, the type of products and harm covered, the test for causation and the statutory 
defences available. 
 
This chapter concludes by providing a summary of the main similarities and differences 
between these foreign product liability frameworks as well as useful principles and insights 
that can be gleaned from foreign case law regarding the interpretation and application of 
these frameworks. As noted above at 1.4.1, when conducting applied comparative 
research, it is important to remain conscious of the fundamental differences in legal 
traditions of other jurisdictions and the unique policy contexts which have shaped the 
comparative legislative instruments in those jurisdictions.  
 
3.2 UNITED STATES 
3.2.1 The US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 1998 
In the late 19th century, a growing trend to impose strict warranty or negligence liability on 
commercial sellers of defective goods emerged in numerous states across America.352 
The consumer, whose main obstacle in succeeding with a negligence claim being the 
                                                          
352 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, section 1, comment (a). 
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burden of proving fault, was increasingly aided by a flexible application of res ipsa 
loquitur.353 Although the defendant could, in theory, rebut the inference of negligence by 
showing that the harm caused by the defective product was not avoidable by exercising 
reasonable care, such cases were by the 1960’s considered “so extremely rare as to be 
negligible.”354 Although courts insisted they were using negligence standards, liability in 
tort became increasingly strict.   
    
Notwithstanding proof that all possible care had been exercised in the preparation and 
distribution of the goods, sellers could nevertheless be held liable on the faultless basis of 
warranty. However, given that strict warranty liability is ring-fenced by the requirement of 
contractual privity, third parties to a particular agreement, such as family members or 
employees of the purchaser of a product, were precluded from bringing actions for 
contractual damages. As a result of this doctrinal barrier, American courts in the early 
1900’s began to depart from classical warranty theory.355 The majority of state jurisdictions 
followed the rule in McPherson v Buick Motor Co.,356 in which the New York Court of 
Appeals held “there is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A, who has 
contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others according as he knows or does not know 
that the subject-matter of the contract is intended for their use.”     
 
Contrary to the doctrinal rule, vertical non-privity plaintiffs were for the first time allowed to 
sue the manufacturer of a faulty product on the basis of an implied warranty.357 Later, in 
                                                          
353 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 593. See, for example, Escola v 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1944) 150 P2d 436. 
354 Prosser 'The Assault upon the Citadel' (1960) Yale Law Journal 69 at 1115. Deakin, Johnston & 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 593. 
355 Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 14. 
356 1916 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050. 
357 Stapleton 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 
Washburn Law Journal 39 at 366, citing Mazetti v Armour & Co 135 P 633 (Wash.1913).  
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Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc358 abandonment of privity also extended horizontally 
in favour of consumers who fell entirely outside the contractual chain of supply.359 The 
court held that: 
 
"…where the commodities sold are such that if defectively manufactured they will 
be dangerous to life and limb, then society's interests can only be protected by 
eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and the 
reasonably expected ultimate consumer...[384] Accordingly, we hold that under 
modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the 
stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that 
is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the 
ultimate purchaser. The absence of agency between the manufacturer and the 
dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.”360 
 
             Manufacturer 
 
             (Vertical chain)    Distributor 
 
                   Retailer              Consumer               User 
  
                (Horizontal chain) 
 
Fig. 1 Vertical and horizontal chains of supply361 
 
By the early 1960's, American courts were generally of the opinion that sellers of defective 
products should be liable for harm caused, regardless of whether a warranty or negligence 
claim could be maintained.362  In the landmark judgment of Greenman v Yuba Power 
                                                          
358 32 N.J. 358,161 A.2d 69 (N.J.1960). 
359 Stapleton 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 
Washburn Law Journal 39 at 366. 
360 379. 
361 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 608. 
362 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, section 1, comment (a). 
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Products Inc,363 the Supreme Court of California, faced once again with a warranty claim in 
relation to a defective product, chose to abandon the language of warranty altogether and 
to impose instead upon the manufacturer a general strict liability in tort. The Court 
acknowledged that: 
 
“although strict liability has traditionally been based on an express or implied 
warranty given by the manufacturer, the fact that the contractual nexus 
requirement has been abandoned, the recognition that liability for defective 
products does not arise from an agreement but is imposed by law and the refusal 
to allow the manufacturer to define the scope of its liability for defective products 
make it clear that product liability is not governed by the law of contractual 
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.”364 
 
Leading up to this decision, it had already been widely thought that many courts were, 
under the guise of negligence, holding manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury caused 
by manufacturing defects.365  This, it was believed, resulted from a combination of an 
exceptionally high standard of care, vicarious liability, and a flexible application of res ipsa 
loquitur, making it nearly impossible for manufacturers to succeed with exculpatory 
defences.366  
 
In short, the American movement toward strict liability for defective products was driven 
along two routes.367 The courts’ apparent dissatisfaction with traditional negligence and 
warranty remedies led, initially, to an extension of warranty liability beyond the borders of 
privity, and later, to a gradual rising in the strictness of negligence liability up to the point, 
in the early 1960’s, where it was judicially proclaimed to be strict liability in tort.368 
                                                          
363 377 P 2d 897 (1963) 
364 901 (Traynor J). 
365 Stapleton 'Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) Washburn Law Journal 39 at 381. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 594. 
368 Ibid. 
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The next logical step was to regularise this novel strict liability in tort by drafting a broad 
liability rule that would guide courts in its application. To that effect, the American Law 
Institute published the Restatement (Second) of Torts,369 containing in section 402A a 
model version of strict tort liability, which was adopted by the majority of American 
jurisdictions at the time.370 Strict liability in tort would, as the Reporters of the Restatement 
(Third) phrased it, “merge the concept of implied warranty, in which negligence is not 
required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which contractual privity is not required.”371 
 
 
Liability in terms of section 402A was based on the core notion of a product which reached 
the consumer “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.” In comment (i) to section 
402A, the Restatement (Second) introduced a test for defectiveness, which reads that “the 
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.”  
 
Although it was argued by some that section 402A’s use of wording such as 'unreasonably 
dangerous' seems to essentially utilise negligence rhetoric, it was maintained that the 
focus here is on whether the product was unreasonably hazardous from the viewpoint of 
the consumer and not on the blameworthiness of the manufacturer’s conduct.372 
 
The formulation of comment (i) was utilised by a number of American courts as the basis 
for applying what came to be known as the 'consumer expectations test' for 
                                                          
369 (1965). 
370 Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 17; Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 598. 
371 Restatement (Third) of Tort: Products Liability section1, comment (a). 
372 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 599. 
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defectiveness.373 Regrettably, and for reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter, 
this legal standard proved unsuitable as a controlling test for product defectiveness and 
attracted severe academic criticism. It is therefore hardly surprising that this test was 
rejected by the Reporters in the subsequent Restatement (Third) as an independent 
measure of defect.   
 
Furthermore, comment (i) allowed courts to develop a separate 'risk-utility defence', over 
and above the numerous defences that were provided for in section 402A.374 Particularly in 
the context of design defects, this ‘risk-utility defence', comprising a balancing of the costs 
and benefits of product innovation on society, not unfamiliar to the negligence lawyer, was 
developed by the courts to avoid a situation of absolute liability.375 As regards specifically 
listed defences under section 402A, comment (g), for example, exempted the defendant 
from liability if he “delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or 
other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed.”  
 
In addition, manufacturers of what was termed 'unavoidably unsafe products', mainly 
aimed at prescription and high-risk pharmaceutical products, could escape strict liability in 
terms of comment (k), provided these products were properly prepared and marketed, and 
adequate warnings were given. This defence was justified on the grounds of utility: a 
manufacturer should not be liable for seeking to provide the public with an 'apparently 
useful and desirable product, attended with a known, but apparently reasonable risk'. In its 
                                                          
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Birnbaum 'Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to 
Negligence' (1980) Vand.LR 33 at 593, 600. 
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very first form, section 402A essentially represented a strict tort liability regime, tempered 
with negligence elements and extensive provision for defences.376  
 
With the introduction of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 402A was replaced by a 
new formulation of liability. One major change brought about by the Restatement (Third) is 
the differentiation between types of defects. Manufacturing defects, design defects and 
products which are defective due to inadequate instructions or warnings are dealt with 
separately under section 2 and accorded varying forms of liability. The second important 
departure from the Restatement (Second) was the clear and unequivocal rejection of the 
consumer expectations test as a controlling standard for defect,377 and the replacement 
thereof with multiple definitions of defect, set out in section 2, comment (e) to section 2, as 
well as sections 3 and 4, and special standards of liability for certain product groups, such 
as prescription drugs and medical devices378 and food products.379 
 
Understanding the Restatement (Third)’s formal status within the legal environment which 
it seeks to inform, or reform, is pivotal prior to a discussion of its substantive provisions. In 
essence, restatements are of mere advisory value to state legislatures and courts and their 
formulation tends to be strongly influenced by stakeholder interests on both sides of a 
debate.380 It is not entirely certain which approach to codification restatements should 
adopt. The Restatement (Second) followed an 'outer rim' approach to codification, i.e. 
reflecting the maximum liability that has been imposed by courts in an area. In contrast, 
the Reporters describe the Restatement (Third) as a recording of the 'consensus' position, 
                                                          
376 Conk 'Is there a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?' (2000) Yale Law 
Journal 109 at 1094. 
377 Comment (g). 
378 Section 6. 
379 Section 7. 
380 Stapleton 'Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) Washburn Law Journal 39 at 371. 
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indicating where the weight of authority in a particular area lies.381  As Stapleton382 argues, 
both approaches may be misleading to courts. For instance, if courts mistakenly misread 
the 'outer rim' approach as reflecting the consensus position on a matter, a restatement 
could encourage expansionist legal reform. Conversely, the 'consensus' approach may be 
misinterpreted by courts as reflecting the outer borders of liability, thereby effecting a 
“retrenching dynamic of legal change.”383  
 
Regardless of the reformist impact it may have had until now, the Restatement (Third) 
reflected, at the time of its introduction, a clear and continuing change of course in 
American strict product liability principles.384 Courts had been, for quite some time, relying 
increasingly on a risk-utility standard for defectiveness, in apparent preference to a test 
based on consumer expectations.385 There had been marked relaxation of the strict-liability 
requirements of the 'state of the art' defence in many states, and courts had gradually 
become more inclined to limit the scope of manufacturers’ liability.386  
 
Empirical studies conducted on appellate court judgments show that plaintiffs’ success 
rate in product liability claims began to decline steadily by the early 1980’s.387 Whereas 
initially, consumer protection was the main driving force for the imposition and 
institutionalisation of strict product liability in the 1960's, the American regime has become 




384 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 604. 
385 Ibid. Courts, however, denied that this reverts to negligence standards, as the focal point of judgment is 
the product itself rather than the conduct of the manufacturer.  
386 605. 
387 Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 3; Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
Tort Law (2012) 606. These studies, conducted by Professors Henderson and Eisenberg, indicate that 
courts were becoming increasingly pro-defendant, by dismissing claims pre-trial on questions of law, 
thereby preventing judgment by juries, who are traditionally more pro-plaintiff. See: Henderson & 
Eisenberg 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability' (1991) Anglo-American Law Review 20 at 188. 
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noticeably more conservative over the last two and a half decades, arguably in an effort to 
increase industry protection against allegedly overblown liability rules.388  
 
3.2.1.1 Parties liable         
The Restatement (Third) imposes liability upon a broad range of defendants, including 
commercial sellers and distributors. In terms of section 1, “one who is engaged in the 
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective 
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”  
 
 
This would therefore include manufacturers and commercial sellers/retailers, 
distributors/wholesalers and importers of defective goods into the US. Among the reasons 
cited by the Reporters389 for extending liability to all actors in the distribution chain is the 
belief that wholesalers and retailers are in a better position than individual consumers and 
users, to absorb the risks of defective products, and that they will, in turn, be able to 
recover liability costs from the manufacturer. Moreover, due to the sometimes extended 
nature of modern supply chains, plaintiffs regularly face procedural challenges in joining 
manufacturers in product claims. A further argument in favour of this inclusive category of 
defendants is that, by holding wholesalers and retailers strictly liable, the interests of users 
and consumers will be better protected, in the sense that the former will be encouraged to 
deal only with trustworthy and financially responsible manufacturers and distributors 




                                                          
388 Reimann 'Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?' (2003) AmJCompL 760. 
389 Section 2, comment (a). 
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3.2.1.2 Potential claimants 
Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) simply refers to harm to ‘persons or property’. In 
section 3, reference is made to harm sustained by the ‘plaintiff’’. In other words, any 
person who suffers harm due to a defective product is arguably entitled to bring a claim 
against the commercial seller or distributor. 
 
Section 21 defines “harm to persons or property” in the context of recovery of economic 
loss to include any economic loss caused by “harm to the plaintiff’s person” or “the person 
of another when harm to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by 
tort law.” In other words, this section confirms that plaintiffs may also be dependants of a 
person who is physically harmed by a defective product. 
 
3.2.1.3 Goods 
Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) defines a ‘product’ as follows:   
  
“(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or 
consumption. Other items, such as real property and electricity, are products 
when the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the 
distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply 
the rules stated in this Restatement.  
(b)  Services, even when provided commercially, are not products.  
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not 
subject to the rules of this Restatement.”   
 
The Restatement (Third)’s definition of “product” is essentially restricted to tangible goods, 
however, a few types of intangible goods have attracted strict liability. The majority of 
American jurisdictions have held that, once electricity has been distributed to the 
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consumer through the meter, it is subject to strict product liability.390 A minority of courts 
have declined to impose strict liability in the context of electrical injuries on the basis that 
the provision of electricity is a service.391 A number of American courts have held that 
high-voltage electricity is not subject to product liability as the high-voltage electricity has 
not yet been converted to a form for delivery to a consumer.392 For instance, if a plaintiff 
comes into contact with a high-voltage distribution line, product liability does not apply, 
however, the electrical supplier may be negligent in relation to the manner in which the 
electricity was distributed, for instance, by an uninsulated or low-hanging distribution 
power line. 
 
The definition of “product” does not refer to component products, however the 
Restatement (Third) provides specifically for liability of commercial sellers or distributors of 
defective product components for harm caused by another product into which that 
defective component was integrated. The majority of American courts do not consider 
property in the form of information to be a “product.” The reason for this is that courts are 
concerned from a policy perspective that imposition of strict liability for the distribution of 
false or defective information would encroach considerably on free speech.393  
 
While the definition of “product” is silent on whether second-hand goods are included, any 
second-hand tangible good that is “distributed commercially for use or consumption” would 




                                                          
390 Standler ‘Legal Liability for Electricity in the USA: Products Liability’ (2011) 11. Available [online]: 
www.rbs2.com/utility.pdf. 
391  28. 
392  11. 
393  Restatement (Third) section 19, comment (d). 
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3.2.1.4 Causation 
Section 15 of the Restatement (Third) provides a general rule regarding the causal 
connection between a product defect and harm as follows: 
“Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or property is determined by 
the prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort.” 
 
Causation in US tort law involves two enquiries, namely the factual cause of the injury and 
the legal/proximate cause of the injury (based on policy considerations), both of which are 
determined by a jury. A review of the general principles governing causation in American 
tort law is beyond the scope of this study. However, a few brief comments are warranted in 
relation to the impact of the causation requirement on strict product liability. 
 
In relation to factual causation, a plaintiff is required to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the harm would not have occurred ‘but for’ the product defect. 394 The 
plaintiff must show that the defect is capable of causing the general type of harm suffered 
(general causation) and the particular harm in question (specific causation) and the fact 
that the defect was present in a product commercially distributed by the defendant  
(individualised causation). 395  Plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing all of these 
elements, either due to the nature of the accident, the defect or the product.396 
 
US courts have recognised a so-called “material contribution to risk” rule in the context of 
asbestos-related cancer claims where there is a single wrongdoer. Under this rule, 
plaintiffs need only show that exposure to the defendant’s asbestos products was, in 
                                                          
394  Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 201. 
395  Ibid.  
396  Ibid. 
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reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in contributing to the risk of developing 
cancer.397  
 
With its roots in the law of negligence, section 3 of the Restatement (Third) fulfils a 
function analogous to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine by allowing an inference of defect to be 
drawn when justified by the facts of the harm-causing incident.398 According to section 3: 
  
“It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific 
defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product 
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.” 
 
Although this provision is occasionally applied in cases involving a design defect, the 
majority of cases brought under this section involve alleged manufacturing defects.399 The 
Reporters make it clear that application of this section is restricted to cases where the 
product to failed to perform its manifestly intended function, thereby lending support to the 
conclusion that a product defect is the most likely explanation for the harm caused.400 The 
malfunction theory or doctrine, as some courts refer to it, 'permits a plaintiff to prove a 
defect in a product with evidence of the occurrence of a malfunction and with evidence 
eliminating abnormal use or reasonable, secondary causes…'401 Since the plaintiff is not 
required to prove the specific nature of the defect that resulted in this malfunction, 
defectiveness can be established without meeting the requirements for a defect under 
                                                          
397 Rutherford v Owens-Illinois Inc (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 953; Kennedy v Southern California Edison Co, 219 F. 
3d 988 (9th Cir. 2000). 
398  See also the res ipsa loquitur section contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 328D. 
399 Section 3, comment (b). 
400 Ibid. 
401 Harkins v Calumet Realty Co, 614 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa.Super.Ct.1992). 
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section 2.402 The court in Sanders v Quikstak Inc403 summarises the position as follows: 
  
 
“Under certain circumstances, however, a plaintiff need not prove a specific defect 
in the product at issue. Despite an absence of proof of any specific defect in a 
product, a jury may infer that an accident occurred because of a defect when the 
plaintiff has proven that the product did not perform as intended and has excluded 
all causes of the accident not attributable to the defendant.” 
 
Along the same route, some courts recognise that there may be products or categories of 
products that pose 'inherently unreasonable risks' for which strict liability should attach, 
regardless of the exact nature of the defect. In Phipps v General Motors Corp, 404  a 
Maryland court explains that “there are those kinds of conditions which, whether caused by 
design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable risk.” Such products are 
therefore held to be defective and unreasonably dangerous without having to weigh and 




3.2.1.5 Harm and damages 
Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) imposes liability for ‘harm to persons or property’. 
This is expanded in Section 21 where the Restatement (Third) provides that ‘harm to 
persons or property’ includes economic loss if caused by harm to:   
   
“(a) the plaintiff’s person; or 
 (b) the person of another when harm to the other interferes with an interest of 
the plaintiff protected by tort law; or  
 (c) the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.” 
 
                                                          
402 Comment (c). See, for example, Andersen v Chrysler Corp 403 S.E.2d 189 (W.Va.1991); Henderson v 
Sunbeam Corp. 46 F.3d 1151 (10th Circuit 1995).  
403 889 F.Supp.128,131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
404 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976). 
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The Restatement (Third) excludes harm to the defective product itself. As noted above, the 
wording of section 21(b) indicates that a claim can be brought by dependants of a person 
who is harmed by a defective product, for loss of financial support.  
 
With respect to section 21(c), courts in a strong majority of states have held that any 
consequential financial loss resulting from damage to the effective product itself, cannot be 
recovered under the Restatement (Third), pursuant to the so-called “economic loss 
rule.”405 The reason for this rule is that pure economic loss caused by a defective product 
“is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain - traditionally 
the core concern of contract law.”406  
 
Some jurisdictions allow for the recovery of punitive damages in product liability cases. 




3.2.1.6 Concept of Defectiveness 
Instead of providing a single definition for defectiveness, the Restatement (Third) has 
opted for a trifurcated formulation. Section 2(a) to (c) defines and sets out the liability 
standard separately for manufacturing, design and inadequate instructions or warnings 
defects. While true strict liability applies to manufacturing defects in terms of section 2(a), 
the Reporters explain that this is not suitable for design defects and inadequate warning 
defects, since the rationale for liability in the latter two cases are fundamentally different.408 
For these types of defect, 'some sort of independent assessment of advantages and 
                                                          
405 Restatement (Third) Section 21, comment (d); Sudzus & Carroll ‘Product Liability 2016 - USA’ (2016) 
International Comparative Legal Guides at 6.2. 
406 East River S.S. Corp. v Trans-America Delaval 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986). 
407 Sudzus & Carroll ‘Product Liability 2016 - USA’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 6.4. 
408 Section 1, comment (a). 
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disadvantages, commonly referred to as 'risk-utility balancing' is necessary'.409 Although 
many courts insist on phrasing it as strict liability, the law according to the Restatement 
(Third) has returned in the case of design and warning defects to a type of reasonableness 
test closely resembling the enquiry into the negligent conduct of a defendant.410  
 
Section 2(a) to (c) contains a set of 'functional criteria' for each of the three main types of 
defect which, if met, gives the plaintiff the option of bringing his product claim in terms of 
the rules of negligence, strict liability, the provisions of implied warranty of merchantability 
contained in the Uniform Commercial Code, or simply in terms of the applicable 
legislation.411 Although the majority of claims are brought on the basis of these criteria, 
section 2 does not provide the exclusive means of establishing defectiveness in terms of 
the Restatement (Third).  
 
In cases where the product failed to perform its manifestly intended function, the plaintiff 
may circumvent the evidentiary burden of section 2 by relying on a type of res ipsa loquitur 
rule, as restated in section 3, more commonly known as the ‘malfunction doctrine.’412 Many 
state jurisdictions included such a provision in their product liability statutes or have 
judicially recognised the possibility of allowing the plaintiff to present circumstantial 
evidence which could warrant the inference of defect. 
 
Further, pursuant to section 4, a design defect or inadequate instructions or warnings 
defect may be established where the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the product does 
not comply with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation.  
Particularly in the context of design defect cases, comment (e) read with the criteria for 
                                                          
409  Ibid. 
410  Ibid. 
411  Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 81. 
412  Owen ‘Manufacturing Defects’ (2002) S.C. L. Rev. 851,873. 
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defective design contained in section 2(b), allows plaintiffs in some cases to argue that a 
certain product design was so 'manifestly unreasonable' that it should never have been 
marketed in the first place. If the plaintiff succeeds in this, he is relieved from proving the 
section 2(b) requirements for establishing design defect. 
 
It is worth noting that the Restatement (Third) contains special provisions for establishing 
defectiveness in the case of certain product classes, including component products,413 
prescription drugs and medical devices,414 food products415 as well as used products.416 
 
Owen417 argues that, while the Restatement (Third) accurately restates the strict liability 
standard for defectiveness that courts have been applying in the context of manufacturing 
defects, it fails to provide suitable definitions for design and warning defects. He describes 
the current formulations as “structurally awkward and unduly complex, a condition which 
promises to continue the kind of confusion that has plagued the application of section 
402A in the courts.” Owen points out that courts in design and warning cases are applying 
a reasonableness standard which in reality is nothing but “negligence, wrapped in a strict 
liability shroud.”418 
 
In Stapleton’s view, the Restatement (Third) sacrifice analytical clarity in order to 'send 
messages' by means of format and that in doing so, it risks diminishing the influential value 
                                                          
413  Section 5. 
414  Section 6. 
415  Section 7. 
416  Section 8. 
417 Owen 'Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the 'Strict' Products Liability Myth' (1996) U. Ill. L.Rev 743.  
418 744. 
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of the Restatement (Third).419 She proposes a more user-friendly analytical sequence for 
determining defectiveness under the Restatement (Third):420 
i. Did the product fail to fulfil its manifestly intended function?421 If yes, no proof of 
a RAD is required, and an inference of defect is drawn. 
ii. Did the product fail to comply with a relevant product safety statute or 
administrative regulation?422 If yes, no proof of a RAD is required. 
iii. Was the product’s design manifestly unreasonable?423 Provided the relevant 
jurisdiction allows such a 'categorically defective design' category', proof of a 
RAD is irrelevant. 
If none of the above cases applies, the court turns to the three categories of defect 
contained in section 2: 
iv. Does the product have a manufacturing defect?424 
v. Is the product defective in design?425 (Proof of a RAD is required.) 
vi. Is the product defective due to inadequate instructions or warnings?426 
 
 
From this analytical sequence, it is clear that the Restatement (Third) provides at least six 
ways in which to establish defectiveness, and more importantly, that section 2(b) 
represents a class of defect that is resorted to only when none of the bases for 




                                                          
419 Ibid. 
420 387. 
421 Section 3. 
422 Section 4. 
423 Section 2, comment (e).  
424 Section 2(a). 
425 Section 2(b). 
426 Section 2(c). 
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3.2.1.6 (i) Manufacturing Defects 
The Restatement (Third) imposes strict liability where the plaintiff can prove that a 
manufacturing defect existed in the product at the time that product left the hands of the 
manufacturer or any seller in the supply chain. In terms of section 2(a): 
 
“A product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its 
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product;” 
 
Liability for manufacturing defects is premised on the deviation of a product from the 
design it was intended to conform to, and evidence regarding the safety controls or care 
taken by the manufacturer or seller will not serve as a defence. The product unit in 
question is measured against the manufacturer’s own design standards and specifications 
for that product line. In Barker v Lull Engineering Co427 the Californian Supreme Court 
defined a product containing a manufacturing defect as one that “differs from the 
manufacturer’s intended result or other ostensible identical units of the same product line.”  
 
The manufacturer’s design is not questioned in manufacturing defect cases, merely the 
specific product unit’s conformance to that design. This was clearly formulated in Banks v 
ICI Americas Inc428 where the court stated that in a manufacturing defect case “...it is 
assumed that the design of the product is safe and had the product been manufactured in 
accordance with the design it would have been safe for consumer use.” Support for this 
definition of manufacturing defectiveness can be found in numerous state laws. For 
example, a Louisiana statute429 considers a manufacturing defect to be present when a 
“product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications or performance 
                                                          
427  573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978). 
428  450 S.E. 2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) 
429  L.a. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 9:2800.55 (West 1988) 
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standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same 
manufacturer.”  
 
It is quite possible that the manufacturing defect only surfaces after it has left the 
manufacturer's control, for example during transportation or storage. In these cases, the 
distributor or retailer can be held liable provided sufficient proof is given that the defect 
existed in the product when it left their hands.430 
 
As noted above at 3.2.1.4, the plaintiff may be able to prove a manufacturing defect in 
certain circumstances where it is not possible to provide direct proof of the defect, for 
instance, where the product is destroyed in an accident. Section 3 may assist plaintiffs in 
these cases by inferring defectiveness from circumstantial evidence of the malfunction, 
provided the malfunction occurred during normal use and the product had not been altered 
or misused.431   
 
3.2.1.6 (ii) Inadequate Warnings or Instructions 
A product is defective in terms of section 2(c) when the manufacturer or any subsequent 
product seller failed to give reasonable instructions for safe product use or warnings of 
potential product hazards. Section 2(c) adopts a reasonableness standard that basically 
mirrors the section 2(b) standard for design defectiveness, stating that a product:  
 
“is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, 
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.” 
                                                          
430  Section 1, comment (e). 
431  Owen ‘Manufacturing Defects’ (2002) S.C. L. Rev. 851,873. 
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As a general rule, the manufacturer or seller’s duty to inform or warn about inherent risks 
accompanying a product arises whenever a reasonably foreseeable consumer or user 
would consider such risks material in deciding whether to use the product or not.432 It was 
in warning defect cases that courts for the first time acknowledged that the duty to warn of 
product risks only arises where those risks were foreseeable and that liability for failure to 
warn or instruct should be based on principles of negligence rather than strict liability.433 
 
The duty to warn normally does not extend to obvious and generally known risks. 
According to the Reporters’ comment (j) to this section, the inclusion of warnings about 
risks that are knowable through common sense would seldom result in a higher level of 
product safety, and could even cause consumers to start disregarding warnings, the 
obvious danger being that they could contain information on non-obvious risks as well.  
 
Although the manufacturer is arguably best positioned to provide instructions and warnings 
relating to its product, the Restatement (Third) imposes on subsequent sellers a duty to 
warn or instruct whenever it is “feasible and reasonably necessary,” and they will be held 
liable for inadequate manufacturer instructions or warnings.434 
 
The Reporters acknowledge that there is no such thing as a perfect level of detail and that 
product warnings or instructions can hardly ever include all the information that could 
possibly be relevant to product use.435 In evaluating the reasonableness of the instructions 
or warnings, a number of factors are balanced by courts, including content and 
                                                          
432 Comment (i). 
433 See, for example: Feldman v Lederle Labs 479 A.2d 374 (N.J.1984) and Brown v Superior Court 751 
P.2d 470 (Cal.1988), both dealing with warnings accompanying prescription drugs. See also: Anderson v 
Owens-Coming Fibreglas Corp. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal.1991), a case involving asbestos, in which the court 
extended the negligence-based liability for failure to warn of foreseeable risks to all products. 
434 Comment (i). 
435 Ibid. 
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comprehensibility, intensity of expression and characteristics of expected user groups.436 
Geistfeld437 argues that the level of information to be provided to consumers should be 
considered in terms of the information costs associated with providing that information. He 
argues that more information is not necessarily better. If consumers are overloaded by 
information which they believe is not worthwhile reading, they will stop reading. 
 
In some cases, particularly involving pharmaceutical products and medical devices, 
American courts recognise a so-called ‘learned intermediary’ doctrine. Pursuant to this 
doctrine, a manufacturer may escape liability by establishing that it had provided all 
necessary product information to a ‘learned intermediary’, such as a treating physician, 
who then interacted directly with the consumer. This doctrine relies on the presumption 
that the services and advice of the learned intermediary are required before a consumer 
may receive the product (e.g. a prescription for medication).438 This doctrine has been 
adopted by a majority of states in the US.  
 
In cases where a manufacturer or seller supplies a product which he knows will be made 
available for use by an intermediary to ultimate users, section 2(c) of the Restatement 
(Third) may require that instructions or warnings be given directly to these ultimate users. 
Whether the supplier can rely on the intermediary to warn or instruct the ultimate user, is 
once again a question of reasonableness, for which the Reporters cite factors such as the 
gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the intermediary will warn or 
instruct the ultimate user regarding the risks and the feasibility and effectiveness of giving 
a warning directly to the ultimate user. Geistfeld argues that factors such as the reliability 
                                                          
436 Ibid. 
437 Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 81. See also, generally: Rheingold & Feinglass ‘Risk-utility 
analysis in the failure to warn context’ (1997) 30 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 353. 
438 Reyes v Wyeth Labs 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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or sophistication of the intermediary may also be relevant to the risk-utility analysis here.439 
He argues that, while the appropriate warnings may have been communicated to the 
intermediary, mistakes are inevitable and the intermediary may forget about certain 
risks.440 
There has been a trend in a minority of states to erode the learned intermediary doctrine in 
the case of so-called ‘direct-to-consumer’ advertising.441 The reasoning is that, where a 
pharmaceutical manufacturers advertises its products directly to consumers, they owe an 
additional duty to warn consumers of product risks and cannot rely on the learned 
intermediary defence as a complete defence. 
 
Highlighted as a special category of products, comment (k) sets out the warning 
requirements for products that may cause “adverse allergic or idiosyncratic reactions.”  
While prescription pharmaceuticals are dealt with separately in section 6, this category 
covers an extremely wide range of products, including non-prescription pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics, food, toiletries, paint, solvents, building materials clothing and furniture. 
According to the Reporters, courts generally seem to require warnings whenever the 
evidence shows that a “substantial number of persons are allergic” to the product or the 
allergen it contains.442 This quantitative burden of proof is qualified by one factor: the more 
severe the plaintiff’s harm, the smaller the group of persons at risk would have to be to 
qualify as 'substantial'.443 
 
                                                          
439 Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 154. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Eg. State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007); Perez v. Wyeth 
Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
442 Comment (k). 
443 Ibid. 
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Warnings of the risks posed by a product will generally not be sufficient where the plaintiff 
can prove that a safer alternative design could reasonably have been adopted by the 
manufacturer. 444  Even in cases where risks are so obvious or generally known that 
warnings would be of little or no use, the manufacturer will nevertheless have a duty to 
adopt a safer alternative design if this is technically and economically feasible. 
 
The Restatement (Third) provides that, in warning and design defect cases, liability should 
only be imposed where the plaintiff can prove the manufacturer was aware or should have 
been aware of the risks attendant to product use,445 in other words, whether the risks were 
reasonably foreseeable. This evidential burden is particularly heavy in cases involving 
complex products such as prescription drugs, medical devices and toxic chemicals, where 
certain risks or side-effects sometimes only become apparent after sale, making warnings 
prior to sale impossible. The risks that a manufacturer could and should have foreseen are 
those risks that would have come to light if reasonable testing was conducted prior to 
placing the product on the market. 
 
Interestingly, non-manufacturing sellers such as wholesalers or retailers, are held strictly 
liable for design or inadequate warning defects, even though they did not and could not 
have foreseen the risks posed by the product.446 Comment (o) explains that, as long as the 
plaintiff can prove that a predecessor in the supply chain could reasonably have prevented 
the harm by adopting a reasonable safer design or providing better instructions or 
warnings, it is irrelevant whether the non-manufacturing seller exercised all reasonable 
care. 
 
                                                          
444 Comment (i). 
445 Comment (m). See also: Jones v NordicTrac, Inc 550 S.E.2d 101, 103 (Ga. 2001); Geistfeld Principles of 
Product Liability (2011) 124. 
446 Section 1, comment (e). 
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Since liability for harm caused by warning and design defects in terms of section 2(b) and 
(c) only attaches where the risks were foreseeable, the Reporters state that foreseeable 
product misuse, alteration or modification of the product by the consumer or user are 
factors that courts should also take into account when judging design or warning 
defectiveness. 447  For example, there may be situations where the consumer or user 
misuses the product so unreasonably or abnormally that it simply could not have been 
avoided by adopting an alternative design or providing a warning against it. Not only can 
these factors result in a finding that the product is not defective in terms of (b) or (c), it may 





Many courts in warning defect cases consider the patent nature of a product risk as 
grounds for releasing the manufacturer from the duty to warn. This practice is reflected in 
section 2, comment (j) in the Restatement (Third), which explains that inclusion of 
warnings about risks that are knowable through common sense, would seldom result in a 
higher level of product safety and could even cause consumers to disregard such 
warnings, the danger being that they potentially contain information on latent risks as well. 
 
3.2.1.6 (iii) Design Defects  
The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) note that the bulk of product liability litigation in 
America revolves around harm caused by alleged defects in product design.450 Whereas 
manufacturing defects are premised on a deviation from the manufacturer’s design, a 
product unit with a design defect does conform to the manufacturer’s design specifications 
                                                          
447 Comment (p). 
448 Sections 17 and 18. 
449 Section 17. 
450 Comment (f). See also: Geistfeld Principles of Product Liability (2011) 91.  
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for that product line.451 The basis for defectiveness here is the unreasonableness of the 
design itself. According to section 2(b) a product: 
 
“is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain 




The standard of reasonableness is strongly embedded in this definition, making it clear 
that liability for harm caused by a defect in design is not strict. Comment (f) describes 
section 2(b) as being based on the common-sense notion that liability should not be 
imposed for design defects unless the harm was reasonably preventable. Hence the use 
of negligence-based notions such as “foreseeable risks of harm” and a product condition 
described as “not reasonably safe.” In the words of the Reporters,452 the test for design 
defect in terms of s 2(b) asks whether:   
“a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of 
the alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain 
rendered the product not reasonably safe.” 
 
The concept of “not reasonably safe” replaces the previous formulation of the 
defectiveness standard under section 402A, which defined a defective product as 
“unreasonably dangerous.” This change was initially proposed by Wade,453 who contended 
that the term “unreasonably dangerous” may be misinterpreted by courts to mean that the 
product must be shown to have been 'unusually or extremely dangerous'.  
 
                                                          
451 Ibid. 
452 Comment (d). 
453 Wade 'On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products' (1973) Miss L.J. 44 at 825, 833. 
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Whether a product is “unreasonably safe” for purposes of design defectiveness, is 
generally decided by the jury, after the plaintiff has satisfied the court of the existence of a 
reasonable alternative design ('RAD'). Typically, the jury will be asked: 'Was the product, 
as designed, manufactured or sold, defective in that it was not reasonably safe for its 
intended or reasonably foreseeable uses?'454 The 'reasonably safe' standard contained in 
section 2(b) can be seen as a minimum standard a product design should meet.455  Even 
where the plaintiff can prove that the product design could have been made safer with 
minimal additional cost, it does not necessarily mean that the defendant's design falls short 
of what is considered to be 'reasonably safe'.456 
 
The requirement of a RAD goes to the heart of design defectiveness in terms of section 
2(b). The enquiry into whether a proposed alternative design is reasonable necessarily 
involves a balancing of the risks and benefits of the actual product design with those of the 
design alternative. Although not the exclusive test, courts in the majority of design defect 
cases perform a type of risk-utility analysis by requiring, either explicitly or implicitly, proof 
of the existence of an alternative, safer design which the manufacturer could have 
practically adopted at the time of manufacturing or sale. 
 
Those jurisdictions that explicitly require proof of a RAD, make it clear that evidence of a 
reasonable, safer and practical alternative design, which was available to the 
manufacturer, is an indispensable component of a prima facie case of design defect. 
Furthermore, in most of these cases, consumer expectations are explicitly rejected as an 
independent test for defectiveness. For instance, in a case involving an alleged design 
                                                          
454 Jurado v Western Gear Works 619 A.2d 1312, 1315 (N.J. 1993).  
455 Stapleton 'Product Liability, an Anglo-American Perspective' (2000) Washburn Law Journal 39 at 396. 
456 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129 
defect in an automobile the Alabama High Court stated that, to establish defectiveness, the 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a RAD by showing: 
 
 
“(a) the plaintiff's injuries would have been eliminated or in some way reduced by 
use of the alternative design, and that, 
(b) taking into consideration such factors as the intended use of the vehicle, its 
styling, cost, and desirability, its safety aspects, the foreseeability of the 
particular accident, the likelihood of injury, and the probable seriousness of the 
injury if that accident occurred, the obviousness of the defect, and the 
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the defect, the utility of the alternative 
design outweighed the utility of the design actually used.” 457 
 
The broad range of factors contemplated by the court demonstrates the inherent risk-utility 
nature of the RAD requirement. Regardless of whether a jurisdiction explicitly adopts a 
risk-utility test or not, by requiring proof of an alternative design that is reasonable, a court 
is bound, in any event, to weigh a range of factors which are relevant to that specific case, 
and which inevitably boil down to a balancing act traditionally performed in a negligence-
based reasonableness test.  
 
Several states recognise the possibility that evidence of a RAD may not be required in 
some cases. For example, Maryland courts have recognised the possibility that 
defectiveness may be established without performing risk-utility balancing in exceptional 
cases where a product carries an “inherently unreasonable risk.” 458  An 'inherently 
unreasonable risk' is considered by courts in this jurisdiction to be akin to a manufacturing 
defect in the sense that, in both instances, the product fails to function as the manufacturer 
                                                          
457 General Motors Corp v Edwards 482 So.2d 1176 (Ala. 1985). 
458 Phipps v General Motors Corp 363 A.2d 955 (Md.1976) where the court cites examples of unreasonably 
dangerous products or product designs such as:  the steering mechanism of a new automobile causing a 
car to swerve off the road, the brakes of a new automobile suddenly failing, or the drive shaft of a new 
automobile separating from the vehicle when driven in a normal manner. 
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intended.459 The Reporters consider this to be consistent with section 3 of the Restatement 
(Third), which allows for an inference of defectiveness to be drawn on certain facts, such 
as where the product failed to perform its manifestly intended function.  
 
The more common cases in which courts abandon the RAD requirement involve product 
designs that are “manifestly unreasonable.” In these cases, the product design poses a 
level of risk so high that it should be removed from the market rather than redesigned. 
Hence, the existence or possibility of a RAD is irrelevant.460 This position is consistent with 
section 2 comment (e) of the Restatement (Third), relating to “manifestly unreasonable” 
products. 
 
Some jurisdictions apply a risk-utility test, thereby implicitly requiring proof of a RAD. 
Courts performing a risk-utility analysis in design defect cases weigh, inter alia, the 
likelihood and magnitude of foreseeable harm against the duty of the defendant to prevent 
such foreseeable harm.461 According to the Reporters, this duty to prevent harm can take 
only one of two forms in the context of design defectiveness: Either the defendant had the 
duty to adopt a safer RAD462 or the product should never have been made commercially 
available, reflecting the rare cases of 'manifestly unreasonable' products under comment 
(e) to section 2. It follows, that in the majority of design defect cases, where comment (e) 
is not applicable, the court will apply a risk-utility analysis which inevitably poses the 
question of whether the manufacturer could have and should have adopted a RAD.463  
                                                          
459 Ziegler v Kawasaki Heavy Indus. 539 A.2d 701,705 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1988). 
460  See for instance, the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Wilson v Piper Aircraft Corp. 577 P.2d 1328 n.5. 
461 Reporter’s Note to Restatement (Third) Part II B, p.65. 
462 Section 2(b). 
463  See for instance, the approach by Florida courts: Radiation Technology Inc.v Ware Construction Co. 445 
So.2d 329 (Fla.1983), as cited in the subsequent decision of Light v Weldarc Co. Inc. 569 S0.2d 
1302,1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990). Florida courts apply a risk-utility analysis which does not explicitly take 
into account a RAD as phrased by section 2(b), but rather balances: “the likelihood and gravity of 
potential injury against the utility of the product, the availability of other, safer products to meet the same 
need, the obviousness of the danger, public knowledge and expectation of the danger, the adequacy of 
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Some jurisdictions apply a consumer expectations test based on risk-utility, thereby 
implicitly requiring proof of a RAD. Although it may be considered somewhat confusing 
usage of two defectiveness standards, courts in some jurisdictions seemingly apply a 
consumer expectations standard, yet resort to balancing of risk and utility factors to 
establish whether the product meets the 'reasonable expectations' of the consumer.464 
Whether a consumer expectations test based on a risk-utility analysis incorporates the 
RAD factor will arguably depend on the specific facts of a case.  
 
A distinct minority of states apply a consumer expectations test without requiring proof of 
RAD in design defect cases. In terms of this test, design defectiveness is premised solely 
on the failure of a product to meet the expectations of the ordinary consumer. Case law 
illustrates how courts have limited the scope of application of this standard to simple, non-
complex products. For instance, California law up until 1994 adopted consumer 
expectations as an independent standard for design defectiveness. This position was 
reconsidered in Soule v General Motors Corp 465  where the Supreme Court, while 
conceding that consumer expectations may play a limited role in determining design 
defectiveness, found it to be entirely inadequate for complex design cases as consumers 
have no idea how a complex product should perform or what level of safety it should have 
in relation to all foreseeable hazards. The court noted that consumer expectations would 
be relevant in determining defectiveness in cases where the everyday experience of the 
product's users allows a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety 
assumptions and is thus defective regardless of expert evidence as to its merits. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
instructions and warnings on safe use, and the ability to eliminate or minimize the danger without 
seriously impairing the product or making it unduly expensive.” 
464 See, for instance: Potter v Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn.1997). 
465 882 P.2d 298 (Cal.1994). 
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Reporters note such cases are similar to those typically covered by section 3, allowing for 
an inference of defectiveness to be drawn where the facts speak for itself.  
 
 
An exception to the evidential burden of the section 2(b) criteria for design defectiveness is 
a case brought under section 3 involving circumstantial evidence aimed at creating an 
inference of design defect. Analogously to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine under the law of 
negligence, a design defect would be inferred where the very nature of the injury-causing 
incident supports the conclusion that the product failed to fulfil the function that the 
manufacturer manifestly intended it to.466 Some courts have chosen not to demand proof 
of a RAD here, and apply the seemingly opposing standard of consumer expectations to 
determine defectiveness.467  Due to their low or negligible social utility and great risk of 
danger, so the reasoning goes, liability should be imposed for these categorically defective 
products regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove a RAD or not.468 A further exception 
is section 4, which provides that a product design will be defective per se if it can be 
shown to violate a safety statute or regulation, regardless of the existence of any safer, 
alternative designs.  
 
Further, where a design is simply manifestly unreasonable, 469  the court may find the 
design defective without applying the general defectiveness criteria under section 2(b). 
Comment (e) to section 2(b) recognises the possibility, as numerous courts have 
suggested, that there may be instances where a product design is 'so manifestly 
unreasonable', in the sense that it has such low social utility and such a high degree of 
danger that the design should be held defective regardless of the fact that no proof of a 
                                                          
466  Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design' (1998) Cornell L. Rev. 83 at 
874. 
467  Comment (b). 
468  Comment (e). 
469  Section 2, comment (e). 
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RAD can be produced. According to the Reporters, instances of manifestly unreasonable 
designs are very exceptional, since it would have to be shown that 'the feature of design 
that presents the risk of harm to be the very same feature upon which some persons, 
albeit unreasonably, place value.'470 The logic underlying this qualification is that, since the 
design feature that gives the product its value determines which alternatives could have 
been considered, a design feature that is so unreasonably and manifestly unsafe yet gives 
the product its value, has no safer alternative, or RAD.471 
 
Where none of the abovementioned exceptions apply, courts are faced with what the 
Reporters refer to as 'classic design cases', which require all the criteria of section 2(b) to 
be met in order to establish defectiveness. The reporters describe 'classic design cases' 
as those where 'either no specific safety standards apply, or the designs comply with the 
applicable standards, but the plaintiffs nevertheless plausibly claim that the designs are 
unacceptably dangerous, and therefore, legally defective.'472 It is in these cases that the 
court is required to apply a more nuanced, general, normative standard for defectiveness 
which ultimately requires a determination of the level of design safety that is acceptable for 
the product in question.  
 
Evaluating defectiveness in terms of section 2(b) involves two key questions: Firstly, 
whether the alternative design proposed by the plaintiff is reasonable, and if so, whether 
the defendant’s failure to adopt that alternative design rendered the product unreasonably 
safe. The Reporters provide in comments (f) and (g) a range of reasonableness factors 
                                                          
470 Henderson & Twerski ‘What Europe, Japan and Other Countries Can Learn' (1999) 34, 1 Texas 
International Law Journal at 8. 
471 72 A.L.I. Proc.201,202n (1995) (remarks of R. L. Habush, Attorney) as discussed by Stapleton in 
‘Restatement (Third): An Anglo-American Perspective’ (2000) 39 Washburn Law Journal at 391. 
472 Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design' (1998) Cornell L. Rev. 83 at 
876. 
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essentially amounting to a broad risk-utility balancing that may be considered under 
section 2(b).  
 
The rationale for introducing the RAD requirement, according to the Reporters, was to 
avoid a risk-utility analysis that is too polycentric for courts to manage.473 They contend 
that, in the absence of an alternative design which the court can compare to the actual 
design, the court would have to assess the overall costs and benefits of the defendant’s 
design, which amounts to what is termed 'macro risk-utility balancing'.474 Instead of simply 
comparing the marginal differences between the defendant’s design and the proposed 
alternative, the court would be faced with the 'unmanageable' question of whether, in light 
of all the costs and benefits, the defendant’s design was 'good for America'.475 
 
The RAD required by section 2(b) does not necessarily have to be a design that is in 
actual use within the relevant industry. The plaintiff would meet this criterion by presenting 
sufficient evidence, often by means of expert evidence, of a theoretical alternative design 
that is both technologically feasible and practical. Further, although it would be preferable, 
plaintiffs are generally not expected to provide technical design drawings or to develop a 
prototype, merely testimony which 'supports the conclusion that a RAD could have been 
practically adopted at the time of sale.'476  For instance, to qualify as a practical alternative, 
Indiana law 477  requires such a design to be 'cost-effective under general negligence 
principles'.  
                                                          
473 Henderson & Twerski 'Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters' Travelogue' (1997) 
U.Mich.J.L.Reform 30 at 584-86. See also: Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design' (1998) Cornell L. Rev. 83 at 884-87.  
474 Henderson & Twerski 'Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters' Travelogue' (1997) 
U.Mich.J.L.Reform 30 at 588. 
475 Henderson & Twerski 'What Europe, Japan and Other Countries can Learn' (1999) Tex. L.J. 34 at 20. 
476 Comment (f), citing, for example: Surace v Caterpillar Inc 111 F.3d 1039 (3d Cir.1997). 
477 Ind.Code Ann. sectionsection  33-1-1.5-2.5 (West 1994), as applied in Whitted v General Motors Corp. 58 
F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.1995). 
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When evaluating the reasonableness of the proposed alternative design, courts are 
required to judge its safety as a whole. Comment (g) states that, even if the adoption of the 
alternative design would have prevented or lessened the harm caused to the plaintiff, such 
alternative would be deemed unreasonable if, at the same time, it presented other equal or 
even greater risks to consumers. 
 
Proof of the existence of a RAD does not automatically imply that the defendant’s design 
was 'not reasonably safe.' Whereas the first part of the defectiveness enquiry under 
section 2(b) asks whether the defendant could have adopted a reasonable alternative 
design, the second part essentially asks whether the defendant should have adopted the 
proven design alternative in order to avoid supplying a product that is 'not reasonably 
safe'. This part of the enquiry involves a 'normative balancing process', in which the jury 
has no choice but to weigh up all the relevant costs and benefits relating to the product 
design in order to determine whether the defendant’s design was, based on aggregate 
risk-utility, 'good for America'.478   
 
Stapleton479 points out that this broad normative standard applied in the second part of the 
design defectiveness test, represents exactly the type of 'unmanageability' which the 
Reporters were hoping to avoid by introducing the RAD requirement. Whether the 
defendant could have adopted a RAD only takes the case through an 'additional filtering 
gateway', before the question of design defectiveness ultimately rests again on the vague 
and open-ended normative standard of whether the defendant’s design was safe enough, 
or phrased differently, whether a safer design should have been adopted.480  
 
                                                          
478 Stapleton ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-American Perspective' (2000) 
Washburn Law Journal 39 at 396. 
479 Ibid. 
480 398. 
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Section 2(b) restates the consensus position regarding the standard for design 
defectiveness in so-called 'classic design cases', as it has emerged from case law in the 
various states. It is clear from the formulation of this section that the majority of courts 
agree that design defectiveness should be based on some form of reasonableness 
standard, which involves a balancing act closely resembling the traditional negligence 
enquiry.481 
 
One of the most frequently cited risk-utility tests in design defect cases is the so-called 
'Wade test', developed by John Wade in the early 1970's. This seven-factor test provided 
guidance to courts across the United States in determining whether a product is 
'unreasonably dangerous' for purposes of strict liability under the former section 402A. He 
listed the following factors as relevant to risk-utility balancing in the context of product 
liability:      
(1) The utility and desirability of the product: its utility to the user and the general public. 
(2) The safety of the product: the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable 
gravity of the injury. 
(3) The availability of an alternative product with the same utility but not as unsafe. 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe characteristic of the product without 
impairing its utility or making it too expensive to maintain utility. 
(5) The user's capacity to avoid the danger by exercising care when using the product. 
(6) The user's expected awareness of the risks inherent in the product and their 
avoidability, due to common knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or 
suitable warnings or instructions. 
                                                          
481 Section 1 comment (a). 
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(7) The ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss by setting the price of the product or 
carrying liability insurance.482 
 
In support of the Wade-model of risk-utility, some argue that it avoids the rigidity of the 
consumer expectations test.483 To illustrate: A highly useful product which contains a low 
and unavoidable risk which consumers were not aware of, could disappoint consumer 
expectations sufficiently to result in liability. In contrast, a risk-utility test would grant the 
defendant the opportunity to justify his product on the grounds of its high utility, which 
overshadows its comparatively low risk. Conversely, where a product poses a patent risk, 
consumers' expectations may be so low that the product cannot be said to disappoint 
them, even though the risk could easily have been avoided by an alternative design for 
example. Liability, in this case, would not attach based on a consumer expectations test, 
whereas a risk-utility analysis would bar any 'patent danger' defence that a manufacturer 
might attempt to rely on.484 
 
 
The RAD required by section 2(b) in determining design defectiveness should not be 
confused with the 'available substitute' listed as the third factor in the Wade-test. As the 
drafters of the Restatement (Third) point out, this 'available substitute' refers to the 
'technological feasibility of an alternative design' which is merely one of the factors in the 
risk-utility analysis for design defectiveness. 485  In contrast, the 'reasonable alternative 
design' required by section 2(b) represents something broader: Firstly, it requires that the 
proposed alternative design be 'reasonable', which already involves the balancing of a 
range of risk-utility factors. Secondly, linked to the RAD requirement, is the normative 
                                                          
482  Wade 'On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products' (1973) 44 Miss. L.J. at 837-38. 
483  Myers 'Dean John Wade and the Law of Torts' (1995) 65 Mississippi Law Journal at 29.   
484  Shapo ‘In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project’ (1995) 48 Vand. L. Rev. 
at 662-63 & n.158. 
485  Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design' (1998) 83 Cornell Law 
Review at 889. 
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question of whether that design alternative should have been adopted by the manufacturer 
to render his product 'reasonably safe'. The RAD required under section 2(b), which 
essentially asks whether a reasonable manufacturer would have adopted that alternative, 
safer design, can thus be said to represent the broad risk-utility balancing process itself, 
and should not be understood as equivalent to merely one of the seven factors in Wade's 
risk-utility analysis.486  Owen argues that the section 2(b) test can be formulaically be 
expressed in one of two ways:487 
 
 
D = RAD + NRS 
or 
D = RAD = NRS 
 
in which D means 'defective'; RAD means 'reasonable alternative design', and NRS means 
'not reasonably safe'.  
 
The Reporters of the Restatement (Third), while endorsing the Wade-model as a useful 
risk-utility test in determining product defectiveness, provide in section 2 comment (f) and 
(g) a list of factors which courts may take into account when determining design 
defectiveness under section 2(b). Whether a proposed alternative design is 'reasonable', 
and whether the failure of the manufacturer to adopt that alternative renders the actual 
product design 'not reasonably safe' involve a balancing of some or all of the following 
factors, or other factors as the case may require: 
 
“▪ the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm; 
 the instructions and warnings accompanying the product; 
                                                          
486 Ibid. The reporters refer to Flaminio v Honda Motor Co. 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir.1984), in which the 
court distinguishes the technical feasibility of an alternative design as a factor in the risk-utility analysis, 
from the risk-utility analysis itself, in which the court asks whether, in light of all the costs and benefits, the 
manufacturer should have adopted the alternative design. (In this case, the 'feasibility' of a safety feature 
was distinguished from the 'net advantages' that would be gained by adopting that feature).  
487 Owen 'Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the 'Strict' Products Liability Myth' (1996) U.Ill.L.Rev. 769. 
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 the nature and strength of consumer expectations (including expectations arising from 
the product’s marketing and portrayal); 
 the relative advantages and disadvantages of the product and design alternative; 
 the likely impact of the alternative design on production costs; 
 the likely impact of the alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, repair 
and aesthetics; and 
 the range of consumer choice among products.”488 
 
 
Like the traditional balancing test done under negligence law, the relevance and weight 
carried by each of these factors will be determined by the facts of the particular case. 
Typically, the relevant considerations interact with one another. For example, the plaintiff 
may lead evidence of the magnitude and probability of foreseeable harm, which may be 
offset by evidence presented by the defendant of the likely reduction in efficiency and 
utility of the product if the proposed alternative design were to be adopted.489  
 
While the obviousness of risk may play a role in the defectiveness enquiry, it cannot serve 
as an absolute bar to liability.490 This position is confirmed by the Restatement (Third) in 
the context of design defects, where the Reporters note:  
 
"The fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the issue of 
defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a 
reasonable alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced 
or prevented harm to the plaintiff.”491 
 
                                                          
488 Section 2 comments (f) and (g). 
489 Comment (f). 
490 Micallef v Miehle Co. 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976). Owen ‘Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the ‘Strict' 
Products Liability Myth' (1996) U.Ill.L.Rev at 779. 
491 Section 2, comment (d). 
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As noted above in 3.2.1.6(ii), liability under the Restatement (Third) for design and warning 
defects should only be imposed where the plaintiff can establish that the risks were 
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer. Further, any foreseeable product misuse, 
alteration or modification of the product by the consumer or user are relevant 
considerations for courts in assessing design and warning defectiveness.492 
 
The expectations of a consumer regarding the product design are listed by the Reporters 
as one of many factors that form part of the broad reasonableness test for design 
defect. 493  However, it is rejected by the Restatement (Third) 494  as an independent 
measure of design defectiveness, for the main reason that it is incapable, on its own, of 
taking into account reasonableness factors such as “whether an alternative design could 
be implemented at a reasonable cost, or whether it would provide greater overall safety.”  
Prosser & Keeton also disapprove of consumer expectations as an independent test on 
the grounds of its ambiguity and vagueness, stating that it provides little guidance to courts 
in determining design defectiveness:   
 
“What does the reasonable purchaser contemplate? In one sense he does not 
'expect' to be adversely affected by a risk or hazard unknown to him. In another 
sense, he does contemplate the 'possibility' of unknown 'side effects.' In a sense, 
the ordinary purchaser cannot reasonably expect anything more than that 
reasonable care in the exercise of the skill and knowledge available to design 
engineers has been exercised. The test can be utilised to explain almost any result 
that a court or jury chooses to reach.” 495 
 
                                                          
492 3.2.1.6(ii).  
493 Comments (f) & (g). 
494 Comment (g). 
495 The Law of Torts (1984) 699. 
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It is worth noting that the consumer expectations test embodied by the former section 
402A was followed closely by very few courts.496 It gradually became clear that this was an 
impracticable standard for design defectiveness for various reasons, summarised by 
Davis497 as follows: Firstly, where a product poses a patent risk of danger, it stands to 
reason that the consumer incorporated this risk into his expectations, which would prevent 
liability and consequently reduce incentives for increased product safety. 498  Simply 
because a risk is open and obvious does not necessarily mean that the consumer was not 
reasonably entitled to expect more of its safety standard. Secondly, while tort and warranty 
based theories of product liability have both evolved beyond the limits of privity and now 
offer protection to bystanders, it is difficult to imagine what expectations, if any, these 
bystanders may have had of the product which caused their harm. Finally, possibly the 
most important general criticism of the consumer expectations test relates to its 
vagueness. Courts found it extremely difficult to determine what exactly an average 
consumer would expect from the technical characteristics of a product design. 
 
Consumer expectations as a separate standard for defectiveness, is said to fail on 
normative grounds.499 The test carries with it the possibility that consumers may form 
unreasonable expectations of product safety or performance. What independent standard 
would courts apply to assess the reasonableness of these expectations? If the answer to 
this difficulty is that consumers are entitled to a reasonable level of design safety, the 
consumer expectations test is simply falling back on a risk-utility standard that determines 
what is 'reasonably safe'.500 The product expectations of the ordinary consumer are said to 
                                                          
496 Davis 'Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility' (1993) 39 Wayne Law Review at 
1236-37. 
497 1217,1236-37. 
498 Ibid.  
499 Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design' (1998) Cornell Law Review 
May at 880. 
500 881. 
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lack the objectivity needed to constitute a fairness-based standard of liability as they carry 
with them: 
 
“…inescapable psychological connotations that frustrate attempts to objectify the 
appropriate standard. Is the ordinary consumer to be characterised as risk-averse 
or risk-preferring? Is the ordinary consumer willing to sacrifice aesthetics, 
economy, or ease of repair for greater safety? It is unrealistic to believe that one 
can surgically separate ordinary consumer expectations from the value 
preferences of flesh-and-blood human beings. Risk-utility analysis confronts this 
same problem of objectifying the normative standard. However, compared with the 
consumer expectations standard, risk-utility analysis more successfully addresses 
this problem.”501 
 
The main reason why some courts retain consumer expectations as a test is that it assists 
plaintiffs considerably in establishing an inference of defect by relying on circumstantial 
evidence,502 as provided for by section 3 of the Restatement (Third). Under this test, a 
plaintiff would succeed in creating an inference by merely showing the product failed to 
perform the way an ordinary consumer or user would have expected it to under the 
circumstances, regardless of whether the defendant could have foreseen the risk of harm. 
Keeton503 disputes this position, arguing that the defendant should be allowed to rebut 
such an inference by way of a risk-utility analysis. This would arguably bring the position 
into line with the general reasonableness standard for design defectiveness under section 
2(b), based on the fairness notion that a defendant should not be held strictly liable under 
section 3 for an unforeseeable and undiscoverable design defect.  
 
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) make it clear that application of a consumer 
expectations test is limited to those special cases where the product's malfunction in itself 
                                                          
501 881-882. 
502 'Products Liability Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect' (1979) 10 Cumb.L.Rev. 293, 310. 
503 Ibid. 
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points to defectiveness. They point out that some courts may adopt a pure risk-utility 
standard and reject consumer expectations as the controlling standard for design 
defectiveness, yet at the same time refer to the disappointment of consumer expectations 
in cases where that product design malfunctions. This does not, however, mean that the 




Nevertheless, the potential weight of consumer expectations in the general defectiveness 
enquiry under section 2(b) must not be underestimated. The Reporters explain that the 
expectations consumers form of how a product should function and the dangers involved 
in its usage, are interconnected with the magnitude and probability of foreseeable risks of 
harm, both factors relevant under section 2(b). 505  It is therefore not impossible that 
consumer expectations may at times, either directly or indirectly, be a weighty or even 
determinative factor in the risk-utility based test for design defectiveness.  
 
3.2.1.7 Defences / Restriction of Liability 
3.2.1.7(i) Compliance with public regulation 
Section 4 of the Restatement (Third) deals with the issue of non-compliance and 
compliance with product safety statutes and regulations. It provides as follows: 
“In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or 
warnings:  
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or 
administrative regulation renders the product defective with respect to the 
risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation; and  
                                                          
504 Henderson & Twerski 'Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design' (1998) Cornell Law Review at 
867. 
505 Comment (g).  
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(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or 
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether 
the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by 
the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a 
matter of law a finding of product defect.”     
    
According to section 4(b) comment (e), regulatory compliance of a product does not 
provide a defence per se to a strict product liability claim. The reason for this is that most 
product safety regulations are intended only as minimum standards. 506 Geistfeld notes 
that in most cases, regulatory compliance has not provided defendants with a complete 
defence as regulations are often not comprehensive.507 He explains that regulators are 
often unable to comprehensively examine and regulate every aspect of every product type 
within their jurisdictions, in which case tort law would complement the regulatory system. 
On the other hand, where regulators have thoroughly evaluated and regulated a certain 
area of product safety, based on a comprehensive risk-utility analysis, those regulations 
may fully define the safety standards imposed by tort law on sellers of products, in which 
case regulatory compliance may be a complete defence.508 
 
3.2.1.7(ii) Absence of defect at time of supply 
The Restatement (Third) does not contain an express defence to the effect that it is a 
defence to show the alleged product defect did not exist at the time it was supplied by the 
manufacturer.  
 
Nevertheless, such a defence could arguably be raised by a manufacturer by producing 
evidence that the product was not defective at the time of supply, for instance by showing 
                                                          
506 Comment (e). 
507 Products Liability Law (2011) 193 
508 Ibid. 
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test results conducted immediately prior to supply. Further, a manufacturer may seek to 
argue that the factual causation element of ‘individualised causation’, namely that a defect 
was present in a product commercially distributed by the defendant, is not made out.509 
Alternatively, a manufacturer may be able to argue that the product was not defective, 
rather it failed or caused harm as it was altered, modified or tampered with after it was 
supplied by the manufacturer.510  
 
3.2.1.7(iii) Defect not reasonably discoverable  
The manufacturer would often attempt to defend its product design by arguing that it 
conforms to industry practice and incorporates the most advanced or cutting edge 
technology or scientific knowledge available.511 Comment (d) regarding design defects 
states that evidence of industry practice can be relevant to defectiveness in two ways: 
Firstly, the defendant may present such evidence to show that an alternative design 
proposed by the plaintiff was not practicable. Secondly, it may be relevant in considering 
whether the defendant’s failure to adopt the alternative design rendered the product 'not 
reasonably safe'.512 While relevant, the Reporters point out that such evidence, on its own, 
is not determinative of defectiveness.513  
 
However, this defence, commonly known as the 'state of the art' defence, could be fatal to 
a plaintiff's claim where a defendant can show that his design maintains the highest 
degree of safety possible for those products within the market.514 In such a case, although 
not theoretically impossible, a plaintiff would rarely be able to prove that the adoption of a 
                                                          
509  See above at 3.2.1.4. 
510 Restatement (Third) Section 2, comment (p). 
511 Comment (d). 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. 
514 The Reporters note in comment (d) that courts interpret 'state of the art' in various ways: To some, it 
denotes the prevailing industry custom or practice; to others, it means the safest available technology 
that has been adopted for use. It has also been interpreted to mean cutting edge technology. 
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RAD was practical under the circumstances, thereby implying that the prevailing industry 
practice as a whole could have been improved upon.515  
 
In general, US courts agree that conformance with the state of the art is not an absolute 
defence.516 In some states, proof of compliance with industry practice is considered to be a 
relevant factor in determining defectiveness,517 and may create a rebuttable presumption 
of non-defectiveness. 518  For instance, particularly in the context of design defects a 
Colorado court519 acknowledged that:  
 
“state of the art would be an applicable factor in a design defect case, if the 
alternative design suggested by the plaintiff was not practically feasible in light of 
the state of the art at the time the product was manufactured.” 
 
A small number of states allow for an absolute defence based on compliance with industry 
practice, judging the product design against the state of the art existing either at the time of 
design520 or at the time the product was made available on the market.521 In contrast, 
another minority of states consider evidence regarding the state of the art to be entirely 
irrelevant to determining defectiveness.522 The Restatement (Third) clearly rejects these 
two extreme positions by supporting an approach where evidence of the state of the art 
can play a role, albeit a limited one, in determining defectiveness. 
 
                                                          
515 Comment (d). 
516 Reporters' Note IV-B page 44.  
517 Sturm, Ruger & Co v Day 703 P.2d 396,405 (Alaska 1985); Elliott v Brunswick Corp. 903 F.2d 1505 (11th 
Cir. 1990); 
518  Eg. Colorado Rev. Stat. section13-21-403(1)(a)(1987); Kentucky Rev.Stat. section 411.310(2) (Banks-
Baldwin 1978). 
519  Fibreboard v Fenton 845 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo.1993) 
520  E.g. Indiana Code section33-1-1.5-4(b)(4) (1988); Iowa Code Ann.section 668.12 (West 1987) 
521  Mo. Ann. Stat. section 537.764 (West 1987); N.J. Stat.Ann. section 2A: 58C-3(1) (West 1987). 
522  Eg. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases 699 F.Supp. 233, 235-236 (D.Haw.1988) the court rejects the 
state of the art evidence as a relevant consideration in both design defect and failure to warn cases. See 
also: Carrecter v Colson Equip. Co. 499 A.2d 326 (Pa.Super.Ct.1985); Lewis v Coffin Hoist Division, Duff-
Norton Co. Inc. 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987).  
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In support of a development risk defence and to rebut a plaintiff’s expert evidence, a 
manufacturer may submit evidence showing compliance with federal regulations regarding 
design standards, that the manufacturer had submitted all relevant material to regulatory 




3.2.1.7(iv) Apportionment of liability 
The Restatement (Third) provides for apportionment of responsibility between or among 
plaintiff, sellers and distributors of defective products and others. Section 17 provides that:
   
“(a) A plaintiff’s recovery of damages for harm caused by a product defect may be 
reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product defect to 
cause the harm and the plaintiff’s conduct fails to conform to generally 
applicable rules establishing appropriate standards of care.” 
 
The manner and extent of the reduction and the apportionment among multiple defendants 
are governed by generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility.524 The Reporters 
note that a strong majority of states apply the comparative responsibility doctrine, however 
the rules or developed principles of apportionment of responsibility vary among the 
jurisdictions.525  
 
Where a plaintiff’s conduct amounts to misuse, alteration or modification of a product, this 
may be relevant to the question of defectiveness, causation or the plaintiff’s contributory 
responsibility.526 
 
                                                          
523 Sudzus & Carroll ‘Product Liability 2016 - USA’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 3.2. 
524 Section 17(b).  
525 Comments (a) and (b).  
526 Section 2, comment (p). 
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Some states follow a ‘modified’ comparative fault, whereby the parties’ responsibilities are 
adjusted in accordance with predetermined thresholds of responsibility. For instance, in 
some states a plaintiff’s recovery is fully barred if the plaintiff is found to have contributed 
more than 50% to the harm.527 The seriousness of the plaintiff’s ‘fault’ or contributory 
conduct and the nature of the product defect are relevant considerations in apportioning 
responsibility between the plaintiff and supplier.528 
 
3.2.1.7(v) Prescription 
The Restatement (Third) contains no provisions regarding limitation periods for bringing a 
product liability claim. Statutes of limitations in each state govern the time limit for bringing 
product liability claims, which generally varies between two to six years.529  
 
States also impose repose periods by way of statute, which vary from state to state. A 
repose period denotes the number of years that consumers can use a product during its 
useful life before bringing a court proceeding, following expiry of which manufacturers are 
immune from liability.530  
 
3.2.1.7(vi) Contractual restriction of liability 
The effect of contractual limitations, waivers, disclaimers or other exclusion clauses are 
dealt with in section 18 of the Restatement (Third), which provides that: 
 
 
“Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, 
waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or 
written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid product liability claims against sellers 
or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.” 
                                                          
527 Comment (b). See also: Sudzus & Carroll ‘Product Liability 2016 - USA’ (2016) International Comparative 
Legal Guides at 3.1. 
528 Comment (d). 
529 Comment (b). See also: Sudzus & Carroll ‘Product Liability 2016 - USA’ (2016) International Comparative 
Legal Guides at 5. 
530 Ibid. 
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The Restatement does not allow commercial sellers or other distributors of new products 
to avoid product liability by means of limitation clauses in the contract of sale.531 There is a 
presumption that the ordinary consumer lacks adequate information and bargaining power 
to agree to a fair contractual limitation of rights clause in a contract of sale.532 This does 
not prohibit parties within the supply chain from contracting among themselves with 
respect to indemnity.533 
 
3.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.3.1 The Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC 
Prior to 1985, product liability in Europe was governed separately by the respective 
national laws of EU member states, whether based in contract, tort or special liability. 
Pressure to harmonise laws within the European Community coupled with widespread 
demands for increased consumer protection following the Thalidomide tragedy led the 
EEC Council to adopt the Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability 
for defective products 85/374/EEC (“the EU Directive”).  
 
The legal status of the EU Directive differs from the advisory US Restatements in the 
sense that it places an obligation on the EU Member States to transpose its provisions as 
closely as possible into their national legal systems.534 In terms of article 189 of the Treaty 
of Rome, 535  the EU Directive is 'binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
                                                          
531 Comment (a). 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid. 
534 Member states were given 3 years from the date of notification (July 30, 1985) to transpose and enforce 
the Directive within their legal systems. 
535 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) signed on 25 March 1957. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 150 
member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and method.' 
 
The implementation of the EU Directive in the various states has been done in different 
ways. Some states, such as France and the Netherlands, have amended their existing civil 
codes in line with the EU Directive, whereas other states such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom have introduced a separate statute to regulate this new product liability rule. 
Some states have made use of the discretion given by the EU Directive regarding certain 
optional provisions. Importantly, the EU Directive does not impact on pre-existing laws 
governing product liability in the Member States. Article 13 provides: 
 
“This Directive does not affect any right an injured person may have according to 
the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability 
system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.” 
 
In 2003 a report was prepared for the European Commission regarding the practical 
operation of the EU Directive on product liability in the Member States.536 Participants in 
the study included consumer representatives, producers, suppliers and trade associations, 
insurers, reinsures, brokers and insurance associations, lawyers, regulators and other 
government agencies and legal academics. The study found that there had been a 
noticeable increase in product liability claims in the EU over the past decade.537 While 
participants cited the EU Directive as a factor that contributed to the increase in claims, 
more frequently cited factors included increased consumer awareness and access to 
information and media activity. 538  Insurers reported that the incidence of out-of-court 
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settlements had increased over the past 10 years, which they attributed mainly to 
increased media activity and greater access to legal assistance/advice.539 
 
In terms of insurance coverage, less than 25% of participants reported that the EU 
Directive had had an impact on the type of insurance policies offered in the EU. 540 
However, more than 50% of insurers said it has impacted the basis on which insurance is 
offered, for instance, premiums or conditions for coverage, and on the way they deal with 
insureds.541 
 
The EU Directive was viewed by most participants as striking an appropriate balance 
between the interests of producers/suppliers and consumers.542 The majority of consumer 
representatives considered that the EU Directive does not adequately protect the needs of 
consumers for reasons relating to the development risks defence and burden of proof.543 
On the other hand, a minority of producers/suppliers opined that the EU Directive did not 
adequately protect them due to the application of the EU Directive's strict liability to design 
and warning defects.544 These participants questioned the appropriateness of strict liability 
for design defects and failure to warn cases, suggesting that a negligence-based standard 
was better suited to such defects, as is followed by the US Restatement (Third).545 Some 
participants, particularly representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, argued that a 
defence of regulatory compliance ought to be introduced to apply where products’ safety is 
closely regulated and the products complied with those regulations.546 The argument in 
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support of this is that ‘it is not for national civil courts to second guess or undermine 
regulations that deal comprehensively with the safety of particular products.’547  
 
A 2011 report prepared by the European Commission548 found that, between 2006 and 
2011, the number of claims made on the basis of the EU Directive as well as the number 
of out-of-court settlements for product liability claims in the Member States continue to 
increase.549 The report reiterated that the aim of the EU Directive was to create a general 
liability framework that afforded consumers adequate protection without stifling 
innovation.550 The European Commission concluded that the EU Directive should not be 
amended as it struck an appropriate balance between manufacturers and consumers.551 
 
3.3.1.1 Parties Liable 
 
The EU Directive imposes faultless liability on the “producer” for damage caused by a 
defect in his product. 552  Pursuant to article 3(1), “producer” is defined to mean the 
manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or a component part 
and any person who presents himself as the producer of the product by placing his name, 
trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product. Further, without prejudice to the 
liability of the producer, a person who imports into the EU a product for sale, hire, leasing 
or distribution in the course of his business is deemed to be a producer.553    
 
                                                          
547 Ibid. 
548 European Commission ‘Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 10 May 1999’ (2011). 
549 11. 
550  9 - 11. 
551 11.  
552 Article 1. 
553 Article 3(2). 
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In circumstances where the producer cannot be identified, each supplier of the product is 
deemed to be its producer, unless the supplier informs the injured person, within a 
reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or the person who supplied the product to 
that supplier.554 The same rule applies in the case of an imported product, if the imported 
product does not show the identity of the importer, even if the name of the producer is 
shown.555    
 
3.3.1.2 Potential claimants 
The preamble to the EU Directive refers in numerous recitals to the “protection of the 
consumer.” However, the provisions of the EU Directive, in particular articles 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 
refer to “the injured person”.  For instance, article 3 provides that the “injured person” is 
required to prove the damage caused by the defective product and the causal relationship 
between the defect and the damage.  
 
Accordingly, the remedy afforded by the EU Directive appears to be available to any 
person harmed by a defective product, whether that person is the purchaser of the 
product, a bystander or a defendant who suffers loss as a result of harm caused by a 
defective product to another person. 
 
3.3.1.3 Goods 
The EU Directive originally defined ‘product’ to mean: 
 
“all movables, with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even 
though incorporated into another movable or into an immovable. ‘Primary 
agricultural products’ means the products of the soil, of stock-farming and of 
                                                          
554 Article 3(3). 
555 Ibid. 
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fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing. ‘Product’ 
includes electricity.”556 
 
This definition of ‘product’ was subsequently amended by Directive 1999/34EC557 so that 
primary agricultural products are no longer excluded. Article 1 of Directive 1999/34EC 
provides that: 
 
“Directive 85/374/EEC is hereby amended as follows: 
1. Article 2 shall be replaced by the following: “Article 2. For the purpose of this 
Directive, ‘product’ means all movables even if incorporated into another movable 
or into an immovable. ‘Product’ includes electricity.” 
 
The recitals to Directive 1999/34EC notes that the inclusion of primary agricultural 
products within the scope of the EU Directive would assist in restoring consumer 
confidence in the safety of agricultural products. 558 It is argued that, while it clear that 
farmers are intended to be included within the scope of the EU Directive, farmers  do not 
easily meet the definitions of ‘producer’ in article 1(2) of the EU Directive.559 Farmers could 
perhaps be defined as producers of raw material pursuant to article 3(1) of the EU 
Directive.560  
 
The reference to movables being “incorporated into another movable” would include 
component products that are later fitted, assembled into or incorporated into another 
product. The EU Directive is silent on whether second-hand goods are included, however, 
the words “all movables” is arguably broad enough to include second-hand goods. 
 
                                                          
556 Article 2. 
557 Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999 amending Council 
Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products. 
558 At par 5.  
559 Winfield & Jolowicz Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 310 at footnote 124. 
560 Ibid. 
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3.3.1.4 Causation 
Article 4 of the Directive provides that: 
“The injured person should be required to prove the damage, the defect and the 
causal relationship between defect and damage.” 
 
The EU Directive does not provide any further guidance as to the test for causation that 
ought to be applied by member states. This appears to leave it up to member states to 
apply, for instance, the general principles of causation used in negligence claims. 
However, it is questioned by some authors whether the general principles of causation 
applicable in tort law should not be adapted in the case of a strict liability tort to provide for 
a partial reversal of the burden of proof, given the consumer protection policy underlying 
the EU Directive.561  
 
In the Dutch case of Leebeek v Vrumona, 562  a case involving an allegedly defective 
lemonade bottle, the top of which broke off, provided an interesting application of the res 
ipsa loquitur rule. At the time of the accident in 1988, the Netherlands was already late in 
implementing the EU Directive by a few months, and was therefore obliged to interpret its 
tort law in line with the EU Directive. The producer of the bottle denied defectiveness, 
arguing that it may have broken due to the use of too much force. Although article 4 of the 
EU Directive places the burden of proving defectiveness on the claimant, the Dutch court 
found this burden too heavy, and instead opted for a midway: If the claimant could show 
that he had opened the bottle in a normal way, in other words, absence of any misuse, it 
will be factually presumed that a defect in the bottle caused the damage. The burden 
would then shift to the producer to prove the bottle was not defective. 
 
                                                          
561 Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 622-623. 
562 HR 24 December 1993, NJ 1994, 214. See discussion in Van Dam Dutch case law on the EU Product 
Liability Directive in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 130-31. 
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The failure of the EU Directive to clarify the standard of proof required to establish 
causation could mean that plaintiffs in other member states are faced with the same 
evidentiary difficulties posed by a common law claim in negligence due to the informational 
and financial imbalances existing between plaintiffs and manufacturers, particularly in the 
case of products of a complex, technical nature. 
 
3.3.1.5 Harm and damages  
Article 9 defines ‘damage’ for purposes of the EU Directive to mean: 
 
“(a) damage caused by death or by personal injuries; 
 (b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective 
product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item of 
property: 
     (i)  is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and 
    (ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or 
consumption.”  
 
Article 9 provides that the EU Directive is without prejudice to national laws regarding ‘non-
material damage’. In other words, the member states’ respective laws regarding economic 
loss damages are not affected by the EU Directive. 
   
The Directive prohibits a producer from limiting or excluding its liability in relation to the 
injured person by a provision to that effect.563 However, the liability of the producer may be 
reduced or disallowed where the damage is caused by a defect as well as the fault of the 
injured person or someone for whom the injured person is responsible.564 
 
                                                          
563 Article 12. 
564 Article 8(2). 
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In Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt and Others,565 which is 
discussed in further detail below at 3.3.1.6 in the context of the concept of defectiveness, 
the CJEU was for the first time asked to provide guidance in relation to the scope of 
damages recoverable under the EU Directive. In particular, the referring German Supreme 
Court asked the CJEU whether the costs of the removal and replacement of a defective 
medical device constituted damage caused by a personal injury within the meaning of 
article 9.  
 
The CJEU adopted a broad interpretation of the meaning of ‘damage’.  It held that the EU 
Directive requires a plaintiff to prove a causal relationship between the defect and the 
damage suffered, the EU Directive allows for damages that are necessary “to eliminate 
harmful consequences and to restore the level of safety which a person is entitled to 
expect”.  Therefore, in the case of the defective pacemaker, the EU Directive covers 
damages for the cost of replacement of the defective product and the costs of the surgery.   
The broad interpretation of ‘damage’ by the CJEU appears to be in conflict with the 
wording of article 9 of the EU Directive, which expressly provides that ‘damage’ excludes 
the cost of replacement of the defective product itself. It is argued that plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
the EU are likely to rely on this ruling by the CJEU to argue that all losses and expenses 
relating to the use of a defective product, such as the cost of so-called ‘medical monitoring’ 
where a medical device has not yet caused injury but may in the future, are recoverable, 
regardless of how remote that loss may be.566 Recovery of medical monitoring expenses 
may also be possible in cases involving a defective pharmaceutical product, where a rare 
side effect related to it may only manifest many years after use.567   
                                                          
565 Joined cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 (5 March 2015). 
566 Dodds-Smith & Brown ‘Recent Developments in European Product Liability’ (2016) International 
Comparative Legal Guides at 2. 
567 Ibid. 
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3.3.1.6 Concept of Defectiveness  
Defectiveness under the Directive is based on a consumer expectations standard, which 
therefore serves as the applicable test for defectiveness within all EU jurisdictions. Several 
other countries in the Far East, Latin America, the Pacific Rim and most recently, South 
Africa, have modelled their special product liability provisions of the EU Directive’s 
formulation of this core element.568 In terms of article 6: 
 
"1.  A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: 
 the presentation of the product; 
 the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; 
 the time when the product was put into circulation. 
2.  A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better 
product is subsequently put into circulation." 
 
The EU Directive does not require a product to be absolutely safe. It prescribes a minimum 
standard of safety to which products should conform, that standard being what a person is 
entitled to expect in light of all the relevant circumstances. This standard is based on the 
legitimate expectations of consumers in general, or the public at large, and not upon the 
subjective expectations formed by the individual consumer. The degree of socially 
acceptable risk which a product may carry is an issue of fact and will vary from case to 
case, product to product.569 
 
                                                          
568 Reimann 'Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?' (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law at 761. 
569 Hodges 'The European Minefield' (1993) 129 Product Liability International at 52-53; Hulsenbeck & 
Campbell Product Liability: Prevention, Practice and Process in Europe and the United States (1989) 24. 
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The manner in which products are generally marketed to the public, as well as its direct 
and personal presentation to the final consumer, may impact on consumer expectations 
regarding product quality and safety.570 According to Hodges,571 the presentation factor will 
have an effect on the product's packaging, in particular, any accompanying warnings, 
instructions, leaflets or certifications of safety, as well as any promotional or marketing 
information provided to consumers.  
 
The factor of ‘reasonably expected product use' arguably excludes liability for damage 
caused by unforeseeable product use, or misuse. The Directive does not specify what 
would qualify as product misuse, since it would depend on the facts of the particular case. 
Foreseeability of the uses to which a product may be put is closely linked to the 
foreseeability of harm, both of which are important considerations in a manufacturer's 
choices regarding design and manufacturing, and especially the extent and substance of 
warnings or instructions regarding product use accompanying the product. Although at first 
glance, the foreseeability of harm seems to hint at an enquiry into the negligent conduct of 
the manufacturer, the drafters of the Directive were careful to avoid any reference to what 
the producer “could have done differently”, or in other words, avoidability of risk or harm. 
Therefore, unless any of the listed defences apply, a producer may be held strictly liable 
under the Directive for damage caused by a foreseeable product use, even though there 
was no way in which the risk of harm could have been avoided. 
 
 
Courts are required to judge a product’s defectiveness in light of industry norms and 
standards that prevailed at the time the product was made commercially available or put 
into circulation. This factor links in with article 6(2), which holds that a product will not be 
                                                          
570 Hodges 'The European Minefield' (1993) 129 Product Liability International at 53-54.                           
571 Ibid. 
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considered defective simply because a safer product, either from the same producer or 
another, was subsequently made available to consumers. When read together, the 
Directive seems to suggest that similar products available on the market at the time the 
product was put into circulation, and not at the time of trial, may be considered. 
 
The defectiveness test under article 6, while listing three of the most important 
considerations that should be taken into account, requires courts to consider “all the 
circumstances.” This gives courts considerable discretion in deciding which other factors 
are relevant to the enquiry. Whittaker572 argues that national courts are likely to interpret 
this Directive in light of its stated goal to impose faultless liability, and thereby limit the 
factors that may be weighed under article 6 to those that are not in any way relevant to 
fault. Due to divergences in the definition of 'civil fault' in the various Member States, such 
an approach to article 6 would result in national courts excluding different factors from the 
defectiveness enquiry, thereby defeating the harmonisation efforts of the Directive.573     
 
A major difference between the EU Directive and its American counterpart, the 
Restatement (Third), is the fact that the EU Directive draws no express distinction between 
the three main categories of product defects generally recognised in literature, namely 
manufacturing defects, design defects and inadequate instructions or warnings. This does 
not mean that member states may not refer to these categories, however, article 6 
imposes on member states one universal test for defectiveness in all types of defect 
cases. For example, product liability case law in The Netherlands sometimes refers to 
                                                          
572 Liability for Products - English Law, French Law and European Harmonization (2005) 492-494. This 
approach was followed by in A v National Blood Authority (2001) 3 All ER 289. 
573 Ibid. 
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these categories of defects, however, no legal consequences have flown from the 
distinction.574  
 
Where a national court has doubts as to whether a particular factor should be considered 
in the test for defectiveness under Article 6(1), it may refer this question to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for a ruling.575 In Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK 
Sachsen-Anhalt and Others,576 which is also discussed above at 3.1.1.5 in the context of 
harm and damages, the German Supreme Court referred a question to the CJEU in 
relation to the meaning of “defect” under the EU Directive. For the first time since the EU 
Directive was enacted, the CJEU provided some guidance as to the definition of 
defectiveness in article 6 of the EU Directive. 
 
The German Supreme Court’s question related to two joined cases involving implanted 
medical devices, namely a pacemaker and a cardioverter defibrillator, both manufactured 
by Boston Scientific. In particular, the question to the CJEU was whether a product is 
defective under article 6 if it forms part of a group of products that have a significantly 
increased risk of failure, but where a defect has not been identified in each specific product 
within that group. The cases involved recovery claims by the patients’ health insurers for 
the costs of replacing the devices. The difficulty was that affected medical devices were 
destroyed after surgical removal, which meant there was no evidence to establish that the 
particular device had in fact malfunctioned.  
 
With respect to the pacemakers, the manufacturer had identified that a certain component 
in the pacemaker could gradually degrade over time, resulting in a 0.3% to 0.9% risk of 
                                                          
574 Ibid, citing Dommering-van Rongen Product-aansprakelijkheid. Een rechsvergelijkend overzicht (2000) 
50. 
575 Article 234 EC Treaty. 
576 Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13. 
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premature failure due to sudden loss of battery power. The manufacturer made a 
recommendation to doctors tha they consider replacing the pacemakers and offered to 
bear the costs of providing replacement devices and the replacement surgery. In relation 
to the cardioverter defibrillator, it was found that a magnetic switch in the defibrillator could 
remain stuck in the closed position, preventing the device from treating ventricular and 
atrial arythmias. The prevalence of this problem was 4 out of 46,000 devices. These 
patients became aware of an audible beeping tone and the devices were replaced. 
 
 
In interpreting article 6, the CJEU referred to the sixth recital in the preamble to the EU 
Directive, stating that this meant that consumer expectations ought to be assessed “in the 
abstract” with regard to the expectations of the “public at large”.577 The CJEU held that, 
while the notion of “legitimate expectation” is particularly difficult to define, the expected 
degree of safety must be determined by taking into account various factors, including the 
intended purpose of the product, the nature of the product and the requirements of the 
group of users for whom the product is intended.578 In other words, while the consumer 
expectations test is expressed as taking account of the expectations of the public at large, 
in practice, the test compasses the specific requirements and expectations of the group of 
users for whom the product is intended.  
 
The CJEU ruled that, where products belonging to the same production series have been 
shown to have a “significantly higher than normal risk of failure”, or in which a “significant 
number of failures have already occurred,” all products in that production series can be 
classified as defective for purposes of article 6 without proof that a specific product was 
defective.579 The CJEU noted that, on the facts before it, the affected patients were entitled 




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 163 
to expect a particularly high level of safety given that these products are implanted devices 
which can lead to cardiac failure or death if they failed. The CJEU held that this 
interpretation of article 6 is consistent with the objectives of the Directive, particularly the 
second and seventh recitals indicating that the EU Directive was aimed at ensuring a fair 
apportionment of risks between the injured person and the manufacturer.580   
 
It is argued that, while the CJEU took into account the specific risks arising from implanted 
medical devices on the facts before it, it formulated its ruling broadly so as to apply to any 
group or series of products that have a potential defect and that it is a relevant 
consideration where the product has an abnormal risk of harm.581 It remains to be seen 
how member states’ courts will interpret the CJEU’s ruling, particularly, when products 
would qualify as presenting a “significantly higher than normal risk of failure”.   
 
It is argued that, while the CJEU has provided some general guidance regarding the 
defectiveness test under the EU Directive, there are still areas of uncertainty regarding the 
interpretation of article 6, such as what information may be considered by courts in 
assessing defectiveness.582 For instance, it is questioned whether product information and 
warnings supplied to learned intermediaries (‘the learned intermediary doctrine’) or 
information supplied directly to consumers (‘direct-to-consumer advertising’) would be 
relevant in the assessment.583  
 
                                                          
580 [30]. 
581 Dodds-Smith & Brown ‘Recent Developments in European Product Liability’ (2016) International 
Comparative Legal Guides at 2. 
582 Ibid. 
583 See, for instance, the discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine and direct-to-consumer marketing in 
the context of inadequate instructions or warning defects under the US Restatement (Third) above at 
3.2.1.6(ii).  
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In 2011, a report by the European Commission on the application of the EU Directive584 
noted that representatives of the European pharmaceutical industry take the position that 
the EU Directive fails to properly take into account that fact that this industry is highly and 
strictly regulated. They argue that the EU Directive should, in considering defectiveness, 
take into account the fact that the use of pharmaceutical products is generally subject 
external examination by medical professionals (learned intermediaries) and that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers do not have any control over the way in which medicines 
are prescribed or administered. 
 
3.3.1.7 Defences / Restriction of Liability  
3.3.1.7(i) Compliance with public regulation 
A producer can escape liability under article 7(d) of the EU Directive if it can show that “the 
defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by public 
authorities.”585 
 
The wording of this section indicates that the defence is limited to circumstnaces where 
the regulations in question create a legal obligation on the producer to comply. In other 
words, minimum product standards that are not compulsory but rather industry guidelines, 
would not bring a manufacturer within the realms of this defence.  
 
In reality, it would be a rare scenario where a product defect is caused by compliance with 
a mandatory product regulation, which is usually aimed at improving product safety.  It is 
interesting to note that this provision does not state that regulatory compliance must be the 
                                                          
584  Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 
1999  
585 Article 7(d). 
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sole cause of the product defect. Arguably, where a product is found to be defective due to 
compliance with a mandatory regulation in one respect and due to some other unrelated 
factor, such as the producer’s faulty design or a defective component, the producer would 
not be able to rely on article 7(d) as defence where the plaintiff can show that the defect 
unrelated to regulatory compliance was also causative of the harm. 
 
It should also be noted here that proof of compliance with mandatory regulations do not 
automatically provide producers with a defence under the EU Directive. Often, mandatory 
regulations are set as minimum safety standards and compliance with them do not 
necessarily discharge producers’ duty to ensure their products are safe. Having said that, 
in circumstnaces where a certain prodcut is heavily regulated and sets high safety 
standards, evidence of regulatory compliance may be a weighty consideration in the 
assessment of defectiveness under article 6, or even indicative of the state of scientific 
knowledge available for purposes of the ‘development risk’ defence under article 7(e). 
 
In 2011, a report by the European Commission on the application of the EU Directive586 
noted that there is very little case law on the application of article 7(d). Interestingly, 
according to the report, Hungarian authorities indicated this defence is mainly raised in 
relation to vehicles and medical products, but that producers’ liability is rarely established 
under the national law transposing the EU Directive.  
 
3.3.1.7(ii) Absence of defect at time of supply 
Pursuant to article 7(b), a producer can escape liability under the EU Directive if it can 
establish that:  
                                                          
586  Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 
1999  
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“having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect did not exist at 
the time the product was put into circulation by the producer or that the defect 
came into being afterwards”.587 
 
This defence would cover the scenario where a producer can show evidence such as 
compliance with stringent quality control procedures, which justifies the conclusion, on 
balance, that the product was not defective when it left the producer’s control. This 
defence would be relevant where a product became defective due to misuse, modification 
or alteration of a product by a party other than the producer after the producer put the 
product into circulation.  
  
It is relevant to note here that, in the case of a component manufacturer, it is a defence if it 
can be shown that the defect is attributable to the design of the product in which the 
component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the 
product.”588 In other words, it may be that the component was not defective at the time of 
supply to the manufacturer of the product into which the component was incorporated. 
Rather, the compnent only became defective when it was incorporated into another 
product, either due to the design of that other product and the specifications given by the 
manfuacturer of the final product to the component manufacturer.    
 
3.3.1.7(iii) Defect not reasonably discoverable 
Perhaps the most controversial of the listed defences in the EU Directive is the so-called 
‘development risk defence’ in article 7(e), pursuant to which a producer can escape liability 
by showing that: 
 
                                                          
587 Article 7(b). 
588 Article 7(f). 
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“the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the producer put 
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to 
be discovered;589 
 
It has been held by the CJEU that the reference to “scientific and technical knowledge” in 
article 7(e) does not refer to the state of knowledge in the industrial sector within which the 
producer of the product operates, but rather “the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge” in general.590 In other 
words, it is irrelevant to the question of liability under the EU Directive that no-one within 
the particular class of manufacturer takes the necessary steps to eliminate or prevent a 
defect, if such steps can be taken based on the available knowledge. Section 7(e) is 
directed that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge available, “of which 
the producer is presumed to have been informed.”591 
 
However, the CJEU did qualify this by stating that the relevant knowledge must have been 
accessible at the time the product was put into circulation.592 The CJEU conceded that the 
‘accessibility’ of knowledge raises difficulties of interpretation, but held this is a matter for 
national courts to resolve.593  
 
In the UK Advocate General’s opinion, the practicability and cost of the steps to eliminate 
or prevent the defect or the fact that the manufacturer did not keep up to date with 
scientific knowledge in this area, as disclosed in specialist literature, are irrelevant to 
section 7(e) of the EU Directive and section 4(1)(e) of the UKCPA. 594  Further, the 
                                                          
589 Article 7(e). 
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Advocate General opines that the relevant knowledge must be available in a language that 
is reasonably accessible and in a format that has a reasonably high degree of circulation.   
 
Two member states, Finland and Luxembourg, have elected to exclude this defence for all 
products in their national legislation implementing the Directive. In some states, application 
of the defence is excluded for specific products.595 
 
A study conducted for the European Commission in 2002 on the economic impact of the 
Directive in EU member states and in particular, the development risk defence, found that 
the practical application of the defence was still extremely limited in reported judgments.596  
 
In 2011, a report by the European Commission on the application of the EU Directive597 
considered, among other things, whether the article 7(e) defence ought to be retained. The 
report notes that industry and insurance representatives believe removal of the defence 
would stifle innovation and raise insurance costs. These stakeholders argue the fact that 
exclusion removal of this defence has not had any significant impact in Finland or 
Luxembourg is due to the size of the markets in these member states. On the other hand, 
consumer representatives are in favour of removing this defence. The report notes that 
stakeholders have differing opinions regarding the effectiveness of this defence, but 
recognise that the EU Directive overall strikes an appropriate balance between the 
competing interests of industry and consumers.  
 
                                                          
595 For instance, in Spain the defence does not apply to pharmaceutical products and foodstuffs for human 
consumption. 
596 Fondazione Rosselli ‘Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as provided by 
Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products ETC 2002/B5’ at 130. 
597  Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 
1999  
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It remains unclear exactly what practical effect the development risk defence has had to 
date in the EU. However, it appears to be considered important in order to maintain an 
appropriate balance between producers and persons harmed by defective products and 
has had a limited economic impact in at least two member states. Of course, this does not 
mean that the defence is not raised frequently and successfully in out of court negotiations 
and settlements. 
 
3.3.1.7(iv) Apportionment of liability        
In circumstances where the harm is caused by a defect in the product as well as the fault 
of the injured person or a person for whom the injured person is responsible, article 8 of 
the EU Directive provides that the producer's liability may be reduced or disallowed, having 
regard to all the circumstances.598         
 
However, the liability of the producer will not be reduced if the harm is caused by a defect 
in the product and an act or omission of a third party.599 This provision is subject to the 
various member states’ national law concerning the right of contribution or recourse. 
 
3.3.1.7(v) Prescription 
Article 10 of the EU Directive imposes a 3 year limitation period, which commences to run 
from the day “the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the 
damage, the defect and the identity of the producer.” Article 10 provides that this provision 
does not affect member states’ laws regarding suspension or interruption of limitation 
periods.  
 
                                                          
598 Article 8(2). 
599 Article 8(1). 
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Further, article 11 of the EU Directive imposes a so-called ‘long-stop’ provision where all 
rights conferred on the injured person by the EU Directive are extinguished after a 10 year 
period from the date the producer put the actual product in question into circulation, unless 
the injured person has brought proceedings against the producer in the interim. 
 
In O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd600, the CJEU held that this long-stop limitation period 
should be interpreted as commencing from the point at which the product “leaves the 
production process operated by the producer and enters a marketing process in the form 
in which it is offered to the public in order to be used or consumed.”601 
 
3.3.1.7(vi) Contractual restriction of liability                                                            
Article 12 of the Directive provides that the liability of the producer, in relation to the injured 
person, may not be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his liability or exempting him 
from liability. Any contractual provision which has the effect of limiting or excluding the 
producer's liability would therefore be void and cannot be raised as a defence. 
 
3.3.1.8 Implementation of the Directive by EU Member States 
3.3.1.8(i) The United Kingdom 
In fulfilment of its obligation to implement the European Directive, the United Kingdom 
introduced the Consumer Protection Act (‘UKCPA’) in 1987. Part 1 of the UKCPA contains 
the relevant strict product liability provisions.  
 
In practice, claimants in the UK are more likely to bring a claim under the UKCPA than 
under negligence.602 However, common law claims in negligence remain necessary in 
                                                          
600 Case C-127/04 (9 February 2006). 
601 [27]. 
602 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 297. 
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some cases, for instance where harm is caused to property not intended for private use603 
or where a strict liability claim is statute barred by the special limitation periods under the 
UKCPA.604 
 
While the UKCPA is seen as an important development in English tort law, it is argued that 
liability under the act is not absolute and shows affinities with common law.605 It remains 
unclear to what extent the UKCPA has had any effect in practice.606 The UK has had very 
low rate of claims arising from the Directive, despite a common perception in Europe that 




The UKCPA imposes liability on three categories of persons in relation to a defective 
product, namely: 
 
        “(a) the producer of the product; 
(b)  any person who, by putting his name on the product or using a trade mark or 
other distinguishing mark in relation to the product, has held himself out to be 
the producer of the product; 
(c) any person who has imported the product into a member State from a place 
outside the member States in order, in the course of any business of his, to 
supply it to another.”608  
 
Section 1(2) of the UKCPA further defines a ‘producer’ as:    
   
“(a) the person who manufactured it; 
 (b) in the case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been 
won or abstracted, the person who won or abstracted it; 
                                                          
603 Section 5(3) UKCPA. 
604 297. See sections 22A and 22B UKCPA. 
605 319. 
606 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 319. 
607 320. 
608 Section 2(2). 
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 (c) in the case of  a product which has not been manufactured, won or abstracted 
but essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other 
process having been carried out (for example, in relation to agricultural 
produce), the person who carried out that process.” 
 
The first definition of ‘producer’, when read with the definition of ‘product’ in section 1(2), 
includes both manufacturers of component parts and the final manufacturer or assembler 
of the product.  
 
Mere suppliers of defective products may also be held liable in certain circumstances. 
Section 2(3) provides that, where a supplier receives a request from the ‘person who 
suffered the damage’ to identify the producer, importer or a person who held himself out as 
the producer, and the supplier fails to comply with the request or identify his own supplier 
within a reasonable time, that supplier will be liable under act. This request for 
identification may be made to any supplier of the defective product, not only the supplier 
who directly supplied the product to the claimant. Section 46 provides a broad definition of 
the concept ‘supply’ which includes: 
 
“(a) selling, hiring out or lending the goods; 
 (b) entering into a hire-purchase agreement to furnish the goods; 
 (c) the performance of any contract for work and materials to furnish the goods; 
 (d) providing the goods in exchange for any consideration…other than money; 
 (e) providing the goods in or in connection with the performance of any statutory 
function; or 
(f) giving the goods as a prize or otherwise making a gift of the goods; 
and in relation to gas or water, those references shall be construed as including 
references to providing the service by which the gas or water is made 
available for use.”        
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Section 2 provides that, where “damage is caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, 
every person” listed in section 2(2) is liable for the damage. Where two or more persons 
are liable under the UKCPA, their liability to the claimant is joint and several,609 although 




The relevant strict product liability provisions of the UKCPA simply refer to ‘the person who 
suffered the damage’. This wording is broad enough to entitle any person who has 
suffered damage as a result of a defective product, whether a consumer who purchased 
the product, a bystander or dependants of ‘the person who suffered the damage’, to 
recover damages under the UKCPA. 
 
Goods  
Section 1(2) of the UKCPA defines ‘product’ to mean: 
 
“any goods or electricity and (subject to subsection (3) below) includes a product 
which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component 
part or raw material or otherwise;” 
 
Further, subsection 1(3) of the UKCPA provides that: 
 
“For purposes of this Part611 a person who supplies any product in which products 
are comprised, whether by virtue of being component parts or raw materials or 
otherwise, shall not be treated by reason only of his supply of that product as 
supplying any of the products so comprised.”  
 
                                                          
609 Section 2(5).  
610 Winfield & Jolowicz ‘Liability for Defective Products’ (2014) at 308, and more generally in relation to 
apportionment between joint tortfeasors, Chapter 22.  
611 Part I of the UKCPA. 
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The concept ‘goods’ is further  defined in section 45 to include “substances, growing crops 
and things comprised in land by virtue of being attached to it and any ship, aircraft or 
vehicle.” 
While there is no doubt that agricultural products are intended to be included,612 farmers 
do not fall easily into any of the categories of ‘producer’ as defined in section 1(2).613 
Winfield and Jolowicz argue that a farmer could perhaps be described as a ‘producer…of 
raw material’ under article 3(1) of the EU Directive of 1985.614  
 
While the UKCPA covers information in the tangible form of a book, it appears that 
‘information’ in general is not covered.615 It is argued that this position was clearly the UK 
legislature’s intention, however, it is questioned why certain provisions in the Bill of the 
UKCPA, which made this position clear, were removed.616   
 
With respect to digital information, the position is not so clear, particularly in circumstances 
where it is difficult to draw a line between ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ of a product.617 If we 
take the example of a computerised autopilot device in an aeroplane, it has to be 
questioned whether the result under the UKCPA should be any different where one of the 
following scenarios occur: 
 The autopilot device causes the plane to crash due to failure of a hardware component 
of the device; 
 The autopilot device causes the plane to crash due to a shortcoming or malfunction in 
its programming (i.e. software). 
                                                          
612 By virtue of Directive 1999/34. 
613 Winfield & Jolowicz ‘Liability for Defective Products’ (2014) at 310. 
614 Ibid at footnote 124. 
615 310. 
616 310, citing Whittaker ‘European Product Liability and Intellectual Products’ (1989) 105 L.Q.R 125. 
617 Winfield & Jolowicz ‘Liability for Defective Products’ (2014) at 310. 
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Given the vast and ever-increasing number of tangible consumer products today that 
incorporate digital software components, the UKCPA would be excluding a large 
proportion of product liability claims from its scope if it were interpreted so as to exclude 
defective software. From a policy perspective, it would seem contrary to the promotion of 
consumer protection to exclude such claims, particularly with the advent of technology 
such as driverless motor vehicles which will require consumers to rely on advanced, built-
in software to avoid life-threatening collisions. 
 
Causation 
Section 2 of the UKCPA simply provides that the damage be “caused wholly or partly by a 
defect in a product”. The UKCPA provides no further guidance as to how causation ought 
to be established and in particular, to what degree of specificity a claimant is required to 
prove the nature of the alleged defect that caused the harm. As noted above at 3.3.1.4, the 
EU Directive does not assist in this regard and simply requires the claimant to “prove the 
damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage.” The 
difficulties arising from this lack of precision in defining the mode of causation is evident 
from a number of decisions. 
 
The case of Richardson v LRC Products Ltd618 involved a claim by a woman who had 
fallen pregnant after a condom used by her husband had fractured during use. The court in 
this case held that the mere existence of a fracture in the condom was not in itself proof of 
a ‘defect’. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied heavily on statistical evidence that 
condoms do, from time to time, fail and found that ‘persons generally’ do not expect that 
condoms would never fail.  
 
                                                          
618 [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 280. 
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In the case of Foster v Biosil619 the court held, in relation to allegedly defective breast 
implants, that the claimant had to show precisely what the defect was. The implants in 
question had both ruptured within 7 months after they had been implanted. The court 
required that both the defect and the cause of that defect had to be established by the 
claimant. The court held that it is not sufficient, for purposes of section 3 of the UKCPA, to 
merely show that a product failed in an unsafe manner contrary to ‘what persons generally 
are entitled to expect.’ Rather, a claimant is also required to show, on balance of 
probabilities, the mechanism of the product’s failure. The claimant was unable to prove the 
mechanism of the failure and was therefore unsuccessful. 
 
The Foster v Biosil judgement has been subject to criticism on the basis that it, and its 
interpretation of Richardson v LRC Products, have introduced into the UKCPA’s strict 
product liability regime the same evidentiary requirements as those in a common law 
negligence claim.620  
 
Some years later, in Ide v ATB Sales Ltd,621 the Court of Appeal had to determine the 
correct approach a court should take to proof of causation where alternative possibilities 
are presented to the court. In this case, the claimant had fallen off a mountain bike, which 
was imported to the UK by the defendant. The parties put forth two alternative causes of 
the accident, being either a defective handlebar or loss of control over the bike by the 
claimant causing damage to the handlebar in the fall.  
 
                                                          
619 (2001) 59 BMLR 178 
620 Bradley ‘Proof of defect under the CPA 1987: Hufford v Samsung Electronics.’ Product Liability Alerter (9 
January 2015). Available [online]: http://www.hendersonchambers.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Matthew-Bradley-Product-Liability-Alerter-9-January-2015.pdf. 
621 [2008] EWCA Civ 424; [2009] RTR 8. 
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This case did not focus specifically on the UKCPA, rather it was concerned with the correct 
approach to establishing causation at common law where there are two competing 
theories, neither being improbable. The Court of Appeal, as per Thomas LJ, held that: 
“As a matter of common sense it will usually be safe for a judge to conclude, where there 
are two competing theories before him neither of which is improbable, that having rejected 
one it is logical to accept the other as being the cause on the balance of probabilities.” 
 
Thomas LJ then compared this position under the general common law to the position 
under the UKCPA, stating that:622 
“The application of this approach by a court in considering a claim under the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 in respect of a defective product can often be 
simpler. Under ss. 2 and 3 of the Act if a person is injured by a product, his claim 
succeeds if he establishes there is a defect in the product and that defect caused 
the loss unless the defendant can rely on one of the statutory defences.  In 
determining whether the loss or injury has been caused by a defect or by some 
other cause, although the process of reasoning may involve an explanation of how 
the defect was caused, the task of the court is simply to determine whether the 
loss was caused by the defect and not by another cause…that distinction is 
important and can make the task of the court a simpler one, as no doubt 
Parliament intended.”     
 
In other words, it appears from Ide v ATB Sales that a claimant does not have to show the 
cause of the defect, merely that the harm was caused, on balance of probabilities, by the 
defect and not another cause. Further, the court seems to be saying that the causation 
enquiry under the UKCPA was intended by the legislature to be a more straightforward 
enquiry. This may indicate that causation under the UKCPA perhaps requires a less 
detailed investigation into the competing theories of causation put forward by the parties 
                                                          
622 At par [7] and [19].  
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and simply requires that the court satisfy itself, on balance, that the defect was wholly or 
partly causative of the harm. 
  
The recent decision in Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd 623  appears to have 
confirmed that a claimant is not required to prove the precise cause of the defect. Basing 
its decision on Ide v ATB Sales Ltd, the court held that: 
 
“in relation to a claim under the [UKCPA], a claimant does not have to specify or 
identify with accuracy or precision the defect in the product he seeks to establish, 
and thus prove. It is enough for a claimant to prove the existence of a defect in 
broad or general terms, such as ‘a defect in the electrics of the Lexus (motor car).” 
 
In fact, the decision in Hufford v Samsung Electronics appears to have gone even further 
than Ide v ATB Sales by stating that, in addition to there being no requirement to show the 
cause of the defect, a claimant need not even show with precision what the defect was. If 
this position is to be followed by courts in the future without qualification, it would greatly 
assist claimants in establishing ‘defect’ as well as causation for purposes of a UKCPA 
claim. Arguably, if the case of Foster v Biosil was heard today, following the decision in 
Hufford v Samsung Electronics, the claimant would likely have succeeded in establishing 
the breast implants were defective purely on the basis that they had ruptured within 7 
months of implantation.  
 
In some instances, UK courts have recognised exceptions to the traditional ‘but for’ test for 
factual causation, known as the ‘material contribution to harm’ and the ‘material 
contribution to risk’ tests. The material contribution to harm exception has its origins in 
nineteenth century nuisance cases in Scotland involving pollution of rivers and waterways 
                                                          
623 [2014] EWHC 2956 (TCC). 
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by multiple factory owners.624 It was held by courts that it is sufficient to establish factual 
causation by showing that a particular factory had ‘materially contributed’ to the pollution 
and it was irrelevant whether that factory’s discharge into the waterway would have 
amounted to an actionable nuisance on its own.625 This material contribution exception 
was again applied in a later Scottish case Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings626 where an 
industrial worker was exposed to silica dust in the course of his employment which 
resulted in pneumoconiosis. The worker had contracted the disease due to atmospheric 
exposure at the industrial plant which was present partly due to breach of duty by the 
defendant and party due to no breach of duty. In this case, the court held that the 
defendant’s negligence resulting in the presence of silica dust had made a ‘material 
contribution’ to the worker contracting the disease. 
 
In a later Scottish case, McGhee v National Coal Board,627 the material contribution to 
harm test resulted in the development of a ‘material contribution to risk’ test. In this case, a 
worker had developed dermatitis in the course of his work at the defendant’s brick kiln due 
to exposure to brick dust. On the facts, it was found that the defendants had failed to 
provide adequate washing facilities, requiring workers to commute home in a dirty state. 
The worker was unable to prove, on balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s failure to 
provide washing facilities would have prevented the dermatitis. The medical evidence was 
only able to state that washing facilities would have ‘materially reduced’ the risk of 
developing dermatitis. The worker argued that the ‘material increase in risk’ of developing 
                                                          
624 Steel & Ibbetson ‘More grief on uncertain causation in tort’ (2011) Cambridge Law Journal at 453. 
625 Ibid, citing for example: Duke of Buccleuch v Cowan (1866) 5 M. 214, 216 (Lord-Justice Clerk), 223-224, 
227-229 (Lord Cowan), 232-233 (Lord Benholme), 234-237 (Lord Neave); Countess Dowager of Seafield 
v Kemp (1899) 1 F. 402, 406 n.3; Fleming v Gemmill 1908 S.C. 340, 347, 350; Brownlie & Son v 
Magistrates of Barrhead 1923 S.C. 915, 927, 933, 935. 
626 1955 S.C. 320; [1956] A.C. 613. 
627 1973 S.C. (H.L.) 37; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1. 
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dermatitis is the same as ‘material contribution’ to the disease itself. While this argument 
was rejected at first instance, the worker succeeded on appeal.  
 
In cases involving a single wrongdoer where the facts point to more than one probable 
cause of harm, the UK Supreme Court has also applied the ‘material contribution test’ as 
an alternative to the traditional ‘but-for’ test. In Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd; Knowsley 
MBC v Willmore628 the plaintiffs had died of mesothelioma due to exposure to asbestos 
dust. The plaintiffs had been subject to low-level atmospheric exposure to asbestos as well 
as light exposure over a prolonged period at their respective places of employment. The 
UKSCA held that the contribution to risk of mesothelioma by the places of employment 
was sufficiently material to constitute factual causation against the employers. The reason 
for this exception is that medical science is currently not able to ascertain which asbestos 
fibre or fibres caused the mesothelioma, which usually only occurs many years after 
exposure. The Sienkiewicz exception has been developed in the context of asbestos-
related mesothelioma cases where the plaintiff was subject to a tortious exposure to 
asbestos and other non-tortious, atmospheric/environmental exposures to asbestos. In 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,629 the material contribution to risk test was 
also applied in the context of mesothelioma and multiple tortious exposures to asbestos 
caused by more than one wrongdoer. In other words, as long as it can be shown that a 
particular wrongdoer’s negligence in exposing the claimant to asbestos materially 
increased the risk of mesothelioma, factual causation can be established against that 
particular wrongdoer. 
 
                                                          
628 [2011] UKSC 10. 
629 [2002] UKHL 22. 
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More recently, English courts have applied the material contribution to harm test in the 
context of medical negligence or malpractice, where a person suffers from a harmful 
process arising from a natural cause, but exposure to the harm is prolonged due to 
medical malpractice.630 
 
Aside from the cases dicussed above where a material contribution to harm or material 
contribution to risk of harm test has been applied in the context of causation, the traditional 
‘but for’ test remains the applicable test for factual causation in the UK. It appears that the 
material contribution to harm or risk of harm test for causation has not yet been applied in 
any reported product liability case law in the UK. However, given the numerous instances 
where this test has been recognised in other contexts, it may only be a matter of time 
before it is extended, in appropriate cases, to product liability claims brought under the 
UKCPA or in negligence.  
 
Harm and damages 
The UKCPA defines ‘damage’ to mean “death or personal injury or any loss of, or damage 
to any property (including land).”631 However, liability in respect of property damage is 
restricted by further provisions under the UKCPA. 
 
 
In particular, section 5(2) provides that a claimant cannot recover compensation for “the 
loss or damage to the product itself or the whole or any part of any product which has 
been supplied with the product in question comprised in it.” Further, section 5(4) provides 
that no liability arises unless the damages (excluding interest) would be a minimum of 
£275.00.632 
                                                          
630 See, eg. Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2009] 1 WLR 1052; Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] AC 
888. 
631 Section 5(1). 
632 This is to give effect to article 9(2) of the EU Directive.  
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A further limitation lies in the fact that the UKCPA does not enable recovery of 
compensation for damage to property which is not of a description “ordinarily intended for 
private use, occupation or consumption” and “intended by the person suffering the loss or 
damage mainly for his own private use, occupation or consumption.”633 A reason for this 
restriction on the type of property damage recoverable may be that strict product liability, 
from a policy perspective, is essentially aimed at protection of the vulnerable individual or 
consumer, rather than providing a remedy to sophisticated commercial entities.    
 
Concept of defectiveness 
In terms of section 3 of the UKCPA, a product is said to have a ‘defect’ if:  
 
  "(1) the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to 
expect; and for those purposes 'safety' in relation to a product, shall include 
safety with respect to products comprised in that product and safety in the 
context of risks of damage to property, as well as in the context of risks of 
death or personal injury. 
   (2) In determining for the purposes of subsection (I) above what persons 
generally are entitled to expect in relation to a product all the circumstances 
shall be taken into account, including - 
   (a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been 
marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and 
any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from 
doing anything with or in relation to the product; 
   (b) what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the 
product; and 
   (c) the time when the product was supplied by its producer to another; 
                                                          
633 Section 5(3).  
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and nothing in this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the fact alone 
that the safety of a product which is supplied after that time is greater than the 
safety of the product in question.” 
 
A noteworthy judicial interpretation of the defectiveness standard under the UKCPA is the 
judgment of Burton J in A v National Blood Authority.634 In this case, the National Blood 
Authority was held strictly liable for supplying blood infected with the Hepatitis C virus, the 
detection of which was not possible at the time of supply. In analysing the defectiveness 
standard, the court focused mainly on the formulation of the consumer expectations test in 
article 6 of the European Directive.  
 
Burton J rejected academic criticism of the consumer expectations test, such as the 
argument that the strict liability under the Directive was nothing more than a strict form of 
negligence, particularly in the context of design defects. 635  He also rejected the 
commentary given by Lord Griffiths soon after the implementation of the Directive in the 
UK, in which the idea was promoted that some form of risk-utility balancing would have to 
be undertaken in the application of the article 6 defectiveness standard.636 It should also 
be borne in mind that, at the time of this judgment, consumer expectations had already 
been widely rejected in the United States as a controlling test for defectiveness, in favour 
of a risk-utility approach to design and warning defects. Nevertheless, Burton J was 
determined to apply strict liability, with consumer expectations as the determinative 
standard for defectiveness. To do so, he sought guidance from a great number of foreign 
sources.  
                                                          
634 (2001) 3 All ER 289. 
635 Howells Defect in English Law- Lessons for the harmonisation of European Product Liability. In Fairgrieve 
(ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 141. See, for example, criticism by Stapleton 
Product Liability (1994). 
636 Lord Griffith. Val & Dorner 'Developments in English Product Liability Law: a Comparison with the 
American System' (1988) 62 Tul LR at 353. 
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The judge preferred the use of 'legitimate expectations' rather than 'entitled expectations'. 
He pointed out that the 'legitimate expectations' regarding product safety could be higher 
or lower than the expectations generally held by the public. There may also be cases 
where the public simply do not have any safety expectations regarding a specific products. 
He referred to the work of Bartl,637 a German author, who argues that the judge is 'an 
informed representative of the public at large', and as such, can, therefore, determine 
whether a product conforms to a socially acceptable standard of safety.638 The failure of a 
product to meet legitimate safety expectations does not simply provide evidence or an 
indication of defectiveness. Failure to meet legitimate expectations, in itself, is the 
defect.639  
 
Burton J also referred to the interpretation of the defectiveness standard in article 6 by a 
Dutch court in Scholten v Foundation Sanquin of Blood Supply. 640  In that case, the 
claimant had contracted HIV through a blood transfusion during heart surgery. The virus 
was untraceable at the time of donation, presumably because the donor was within the so-
called 'window period' after infection. In applying the consumer expectations standard, the 
Court had to determine what level of safety the claimant was entitled to expect in relation 
to the donor blood and held that: 
 
“taking into account the vital importance of blood products and that in principle 
there is no alternative, the general public expects and is entitled to expect that 
blood products in the Netherlands have been 100 percent HIV-free for some time. 
The fact that there is a small chance that HIV could be transmitted via a blood 
transfusion, which the Foundation (defendant) estimates at one in a million, is in 
                                                          
637 Bartl Produkthaftung nach neuem EG-Recht (1989). 
638 This would typically be the function of a jury in the United States. 
639  Par [63]. See also: Howells Defect in English Law- Lessons for the harmonisation of European Product 
Liability in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 142.   
640  NJ 1999, 621 (unreported, County Court of Amsterdam). 
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the opinion of the Court not general knowledge. It cannot, therefore, be said that 
the public does not or cannot be expected to have this expectation.” 641 
 
For this reason, the Dutch court held that the blood was defective. 642  The important 
principle from this judgment, which was cited in A v National Blood Authority643 is that the 
public's expectations regarding a product's safety are not to be based on statistical 
expectations, but on what the individual consumer could legitimately expect. In this specific 
case, the individual consumer was entitled to expect that the donor blood is 100 percent 
safe. The fact that the public at large might have been aware of minor risks relating to 
blood transfusions is not relevant to what the individual consumer expects of this live-
saving product, which is absolute safety.644  
 
Returning to A v National Blood Authority, Burton J noted that article 6(1) of the Directive, 
as well as section 3(2) of the UKCPA, clearly provide that 'all the circumstances' may be 
taken into account in determination of defectiveness, which he interprets to mean 'all 
relevant circumstances', some of which are mentioned in article 6(1)(a)-(c), and others 
not.645 Importantly, he stressed the fact that avoidability of risk was excluded from this 
‘basket’ of factors.646 He did so in an effort to distinguish the Directive liability which, 
according to the Preamble, is clearly intended to be faultless, from liability in negligence: 
 
                                                          
641 Translation derived from A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, par 44(iii). 
642 However, the defendants succeeded in raising the so-called ‘development risk defence’ as found in article 
7(e) of the EU Directive. 
643 (2001) 3 All ER 289. 
644 The position will arguably be different in cases involving products on which consumers to not depend so 
heavily for health or survival. In a 2008 case against major tobacco manufacturer BAT, the District Court 
of Amsterdam (LJN: BG7225, Rechtbank Amsterdam, 318074 / HA ZA 05-1691) held that cigarettes 
cannot be considered defective merely because it is detrimental to a smoker's health.644 The Court 
referred to numerous highly publicised scientific reports, some dating back to the 1950’s, which sparked 
great media attention and public debate on the risks of smoking. Based on this, it was held that the public 
has been generally aware of the dangers since, at least, the early 1960’s and that health damage 
resulting from smoking is not sufficient to justify a finding of defectiveness and imposition of liability. 
645 [35]. 
646 [63]. 
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“In the comparative process, the claimant may point to a product which is safer, 
but which the producer shows to be produced five years later. Particularly, if no 
other contemporary product had these features, this is likely to be capable of being 
established, and insofar as such product has improved safety features which have 
only evolved later in time, they should be ignored, as a result of Article 6(2). The 
claimant might, however, want to allege that the later safety features could have 
been developed earlier by the producer. That would obviously amount to the 
claimant running the evidence of 'should have done'. This would however once 
again go to the issue of avoidability, which I have concluded to be outside the 
ambit of Article 6, and so once again if the claimant really wanted to do so he 
could run the point, but only in negligence.”647 
 
Howells648 argues that, while this interpretation may be justified on the grounds that the 
‘avoidability of risk’ factor could easily reintroduce fault to the enquiry, it was nevertheless 
a bold decision, given the clear wording of Article 6 of the EU Directive. The judge 
reasoned that, if avoidability of risk was intended to be a factor, it would have been 
mentioned explicitly in the non-exclusive list of factors in article 6(1). 
 
Burton J rejected the formal categorisation of defect types, as either manufacturing, design 
or warning defects, as done in the US Restatement (Third), on the basis that 'there is no 
place for them in the Directive.'649 Instead, he opted for a distinction between: 
 products which have 'obviously dangerous characteristics by virtue of their very nature 
or intended use'; and 
 other products, which are subcategorised as either standard or non-standard products. 
 
 
                                                          
647 [72]. 
648 Howells Defect in English Law- Lessons for the harmonisation of European Product Liability in Fairgrieve 
(ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 143. 
649 [39]. 
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Products falling into the first category, such as knives, guns, poisons or alcohol, will not be 
held defective based on their particular inherent risks which are generally known to the 
public, since they cannot 'legitimately be expected' not to possess those characteristics. 
With regard to second category of products, Burton J distinguishes as follows: 
“A standard product is one which is and performs as the producer intends. A non-
standard product is one which is different, obviously because it is deficient or 
inferior in terms of safety, from the standard product.”650 
 
Where a non-standard product incorporates a harmful characteristic, the issue of 
defectiveness is likely to be straightforward, primarily dealing with the question whether the 
harmful nature of the product had been brought to the general public's attention.651 In the 
case of standard products, any alleged defect is likely to be one of design or resulting from 
an allegedly flawed system, and here: 
“The question of presentation/time/circumstances of supply/social acceptability 
etc. will arise…The sole question will be safety for the foreseeable use. If there are 
any comparable products on the market, then it will obviously be relevant to 
compare the offending product with those other products, so as to identify, 
compare and contrast the relevant features…Price is obviously a significant factor 
in legitimate expectation, and may well be material in the comparative process. 
But again…there is no room in the basket for: (i) what the producer could have 
done differently; (ii) whether the producer could or could not have done the same 
as the others did.”652 
 
On the basis of this analysis, Burton J found the packets of infected blood to be 'non-
standard', since they deviated from the standard intended for those products by the 
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producer.653 He rejected an argument that all the blood products carried an equal risk of 
infection and are therefore equally defective as 'very philosophical'.654 The fact that the 
general public had not been aware of the risks of blood being infected by a virus, seemed 
to be the decisive factor in the finding of defectiveness.655 The absence of knowledge of 
risks rendered considerations of social utility of the product irrelevant in determining 
defectiveness.656 Although the judge did not indicate what the position would have been if 
the public had been adequately warned of the risks, Howells657  argues “it is hard to 
conceive that a judge would hold blood to be defective when it was as safe as it could be 
and the public had been fully warned of inherent risks.” 
 
Burton J approached defectiveness in an abstract manner: When the general public’s 
perceptions regarding the product’s level of safety are disappointed, that does not simply 
serve as proof of a defect, it is the defect. The approach focuses on the lack of information 
regarding the risk of contamination provided to the general public, rather than the actual, 
physical condition of the blood product.658 Howells disagrees with the judge’s need to point 
to a specific physical defect by singling out the contaminated blood as 'non-standard', 
since the mere existence of the risk, which disappoints the public expectation regarding 
blood products, would have been sufficient for a finding of defectiveness. 659  In other 
words, the same conclusion of defectiveness could have been reached under an abstract 
approach without drawing the standard/non-standard distinction. 
 




656 Whittaker Liability for Products - English Law, French Law and European Harmonization (2005) 489. 
657 Defect in English Law- Lessons for the harmonisation of European Product Liability in Fairgrieve (ed) 
Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 144. 
658 146. 
659 Ibid. 
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It is argued that Burton J’s emphasis on the Directive’s goal of imposing faultless liability 
and his determination to steer clear of any factor related to avoidability of risk, led him to 
adopt a very restrictive view of the article 6 provisions.660 Whittaker argues that the judge’s 
approach places undue weight on the knowledge of consumers regarding product risks at 
the time of supply in determining 'legitimate expectations' for purposes of defectiveness 
and suggests that: 
“…a more natural interpretation is that they 661  make clear that a producer’s 
conduct in relation to the risks which a product presents (including in relation to 
avoidance) must be assessed as at the date of supply…In sum, and with respect, 
Burton J’s interpretation distorts the significance of the words used by article 6 so 
as to fit a misunderstanding of the significance of the Directive’s recitals.”662 
 
A year prior to this judgment, the Court of Appeal in Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd663 
had to determine whether a fleece-lined sleeping bag, which injured a twelve-year-old boy 
when the elastic strap slipped and the buckle hit him in the eye, was defective in terms of 
the CPA. The court held that the claimant had established 'on balance' that the product 
was defective since its design carried the risk of injury and had not been warned 
against.664 In the leading judgment, Pill LJ considered relevant to the defectiveness issue 
factors such as the knowledge of the risk and the practicalities of its avoidance by the 
manufacturer, whether in terms of warnings or in terms of the substitution of a non-elastic 
material.665  
 
Despite the bold judgment of Burton J in National Blood Authority excluding any 
defectiveness factors that may be relevant to negligence, there are many authors that 
                                                          
660 Whittaker Liability for Products – English Law, French Law and European Harmonization (2005) 490. 
661 The article 6 provisions. 
662 Whittaker Liability for Products - English Law, French Law and European Harmonization (2005) 490. 
663 (2000) All ER (D) 2436. 
664 [27]. 
665 Ibid. 
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support a risk-benefit approach to defectiveness which, although focusing on the condition 
of the product rather than the conduct of the manufacturer, does overlap with the 
negligence enquiry to some extent. For example, Winfield & Jolowicz 666  argue that 
‘standard products’ which, according to Burton J’s classification are products that perform 
as the manufacturer intended, do often carry some inherent risk in their use, for instance 
certain medications or vehicles. Often these risks can only be eliminated or diminished by 
incorporating safety features at a cost disproportionate to the product’s value and could 
possibly result in lower utility. Winfield and Jolowicz argue that: 
“the relationship of the Act [CPA] with the law of negligence in these cases has not 
been fully explored, but it must surely be that the court is required to come to a 
judgment on whether the risks associated with the product in its present form are 
outweighed by the benefits that it brings, otherwise there would be liability for 
injuries caused by products rather than for injuries caused by defects in products, 
which would be neither socially acceptable nor within the scope of the Directive. 
While scientific evidence is no doubt relevant and often helpful there is no 
escaping the fact that in the last resort the judgment is a 'value' one: there is no 
scientific formula which will tell us whether the risk of allowing cars to be made 
without advanced safety systems is greater or less than the benefits obtained by 
having cheaper cars.”667        
      
The value judgment described here involves a cost-benefit approach which has in fact also 
been acknowledged by the Department of Trade and Industry’s explanatory note on the 
Directive. In a section relating to pharmaceutical drugs, the DTI explains this defectiveness 
approach as follows: 
“The more active the medicine, and the greater its beneficial potential, the more 
extensive its effects are likely to be, and therefore the greater the chances of an 
adverse effect. A medicine used to treat a life threatening condition is likely to be 
                                                          
666 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 312. 
667 312-313. 
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much more powerful than a medicine used in the treatment of a less serious 
condition, and the safety that one is reasonably entitled to expect of such a 
medicine may, therefore, be correspondingly lower.”668    
   
Therefore, Winfield and Jolowicz hold the view that the determination of legitimate safety 
expectations inevitably involves consideration of how the product could have been 
improved with respect to safety. Further, while neither the Directive or the UKCPA 
distinguish between defect types and Burton J clearly rejected the US Restatement 
(Third)’s distinction, Deakin & Markesinis argue that is not impossible that English courts 
may in the future draw on the American approach by applying a consumer expectations 
standard for manufacturing defects and adopting a broader risk-utility standard for design 
and warning defects. 669  Based on Burton J’s standard/non-standard distinction, the 
authors argue that a non-standard product, being one that deviates from the 
manufacturer’s safety norms, could be seen as a manufacturing defect for which a strict 
consumer expectation standard would apply.670 Indeed, as Burton J commented, a finding 
of defectiveness in such cases would, in the presence of a harmful characteristic “likely be 
straightforward.”671  
 
As regards design and warning defects, the authors argue that English courts could then 
apply a broader risk-utility test, allowing consideration of the social utility of a product 
compared to its risks. 672 The critical question here is whether this risk-utility approach will 
                                                          
668 313. 
669 Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 618. 
670 618. 
671 [66]. 
672 Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 618. 
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take into account 'avoidability of risk', as the Restatement (Third) openly does,673 thereby 
potentially reintroducing negligence to the defectiveness enquiry.  
 
The relevance of regulatory safety standards and an alternative, safer design in 
determining whether a product is defective was discussed in Tesco v Pollard.674 In this 
case, the court held that a consumer is entitled to expect a child resistant cap on a bottle 
of dishwasher powder to be more difficult to open than a normal screw top, but nothing 
more specific can be said of the test for defectiveness. On the facts, the child resistant cap 
had not complied with the British Standard for such caps (which would have made it even 
more difficult to open), but it was nevertheless more difficult to open than an ordinary 
screw cap. The fact that the non-mandatory British Standard was not complied with did 
not, in itself, render the product defective. The cap was more difficult to open than normal 
caps, thereby meeting the expectations consumers are ‘generally entitled’ to, therefore the 
product was not defective. 
 
The court’s interpretation of ‘what persons are generally entitled to expect’ in this case 
appears to be correct. In reality, members of the public cannot be said to have any specific 
expectations as to the design standards that are in place for a specific product. Further, 
the level of safety that the public is generally entitled to expect of any product has to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis and a more specific test than this cannot be formulated.  
 
While there are only a limited number of cases applying Part 1 of the UKCPA, it is clear 
from case law that English courts are keen to distinguish this statutory strict liability from 
                                                          
673 Section 2(b) and (c). 
674 [2006] EWCA Civ 393; [2006] All ER (D) 186 (Apr). 
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the traditional negligence-based liability.675 Further, while A v National Blood Authority had 
gone some way to defining the concept ‘defect’ in the case of a so-called ‘non-standard’ 
product,676 English courts have not yet defined defectiveness in the case of a ‘standard’ 
product.677 It could be argued that Burton J in A v National Blood Authority did not seek to 
develop a general rule for categorisation of product defects under the UKCPA but simply 
attempted to deal with the specific facts at hand, namely a single product in a batch of 
products that deviated from the standard intended by the producer for those products. It is 
important to note that Burton J’s standard/non-standard classification of products does not 
appear to have been applied by English courts in subsequent cases. In fact, in the recent 
High Court case of Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd 678  Hickinbottom J held that the 
categorisation of products into ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ is both “unnecessary and 
undesirable, positively unhelpful and potentially dangerous”679 and is a distraction from the 
true analysis required of a court, namely to determine the level of safety which persons 
generally are entitled to expect of a product taking into account all relevant 
circumstances.680 It is argued that the vagueness of the concept ‘defect’ has resulted in 
fewer claims being brought under the UKCPA than might or should be and because of this, 
courts have had fewer opportunities to clarify the meaning of this core concept.681 
 
 
                                                          
675 Howells Defect in English Law- Lessons for the harmonisation of European Product Liability. In Fairgrieve 
(ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 140. See, for example, Abouzaid v Mothercare 
(2000) All ER (D) 2436, in which the Court of Appeal imposed strict liability under the CPA for a faulty 
fleece liner whose buckle caused an injury to an infant. In its judgment, the court emphasised that the 
liability was not negligence-based.  
676  I.e. a product which deviates from what was intended by the manufacturer. 
677 Body ‘Product Liability Claims under the Consumer Protection Act 1987: some practical problems’ (2012) 
Journal of Personal Injury Law 79. 
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Defences  
Compliance with public regulation  
The UKCPA provides in section 4(1)(a) a defence if it can be shown that a defect “is 
attributable to compliance with any requirement imposed by or under any enactment of 
with any Community obligation.” 
 
This defence does not mean that a producer can escape liability under the UKCPA by 
showing compliance with a regulation or other legal requirement that sets a minimum 
standard.682 A product may, whilst complying with that minimum standard, have other 
features not contemplated or covered by that standard, which are found to be harmful.   
 
The defence would not be available in circumstances where certain features or elements 
of a product are permitted, but not required, by law. Further, it would appear from the 
wording of this defence that it would not apply in the case of non-mandatory standards, for 
instance, best practice guidelines published by non-governmental industry bodies.   
 
It should be noted here that a failure to comply with a non-mandatory product standard 
may not be decisive in determining liability. In Tesco v Pollard683 a manufacturer was not 
held liable for supplying a bottle of dishwasher powder with a child resistant screw cap 
which did not meet the relevant non-mandatory British Standard. The court held that all 
that the public could legitimately expect was that the bottle would be more difficult to open, 




                                                          
682 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 317. 
683 [2006] EWCA Civ 393, discussed above at 3.3.1.6 in the context of defectiveness. 
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Absence of defect at time of supply  
Section 4(1)(d) of the UKCPA provides a defence if a defendant can show that the defect 
did not exist in the product at the “relevant time”. The “relevant time” is defined in section 
4(2) as follows: 
 with respect to electricity, the “time at which it was generated, being a time 
before it was transmitted or distributed”; 
 in relation to any other product: 
o in the case of a defendant within section 2(2): the time when that defendant 
supplied the product to another; 
o In the case of a defendant that does not fall within section 2(2):684  
o the time when the product was last supplied by a defendant within 
section(2)(2) to another.   
   
This defence would cover the scenario where a product becomes defective after leaving 
the defendant’s control due to misuse, tampering or fair wear and tear. If the claimant has 
established that the product was defective and caused harm, the onus is on the producer 
to raise and prove that the defect only occurred after the relevant time, for whatever 
reason.685 If it is shown that the defect did exist at the relevant time, a defendant cannot 
rely on the possibility of intermediate inspection or examination by another person as a 
defence.686 
 
                                                          
684 For instance, suppliers under section 2(3) who are liable due to failure to identify or provide details of their 
suppliers or the producer of the product within a reasonable period following a request by the person who 
suffered the damage.  
685 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 317. 
686 318. 
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In Terence Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Limited687 the Court of Appeal had to consider 
whether a defective hip prosthesis, which fractured after implantation, was defective at the 
time it was supplied by the manufacturer to the hospital. Based on the manufacturer’s 
evidence regarding its quality control processes and inspections, the court was satisfied 
that any defect in the surface of the prosthesis would have been identified by the 
manufacturer prior to delivery, even though there was no proof of inspection of the specific 
prosthesis that failed. The court held that it was not necessary for the manufacturer to 
prove the actual cause of the defect and when it arose.  
 
Further, section 4(1)(f) provides a defence if a producer can show that:  
   
“(f) that the defect— 
      (i) constituted a defect in a product ( “the subsequent product”) in which the 
product in question had been comprised; and 
    (ii) was wholly attributable to the design of the subsequent product or to 
compliance by the producer of the product in question with instructions 
given by the producer of the subsequent product.”   
    
This defence assists producers of components where their components alone are not 
defective but when incorporated into a subsequent or final product, the subsequent 
product becomes defective. It would also provide a defence to component producers 
where they have manufactured components based on specifications provided to them by 
the producer of a subsequent product. In this scenario, it is the producer of the subsequent 
product who was responsible for coordinating the incorporation of the components into the 
subsequent product and should bear responsibility for failure to provide the correct 
specifications to component producers.     
                                                          
687 [2006] 92 BMLR 141. 
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Defect not reasonably discoverable  
Section 4(1)(e) of the UKCPA provides a defence where a defendant can show: 
“that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not 
such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in 
question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his 
products while they were under his control;” 
 
It is argued that the wording of section 4(1)(e) essentially confines it to cases involving 
alleged design defects and that its application would be limited in the case of 
manufacturing defects.688 Further, this defence should not have any application in cases 
where the defendant knew of the defect in question, in which case the producer supplies 
the product at his own risk.689  
 
In European Commission v United Kingdom,690 the European Commission challenged the 
wording of section 4(1)(e) of the UKCPA. The CJEU upheld section 4(1)(e) and in doing 
so, provided some guidance as to the scope of the defence under article 7(e) of the EU 
Directive (which section 4(1)(e) transposes into UK law).  
 
In the UK Advocate General’s opinion, presented in this case to the CJEU, it was argued 
that the relevant knowledge must be available in a language that is reasonably accessible 
and in a format that has a reasonably high degree of circulation.691 Further, the Advocate 
General argued that factors such as the practicability and cost of the steps to eliminate or 
prevent the defect or the fact that the manufacturer did not keep up to date with scientific 
                                                          
688 Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 622. 
689 Ibid, citing the decision of Burton J in A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289. 
690 Case C-300/95, [1997] ECR I-2649; [1997] All ER (EC) 391. 
691 At par 23.  
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knowledge in this area, as disclosed in specialist literature, are irrelevant considerations to 
section 7(e) of the EU Directive and section 4(1)(e) of the UKCPA.692 
 
As noted above at 3.3.1.7(iii), it was held by the CJEU that the reference to “scientific and 
technical knowledge” in article 7(e) does not refer to the state of knowledge in the 
industrial sector within which the producer of the product operates, but rather “the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge” 
in general.693 However, the CJEU qualified this by stating that the relevant knowledge 
must have been “accessible” at the time the product was put into circulation.694 The CJEU 
conceded that the ‘accessibility’ of knowledge raises difficulties of interpretation, but held 
this is a matter for national courts to resolve.695  
 
Apportionment of liability  
 Section 6(4) of the UKCPA provides that:  
“Where any damage is caused partly by a defect in a product and partly by the 
fault of the person suffering the damage, the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 and section 5 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (contributory 
negligence) shall have effect as if the defect were the fault of every person liable 
by virtue of this Part for the damage caused by the defect.”   
     
This provision has the effect of deeming the ‘defect’ in the product to be the ‘fault’ of the 
defendants liable under the UKCPA for harm caused by that defect. This is done to 
address the theoretical problem of apportioning liability as is done in negligence claims, 
under a strict liability regime where fault does not feature. 
                                                          
692 Ibid. 
693 European Commission v United Kingdom [1997] All E.R. (EC) 481 at [20]; [26]. 
694 [29]. 
695 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 199 
 
There may be circumstances where the claimant’s fault is so extreme that it amounts to 
the sole cause of the harm at law, resulting in a complete disallowance of damages.696 By 
the same token, the claimant’s conduct may amount to misuse to such a degree that the 
product is found not to be defective, even if it has caused harm.697  
 
Prescription 
The general principles regarding limitations of actions under the Limitations Act 1980 apply 
to claims under the UKCPA,698 with two exceptions.699 Firstly, a limitation period of three 
years applies in the case of property damage and personal injury, as opposed to the 
normal six year period. Secondly, the UKCPA provides for a long-stop provision whereby 
no liability arises if a claim is brought under the UKCPA more than 10 years (as opposed 
to the normal 15 years) after the defective product was supplied by the manufacturer to 
another.700 The long-stop provision is aimed at limiting, to some extent, major class actions 
arising from defects that only manifest many years after a product was put into circulation, 
such as asbestos.701 
 
As noted above at 3.3.1.7, the EU Directive’s equivalent long-stop provision in article 10 
refers to the time when the product was put into circulation. The CJEU held in O’Byrne v 
Sanofi Pasteur MDS Limited and Sanofi Pasteur SA702 that “a product is put into circulation 
when it is taken out of the manufacturing process operated by the producer and enters a 
marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the public in order to be used or 
consumed.” 
                                                          
696 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 318-319. 
697 319. 
698 Schedule 1, Section 11A. 
699 Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 626-627. 
700 Schedule 1, Section 11A(3).  
701 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (2014) 319. 
702 Case C127/04 
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Contractual restriction of liability 
Section 7 of the UKCPA expressly prohibits any limitation or exclusion of liability “by any 
contract term, by any notice or by any other provision.” This applies in relation to any type 
of damage suffered.703 In comparison, the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 voids all 
contractual exclusion clauses relating to death or personal injury caused by negligence, 
whereas the validity of a contractual exclusion clause for property damage or economic 
loss is subject to a reasonableness test.704 
 
3.3.1.8(ii) Germany 
The German Product Liability Act 1989705 (‘GPLA’), which transposed the EU Directive into 
German law, came into force on 1 January 1990. The GPLA imposes faultless liability on 
producers for personal injury or property damage caused by defective products.706 Neither 
the EU Directive nor the GPLA, which transposed the Directive into German law, affect 
any rights an injured person may have in terms of the pre-existing, well-established liability 
rules.707 In this regard, it is worth noting that the German Drug Act 1976708 (‘GDA’), a result 
of the particularly dire impact of the Thalidomide tragedy in Germany, was the only special 
product liability regime in Europe at the time the Directive came into force, and thus 
remained unaffected.709 
 
Under German tort law, liability for harm caused by a defective product is based on the 
breach of one of two duties: Either a general duty of care (Verkehrspflicht) under section 
823(1) BGB, or a breach of a statutory duty (Schutzgesetz) under section 823 (2) BGB. 
                                                          
703 Winfield & Jolowicz Tort (2014) 319; Markesinis & Deakin Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (2012) 626. 
704 Section 2.  
705 Produkthaftungsgesetz vom 15. Dezember 1989. 
706 Section 3 GPLA. 
707  Article 13. 
708  Arzneimittelgesetz vom 24. August 1976. 
709 119. Article 13 of Directive provides that the Directive shall not affect a special liability system existing at 
the moment when the Directive is notified.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 201 
Liability in tort for breach of the statutory duty involves an intentional or negligent breach of 
a legislative or regulatory provision dealing with product safety. 710  Examples of these 
provisions can be found in a range of statutes such as the Product Safety Act, the Food 
and Consumer Goods Act, the Medicines Act and the Medical Devices Act.711  
 
The majority of product liability claims in Germany today are based on the GPLA.712 
However, fault-based common law product liability remains relevant in practice where 
compensation is sought for damages which are not recoverable under the GPLA or where 
a plaintiff seeks to circumvent the limitations and liability caps imposed by the GPLA.713 
Further, in cases where a manufacturer is successful in relying on the so-called 
‘development risk defence’ under the GPLA on the basis that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation was not such to enable 
discovery of the defect, a plaintiff may still be able to argue that the manufacturer breaches 
its duty of care to recall the product once the defect was discovered at some point after the 
product was put into circulation.714 
 
Parties liable 
Section 1(1) of the GPLA provides that: 
“(1) In such case as a defective product causes a person's death, injury to his 
body or damage to his health, or damage to an item of property, the producer of 
                                                          
710  Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 106. 
711 'Produktsicherheitsgesetz vom 8 November 2011', 'Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenstandegesetz vom 9 
September 1997', 'Arzneimittelgesetz vom 12 Dezember 2005', 'Medizinproduktegesetz vom 7 August 
2002.' 
712 Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides. 
Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-2016/germany.  
713 Ibid. For instance, the GPLA does not permit recovery of damages for harm to goods or property used for 
business purposes. Further, where the harm is to privately used goods or property, the first 500 euro of 
any damages claim under the GPLA is not recoverable. See discussion below under ‘Harm and 
Damages’ in this section.  
714 Ibid. See discussion below under ‘Defences’ in this section. 
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the product has an obligation to compensate the injured person for the resulting 
damage...”  
 
The GPLA defines “producer” in broad terms in section 4 as follows: 
“(1) A producer within the meaning of this Act is a person who has produced the 
final product, a raw material or a component part. A producer is also anyone 
who by putting his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the 
product presents himself as its producer. 
(2) A producer is also anyone who imports or takes into the area of application of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area a product for sale, hire, 
leasing or any form of distribution with an economic purpose in the course of 
his business. 
(3) Where the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier of the 
product shall be deemed to be its producer unless he informs the injured 
person within a month of his receipt of a demand to this effect of the identity of 
the producer or of the person who supplied him with the product. The same 
shall apply, in the case of an imported product, if this product does not indicate 
the identity of the person referred to in paragraph 2, even if the name of the 
producer is known.”715 
 
According to this extended definition of producer, other members of the supply chain may 
be deemed producers for purposes of the GPLA, such as importers of defective products 
into the EU, component producers and parties who hold themselves out as manufacturers 
by applying their own name or trademark to products (so-called ‘own-branders’). In 
circumstances where the actual manufacturer cannot be identified, each other supplier in 
the supply chain will be deemed producers unless that supplier informs the injured person 
of the identity of the producer or its own supplier within one month. The same applies if the 
                                                          
715 Product Liability Act of 15 December 1989 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2198), last amended by Article 9 (3) 
of the Act of 19 July 2002 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2674), as translated by Flϋgel, E. 
Bundesministerium der Justiz und fϋr Verbraucherschutz (2015) juris GmbH, Saarbrϋcken, available 
[online]: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_prodhaftg/englisch_prodhaftg.html.  
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importer into the EU cannot be identified, even if the identity of the non-EU producer is 
known.  
 
Section 5 of the GPLA imposes joint and several liability in circumstances where two or 
more producers are liable for the same harm. Section 5 further provides that: 
“In the relationship of the parties liable to pay damages, liability in damages as 
well as the extent of compensation to be paid depend, unless otherwise specified, 
on the circumstances, in particular to what extent the damage is caused mainly by 
one or the other party; in all other respects, Sections 421 to 425, Section 426 (1) 
second sentence and Section 426 (2) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) shall apply.”716 
 
Potential claimants 
As noted above, section 1(1) of the GPLA imposes liability where a defective product 
causes “a person’s death, injury to his body or damage to his health, or damage to an item 
of property” and provides that the producer of the product must compensate “the injured 
person for the resulting damage.” 
 
The wording of this section, as translated to English, seems to suggest at first glance that 
“the injured person” is the person who must bring the claim. However, the words ‘resulting 
damage’ arguably imply that the “injured person” could be another person who suffers loss 
as a result of “a person’s death, injury to his body or damage to his health”, such as a 
dependant of an injured breadwinner.  
 
 
                                                          
716 Product Liability Act of 15 December 1989 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2198), last amended by Article 9 (3) 
of the Act of 19 July 2002 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2674), as translated by Flϋgel, E. 
Bundesministerium der Justiz und fϋr Verbraucherschutz (2015) juris GmbH, Saarbrϋcken, available 
[online]: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_prodhaftg/englisch_prodhaftg.html. 
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Goods 
The GPLA defines “product” in section 2 as “all movables, even though incorporated into 
another movable or into an immovable, as well as electricity.” 
This provision essentially mirrors the equivalent provision in article 2 of the EU Directive, 
with no further specific inclusions. 
Causation 
Section 1(4) of the GPLA provides that: 
“The injured person bears the burden of proving the defect, the damage and the 
causal relationship between defect and damage. If it is disputed whether the 
obligation to pay compensation is excluded pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3, the 
producer bears the burden of proof.”      
  
In other words, the claimant is required to make out a prima facie case under the GPLA by 
proving the defect, the harm and the causal link between the defect and harm, whereas 
the burden of establishing any of the available defences rests with the defendant. 
 
As with all other EU member states, German courts apply their national rules regarding 
causation in relation to claims under the GPLA.717 A discussion of the general principles of 
causation in German law is beyond the scope of this study. It is simply noted here that 
Germany’s test for causation involves a two-fold approach, similar to English law, involving 
firstly a factual causation enquiry718 and secondly, a normative question of legal cause.719   
 
                                                          
717 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 116.  
718 The factual causation enquiry involves application of the condition sine qua non or ‘but for’ theory, also 
referred to in German as the Ӓquivalenztheorie”. 
719 Markesinis & Unberath The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise (2002) 103. 
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In some cases, the claimant will not be required to prove the exact nature of the product 
defect which caused harm. If a product malfunctions in “circumstances where one is 
entitled to expect that it does not fail this makes out a prima facie case of defect.”720 
Lenze721 describes the burden of proof here as follows: Once the prima facie case has 
been established, the burden shifts to the defendant who has to identify whether the 
malfunction is due to a manufacturing defect or design defect. If the product deviated from 
its intended design, indicating manufacturing error, the defendant would be strictly liable. 
If, however, the product malfunction is due to a design feature which the defendant can 
identify, the burden shifts back to the claimant who will have to show the possibility of a 
safer, alternative design. 
 
Harm and damages 
As noted above, section 1(1) of the GPLA imposes an obligation on a producer, where a 
defective product “causes a person's death, injury to his body or damage to his health, or 
damage to an item of property,” to compensate the injured person for “the resulting 
damage.”  
Section 1(1) then goes on to provide a qualification in the context of property damages, 
stating that liability to pay damages will only apply: 
“if the damage was caused to an item of property other than the defective product 
and this other item of property is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or 
consumption und was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or 
consumption. 
 
                                                          
720 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 115. 
721 114-115.  
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The GPLA imposes a number of restrictions in relation to the damages recoverable in 
respect of property damage. Firstly, as indicated by the wording section 1(1), a claimant 
cannot recover loss arising from damage to the defective product itself. Secondly, loss 
arising from damage to goods or property used in a commercial context is not 
compensable, only goods or property used in a private context. For example, where a 
defective product causes damage to industrial machinery, that damage is not recoverable.  
 
Thirdly, the first EUR 500 of any claim arising from damage to privately used property 
cannot be recovered under the GPLA. Arguably, this provision was introduced to prevent a 
raft of small and potentially frivolous claims overloading the court system. There is no 
maximum limit on the damages recoverable under the GPLA for property damage.  
 
With respect to personal injury claims, section 10 of the GPLA imposes a cap on the 
recovery of damages of EUR 85 million for harm caused by the same defect. 
 
Concept of defectiveness 
Pursuant to section 3 of the GPLA: 
“(1) A product has a defect when it does not provide the safety which one is 
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, in particular 
a)  its presentation, 
b)  the use to which it could reasonably be expected that it would be put, 
c)  the time when it was put into circulation. 
(2) A product is not defective for the sole reason that a better product is 
subsequently put into circulation.”722 
                                                          
722  Product Liability Act of 15 December 1989 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2198), last amended by Article 9 
(3) of the Act of 19 July 2002 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2674), as translated by Flϋgel, E. 
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Despite the fact that the EU Directive and therefore, the transposing GPLA, provide a 
single standard or definition for defect, German courts have (re-)established the tripartite 
definition of defect, as recognised under German tort law.723 The implication of this resort 
to the tort law definitions is that strict liability may in reality only be applied to 
manufacturing defects, whereas courts may continue to apply the negligence-based 
standards for design and warning cases, notwithstanding the Directive’s clear goal of 
introducing faultless liability.724  
 
 
Although under an obligation to apply the consumer expectations standard under the 
GPLA, courts seem to only formally do so when determining defectiveness. In substance, 
the pre-existing standards under tort law for manufacturing and design defects seem to 
prevail in most cases, rendering the application of a standard based on 'what consumers 
are entitled to expect' largely redundant. Within the context of warning or instruction 
defects, the statutory test, however, plays a significant role. 
 
 
Where a product departs from its intended design, application of the statutory consumer 
expectations test is generally regarded to be redundant in determining manufacturing 
defectiveness as there is no analytical benefit in saying that consumers are “entitled to 
expect that a product does not depart from its intended design.”725 While acknowledging 
that German courts are under an obligation to apply the consumer expectation standard, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Bundesministerium der Justiz und fϋr Verbraucherschutz (2015) juris GmbH, Saarbrϋcken, available 
[online]: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_prodhaftg/englisch_prodhaftg.html. 
723 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 107, citing for example: BGH NJW 1995 2162 (Sparkling Water Bottle II); OLG Dusseldorf, 
20.12.2002, 14 U 99/02 (Chocolate Bar); OLG Hamm NJW-RR 2001, 1248 (Log Flume).  
724 Ibid. 
725 108. 
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Lenze criticises the circularity of the standard that results where courts, in reality, apply the 
tort law standard based on deviation from the product's intended design.726  
 
German courts have not fleshed out the statutory definition of design defect, nor 
established which factors, or circumstances, could legitimately be considered under 
section 3 of the GPLA.727 Consumer expectations as a standard for design defectiveness 
have been criticised by German courts for failing to provide assistance in cases where 
courts cannot identify any existing expectations regarding a product design in the 
consumer market, or where the existing expectations are so unrealistically high or not 
informed by the latest developments in technology.728 Under general German tort law, 
when a product design breaches a safety statute or regulation, defectiveness will 
automatically be established.729 However, compliance with these standards can usually be 
a relevant factor in the defectiveness issue under the GPLA, namely the legitimate safety 
expectations.730 It may also be relevant to the state of the art processes in the context of 
the so-called “development risk defence” under section 1(2)5 of the GPLA.731 
 
The real difficulty arises in cases where no statutory or regulatory safety standards exist, 
and no clear consumer expectations regarding the product design are discernible. 
Lenze732 argues that the answer lies in article 6(2) of the Directive, which states that “a 
product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is 
                                                          
726 Reference is made to the circular reasoning in BGH NJW 1995, 2162 (Water Bottle II). 
727 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 108. 
728 109.  
729   Ibid. In comparison, see, for instance, the English decision of Tesco v Pollard [2006] EWCA Civ 393; 
[2006] All ER (D) 186 (Apr), discussed above at 3.3.1.8(i).  
730   Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
3.3. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/germany.  
731   Ibid. 
732   Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 110. 
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subsequently put into circulation.” According to the author, this implies that existence of 
safer product alternatives at the time the product was put into circulation is a relevant 
factor in determining defectiveness, and therefore article 6(2) provides a basis for a “safer 
alternative design” test, or what the US Restatement (Third) refers to as a “reasonable 
alternative design”. 733  Lenze argues in favour of a type of risk-benefit test, since a 
'reasonable consumer does not and cannot legitimately expect a safer design if that entails 
a disproportionate loss of utility.'734 Not only should the effect on a product’s utility be 
considered, but the production cost implications of adopting a safer design alternative may 
be a relevant factor. Indeed, many writers735 and courts736 in Europe have acknowledged 
that price may be relevant to defectiveness, in the sense that they influence the safety 
expectations of the consumer.737   
 
At first glance, this “safer, alternative design” test for design defectiveness, as would likely 
be applied under section 3 of the GPLA, may appear to be similar to the corresponding 
test under section 2(b) of the US Restatement (Third). However, Lenze emphasises that 
there would be differences in the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden under these two 
instruments.738 The Restatement (Third) requires the plaintiff to discharge a much broader, 
and arguably heavier, risk-utility burden, including proof of a technologically feasible and 
practical alternative design that would have prevented the harm as well as all the technical 
                                                          
733   Ibid. 
734   Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005)109. See also: English case of Boogle v McDonald’s (2002) EWHC 490 QB at [80]. 
735   Kullman & Pfister Produzentenhaftung (2002) Kz.3604/18a; Taschner & Frietsch Produkthaftungsgesetz 
und EG-Produkt-haftungsrichlinie - Kommentar (1990) note 55, Art. 6/20. 
736   Austrian Supreme Court, Decision of 5 December 2002 – 8 Ob 192/99i (Extension Ladder) = 13 (2003) 
European Product Liability Rev. 40. See also: English case of A v National Blood Authority (2001) 3 All 
ER 289 at [71]. 
737 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 110. 
738 111-112. 
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facts necessary to prove the reasonableness of such an alternative.739 The question of 
whether the alternative design was reasonable and whether it should have been adopted 
by the manufacturer, involves a balancing act of a whole range of risk-utility factors, not 
limited to utility and production costs. The German claimant, on the other hand, merely has 
to show that the “overall safety of the product could have been increased by altering the 
design in a practical manner and without an unbalanced loss of utility.”740 The rules of pre-
trial discovery in continental Europe does not allow the claimant to acquire all the detailed 
information necessary to present evidence as to the exact cost implications of adopting the 
proposed alternative design.741  
 
Much uncertainty exists regarding the exact nature of the design defectiveness standard. 
Whether, and to what extent, risk-utility factors will play a role in the consumer 
expectations test under the GPLA, remains to be seen. What is clear is that German 
courts will have strong tendencies to resort to risk-utility factors commonly used under 
fault-based tort law, which could provide much-needed clarity in determining the 'safety a 
person is entitled to expect' of a product's design. 
 
With respect to warning defects, it appears that courts resort to the same factors in 
determining defectiveness as they would apply in negligence.742 It is worth noting in this 
context that the so-called ‘learned intermediary defence' pursuant to which a manufacturer 
may be able to escape liability if a learned intermediary, such as a doctor, provided 
sufficient warnings of the product risk is not recognised under the GPLA or German tort 




742 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005)120, citing for example: OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 2001, 1471 (Beer); OLG Hamm JNW 2001, 1654 
(Tobacco); OLG Dusseldorf 20/12/2002, 14 U 99/02 (Chocolate Bar); LG Bonn, 19.4.2004-606 7/03. 
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law.743 German courts have emphasised the fact that consumers have a duty to consume 
products responsibility. In 2004, the Regional Court of Bonn considered a case brought by a 
claimant who allegedly suffered a breakdown due to a heart rhythm disorder related to excessive 
consumption of liquorice.744 On the facts, the claimant had eaten a 400g pack of liquorice daily 
between November 2002 and February 2003. The claimant’s case was that the producer ought to 
have provided a warning of the risks of excessive consumption and failure to do so constituted a 
product defect. In response to the producer’s argument of excessive consumption, the claimant 
argued the fact that the product came in a 400 g size invited her to eat a packet daily.  
 
The court held that the claimant’s level of consumption was not relevant here, nor whether 
the consumption was the only or one of multiple causes of the claimant’s condition, as the 
product did not contain any defect. This conclusion was upheld by the Cologne Court of 
Appeal, who considered further the regulatory compliance defence in article 7(d) of the EU 
Directive, as transposed by section 1(2)4 of the GPLA. On the facts it was held that the 
product complied with regulatory labelling requirements regarding glycyrrhin content. The 
Court of Appeal noted that mere regulatory compliance would not always be determinative 
in the defectiveness enquiry, particularly where those regulations were not recently 
introduced.745 
 
German courts recognise that some products are inherently dangerous in that they are 
incapable of being designed any safer, carry a degree of risk which so outweighs the 
product's utility that it should not have been marketed at all.746 Phrased in terms of the 
GPLA and the EU Directive, consumers are entitled to expect that a product, lacking a 
                                                          
743 Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
1. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-2016/germany. 
744 Az. 9 0 603/03, 19 April 2004. 
745 See discussion of this case by Shears ‘The EU Product Liability Directive – twenty years on’ (2007) 
Journal of Business Law 904.  
746 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005)112.  
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safer design alternative, should 'not be sold at all' if its overall risks outweigh its overall 
utility.747 In cases where a certain product within a class of products is alleged to be 
inherently dangerous, such as pharmaceutical product, courts generally have little trouble 
in performing an overall risk-utility analysis of the product.748 The analysis becomes more 
problematic in cases where the specific product represents an entire class of products and 
is commonly regarded as providing ‘subjective pleasure’.749 Lenze queries: 
 
“Can a court, for example, say whether the total social costs of alcohol, cigarettes, 
chocolate bars, and liquorice outweigh their total social utilities? Even if one 
accepts that courts engage in ‘social ordering’, they may not duly hold their view, 
or that of an expert, over the general consensus of the public and the preferences 
of consumers.”750  
 
 
It is argued that these are the type of cases where consumer expectations will be most 
relevant to the risk-utility analysis in the context of design defects.751 
 
Interestingly, many similarities can be drawn between the product liability rules under 
German tort law and the US Restatement (Third) of Torts.752 Firstly, in contrast to the 
single definition of defect in the Directive, German courts and authors recognize the three 
main categories of defect set out in section 2 of the Restatement (Third), namely 
manufacturing, design and warning defects. Secondly, a prima facie case of manufacturing 
defect requires proof, either direct or circumstantial, that the product departed from its 
intended design,753 a formulation which basically mirrors the strict liability standard for 
manufacturing defects under section 2(a) of the Restatement (Third). Importantly, the 
                                                          
747 MunchKomm/Wagner S3/32. 
748 Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 





753  MunchKomm/Wagner S823/572. 
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claimant is required to show the manufacturing defect already existed at the time of 
marketing, and not at the time when it was put into circulation, as required by the 
Restatement (Third) as well as the Directive.754  
 
Thirdly, in dealing with a tort claim based on an alleged design defect, the court will apply 
a two-step approach to negligence, strongly resembling the test for design defectiveness 
under section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third). The court will firstly ask what the 
manufacturer could have done to reduce or eliminate the foreseeable risks of harm. After 
determining the so-called 'untaken precaution', the court will be tasked to judge whether 
the manufacturer should have taken this precaution. Essentially, a prima facie design case 
will be established by proving the existence of a safer and practical design alternative.755 
Courts will perform a risk-benefit analysis in which they consider the overall safety of the 
product design, as well as the additional safety and costs linked to the adoption of a safer 
design alternative.756 
 
In the context of warning or instruction defects, German tort law imposes a duty on 
manufacturers to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding product use in order 
to reduce unavoidable product risks or, at the very least, allowing consumers to make an 
informed choice when deciding whether to use the product and taking the attendant 
risks.757 A prima facie case of negligence in the warning context will be made out where 
the plaintiff can prove that a warning regarding the product risk could, in hindsight, 
                                                          
754  Article 7(b). See Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative 
Perspective (2005) 103. 
755  Lenze 'Zum Beweis des Produktfehlers' (2003) Produkthaftpflicht International, 6, citing LG Köln NJW 
2005, 1195 (1200). See in comparison the 'reasonable alternative design' requirement in terms of section 
2(b) of the Restatement (Third). 
756  Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 104. 
757  Kullmann & Pfister Produzentenhaftung (2002) Kz. 1520/38. 
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reasonably have been included.758 Naturally, the defendant will be able to rebut by proving 
that he could not have known of the risks at the time the product was marketed.759 The 
duty to warn under the specific circumstances is generally determined by the level and 
nature of the risk as well as the probability of its manifestation, and, like the Restatement 
(Third),760 excludes warnings regarding commonly known or obvious risks.761 
 
Finally, German tort law allows for an inference of negligence to be drawn in cases where 
the plaintiff can show the damage was caused by an objective safety deficit of the product 
which existed at the time the product was put into commercial circulation.762 Like section 3 
of the Restatement (Third), the exact product defect need not be identified, yet it is 
required that the harm caused by the product defect, or objective safety deficit, be of the 
kind that would ordinarily be the result of a product defect.763 
 
In an effort to clarify the test for defectiveness under article 6 of the EU Directive, as 
transposed by section 3 of the GPLA, the German Supreme Court has recently referred a 
question of interpretation to the CJEU. The ruling by the CJEU is discussed in detail above 
at 3.3.1.6 in the context of article 6 of the EU Directive. Following the CJEU’s decision 
(joined cases C-503/13 and C-504/13) on the interpretation of this concept, the German 
Supreme Court ruled on 5 March 2015 that, where a product belongs to a particular group 
of products or the same production series that contains a potential defect (such as 
pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators), that product may be deemed 
                                                          
758  BGHZ 116, 60, 70. (Toddler Tea). 
759  Lenze German Product Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
(2005) 105. 
760  See comment (j) of the Restatement (Third).   
761  BGH NJW 1986, 1863, 1864; BGH NJW 1996, 2224 (Lubricating Gel); OLG Hamm NJW-RR 2001, 1248 
(Log Flume); OLG Dusseldorf, 20/12/2002, 14 U 99/02 (Chocolate Bar). 
762 BGH NJW 1996, 2506, 2507 (Furniture Polish); BGHZ 51, 91, 105 (Chicken Pest). 
763 Lenze 'Zum Beweis des Produktfehlers' (2003) Produkthaftpflicht International, 6. Lenze German Product 
Liability Law in Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (2005) 106. 
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defective without any evidence in a particular case that the product which has been 




Section 1(2) and 1(3) of the GPLA list the defences that can be raised by a producer under 
the GPLA. These defences essentially mirror the defences contained in article 7 of the EU 
Directive.  
Section 1(2) of the GPLA provides that: 
 
(2) The producer's liability obligation is excluded if 
1.  he did not put the product into circulation, 
2.  under the circumstances it is probable that the defect which caused the 
damage did not exist at the time when the producer put the product into 
circulation, 
3.  the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any other form of 
distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed by him in 
the course of his business, 
4.  the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations 
at the time when the producer put the product into circulation or 
5.  the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the 
producer put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
defect to be discovered. 
 
Section 1(3) provides a further defence to producers as follows: 
 
                                                          
764  Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
8.1. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/germany. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 216 
“(3) The obligation to pay damages of the producer of a component part is also 
excluded if the defect is attributable to the design of the product in which the 
component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the 
product. The first sentence shall apply to the producer of a raw material mutatis 
mutandis.” 
 
Compliance with public regulation 
In Germany, there is no general principle that compliance with regulatory or statutory 
requirements constitutes a defence for the producer. 765 A producer may however escape 
liability if it can show that the defect was caused by compliance with a mandatory 
regulation or product standard under section 1(2)4.  
 
The GPLA’s wording of this defence deviates in one aspect from the equivalent defence in 
article 7(d) of the EU Directive in that it requires the regulatory compliance to have been at 
the time the producer put the product into circulation. It is not entirely clear what purpose 
the inclusion of this time element in the GPLA’s defence serves. Perhaps it simply clarifies 
the point that a product put into circulation 10 years ago should not be judged against 
regulatory standards in place today.  
 
Compliance with regulatory product standards or requirements, while not determinative, 
may be relevant in the defectiveness enquiry of determining what persons generally are 
entitled to expect of the safety of a product, the state of the art processes and the level of 
care expected of a producer.766 As noted above under the discussion of defectiveness in 
Germany, the Regional Court of Bonn in 2004 considered a case brought by a claimant 
who allegedly suffered a breakdown due to a heart rhythm disorder related to excessive 
                                                          
765 Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
3.3. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/germany. 
766  Ibid. 
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consumption of liquorice.767 On the facts, the claimant had eaten a 400g pack of liquorice 
daily between November 2002 and February 2003. On appeal, the Cologne Court of 
Appeal considered the regulatory compliance defence in article 7(d) of the EU Directive, as 
transposed by section 1(2)4 of the GPLA. On the facts it was held that the product had 
complied with regulatory labelling requirements regarding glycyrrhin content. The Court of 
Appeal commented that mere regulatory compliance would not always be determinative in 
the defectiveness enquiry, particularly where those regulations were not recently 
introduced.768 
 
Absence of defect at time of supply 
A producer may escape liability under the GPLA where the circumstances of the case 
justify an assumption that the product in question was defect-free at the time it was put into 
circulation.769 
 
Defect not reasonably discoverable 
A producer may escape liability under the GPLA by showing that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation did not enable the 
defect to be discovered. This defence is only available in relation to design defects, not 
manufacturing defects. It is worth noting that there is also no such defence available under 
the special strict liability regime for pharmaceutical products under the Federal Drug Act.  
 
 
                                                          
767  Az. 9 0 603/03, 19 April 2004. 
768  See discussion of this case by Shears ‘The EU Product Liability Directive – twenty years on’ (2007) 
Journal of Business Law 904.  
769 Moelle & Behrendt ‘Product Liability 2016 – Germany’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
3.1. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/germany. 
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Apportionment of liability  
Section 6 of the GPLA provides for apportionment of liability based on the contributory 
fault of the injured person. Section 6 provides that: 
(1) Where fault on the part of the injured person contributes to the occurrence of 
the damage, Section 254 of the German Civil Code shall apply; in case of 
damage to property, the fault of the person who exercises actual control over 
the item of property is deemed to be equal to the fault of the injured person. 
(2) The liability of the producer shall not be reduced when the damage is caused 
both by a defect in the product and by the act or omission of a third party. 
Section 5 second sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
In extreme cases, the defence of contributory fault of the injured person may result in a 
complete disallowance of the claim.  
 
Prescription 
With respect to limitation periods, section 12 of the GPLA provides: 
(1)  A limitation period of three years from the day on which the party entitled to 
damages became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the 
damage, the defect and the identity of the party liable to pay damages shall 
apply to a claim pursuant to section 1. 
(2)  In such case as negotiations on the compensation for damage to be paid are 
pending between the party liable to pay damages and the party entitled to 
damages, the limitation period shall be suspended until the continuation of the 
negotiations is refused. 
(3)  In all other respects, the provisions of the German Civil Code on limitation 
shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
Further, section 13 of the GPLA imposes a long-stop limitation provision, stating that: 
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(1) The claim under Section 1 shall expire ten years from the time when the 
producer put into circulation the product which caused the damage. This shall 
not apply if a legal dispute or summary proceedings are pending on the claim. 
(2)  Paragraph 1 first sentence shall not apply to claims that have been declared 
final and absolute or to claims based on other enforceable documents. The 
same shall apply to claims that are the subject of an out-of-court settlement or 
were recognised by means of a contractual declaration.   
    
Apart from these provisions, any limitation period in Germany will expire thirty years after 
the damage occurred, regardless of the knowledge of the potential claimant. 
 
Contractual restriction of liability         
Section 14 of the GPLA, titled ‘Mandatory Nature’ provides that: 
“The liability of the producers pursuant to this Act may not be excluded or limited in 
advance. Any agreements to the contrary shall be null and void.”  
This provision essentially mirrors the equivalent provision in article 12 of the EU Directive 
and reflects the policy stated in the preamble to the EU Directive of achieving “effective 
protection of consumers” by not allowing suppliers of defective products to merely contract 







3.4    AUSTRALIA 
3.4.1  Introduction: The Trade Practices Act 1974 / The Competition and Consumer 
Act 1974, Schedule 2 The Australian Consumer Law 
Prior to the introduction of strict product liability to the Trade Practices Act 1974 in 1992, 
product liability under Australian common law could be based on breach of contract,  a 
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claim in tort as governed by the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson,770 or a claim for 
damages resulting from misleading and deceptive conduct.771 In addition to these causes 
of action, the Trade Practices Act provided a statutory basis for product liability in Division 
2A of Part V pursuant to which manufacturers and importers were required to honour 
contract-like obligations based on the terms implied in some contracts by statute, for 
example, the Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW).  
 
Following much debate and initial industry opposition, Australia finally introduced Part VA 
to the Trade Practices Act, a strict liability rule based on the European Directive, which 
would align Australian product liability law with international trends.772 Part VA imposed 
strict liability on a broad class of defendants, including manufacturers, own branders, 
assemblers and importers, for damage caused by defective goods. Contrary to 
suggestions by some authors, Part VA was not a codification of Australian product liability 
law; it merely provides an additional cause of action to the existing rights and remedies of 
consumers.773  
 
Pursuant to section 75AD of Part VA of the TPA, liability attached if “a corporation, in trade 
or commerce, supplies goods manufactured by it, and they have a defect, and because of 
the defect, an individual suffers injuries.” The corporation would be liable for the amount of 
the individual’s loss and the individual may recover that loss by action against the 
corporation. Part VA incorporated a consumer expectations test for defectiveness which 
essentially mirrored the test under article 6 of the European Directive.  
                                                          
770 (1932) AC 562. 
771 Bianco Modern Trends in Products Liability (2002) 143; Harland ‘Influence of European Law on Product 
Liability’ (1995) Sydney Law Review at 339. 
772  Stapleton 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: An Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 39 Washburn Law 
Journal at 144. 
773 Boas ‘Part VA of the Trade Practices Act: A failure to adequately reform product liability law in Australia’ 
(1994) 6 Bond Law Review at 112; Harland ‘Influence of European Law on Product Liability’ (1995) 
Sydney Law Review at 337. 
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Stapleton774 doubts whether Part VA has had much or any reformist effect in this field. She 
argues that, although it cannot be determined how many claims have been instituted on 
the basis of Part VA since its introduction in 1992, the fact that liability under Part VA has 
been imposed only once by a court might be indicative of its limited impact on the product 
liability system in Australia.775 Stapleton notes that:   
 
“In short, and just as with the experience with the Product Liability Directive 
throughout the EU, Part VA does not seem to have had any discernible impact one 
way or the other on: the rate of product claims, court filings or reported cases, 
availability of insurance, the level of research and development, quality control, 
record-keeping and product recall strategies, content of advertising, or product 
warnings.”776 
 
On 24 June 2010, the Australian parliament passed the second of its Trade Practices Act 
Amendment bills, being the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act 
(No.2) 2010 (Cth). The effect of this legislation was that from 1 January 2011, the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 was renamed the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (‘CCA’). The 
amendment also introduced the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’), a single national law 
covering consumer protection and fair trading, which applies consistently nationally and 
across each state and Territory. The ACL is set out in Schedule 2 of the CCA. The ACL 
replaced consumer protection and fair trading provisions in 20 existing national, state and 
territory laws with a single, national consumer law. The states and territories subsequently 
introduced legislation to apply the ACL as the law of each state or territory. Part 3-5 of the 
                                                          
774 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: An Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 39 Washburn Law Journal at 367, 
citing, for example, Boas ‘Part VA of the Trade Practices Act: A failure to adequately reform product 
liability law in Australia’ (1994) 6 Bond Law Review at 112 - 147. 
775 Stapleton 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: An Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 39 Washburn Law 
Journal at 367, citing Ryan v Great Lakes Council [1999] FCA 177. The defence has subsequently been 
upheld only once more, in Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] FCAFC1 128. 
776 Stapleton 'Restatement (Third) of Torts: An Anglo-Australian Perspective' (2000) 39 Washburn Law 
Journal at 367-8.  
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ACL now contains the strict product liability provisions for damages against the 
manufacturer, previously set out in Part VA of the TPA.  
 
Section 131C of the CCA preserves the rights of consumers to bring claims based in 
contract or tort, which are often pleaded in the alternative to a strict product liability claim. 
From a practical perspective, liability is generally easier to establish under the CCA than in 
negligence as it does not require the plaintiff to establish breach of duty of reasonable care 
by the manufacturer. However, in certain circumstances damages recoverable in 
negligence may be more favourable to a plaintiff than under the ACL due to statutory 
restrictions on damages under this legislation. If both causes of action succeed, the 
plaintiff can elect a remedy. The election would have to be made no later than the time of 
seeking final judgment in the proceedings.777 In Graham Barclay Oysters v Ryan,778 the 
court held that:           
  
“The relationship between claims made for relief in respect of contravention of 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act and common law claims, whether in 
negligence, deceit or otherwise, has not been examined in detail in any decision of 
this Court and was not the subject of detailed argument in the present matters. In 
those circumstances, we proceed on the assumption (which was not challenged) 
that a plaintiff may frame alternative claims in negligence and under the provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act relied on here. But it is to be recognised that claims of 
the kind which were made in these matters, in negligence and under the Trade 
Practices Act, were alternative claims, and that, if a group member succeeds in 
establishing the elements of both claims, that group member must elect which 
                                                          
777 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at [130], which was subsequently followed 
in Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd t/as Horsepower [2006] NSWSC 512 at [311], where the 
plaintiff had made no submissions at trial as to whether he wished to claim damages at common law or 
under section 75AD of the Trade Practices Act. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favour of the 
plaintiff for personal injuries sustained, but granted the plaintiff leave to make submissions on the 
question of the election between the two alternative claims before determining the amount of that 
judgment.  
778 2002) 211 CLR 540. 
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remedy will be taken.779 That election would have to be made no later than at the 
time of seeking final judgment in the action.”780 
 
Accordingly, consideration should always be given to pleading negligence in the 
alternative to a claim under the ACL and CCA. 
 
It is likely that judicial interpretation of Part 3-5 of the ACL will draw heavily on case law 
interpreting the corresponding provisions under the former TPA. Although it has no proper 
legal status, a publication by the Commonwealth Treasury Office titled ‘The Australian 
Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions’ (2010) states that the differences in the drafting 
and order of provisions between Part 3-5 and the former Part VA reflect changes to 
drafting conventions since 1992 and are not intended to effect the operation and previous 
judicial interpretations of these provisions. For purposes of the discussion of the Australian 
legislative framework, the relevant product liability provisions of the current ACL will be 
discussed with reference, where applicable, to case law interpreting the corresponding 
provisions under the former TPA. 
 
3.4.1.1 Parties liable 
The ACL provides a number of actions for claiming damages for harm caused by defective 
goods as follows: 
 claims against ‘manufacturers’ for: 
o supplying a good with a ‘safety defect’ (section 138); 
o supplying goods that breach the consumer guarantees under the ACL (section 271) 
 claims against ‘suppliers’ of goods for supplying goods that breach the implied 
consumer guarantees under the ACL (section 259). 
                                                          
779 United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 at [19]. 
780 [130]. 
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Pursuant to section 138, a ‘manufacturer’ is liable to compensate an individual if the 
manufacturer supplies goods in trade or commerce, those goods have a ‘safety defect’, 
and the individual suffers injuries because of the safety defect.781 A manufacturer is also 
liable to compensate a person if: 
 
 an individual other than the person suffers injuries or dies because of the safety defect 
and the person suffers loss or damage due to the injuries or death;782  
 other goods (also of a kind usually acquired for personal, domestic or household use or 
consumption) are damaged or destroyed due to the safety defect;783 or 
 land, buildings or fixtures ordinarily acquired for private use are destroyed or damaged 
because of the safety defect.784   
 
Like the former TPA, the ACL provides an extended definition of ‘manufacturer’, which 
includes:785  
 a person who “grows, extracts, produces, processes or assembles goods”; 
 a person who holds themselves out to the public as the manufacturer;  
 a person who causes or permits their name, the name by which they carry on business 
or their brand or mark to be applied to goods that they supply;786 
 a person who causes or permits someone else to hold them out to the public as the 
manufacturer, in connection with the supply, promotion or possible supply of goods by 
that other person;       
                                                          
781 Section 138. 
782 Section 139. Section 139 is considered to be for the benefit of dependents of the injured or deceased 
person (Stegenga v J Corp Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-695). 
783 Section 140. 
784 Section 141. 
785 Section 7.  
786 See, for example: Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v ACCC (1999) ATPR a company marketed a 
domestic chemical and was held liable as a manufacturer under the TPA as it had lent its name and logo 
to the product.  
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 an importer, if at the time of importation, the actual manufacturer does not have an 
Australian place of business. 
 
 
In the case of Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v ACCC787 it was held that repackaging 
and labelling of products fall within the concepts of processing and assembling.   
 
In Leeks v FXC Corporation788 the plaintiff brought proceedings against the actual and 
deemed manufacturer of a defective product under the former TPA. The Court held that 
multiple deemed manufacturers could be subject to actions because the former TPA 
definitions of 'manufacturer' were not mutually exclusive. The position would arguably be 
the same under the ACL's extended definition of manufacturer. Liability of defendants is 
joint and several.789 
 
A person who wishes to institute a defective goods action against a manufacturer but does 
not know who the manufacturer of the goods is, may write to the supplier or each known 
supplier of the goods, requesting particulars identifying the manufacturer of the goods.790 
If, 30 days after the person made the request(s), the person still does not know who the 
manufacturer of the goods is, each supplier to whom the request was made and failed to 
comply with the request is taken, for the purposes of the defective goods liability action, to 
be the manufacturer of the goods.791   
 
Section 271 provides a further action against a ‘manufacturer’ for damages in 
circumstances where the goods do not comply with a consumer guarantee implied under 
the ACL. Pursuant to section 271(1), if the consumer guarantee under section 54 applies 
                                                          
787 (1998) 90 FCR 40. 
788 (2002) ATPR. 
789 Section 144. 
790 Section 147(1).  
791 Section 147(2). 
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to a supply of goods and the guarantee is not complied with, ‘an affected person’ in 
relation to the goods may recover damages from the manufacturer.792 Liability under this 
section does not arise if the guarantee is not complied with only because of: 
 
 an act, omission or representation by a person other than the manufacturer or an 
employee or agent of the manufacturer; or 
 a cause, outside of human control, that occurred after the goods left the manufacturer's 
control; or 
 the fact that the supplier's price charged for the goods exceeded the manufacturer's 
recommended retail price or the average retail price.793  
 
Pursuant to section 271(3), if a ‘person’ supplies goods by description to a consumer, and 
that description was applied to the goods by or on behalf of the manufacturer, or with the 
manufacturer's consent, and the guarantee under section 56 applies, and it is not complied 
with, an affected person may claim damages from the manufacturer. This does not apply if 
the guarantee is not complied with solely due to:  
 
 an act, default or omission of a person other than the manufacturer or an employee or 
agent of the manufacturer; or 
 a cause, outside of human control, that occurred after the goods left the manufacturer's 
control.794            
  
Pursuant to section 271(5), if the guarantee under section 58 or 59(1) applies to the supply 
and the guarantee is not complied with, an ‘affected person’ in relation to the goods may 
recover damages from the manufacturer. An affected person is entitled to recover 
                                                          
792 Section 271(1). 
793 Section 271(2). 
794 Section 271(4). 
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damages against the manufacturer for a reduction in the value of the goods and any loss 
or damage suffered due to failure to comply with the relevant guarantee, if it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the affected person would suffer such loss or damage due to 
failure to comply with the guarantee.795  
 
Pursuant to section 259 of the ACL, a ‘consumer’ may take action against a ‘supplier’ who 
supplies goods in trade or commerce and a consumer guarantee that applies to the supply 
under the ACL (other than section 58 and 59(1)) is not complied with.796 In circumstances 
where the failure to comply with the guarantee cannot be remedied or is a ‘major failure’, 
the consumer may recover damages for any loss or damage suffered due to the failure to 
comply with the guarantee, provided it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer 
would suffer such loss or damage due to a failure to comply with the guarantee.797  
 
However, the consumer may not recover damages from the supplier if the failure to comply 
with the guarantee was solely due to a cause outside of human control that occurred after 
the goods left the supplier's control.798 The consumer may take action whether or not the 
goods are in their original packaging.799  
 
Section 236(1) of the ACL provides a further general avenue for redress where a person 
suffers loss or damage due to the conduct of ‘another person’ and that conduct 
contravened any provision of Chapter 2 or 3 of the ACL, which include the implied 
consumer guarantees and safety standards, the person may recover damages against that 
‘other person’, or ‘any person involved in the contravention.’  
                                                          
795 Section 272. 
796 Section 259(1).  
797 Section 259(4). 
798 Section 259(5).  
799 Section 259(7). 
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The consumer guarantees implied by the ACL are discussed below at 3.4.1.6 in the 
context of product defectiveness. 
 
3.4.1.2 Potential claimants 
For purposes of an action against the ‘manufacturer’ supplying a good with a ‘safety 
defect’ under section 138, the ACL provides that an ‘injured individual’ or ‘a person other 
than an injured individual’ may bring a claim. This wording is broad enough to include 
claims by dependants of a breadwinner who is injured by the defective good. Use of the 
word ‘individual’ is also broad enough to include product users who did not purchase the 
product and bystanders who are harmed by the use of the good by another person. 
 
With respect to an action against a manufacturer for supplying a good that does not 
comply with the implied consumer guarantees, the ACL provides that ‘an affected person 
in relation to the goods’ may bring an action against the manufacturer. This is also broad 
enough to include dependants of a breadwinner who is injured by the good, product users 
who did not purchase the product and bystanders harmed by the use of the good by 
another person.  
            
For purposes of an action against ‘suppliers’ under section 259 for supplying, in trade or 
commerce, a good that does not comply with the implied consumer guarantees, the ACL 
provides that a ‘consumer’ may bring an action against the supplier.  
 
The term ‘supply’ in relation to goods is defined broadly by the ACL to include “supply 
(including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-purchase”. 
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The ACL defines a ‘consumer’ in relation to goods as follows: 
“3(1) A person is taken to have acquired particular goods as a consumer if, and 
only if: 
    (a) the amount paid or payable for the goods, as worked out under 
subsections (4) to (9), did not exceed: 
    (i) $40,000; or 
   (ii) if a greater amount is prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph - 
that greater amount; or 
(b)  the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption; or 
(c)   the goods consisted of a vehicle or trailer acquired for use principally in 
the transport of goods on public roads. 
(2)  However, subsection (1) does not apply if the person acquired the goods, or 
held himself or herself out as acquiring the goods: 
    (a)  for the purpose of re-supply; or 
    (b) for the purpose of using them up or transforming them, in trade or 
commerce: 
           (i) in the course of a process of production or manufacture; or 
          (ii) in the course of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land.”
   
In other words, the action against suppliers under section 259 is only available to 
consumers who ‘acquire’ the goods directly from the supplier. The ACL defines ‘acquire’ in 
section 2 to include “acquire by way of purchase, exchange or taking on lease, on hire or 
on hire-purchase.”           
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Based on the author's experience, Australian courts generally do not apply the 
requirement that goods be ‘of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption’ strictly and many goods would still qualify as being of a 
kind normally acquired for domestic or personal use, even if they were in fact acquired for 
a commercial purpose or used in a non-domestic setting in that instance. For instance, in 
Carpet Call v Chan,800 a case brought under the former TPA, domestic grade carpet 
supplied to a nightclub was held to be a good ordinarily acquired for domestic use. Further, 
consider for example an internet modem supplied by a mobile network company to a 
consumer who conducts a business from home. Even where the consumer holds a 
business internet account, the modem would arguably still qualify as a good ‘of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for domestic or personal use’, as the same modem is also widely 
supplied to, and used by, residential customers. 
 
 
In Cook v Pasminco Ltd801 the plaintiffs brought claims in negligence and nuisance, as well 
as under sections 75AD and 75AG of the former TPA (the equivalent of section 138 under 
the ACL) due to alleged injury to their health after being exposed to emissions of noxious 
fumes from the defendants’ industrial plants. For purposes of the TPA claims, the Federal 
Court had to consider, amongst other things, whether the fume emissions were ‘goods’, 
‘manufactured’ by the defendants and ‘supplied in trade or commerce’ within the meaning 
of the TPA and if so, whether those goods contained a ‘defect’.  
 
With respect to the claims under section 75AD and 75AG, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
emissions were ‘goods manufactured’ by the defendants and ‘supplied’ by the defendants 
                                                          
800 (1987) ASC 55-553; (1987) ATPR (Digest) 46-025. 
801 [2000] FCA 677 (12 May 2000). 
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to the plaintiffs, that the goods had a ‘defect’, being a harmful impact on human health and 
damaging to safety of land, buildings or fixtures owned by the plaintiffs. 
 
The court firstly considered the concept ‘supply’, which was defined in section 4(1) of the 
TPA as follows: 
“ ‘supply’ when used as a verb, includes: 
"(a) in relation to goods – supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, 
lease, hire or hire-purchase; and 
(b) in relation to services – provide, grant or confer…”     
  
The court held that a necessary element of the ‘supply’ concept is that it is a ‘bilateral and 
consensual process’ which is not the case here as the plaintiffs allege the toxic emissions 
were inflicted on them without their consent.802 The court found that no evidence could 
establish that the emissions passed from the defendants as part of a ‘consensual 
transaction or dealing’ and therefore, it could not be established that there was a ‘supply’ 
for purposes of section 75AD and 75AG.803       
  
With respect to the requirement that the ‘supply’ must have occurred ‘in trade or 
commerce’, the court held that this expression does not only refer to the supplier’s general 
commercial activities, rather the supply itself must form part of an activity or transaction 
which has a ‘trading or commercial character.’804      
  
As to the question whether the emissions had a ‘defect’ in them, the court referred to the 
definition of ‘defect’ in section 75AC(1), which provides: 
                                                          
802 At [24].  
803 At [27]. 
804 [28] - [29]. 
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“For the purposes of this Part [Part VA in which ss 75AD and 75AG occur], goods 
have a defect if their safety is not such as persons generally are entitled to 
expect.”     
 
The court held that the plaintiffs would have to establish that the emissions were unsafe 
because of the presence of a defect in them. However, the plaintiffs were alleging in this 
case that the emissions were unsafe because they were true to their nature, not because 
of a defect in them.805 Accordingly, the plaintiffs would fail on this point as well.806 
 
In light of these conclusions, the court did not deem it necessary to consider the concept 
‘goods’ and ‘manufactured’.807 The TPA claims were struck out. 
 
A person who purchases goods by way of auction is not entitled to bring a claim for 
damages based on breach of implied consumer guarantees under sections 271 and 259. 
The reason for this is that the implied consumer guarantees under the ACL do not apply to 
goods sold by way of auction.  
 
 
The ACL defines a ‘sale by auction’ to mean a sale that is conducted by an agent of the 
person who is supplying the goods, whether that agent conducts the sale in person or by 
electronic means.808 A question arising from the auction exclusion is whether goods sold 
via online auction sites, such as eBay, are excluded from the implied consumer 
guarantees. The author recently acted for an Australian retailer who purchases second-
hand electronic goods from auction houses and resells them to consumers on eBay. One 
of these goods, a second-hand (or possibly third-hand) electronic mediaboard, 
malfunctioned causing an electrical fire which burnt down the plaintiff-consumer’s home. In 




808 Section 2(1). 
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order to determine whether the ACL’s consumer guarantees applied to the retailer’s eBay 
sale to the consumer, it had to be determined whether eBay acted as the retailer’s agent. 
 
The eBay User Agreement, as provided on its website, states as follows: 
 
“Although we are commonly referred to as an online auction website, it is 
important to realise that we are not a traditional ‘auctioneer'. Instead, our site 
merely acts as an online venue to allow members to communicate and offer, sell 
and buy just about anything, at any time, from anywhere, in a variety of formats, 
including a fixed price format and an auction-style format commonly referred to as 
an ‘online auction.”809  
 
  
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission advises on its website: 
“When consumers purchase goods from an online auction site, the seller, even a 
private individual, may need to abide by consumer guarantees as the websites do 
not generally act as an agent for the person selling the goods.”810   
 
 
A comment by the Queensland Office of Fair Trading on its website further states: 
“eBay sales are not considered to be an auction as eBay does not act as an agent 
on behalf of the seller. Therefore, eBay sales are covered by the consumer 




While this point has not yet been judicially tested, based on eBay's terms and conditions, 
coupled with the underlying consumer protectionist policy of the ACL and the commentary 
of consumer protection authorities, sales via eBay to Australian consumers would arguably 
not be excluded from the application of the ACL's consumer guarantees. The position may 
be different in respect of other online auction sites where the site operator does act in the 
traditional auction sense as agent of the vendor. 
                                                          
809 http://pages.ebay.com.au/help/policies/user-agreement.html. 
810 Consumer Action Law Centre, Victoria, Australia. Media release: Is eBay selling consumers short? 
[Online] Available: http://consumeraction.org.au/media-release-is-ebay-selling-consumers-short/.     
811 Ibid. 
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3.4.1.3 Goods 
The ACL provides a broad definition of ‘goods’ in section 2, which includes: 
 
  “(a) ships, aircraft and other vehicles; and  
   (b) animals, including fish; and 
   (c) minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under or attached to land or not; and 
   (d) gas and electricity; and 
   (e) computer software; and 
   (f)  second-hand goods; and 
  (g) any component part of, or accessory to, goods.”812 
 
Section 8 of the ACL provides that goods are taken to be supplied to a consumer even if 
they have become affixed to land or premises at the time of supply.   
 
The definition of ‘goods’ under the ACL expands on the definition of ‘goods’ under the 
former TPA in that it now includes specific references to computer software, second-hand 
goods and any component part of, or accessory to goods. With respect to computer 
programmes, the addition to the definition overcomes any uncertainty as to whether they 
are ‘goods’.813 Other than these additions, the definition of ‘goods’ under the ACL does not 
appear to expand the scope of the original definition of ‘goods’ under the former TPA.814 
 
It has been held by the Australian Federal court that the inclusion of ‘electricity’ in the 
definition of ‘goods’ under the TPA does not mean that ‘goods’ include encoded electrical 
signals such as electronically disseminated financial information sent from a retail supplier 
of stock exchange information to its subscribers’ computers.815 While the information is 
                                                          
812 Section 1. 
813  Miller ‘Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated’ (2016) 14810, citing ASX Operations Pty 
Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460; 97 ALR 513. 
814  Miller ‘Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated’ (2016) 1480. 
815  ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460; 97 ALR 513, which 
dealt contraventions of TPA provisions relating to prohibited trade practices. 
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sent by way of real-time encoded electrical impulses, which are received and interpreted 
by the subscribers’ computers, the ordinary meaning of ‘goods’ cannot be extended by 
interpretation to include encoded electrical signals. 816  The subscribers to the stock 
exchange information cannot properly be characterised as purchasers of ‘electricity’ and 
therefore ‘goods’, rather they are purchasers of electronic information. 817  It is unclear 
whether Australian courts would hold that information in itself, as opposed to the product 
into which it is incorporated, such as software, would qualify as “goods”. 
 
In relation to the supply of human blood in the course of a blood transfusion by a hospital 
during an operation, it has been held, under the former TPA, that the supply was not a 
supply of ‘goods’, rather a supply of ‘services’.818 However, it should be noted that this 
case turned on the particular facts and is not authority for a general proposition that the 
supply of blood will never constitute a supply of ‘goods’.819 
 
3.4.1.4 Causation 
The ACL does not provide any specific guidance as to the test for causation to be applied. 
The general principles of causation, as applied under Australian tort law, apply in the case 
of strict product liability claims under the ACL. The High Court decision of Robinson 
Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott,820 which is discussed in detail below at 
3.4.1.6 in the context of defectiveness, has recently confirmed the test for causation in 
negligence and statutory product liability claims. While the causation analysis may require 
the drawing of inferences, particularly where it is difficult to identify the cause of damage 
from multiple possible causes, establishing causation requires proof, on a balance of 
                                                          
816 [20]. 
817 Ibid. 
818 E v Australian Red Cross Soc (1991) 31 FCR 299; 105 ALR 53.  
819 Miller ‘Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated’ (2016) 1481. 
820 [2016] HCA 22 (8 June 2016). 
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probabilities, that a breach of duty in negligence (or a product defect) was the cause of the 
damage.821  
 
3.4.1.5 Harm and damages  
As noted above at 3.4.1.1, a manufacturer of a product with a ‘safety defect’ may be liable 
to pay compensation for injuries, death, economic loss as a result of death and damage to 
property (other than the defective good). 822  A supplier of goods that breach implied 
consumer guarantees may be held liable for ‘damages’ under the ACL.823   
 
Part VIB of the CCA restricts the amount of personal injury damages recoverable for 
economic loss, loss of earning capacity, superannuation entitlements, gratuitous attendant 
care and non-economic loss (pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and 
disfigurement) and interest.  
 
For instance, non-economic loss is capped at $250,000.00 (subject to inflation 
adjustments, which in 2015 amounted to approximately $270,000.00) for the most extreme 
cases.824 Where the injury is at least 33% of the most extreme case, non-economic loss 
damages cannot exceed the applicable percentage of the maximum amount of damages 
available.825 For injuries between 15% and 33%, a sliding scale contained in the CCA is 
used to determine damages for non-economic loss.826 Damages under are not available 
for injuries considered less than 15% of the most extreme case.827 The most extreme case 
                                                          
821 Ibid.  
822 Sections 138 – 141. 
823 Sections 271(3); 271(5); 259(4) and 236(1).  
824 Section 87M Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
825 Section 87Q. 
826 Section 87R. 
827 Section 87S. 
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is simply defined as a case in which the claimant suffers non-economic loss of the ‘gravest 
conceivable kind’.828 No further guidance is provided for assessing injuries. 
 
Exemplary and aggravated damages are not available in respect of death or personal 
injury claims under the CCA.829   
 
There is no threshold limit or ceiling on a manufacturer’s potential liability in relation to 
property damage under Part 3-5 of the ACL. 
 
3.4.1.6 Concept of Defectiveness 
For purposes of the action against a manufacturer for supplying a good with a ‘safety 
defect’ under section 138, the ACL now refers to a ‘safety defect’ as opposed to ‘defect’ 
under the former TPA. Section 9 of the ACL provides that goods have a safety defect "if 
their safety is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.830 In determining 
defectiveness, courts are still required to take into consideration “all relevant 
circumstances”, including the same listed factors provided under the former section 
75AC(2) of the TPA.831 The provisions regarding inference of defectiveness under the 
former section 74AJ now appear in Sections 9(3) and (4) of the ACL, which mirrors the 
content of the former TPA provisions.  
 
In determining the extent of the safety of goods under section 9, courts must consider all 
relevant circumstances, which include: 
" ▪ the manner in which, and the purposes for which, they have been marketed; 
                                                          
828 Section 87P. 
829 Section 87ZB. 
830 Section 9(1). 
831 Section 9(2). 
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  their packaging;  
  the use of any mark in relation to them;  
 any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or refraining from doing,  
anything with or in relation to them;  
  what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to them; and  
  the time when they were supplied by their manufacturer." 
 
Section 9 prohibits the drawing of an inference that goods have a safety defect only due to 
the fact that, after they were supplied by their manufacturer, safer goods of the same kind 
were put on the market.832 
 
Further, an inference that goods have a defect is not to be made solely due to the fact that 
the goods complied with a Commonwealth mandatory standard and that standard was not 
the safest possible standard in light of the latest state of scientific or technical knowledge 
when their manufacturer supplied them.833  
 
On the other hand, compliance with mandatory safety standards is only a factor in 
determining whether goods have a safety defect and is not conclusive per se. In the case 
of Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson,834 the Full Court of the Federal 
Court agreed with the findings of the trial court that compliance of a pharmaceutical 
product with the requirements of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) was not sufficient 
to discharge the manufacturer’s duty of care, as that Act did not evince an intention to 
revoke common law consumer rights.  
 
                                                          
832 Section 9(3). 
833 Section 9(4). 
834 [2011] FCAFC 128. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 239 
It has been noted that other factors, while not specifically listed in the ACL or the former 
TPA, may have relevance to the defectiveness test. The Explanatory Memorandum, which 
introduced the former Part VA, notes that safety expectations may also depend on the 
“nature of the product and community knowledge of the product.”835  
 
Another relevant factor may be a class of goods that can be referred to as ‘inherently 
dangerous goods’. This category includes tobacco, guns and knives. As such goods are 
by definition inherently dangerous, community expectations in relation to these goods 
must, therefore, include an understanding of the degree of risk involved with their use. 
Where the danger is well known to the general community, the community expects, and 
indeed must accept, a degree of risk.836  
 
The price of goods may also be relevant. A consumer should not expect that a cheaper 
product contains any additional or special safety features which may be associated with a 
more expensive version of the product.837  
 
The role of intermediaries may be relevant to defectiveness under the ACL. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the former TPA gives the example of prescription 
pharmaceuticals supplied to the consumer by a qualified pharmacist and only on the 
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.838 Due to the complex nature and effects of 
medical and pharmaceutical products, comprehensive instructions and warnings may not 
be provided by the manufacturer to the consumer. However, detailed product information 
                                                          
835 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. 1991. Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 1991 at par 21. [Online] Available: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/tpab21991266/memo_0.html.Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Trade Practices Amendment Bill (No 2) 1991. 
836 Par 22.  
837 Par 23. 
838 Par 17. 
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is provided to doctors and pharmacists by the manufacturers so that these learned 
intermediaries can properly determine whether to dispense a product to a consumer. This 
approach was confirmed in Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros and Co (Aust) Pty Ltd,839 which cited 
Australian authority 840  for the principle that the duty to warn rests with the treating 
physician in such cases, not the manufacturer or distributor. The Australian court noted 
that the “learned intermediary” doctrine has been subject to considerable judicial 
consideration in the US, but that it was not necessary to resort to this doctrine in this 
particular case as Australian law already holds that the duty to warn of the risks of medical 
products only accessible through a learned medical professional, rests with that medical 
professional, not the manufacturer or distributor. In other words, for these types of 
scenarios Australian law is consistent with the learned intermediary doctrine. Apart from 
these cases, Australian courts have to date declined to apply the “learned intermediary” 
doctrine in product liability cases.841 
 
In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Glendale Chemical Products,842 the 
only case brought under Part VA of the former TPA where liability was imposed, the court 
had to determine whether a caustic soda used to clean drains, was defective. After 
sprinkling the caustic soda into hot water, which the consumer had poured into a drain to 
dislodge a blockage, it reacted in such a way that it caused serious burns to the claimant’s 
face and eyes. It was never suggested that the caustic soda itself had an inherent defect. 
Instead, the defectiveness issue in this case concerned the adequacy of the warnings and 
safety instructions accompanying the product, particularly whether the manufacturer 
                                                          
839 [2004] FCA 853. 
840 H v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-000.  
841 Loveday & Morrison ‘Product Liability 2016 - Australia’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
5.2. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/australia#chaptercontent5. 
842 40 I.P.R. 619 (1998) (Austl.Fed.Ct.) 
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should have included a warning for possible usage or contact with hot water. At trial, it was 
argued on behalf of the consumer, that:       
   
“While consumers might generally be expected to know that caustic soda is 
corrosive and that contact with eyes and skin is potentially highly dangerous, all of 
which is stated explicitly on the label, ordinary consumers would not be expected 
to know of the dangers attendant upon the use of caustic soda with hot water in 
such a confined space. Accordingly, it was contended by the Commission that the 
goods….had a defect because the safety of such goods is not such as persons 
generally are entitled to expect. In particular, when regard is given to the absence 
of any instructions or warning concerning the use of the contents of the container 
with hot water, the goods are unsafe.”843 
 
The trial court noted that the defectiveness standard adopted by section 7AC(1) 'is an 
objective one based upon what the public at large, rather than any particular individual, is 
entitled to expect.' The judge acknowledged that it is not possible to foresee all possible 
uses of goods, and that section 75AC(1) does not require goods to be completely risk-free. 
According to him, the 'level of safety that is required of a product is what the community is 
entitled to expect.' In light of the factors listed in section 75AC(2), a product may be 
defective even if it does not contain an inherent defect. The judge noted as follows: 
 
“Thus, it is clear that a substance which is, for example, marketed as being 
suitable for a particular purpose without warnings as to the particular way in which 
that purpose should be achieved may have a defect because use in some ways 
would not be safe.”844 
 
 
The court concluded that the manufacturer, who marketed the product for cleaning or 
removing grease from household drains, could have foreseen that a consumer might pour 
the caustic soda down a drain containing hot water. Considering, in addition, that the 
                                                          
843 [627]. 
844 [631]. 
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characteristics of caustic soda, particularly its reaction with hot water, were well known, the 
manufacturer should have included a warning against using this product with hot water. On 
appeal, the Federal Court confirmed this decision, which was summarised by the trial 
judge as follows: 
 
“Persons generally are entitled to expect to be warned of a danger or lack of safety 
in respect of a use to which goods might reasonably be expected to be 
put….While there is a warning that the contents of the container are corrosive and 
that contact with eyes and skin should be avoided, that is not adequate having 
regard to the nature of caustic soda and the purpose for which it was marketed.”845 
 
In Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co,846 and action brought under section 75AD of the former 
TPA, the plaintiff developed thrombo-embolisms after a prosthetic mitral valve was 
implanted into her heart, resulting in the need for further surgery to replace the valve with a 
bio-prosthetic valve. She brought actions against the supplier of the valve in terms of 
section 75AD and against the cardiologist and the surgeon in negligence on the grounds of 
failure to warn of material risks associated with the operation.   
 
With regard to the claim against the supplier of the prosthetic valve under the TPA, the 
plaintiff was required to prove the supply of the valve by a corporation in trade or 
commerce, that the valve had a defect and that she suffered injuries due to the defect. 
 
The court confirmed that the defectiveness standard in section 75AC(1) is an objective 
standard based on what the public at large, rather than a particular individual, is entitled to 
expect. Goods are not required by this standard to be absolutely safe and risk-free. 
Therefore, the mere fact that the prosthetic valve carried a risk of post-operative 
complications and that the claimant unfortunately did suffer such a complication, does not 
                                                          
845 [632]. 
846 (2004) FCA 853. 
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of itself justify a general conclusion that the valve is defective. Furthermore, the risks 
attendant in use of the valve was well known to medical practitioners, and the plaintiff had 
been advised of the risks prior to the operation. Therefore, the plaintiff could not 
reasonably have expected that there would be no risk of complications developing after 
implantation of the valve. The court rejected an argument that the supplier had a duty to 
warn the plaintiff of the risks, since it had been accepted under Australian law that the duty 
to warn patients rests with the treating medical practitioner, not the manufacturer or 
distributor of the medical product.847 
 
The recent decision of the Australian High Court in Robinson Helicopter Company 
Incorporated v McDermott 848  considered the adequacy of instructions provided by a 
helicopter manufacturer in a maintenance manual and the extent to which manufacturers 
can rely on the expertise of qualified maintenance persons in interpreting the instructions. 
The case was brought against a helicopter manufacturer in negligence and pursuant to 
section 75AD of the former Trade Practices Act849 arising from a helicopter crash in 2004 
resulting in the death of the pilot and serious injuries to the plaintiff.  
 
It was accepted by the parties that the crash was caused by the failure of the helicopter's 
forward flex plate due to one of the 4 bolts securing the flex plate being incorrectly 
assembled and not tightened properly (‘the defect'), contrary to instructions contained in 
the helicopter's maintenance manual. The flex plate had been removed and reassembled 
some two months prior to the crash. After reassembly of the flex plate, but before the 
                                                          
847 H v Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-000. 
848 [2016] HCA 22 (8 June 2016). 
849 1974 (Cth). 
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crash, the flex plate had also been subject to two ‘100 hourly' inspections by licenced 
aircraft maintenance engineers (‘LAME')850 and several routine pre-flight checks by pilots.  
 
It was accepted by the parties that the manufacturer did not cause the defect and it was 
unknown who did. However, the focus in these proceedings was not when and how the 
defect arose, but rather the adequacy of the inspection procedure contained in the manual 
for detecting the defect. The manual instructed LAMEs to ‘verify the security’ of the flex 
plate during 100 hourly inspections. The manual further required that the bolts be 
tightened to a specific setting and that a stripe of torque seal paint be applied to the bolts 
after installation, allowing for any subsequent bolt rotation to be detected visually. 
 
At first instance, the trial judge inferred five alternative factual possibilities as to the 
presence (or absence) and condition of the torque stripe at the time the LAMEs conducted 
their inspections. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, holding that the manual’s 
instructions were sufficient to convey to a competent LAME that it was necessary to look 
for a torque stripe on each bolt and if the stripe was missing, damaged or incomplete, to 
take steps to determine whether the bolt was correctly tightened, to re-tighten the bolt and 
then apply a fresh torque stripe.851  
 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and 
found that there was only one possibility: the torque stripe was in a condition that would 
not have alerted the LAMEs to investigate the bolt further. The Court of Appeal held that 
the manual was defective in failing to warn LAMEs that visual inspection of torque stripes 
                                                          
850 The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) prescribed the classes of person allowed to carry out 
maintenance work on helicopters, one such class being licensed aircraft maintenance engineers 
(‘LAME’). The Regulations required that maintenance work on a helicopter by a LAME be performed in 
accordance with instructions provided in the helicopter manual. 
851 McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated [2014] QSC 34 at [159]. 
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may not be a sufficient indicator of bolt security due to fading or incorrect application and 
should have recommended physical testing of the bolts.852  
 
The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal had 
erred in interpreting the evidence and overturning the trial judge's findings of fact without 
demonstrating they were ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling inference’.853 
Further, the High Court found that the trial judge was correct in finding that the plaintiff had 
not shown the Manual was defective or insufficient to discharge the manufacturer’s duty of 
care.854 It was probable that, if the LAMEs had properly inspected the bolt in accordance 
with the manual, they would have noticed the absence of a torque stripe or a torque stripe 
in such a condition that would have alerted them to examine the bolt further.855 
 
While it was strictly unnecessary to address causation, the High Court briefly commented 
that the Court of Appeal had also erred in this regard. Of all the factual possibilities 
inferred, the Court of Appeal had held that one possibility was not covered by the 
manual.856  However, it was not shown that this possibility was any more likely than the 
others.857 Therefore, a breach of duty in failing to provide for this one possibility in the 
manual could not be considered causative of the crash.858 Further, the witness evidence 
pointed against the likelihood that the LAMEs would have been any more diligent in 
adhering to a recommendation in the manual that they physically check the bolts than they 
were in visually examining the torque stripes for possible bolt rotation.859 
                                                          
852 McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated [2014] QCA 357 at [22]. 
853 At [43]. 
854 At [78]. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Namely, the torque stripe was incorrectly applied so as not to adhere to both the bolt and the fixed 
components, such that the stripe could move with the bolt and not crack. 
857 [81] - [82]. 
858 Ibid. 
859 At [87]. 
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While the High Court ultimately found in favour of the manufacturer, this protracted 
litigation serves as a powerful reminder to manufacturers to ensure that maintenance 
instructions accompanying products are clear and comprehensive, having regard to the 
reasonably foreseeable reader, whether it be a lay consumer or qualified maintenance 
person. It further highlights that maintenance instructions accompanying products, 
particularly relating to safety indicators, should alert the reader to the risk of those 
indicators failing or being inconclusive. Manufacturers should avoid, as far as reasonably 
practicable, relying on the expertise of qualified maintenance persons to consider further 
inspections above and beyond what is expressly recommended by the manufacturer. 
Ultimately, the manufacturer is best placed to advise on all features of its product.  
 
With respect to actions for damages against ‘manufacturers ‘ and ‘suppliers’ for breach of 
implied consumer guarantees under section 271 and 259 respectively, the ACL implies 
various consumer guarantees into agreements for the supply of goods to consumers in 
trade or commerce. These guarantees effectively impose a statutory duty on 
manufacturers and suppliers to supply goods that comply with these guarantees, where 
applicable.    
 
Section 54 implies a guarantee as to ‘acceptable quality’ into a supply of goods to a 
consumer in trade or commerce.860 Goods are of acceptable quality under the ACL if they 
are "as fit for all purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied; acceptable 
in appearance and finish; free from defects; safe; and durable as a reasonable consumer 
                                                          
860 Section 54(1)(a). 
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fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of 
the goods), would regard as acceptable," taking into account the following:861  
 
 the nature of the goods;  
 the price of the goods (if relevant);  
 any statements about the goods on packaging or labelling on the goods; 
 any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer of the goods;  
 any other relevant circumstances with respect to the supply of the goods.  
  
 
Goods do not fail to be of acceptable quality if the consumer's conduct causes them to 
become of unacceptable quality or if the consumer fails to take reasonable steps to 
prevent the goods from becoming of unacceptable quality, and they are damaged by 
abnormal use.862 Goods supplied by way of sale by auction are excluded from section 
54.863 
 
Section 55 implies a guarantee into a supply of goods to a consumer in trade or commerce 
that goods are reasonably fit for any disclosed purpose and any purpose for which the 
supplier represents that they are reasonably fit.864 Section 57 provides that, if goods are 
supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model, there is a guarantee that the 
goods match that sample or model in quality, state or condition and that the goods are free 
from defects that would not be obvious on reasonable examination of the sample or model 
and would cause the goods not to be of acceptable quality. If goods are supplied by 
                                                          
861 Section 54(3). If goods are not of acceptable quality, and the only reason(s) for it were drawn to the 
consumer's attention before the supply, then the goods are taken to be of acceptable quality (s.54(4)). 
862  Section 54(6). See, for instance, Jillawarra Grazing Co v John Shearer Ltd [1984] ATPR 40-441; ASC 55 
- 307, a case where agricultural equipment was found not to be defective as it failed to work because the 
person operating it did not operate it correctly. 
863 Section 54(1)(b). 
864 Section 55(1)(a). A disclosed purpose is defined under s 55(2) as a particular purpose for which the 
consumer acquires the goods and that the consumer made known, expressly or by implication, to the 
supplier or manufacturer or an agent of the supplier/manufacturer. This guarantee does not apply if it can 
be shown that the consumer did not rely on, or that it was unreasonable to rely on, the skill or judgment of 
the supplier or the manufacturer. 
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description and by reference to a sample or demonstration model, the guarantees in 
sections 56 and 57 both apply.865 The guarantees under sections 55, 56 and 57 do not 
apply to goods supplied by way of auction sales.  
 
In certain circumstances, a failure of goods to comply with the consumer guarantees 
implied by the ACL will amount to a ‘major failure’ if: 
 A reasonable consumer, fully aware the nature and extent of the failure, would not have 
acquired the goods; or 
 the goods deviate in one or more significant respects from a description, sample or 
demonstration model; or 
 the goods are "substantially unfit for a purpose for which goods of the same kind are 
commonly supplied", and cannot be remedied easily and within a reasonable time; or 
 the goods are unfit for a disclosed purpose which was made known to the supplier, and 
the goods cannot be remedied easily and within a reasonable time to make them fit for 
such a purpose; or 
 the goods are not of ‘acceptable quality’ as they are ‘unsafe.’866  
 
The ACL prohibits contracting out of these consumer guarantees. A term of a contract is 
void to the extent that it purports to exclude, restrict or modify the guarantees or liability of 
a person for a failure to comply with a guarantee.867 However, section 64A of the ACL 
permits suppliers to limit their liability for failures to comply with these consumer 
guarantees to one of the following: 
 replacing the goods or supplying equivalent goods; 
                                                          
865 Section 56(3). 
866 Section 260. 
867 Section 64. 
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 repairing the goods 
 paying the cost of replacing the goods or acquiring equivalent goods; 
 paying the cost of having the goods repaired. 
 
It is not clear what the relationship is between the concepts of ‘acceptable quality’ and 
‘unsafe’ in the context of consumer guarantees and ‘safety defect’ in the context of 
manufacturer’s liability under section 138. This has not been clarified in any reported 
judgements. However, it is arguable that the test for a ‘safety defect’ as set out in section 9 
of the ACL would be informative in determining whether a product is ‘unsafe’ and therefore 
not of ‘acceptable quality’ for purposes of the relevant consumer guarantee under section 
54. From a purely textual interpretation of these words, a product with a ‘safety defect’ 
would arguably also be ‘unsafe’ and not of ‘acceptable quality’.  
 
The guarantee as to ‘acceptable quality’ abandons the words ‘merchantable quality’ used 
in the equivalent provision under the former TPA.868 It has been held under the former TPA 
provision that statistical data on the failure rate of goods of the type in question does not 
amount to any evidence of the quality of those goods.869 Further, the relevant point in time 
for assessing whether goods are of acceptable quality is the time when the goods are 
supplied to the consumer.870However, this does not mean that information about the goods 
which were not known at the time of supply is irrelevant. The assessment of what was 
objectively reasonable for the consumer to expect of the product’s quality is to be made 
taking into account all relevant information available at the time of the trial.871  
 
                                                          
868 Section 74D(3) TPA. 
869 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151.  
870 Ibid; see also Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] FCAFC1 128. 
871 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151. 
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In Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney,872 an action was brought against the Australian importer of 
heart pacemakers when it became apparent that a batch of the pacemakers, which 
included the plaintiff’s pacemaker, failed due to a soldering problem. The court found that 
the plaintiff’s pacemaker was not of merchantable quality under the former TPA provision, 
even though his pacemaker had not in fact failed. 
 
In the author’s practical experience, there is often an overlap in pleadings between these 
concepts of “safety defect” for purposes of a section 138 claim against a manufacturer and 
the concept of ‘acceptable quality’ under section 54 and related actions for damages. For 
instance, the author has been involved in claims brought against suppliers of defective 
products who were also deemed manufacturers of the products (as they imported the 
products to Australia, assembled the products or added their own mark or brand to them). 
The claims are often based on breach of the implied consumer guarantee as to acceptable 
quality, and alternatively, the section 138 claim against manufacturers for supplying a 
product with a safety defect. In pleading the claim under section 138, plaintiffs’ solicitors 
often particularise the allegation of ‘safety defect’ by pleading that the product breached 
the implied consumer guarantees under the ACL. This practice is discussed in further 
detail in the case study below at 4.5.3 
 
3.4.1.7 Defences / Restriction of Liability of the Supply Chain      
3.4.1.7(i) Compliance with public regulation       
With respect to a claim against a manufacturer for supplying a good with a ‘safety defect’, 
the ACL provides a defence if the manufacturer establishes that the goods had a safety 
defect solely due to compliance with a Commonwealth mandatory standard for them.873 
 
                                                          
872 [2003] FCAFC 151. 
873 Section 142(b).  
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A standard which sets out only minimum performance requirements is not a mandatory 
standard for purposes of Part 3-5. The former TPA’s Explanatory Memorandum explains 
that where a manufacturer is free to exceed the minimum requirements of the standard 
without sanction, then it cannot be said that the standard is the sole cause of the defect.874 
Similarly, where the manufacturer is free to choose how to achieve the performance level 
required by the standard and chooses a ‘defective’ method, this defence will not be 
available to the manufacturer. 875  If a manufacturer establishes this defence, the 






3.4.1.7(ii) Absence of defect at time of supply 
Pursuant to section 142, it is a defence to a section 138 claim if the manufacturer 
establishes that the safety defect in the goods did not exist at the time when they were 
supplied by their actual manufacturer. In the case of electricity, the safety defect must not 
have existed at the time at which the electricity was generated, in other words, before it 
was transmitted or distributed. 
 
The wide definition of ‘goods’ under section 2(1) of the ACL includes component parts 
which are later integrated into finished goods. Manufacturers of components incorporated 
into finished goods will be liable to compensate injured plaintiffs if the component goods 
contributed to, or caused the defect in the finished goods.  
 
Section 142(d) provides a defence where the manufacturer establishes that, if the goods 
that had that safety defect were comprised in other goods, that safety defect is attributable 
                                                          
874 Par 53. 
875 Ibid. 
876 Section 148.  
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only to the design of the other goods, the marking accompanying the other goods, or the 
instructions or warnings provided by the manufacturer of the other goods.  
 
The equivalent defence under the former TPA referred to ‘finished goods’ as opposed to 
‘other goods’ under the ACL. The wording of the TPA defence seemed to suggest that 
component manufacturers are provided with a defence where the finished goods were 
defective because of an act of the manufacturer of the finished goods. This appears to 
cover scenarios where the manufacturer of the finished product overloaded or misused a 
component which another manufacturer supplied to specification. It is arguable that the 
ACL’s use of the words ‘other goods’ means that this defence could possibly work in the 
reverse by holding the manufacturer of a defective component liable where the defect is 
solely attributable to the design, markings, instructions or warnings relating to that 
component.   
 
3.4.1.7(iii) Defect not reasonably discoverable 
Pursuant to section 142, it is a defence if the manufacturer establishes that the “state of 
scientific or technical knowledge” at the time when the manufacturer supplied the goods, 
did to enable that safety defect to be discovered. 
 
The equivalent of this defence under Part VA of the former TPA was successfully raised in 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan; Ryan v Great Lakes Council; State of New South 
Wales v Ryan.877 This case involved a claim by a group of consumers who contracted the 
Hepatitis A virus after consuming oysters contaminated with the virus. Investigation 
revealed that the lake where the oysters were grown had been polluted with human faecal 
material flowing from the adjacent land after heavy rainfall. The plaintiffs sued the oyster 
                                                          
877 2002 HCA 54; 211 CLR 540. 
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farmers in negligence and under various provisions of the former Trade Practices Act 
including Part VA.  
 
The High Court held that the oyster farmers did not breach their duty of care to consumers. 
The Court confirmed its previous decision in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt878 that a duty of 
care does not extend to ensuring the safety of consumers in all circumstances. The duty of 
care will be discharged by doing what a 'reasonable man' would do after assessing the 
magnitude of the risk, the probability of its occurrence, and the expense and difficulty of 
alleviating the risk. 879  The court held that, on all the facts, the oyster farmers acted 
reasonably and did not breach their duty of care. The oyster farmers had waited long 
enough after the rainfall before resuming harvesting and made sure the water's salinity 
levels had normalised. It was also shown that the farmers had been using the best test 
commercially available for detecting bacteria.  
 
The Court held that the public is entitled to expect that oysters supplied for consumption 
are virus free and therefore the contaminated oysters were ‘defective goods' within the 
meaning of Part VA. However, the state of science at the time provided no means to test 
for Hepatitis A contamination in oysters without destroying the oysters. As the defect was 
not capable of being discovered before supply, the oyster farmers succeeded with the 
‘state of art' defence. The oyster farmers were, however, liable in negligence and breach of 
consumer guarantee provisions under Part V Division 2A of the TPA in that the oysters 
were not of merchantable quality and not reasonably fit for the purpose for which they 
were supplied.  
 
                                                          
878 (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
879 [190]. 
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In the decision of the Full Federal Court in Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v 
Peterson,880 which related to the pharmaceutical drug Vioxx, the manufacturer's state of 
the art defence was upheld. The court found that the objective state of scientific knowledge 
at the time of supply did not allow the manufacturer to discover the defect. The 
manufacturer was only able to discover that consumer Vioxx increased the risk of heart 
attacks when it obtained the results of a study in September 2004, at which time Vioxx was 
withdrawn from the market.  
 
3.4.1.7(iv) Apportionment of liability 
Where the loss was caused by both a defect in the goods and an act or omission of the 
person who suffered injury or loss because of the defective goods, the ACL provides that a 
court may reduce the amount of compensation by an appropriate amount, taking all 
relevant circumstances into account. 881  The acts or omissions include the acts or 
omissions of another individual for whom the person is responsible. In appropriate 
circumstances, the reduction can amount to a complete disallowance of the claim. This 
provision has a similar effect to the defences of contributory negligence and voluntary 
assumption of risk in a claim brought in negligence. 
 
A manufacturer is liable to indemnify a supplier, who supplied the goods to a consumer, if 
the supplier is liable for damages under section 259(4) for loss or damage suffered by the 
consumer and the manufacturer is or would be liable (under section 271) for damages to 
the consumer for the same loss or damage.882 The supplier may bring an action against 
                                                          
880 [2011] FCAFC 128. 
881 Section 137A(1). 
882 Section 274(1).  
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the manufacturer for such legal or equitable relief as the supplier could have obtained if 
that liability had arisen under a contract of indemnity made between them.883  
 
If the goods in question are not “of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption,” then the manufacturer's liability to the supplier is limited to 
the cost of replacing or repairing the goods, or of obtaining equivalent goods, whichever is 
the lowest amount.884 This limitation does not apply if the supplier establishes that it is not 
fair or reasonable for the liability of the manufacturer to be limited in this way.885   
 
Where goods did not comply with a safety or information standard, a supplier may be able 
to invoke a defence under section 252 if it can show it merely acquired the goods from a 
person carrying on business in Australia for the purpose of re-supply and, either: 
 the supplier did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained, 
that the goods were non-compliant with that safety standard, or that the supplier had not 
complied with that information standard, or 
 the supplier relied in good faith on a representation by the person from whom the 





                                                          
883 Section 274(3).  
884 Section 276A.  
885 Section 276A(2). In determining whether or not it is fair or reasonable for the manufacturer's liability to a 
supplier to be limited, a court is to take into account all the circumstances of the case, and in particular: 
"the availability of suitable alternative sources of supply of the goods; (b) the availability of equivalent 
goods; (c) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the 
supplier" (Section 276A(3)). 
886 A supplier is not entitled to rely on this defence unless a court gives leave or the supplier has, no later 
than seven days before the day on which the hearing commences, served on the plaintiff a written notice 
identifying the person from whom the supplier acquired the consumer goods.   
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3.4.1.7(v) Prescription  
Defective goods actions brought under Part 3-5 of the ACL are generally required to be 
brought within 3 years after the claimant becomes aware, or ought reasonably to have 
become aware, of the particular circumstances that give rise to the cause of action.887 The 
ACL imposes a 10 year repose period, which provides that an action under this part 
cannot be brought more than 10 years after the supply of the goods by the 
manufacturer.888 
 
An action for non-compliance of a product with an implied statutory consumer guarantee 
under Part 5-4 of the ACL must generally be commenced within 3 years after the claimant 
becomes aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, that the consumer 
guarantee was not complied with.889 
 
In relation to personal injury claims in general under the CCA, including actions relating to 
Part 3-5 or Division 2 of Part 5-4 of the ACL, section 87F of the CCA defines the applicable 
limitation period as either the “date of discoverability”890 or the “long-stop period” being a 
period of 12 years from the date of the alleged act or omission,891 whichever is later.  
 
  
3.4.1.7(vi) Contractual restriction of liability  
Section 64A of the ACL provides that any consumer guarantees implied by the ACL and 
any rights and remedies afforded by the ACL cannot be excluded by way of a contractual 
                                                          
887  Loveday & Morrison ‘Product Liability 2016 - Australia’ (2016) International Comparative Legal Guides at 
5.2. Available [online]: https://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/product-liability/product-liability-
2016/australia#chaptercontent5. 
888 Section 143(2). 
889 Ibid.  
890 The date of discoverability for death of injury is the first date when the plaintiff in the proceeding knows or 
ought to know the following: that death or personal injury has occurred and was attributable to a 
contravention of the Act, and that, in the case of personal injury, the injury was significant enough to 
justify bringing an action.  
891 As defined in section 87H. 
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restriction or exemption clause. The ACL provides that a person may be subject to 
prosecution under the Act for attempting to do so. Section 25 of the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 simply lists examples of terms that may be unfair, for instance, a 
term that limits or has the effect of limiting, one party's right to sue another party.892  
 
In practice, manufacturers and suppliers in Australia would often include a clause in their 
contracts of sale whereby they exclude all implied warranties and liability, in so far as it is 
permitted by the ACL and other fair trade legislation. Such a clause may have the effect of 
excluding common law warranties and liability893 however, the manufacturer or supplier 
would still be bound to comply with the ACL and may therefore still be liable under the ACL 
for supplying defective goods.  
 
3.5 COMPARISON OF FOREIGN REGIMES 
3.5.1 Parties liable 
 The US Restatement (Third) 894 imposes liability upon any person in the supply chain 
“who is engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products.” This 
would therefore include manufacturers and commercial sellers/retailers, 
distributors/wholesalers and importers of defective goods into the US.  
 
 The EU Directive895 imposes liability on producers and importers of products into the 
EU. In circumstances where the producer cannot be identified, each supplier of the 
product is deemed to be its producer, unless the supplier informs the injured person, 
within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or the person who supplied the 
                                                          
892 Section 25(k). 
893 Provided the term has been properly included in the contract and is not contrary to law. A discussion of 
the validity of contractual exclusion or exemption clauses in Australia is beyond the scope of this study.  
894 3.2.1.1. 
895 3.3.1.1. 
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product to that supplier. The same rule applies in the case of an imported product, if the 
imported product does not show the identity of the importer, even if the name of the 
producer is shown. A similar scope of parties liable under the EU Directive is achieved 
by the relevant transposing provisions in the UKCPA896 and GPLA.897 
 
 The ACL898  imposes liability on “manufacturers” for supplying goods with a “safety 
defect” or goods that breach implied consumer guarantees under the ACL. The ACL 
also imposes liability on “suppliers” of products that breach implied consumer 
guarantees in relation to acceptable quality (which includes the requirement of ‘safe’), 
which may give rise to a claim for damages. The ACL provides an extended definition of 
manufacturer which may include parties who assemble products, apply their own name, 
brand or mark to the product and in certain instances, importers of products.  
 
 There is general consensus among these jurisdictions that liability for harm caused by 
defective products should not be restricted to the actual manufacturer, but to other 
parties in the supply chain who play a part in putting into circulation harmful products.  
 
3.5.2 Potential claimants 
 The Restatement (Third)899 simply refers to harm to “persons or property” and “the 
plaintiff.” Any person, whether a consumer, user or bystander, who suffers harm due to 
a defective product is arguably entitled to bring a claim against the commercial seller or 
distributor of defective product. The Restatement (Third) defines “harm to persons or 
property” in the context of recovery of economic loss to include any economic loss 
                                                          
896 3.3.1.8(i). 
897 3.1.1.8(ii).  
898 3.4.1.1. 
899 3.2.1.2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 259 
caused by “harm to the plaintiff’s person” or “the person of another when harm to the 
other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort law.” In other words, 
plaintiffs may also be dependants of a person who is harmed by a defective product. 
 
 The EU Directive900 refers in numerous recitals to the “protection of the consumer.” 
However, the provisions of the EU Directive refer to “the injured person”. Accordingly, 
the remedy afforded by the EU Directive appears to be available to any person harmed 
by a defective product, whether that person is the purchaser of the product, a bystander 
or a defendant who suffers loss as a result of harm caused by a defective product to 
another person. In transposing the EU Directive, the UKCPA901 refers to “the person 
who suffered the damage” whereas the GPLA902 refers to “the injured person”. This 
wording is broad enough to entitle any person who has suffered damage as a result of a 
defective product, whether a consumer who purchased the product, a bystander or 
dependants of “the person who suffered the damage” or “the injured person,” to recover 
damages under the UKCPA. 
 
 The ACL903 sets different requirements for qualification as a claimant depending on the 
basis for the action. For purposes of an action against the “manufacturer” supplying a 
good with a “safety defect” under section 138, the ACL provides that an “injured 
individual” or “a person other than an injured individual” may bring a claim. With respect 
to an action against a manufacturer for supplying a good that does not comply with the 
implied consumer guarantees, the ACL provides that “an affected person in relation to 
the goods” may bring an action. This wording is broad enough to include a claim by a 
dependant of a breadwinner who is injured by the defective good, product users who did 
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not purchase the product and bystanders who are harmed by the use of the good by 
another person. For purposes of an action against “suppliers” under section 259 for 
supplying, in trade or commerce, a good that breaches the implied consumer 
guarantees, the ACL provides that a “consumer” may bring an action. The ACL sets 
specific requirements to qualify as a “consumer” and generally requires that the 
consumer received the goods through a “supply” in “trade or commerce.”  
 
 There appears to be general consensus among these foreign strict product liability 
regimes that not only consumers in a contractual sense are protected, but also other 
product users, bystanders and dependants of persons harmed by defective goods. 
 
3.5.3 Goods 
 The definitions of “goods” or “product” vary among the foreign regimes in respect of 
their formulation and specific inclusions.  
 The US Restatement (Third)904 contains a definition of “product” which is essentially 
restricted to tangible goods, namely “tangible personal property.” However, the 
definition recognises that other items, such as real property and electricity, would qualify 
as “products” where “the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to 
the distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply the 
rules stated in this Restatement.” The majority of American courts have held that, once 
electricity has been distributed to the consumer through the meter, it is subject to strict 
product liability. A number of courts have held that high-voltage electricity in a 
distribution line is not subject to product liability as the high-voltage electricity has not 
yet been converted to a form for delivery to a consumer. The majority of courts do not 
consider information to be a “product,” frequently citing the concern that imposition of 
                                                          
904 3.2.1.3. 
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strict liability for false or defective information would encroach considerably on free 
speech. The definition of “product” does not refer to component products, however, the 
Restatement (Third) provides specifically for liability of commercial sellers or distributors 
of defective product components for harm caused by another product into which that 
defective component was integrated. While the definition of “product” is silent on 
whether second-hand goods are included, any second-hand tangible good that is 
“distributed commercially for use or consumption” would arguably qualify as a “product”. 
The definition of “product” expressly excludes all human blood and human tissue, even 
when provided commercially. 
 
 The EU Directive 905  defines “product” to mean all movables, even if they are 
incorporated into another movable or into an immovable. The definition of ‘product’ 
expressly includes electricity. The reference to movables being “incorporated into 
another movable” would include component products that are later fitted, assembled 
into or incorporated into another product. The EU Directive is silent on whether second-
hand goods are covered, however, the words “all movables” are arguably broad enough 
to include second-hand goods. 
 
 
 The corresponding provisions in the UKCPA906 transposing the EU Directive is similar to 
the EU Directive’s definition of ‘product’ in essence but provides further detail as to 
specific “goods” that are included, being “substances, growing crops and things 
comprised in land by virtue of being attached to it and any ship, aircraft or vehicle.” The 
UKCPA covers information in the tangible form of a book, but not information in general. 
                                                          
905 3.3.1.3. 
906 3.3.1.8(i). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 262 
With respect to digital information the position is not so clear, particularly where it is 
difficult to draw a line between the software and hardware of a product.  
 
 The corresponding provisions in the GPLA907 transposing the EU Directive basically 
mirror the EU Directive’s definition of “product” with no further specific inclusions. 
 
 The ACL908 defines “goods” broadly by providing a non-exhaustive list of items that 
would qualify as “goods” being “ships, aircraft and other vehicles; animals, including 
fish; minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under or attached to land or not; gas and 
electricity; computer software; second-hand goods; any component part of, or 
accessory to, goods.” The ACL provides that goods are taken to be supplied to a 
consumer even if they have become affixed to land or premises at the time of supply. 
The Australian Federal Court has held that the inclusion of ‘electricity’ in the definition of 
“goods” under the former TPA does not mean that “goods” include encoded electrical 
signals such as electronically disseminated financial information sent from a retail 
supplier of stock exchange information to its subscribers’ computers, as the ordinary 
meaning of “goods” cannot be extended by interpretation to include encoded electrical 
signals. It is unclear whether Australian courts would hold that information in itself, as 
opposed to the product into which it is incorporated, such as software, would qualify as 
“goods”. The Federal Court has also held, in relation to the supply of human blood in the 
course of a blood transfusion by a hospital during an operation, that the supply was not 
a supply of “goods”, rather a supply of “services” under the former TPA. However, the 
case in question turned on the particular facts and is not authority for a general 
proposition that the supply of blood will never constitute a supply of “goods”. 
 
 
                                                          
907 3.3.1.8(ii).  
908 3.4.1.3. 
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 There appears to be general consensus among these jurisdictions that component 
goods are subject to strict product liability. There is also generally consensus that 
electricity is subject to strict product liability, albeit with certain restrictions in some 
American states. The EU Directive and the majority of US courts do not consider 
information, as opposed to the tangible product into which it is incorporated, to be a 
product in its own right. The ACL is silent on this issue and it has not been judicially 
tested in Australia. Second-hand goods are expressly included in the ACL, whereas the 
EU Directive and US Restatement are silent on this issue but are worded broadly 
enough to include such goods.   
 
3.5.4 Causation 
 The US Restatement (Third)909  provides that causation is to be determined by the 
prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort. In other words, states apply 
the principles of causation as they have been developed in those jurisdictions. 
Causation in US tort law generally involves two enquiries, namely the factual cause of 
the injury and the legal/proximate cause of the injury (based on policy considerations), 
both of which are determined by a jury. Plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing factual 
causation, either due to the nature of the accident, the defect or the product. 
 
 In terms of factual causation, some US courts have recognised a so-called “material 
contribution to risk” rule in the context of asbestos-related cancer claims and a single 
wrongdoer. Under this rule, plaintiffs need only show that exposure to the defendant’s 
asbestos products was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in 
contributing to the risk of developing cancer.      
  
                                                          
909 3.2.1.4. 
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 Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) fulfils a function analogous to the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine by allowing an inference of defect to be drawn when justified by the facts of the 
harm-causing incident. Although occasionally applied in cases involving a design defect, 
the majority of cases brought under this section involve alleged manufacturing defects. 
This rule is restricted to cases where the product to failed to perform its manifestly 
intended function, thereby supporting the conclusion that a defect is the most likely 
explanation for the harm caused, sometimes referred to as the “malfunction theory” or 
“malfunction doctrine”. Since the plaintiff is not required to prove the specific nature of 
the defect that resulted in the malfunction, defectiveness can be established without 
meeting the requirements for a defect under the Restatement (Third). 
 
 
 Some US courts recognise that there may be products or categories of products that 
pose inherently unreasonable risks for which strict liability should attach, regardless of 
the exact nature of the defect. Such products are considered defective and 
unreasonably dangerous without having to weigh and balance the factors normally 
involved in determining defectiveness. 
 
 The EU Directive910 provides no guidance as to the test for causation and leaves it up to 
member states to apply, for instance, the general principles of causation used in 
negligence claims developed in their respective jurisdictions. However, it is questioned 
by English authors whether the general principles of causation applicable in tort law 
ought not be adapted to provide for a partial reversal of the burden of proof, given the 
consumer protection policy underlying the EU Directive. Dutch courts have found that, 
although article 4 of the EU Directive places the burden of proving defectiveness on the 
claimant, this burden is too heavy. Therefore, Dutch courts instead opted for a midway: 
                                                          
910 3.3.1.4. 
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If the claimant can show that he or she had used a product in a normal way and it failed, 
it is factually presumed that a defect in the product caused the damage. The burden 
would then shift to the producer to prove the product was not defective. 
 
 The difficulties arising from the EU Directive’s lack of guidance as to causation is 
illustrated by a series of recent UK judgments applying the UKCPA where differing 
views were expressed on the level of specificity required of a plaintiff with respect to 
proving defectiveness and causation. The position appears to have been settled 
recently, at least in the UK, to the effect that a plaintiff is not required to “specify or 
identify with accuracy or precision the defect in the product. It is sufficient to prove the 
existence of a defect in broad or general terms,” for instance “a defect in the electrics of 
the Lexus (motor car).” If this position is to be followed by English courts in the future 
without qualification, it would arguably assist claimants substantially in establishing 
defectiveness as well as causation for purposes of a UKCPA claim. 
 
 In some instances, UK courts have recognised exceptions to the traditional ‘but for’ test 
for factual causation, known as the ‘material contribution to harm’ and the ‘material 
contribution to risk’ tests.911 The material contribution to harm exception has its origins 
in nineteenth century nuisance cases in Scotland involving pollution of rivers and 
waterways by multiple factory owners. Subsequently, the ‘material contribution to harm’ 
test has been recognised, for example, in the context of a worker developing 
pneumoconiosis following tortious and non-tortious exposure to silica dust at an 
industrial plant. The ‘material contribution to risk’ of harm test has been recognised in 
the context of a worker who developed dermatitis at the defendant’s brick kiln due to 
exposure to brick dust on the basis that the defendant’s failure to provide washing 
                                                          
911 3.3.1.8(i) under discussion of ‘Causation’.  
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facilities materially increased the risk of developing dermatitis.    
      
 In cases involving a single wrongdoer where the facts point to more than one probable 
cause of harm, the UK Supreme Court has also applied the ‘material contribution test’ 
as an alternative to the traditional ‘but-for’ test. In Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd; 
Knowsley MBC v Willmore912 the plaintiffs had died of mesothelioma due to exposure to 
asbestos dust. The plaintiffs had been subject to low-level atmospheric exposure to 
asbestos as well as light exposure over a prolonged period at their respective places of 
employment. The court held that the contribution to risk of mesothelioma by the places 
of employment was sufficiently material to constitute factual causation against the 
employers. The reason for this exception is that medical science is currently not able to 
ascertain which asbestos fibre or fibres caused the mesothelioma, which usually only 
occurs many years after exposure. The Sienkiewicz exception has been developed in 
the context of asbestos-related mesothelioma cases where the plaintiff was subject to a 
tortious exposure to asbestos and other non-tortious, atmospheric/environmental 
exposures to asbestos. In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,913 the material 
contribution to risk test was also applied in the context of mesothelioma and multiple 
tortious exposures to asbestos caused by more than one wrongdoer.   
           
 More recently, English courts have applied the material contribution to harm test in the 
context of medical negligence or malpractice, where a person suffers from a harmful 
process arising from a natural cause, but exposure to the harm is prolonged due to 
medical malpractice. 
 
                                                          
912 [2011] UKSC 10. 
913 [2002] UKHL 22. 
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 Aside from the cases dicussed above where a material contribution to harm or material 
contribution to risk of harm test has been applied in the context of causation, the 
traditional ‘but for’ test remains the applicable test for factual causation in the UK. It 
appears that the material contribution to harm or risk of harm test for causation has not 
yet been applied in any reported product liability case law in the UK. However, given the 
numerous instances where these exceptions have been recognised in other contexts, it 
may only be a matter of time before it is extended, in appropriate cases, to product 
liability claims brought under the UKCPA or in negligence. 
 
 
 German courts apply their national rules regarding causation in relation to claims under 
the GPLA,914 generally comprising a two-fold approach, similar to English law, involving 
firstly a factual causation enquiry and secondly, a normative question of legal cause. In 
some cases, the plaintiff is not required to prove the exact nature of the product defect 
which caused harm. If a product malfunctions in “circumstances where one is entitled to 
expect that it does not fail, this makes out a prima facie case of defect. The burden then 
shifts to the defendant who has to identify whether the malfunction is due to a 
manufacturing defect or design defect. If the product deviated from its intended design, 
indicating manufacturing error, the defendant would be strictly liable. If, however, the 
product malfunction is due to a design feature which the defendant can identify, the 
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 The ACL915 does not provide any specific guidance as to the test for causation to be 
applied. It is accepted that the general principles of causation as applied under 
Australian tort law, apply in the case of strict product liability claims under the ACL. 
While the causation analysis may require the drawing of inferences, particularly where it 
is difficult to identify the cause of damage from multiple possible causes, establishing 
causation requires proof, on a balance of probabilities, that a breach of duty in 
negligence (or a product defect) was the cause of the damage. 
 
 None of the strict product liability instruments considered in this chapter prescribes any 
specific test for causation. Courts in all these jurisdictions have resorted to applying 
general principles of causation prevailing in their respective jurisdictions, generally 
involving a factual enquiry and a more normative, legal causation question. The courts 
have developed specific adaptations or exceptions to the traditional factual causation 
tests to assist plaintiffs in cases where the facts make it impossible to establish factual 
causation on a balance of probabilities. 
 
3.5.5 Harm and damages 
 The US Restatement (Third)916 imposes liability for ‘harm to persons or property’ and 
economic loss resulting from such harm, except for loss resulting from damage to the 
defective product itself. Some jurisdictions allow for the recovery of punitive damages in 
product liability cases. The state laws governing punitive damages and the recovery 
limits vary from state to state. 
 
 
 The EU Directive enables recovery of damages for harm caused by death, personal 
injuries and property damage, with the exception of damage to the defective product 
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itself. The EU Directive is without prejudice to national laws regarding ‘non-material 
damage’. In other words, the member states’ respective laws regarding economic loss 
damages are not affected by the EU Directive. The EU Directive leaves it to member 
states to decide on the recovery of pure economic loss. The EU Directive imposes a 
threshold amount of EUR 500, meaning that the first EUR 500 of any claim is not 
recoverable.   
 
 The CJEU has recently adopted a broad interpretation of the meaning of ‘damage’ 
under the EU Directive.917 It held that the EU Directive requires a plaintiff to prove a 
causal relationship between the defect and the damage suffered and allows for recovery 
of damages that are necessary “to eliminate harmful consequences and to restore the 
level of safety which a person is entitled to expect”.  In the case of a defective implanted 
medical device, the EU Directive covers damages for the cost of replacement of the 
defective product and the costs of the surgery. The broad interpretation of ‘damage’ by 
the CJEU appears to be in conflict with the wording of article 9 of the EU Directive, 
which expressly provides that ‘damage’ excludes the cost of replacement of the 
defective product itself. This ruling by the CJEU may enable plaintiffs to recover all 
losses and expenses relating to the use of a defective product, such as the cost of 
medical monitoring where a medical device or pharmaceutical product have not yet 
caused injury but may in the future, regardless of how remote that loss may be.  
 
 
 In addition to exclusion of damage to the defective product itself and imposing a 
minimum recovery threshold, the UKCPA918 provides a further limitation in relation to 
damages arising from property damage. The UKCPA prohibits recovery of damages for 
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harm to property which is not of a description “ordinarily intended for private use, 
occupation or consumption” and “intended by the person suffering the loss or damage 
mainly for his own private use, occupation or consumption.” A similar restriction on 
recovery of damages for property damage is imposed by the GPLA.919  
 
 The ACL920 provides that a manufacturer of a product with a ‘safety defect’ may be 
liable to pay compensation for injuries, death, economic loss as a result of death and 
damage to property (other than the defective good). A supplier of goods that breach 
implied consumer guarantees may be held liable for ‘damages’ under the ACL. Part VIB 
of the CCA restricts the amount of personal injury damages recoverable for economic 
loss, loss of earning capacity, superannuation entitlements, gratuitous attendant care 
and non-economic loss (pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and disfigurement) 
and interest. Exemplary and aggravated damages are not available in respect of death 
or personal injury claims under the CCA.  There is no threshold limit or ceiling on a 
manufacturer’s potential liability in relation to property damage under Part 3-5 of the 
ACL. 
 
 There appears to be consensus among the foreign jurisdictions considered that plaintiffs 
can generally recover damages for harm or loss arising from personal injury, death and 
property damage, with the exception of loss arising from damage to the defective 
product itself. In realtion to property damage, the EU Directive and transposing UKCPA 
and GPLA impose certain restrictions in the form of a minimum claim threshold. Further, 
the UKCPA and GPLA impose a restriction requiring the property damaged to be of a 
kind ordinarily intended for private use or consumption. The US Restatement (Third) 
and the ACL expressly provide for economic loss arising from personal injury and 
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property damage to be recovered. The EU Directive leaves it up to member states to 
determine whether consequential economic loss resulting from personal injury and 
property damage may be recovered.   
 
3.5.6 Concept of defectiveness 
 
 The US Restatement (Third)921 contains a trifurcated formulation of defectiveness, 
setting the liability standard separately for manufacturing, design and inadequate 
instructions or warnings defects. True strict liability applies to manufacturing defects, 
with the Restatement (Third) defining this as a deviation by a product from its intended 
design, even though all possible care was exercised by the producer. Restatement 
(Third)’s position is that this is not suitable for design defects and inadequate warning 
defects as the rationale for liability in the latter two cases are fundamentally different. 
For these types of defect, an independent reasonableness standard involving an 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a product, commonly referred to 
as 'risk-utility balancing', is required. In brief, a product will have a design or warning 
defect when the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by a 
reasonable alternative design or reasonable instructions or warnings. Although many 
courts insist on phrasing it as strict liability, the law according to the Restatement (Third) 
has returned in the case of design and warning defects to a type of reasonableness test 
closely resembling the enquiry into the negligent conduct of a defendant involving 
reasonable foreseeability and preventability of harm. 
 
 
 In the context of warning or instructional defects, particularly pharmaceutical and 
medical device products, the majority of US courts recognise a ‘learned intermediary 
                                                          
921 3.2.1.6. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 272 
doctrine’. Pursuant to this doctrine, a manufacturer may escape liability by showing that 
it had provided all necessary product information to a learned intermediary, such a 
treating physician or surgeon, who then interacted directly with the consumer. Whether 
the producer can rely on the intermediary to instruct or warn the ultimate user is a 
question of reasonableness.  
 
 
 In the US, warnings of the risks posed by a product will generally not be sufficient where 
the plaintiff can prove that a safer alternative design could reasonably have been 
adopted by the manufacturer. Interestingly, non-manuacturing sellers such as 
wholesalers or retailers are held strictly liable for design or inadequate warning defects, 
even though they did not and could not have foreseen the risks. As long as the plaintiff 
can show that a predecessor of that non-manufacturing supplier could reasonably have 
prevented the harm by adopting a reasonably safer design or providing better 
instructions or warnings, it is irrelevant whether the non-manufacturing supplier 
exercised all reasonable care. Many US courts consider the patent or obvious nature of 
a particular product’s risk as grounds for releasing producers from the duty to warn of 
those risks. 
 
 The bulk of product liability litigation in the US revolve involve design defects. The 
reasonableness test prescribed for design defects queries whether a reasonable 
alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm presented by that 
product and whether failure to adopt that alternative design rendered the product “not 
reasonably safe”. The majority of US courts require proof of a reasonable alternative 
design, either expressly or impliedly, when conducting a risk-utility analysis of the 
subject product’s design, in order to establish a prima facie case of design defect. A 
distinct minority of US states apply a consumer expectations test for design 
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defectiveness without requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design. In these states, 
courts simply ask whether the product’s design failed to meet the expectations of the 
ordinary consumer. Application of this consumer expectations test in the US appears to 
be limited to cases involving simple, non-complex products. 
 
 The EU Directive922 employs a single standard for a product “defect”, based on a type of 
‘consumer expectations’ test supported by a list of non-exhaustive factors to be 
considered by courts. Despite extensive academic criticism of this expectations test 
relating to its vagueness, ambiguity and circularity, it is broad enough to allow for an 
objective risk-utility analysis of a product. The UKCPA923 and GPLA924 both transpose 
the concept of defectiveness from the EU Directive without any significant deviation. 
However, Germany retains a special liability regime in relation to pharmaceutical 
products, which predates the EU Directive and therefore remains unaffected.  
 
 The German Supreme Court recently referred a question to the CJEU in relation to the 
meaning of a product “defect” under the EU Directive.925 The German court’s question 
related to two joined cases involving implanted medical devices, namely a pacemaker 
and a cardioverter defibrillator. The question was whether a product is defective under 
article 6 if it forms part of a group of products that have a significantly increased risk of 
failure, but where a defect has not been identified in each specific product within that 
group. The CJEU held that consumer expectations ought to be assessed “in the 
abstract” with regard to the expectations of the “public at large”. While the notion of 
“legitimate expectation” is difficult to define, the expected degree of safety must be 





Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 274 
determined by taking into account various factors, including the intended purpose of the 
product, the nature of the product and the requirements of the group of users for whom 
the product is intended. The CJEU ruled that, where products belonging to the same 
production series have been shown to have a “significantly higher than normal risk of 
failure”, or in which a “significant number of failures have already occurred,” all products 
in that production series can be classified as defective without proof that a specific 
product was defective. It remains to be seen how member states’ courts will interpret 
and apply the CJEU’s ruling, particularly, when exactly products would qualify as 
presenting a “significantly higher than normal risk of failure”.  
 
 Despite the CJEU’s ruling, there are still areas of uncertainty regarding the EU 
Directive’s defectiveness test, such as what information may be considered by courts. 
For instance, it is unclear whether product information and warnings supplied to learned 
intermediaries (‘the learned intermediary doctrine’) or information supplied directly to 
consumers (‘direct-to-consumer advertising’) would be relevant in the assessment. 
 
 
 The ACL926 employs a single definition of “safety defect” for all types of defects, based 
on the safety that persons are generally entitled to expect. The test is an objective 
standard based on what the public at large, rather than a particular individual, is entitled 
to expect of a product’s safety. The test is supported by a non-exhaustive list of 
considerations as well as “all relevant circumstances”, similar to the EU Directive and 
the transposing UKCPA and GPLA’s definitions of defectiveness. Compliance with 
mandatory safety standards is only a factor in determining whether goods have a safety 
defect under the ACL and is not conclusive per se. The role of intermediaries may be 
relevant to defectiveness under the ACL. In the case of prescription pharmaceuticals 
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and medical devices only accessible through learned medical professionals, that 
comprehensive instructions and warnings may not be provided by the manufacturer to 
the consumer due to the complex nature of these products. However, detailed product 
information is provided to doctors and pharmacists by the manufacturers so that these 
learned intermediaries can properly determine whether to dispense a product to a 
consumer. Australian courts recognise that the duty to warn of the risks of these 
products rests with the treating physician, not the manufacturer or distributor. Apart from 
these cases, Australian courts have to date declined to apply the “learned intermediary” 
doctrine in product liability cases. 
 
 Overall, the US Restatement (Third) provides a more nuanced approach to defining 
defectiveness by formulating an independent test for manufacturing, design and 
warning defects. After decades of experience, American courts clearly do not consider 
strict liability to be suitable for design and warning defects, therefore returning to a type 
of negligence standard involving reasonable foreseeability and preventability. This 
change in American law arguably resulted from political pressure to increase industry 
protection against excessive liability. A similar change has not occurred in the EU and 
Australia, where strict, or at least stricter, liability is retained for all types of defects. The 
EU and Australia still employ a single consumer expectations test for defectiveness 
involving an objective evaluation of the risks and utility of a product and all the relevant 
circumstances of the case. This approach is arguably more flexible, allowing courts to 
determine, in each particularl case, which factors are relevant and the weight to be 
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3.5.7 Defences / Restriction of liability of supply chain 
(i) Compliance with public regulation 
 The US Restatement (Third) 927 provides that, in the context of design or warning/ 
instruction defects, non-compliance with an applicable safety regulation renders the 
product defective with respect to the risks which that regulation aims to reduce. On the 
other hand, compliance with an applicable safety regulation is a factor in determining 
defectiveness. In other words, regulatory compliance does not provide a defence per se 
to a strict product liability claim. The reason for this is that most product safety 
regulations are intended only as minimum standards. In most cases, regulatory 
compliance has not provided US defendants with a complete defence as regulations are 
often not comprehensive. However, where regulators have thoroughly evaluated and 
regulated a certain area of product safety, based on a comprehensive risk-utility 
analysis, those regulations may fully define the safety standards imposed by tort law on 
sellers of products, in which case regulatory compliance may be a complete defence. 
 
 The EU Directive928 provides that a producer can escape liability under article 7(d) of 
the EU Directive if it can show that “the defect is due to compliance of the product with 
mandatory regulations issued by public authorities.” The wording of this section 
indicates that the defence is limited to circumstances where the regulations in question 
create a legal obligation on the producer to comply. In other words, minimum product 
standards that are not compulsory but rather industry guidelines, would not bring a 
manufacturer within the realms of this defence. Further, proof of compliance with 
mandatory regulations do not automatically provide producers with a defence under the 
EU Directive given that mandatory regulations are often set as minimum safety 
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standards and compliance with them does not necessarily discharge producers’ duty to 
ensure their products are safe. In 2011, a report by the European Commission on the 
application of the EU Directive noted that there is very little case law on the application 
of the regulatory compliance defence in the EU.  
 
 The ACL929 provides a defence if the manufacturer establishes that the goods had a 
safety defect solely due to compliance with a Commonwealth mandatory standard for 
them. A standard which sets out only minimum performance requirements is not a 
mandatory standard for purposes of Part 3-5 of the ACL. The reason for this is that 
where a manufacturer is free to exceed the minimum requirements of the standard 
without sanction, it cannot be said that the standard is the sole cause of the defect. 
Likewise, where the manufacturer is free to choose how to achieve the performance 
level required by the standard and chooses a ‘defective’ method, this defence will not be 
available to the manufacturer. If a manufacturer establishes this defence, the 
Commonwealth government of Australia will be liable to compensate the plaintiff. 
 
 There appears to be general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions compared that 
regulatory compliance is merely a factor in the defectiveness enquiry and would rarely 
be determinative of the defectiveness question. The reason often cited for this position 
is that regulations are generally intended as minimum standards and are rarely intended 
to be complete or comprehensive regulation of a particular safety aspect.  The EU 
Directive and ACL expressly provide a defence where it can be shown that a product is 
defective solely due to compliance with a mandatory regulation. The US Restatement 
does not provide for such a defence per se, but recognises that regulatory compliance 
is a factor in determining defectiveness of a product.  
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(ii) Absence of defect at time of supply 
 The US Restatement (Third)930 does not expressly provide a defence where it can be 
shown the alleged product defect did not exist at the time it was supplied by the 
manufacturer. Nevertheless, such a defence could arguably be raised by a 
manufacturer in the context of defectiveness or causation by producing evidence that 
the product was not defective at the time of supply, for instance by showing test results 
conducted immediately prior to supply. Further, a manufacturer may be able to show, on 
balance, that the product failed or caused harm due to alteration, modification or 
tampering after it was supplied by the manufacturer.  
 
 In comparison, the EU Directive931 expressly provides a defence if a producer can 
establish that the defect did not exist in the product at the time it was put into circulation 
or that the defect arose subsequently. This defence would cover the scenario where a 
producer can show evidence such as compliance with stringent quality control 
procedures, which justifies the conclusion, on balance, that the product was not 
defective when it left the producer’s control. This defence would be relevant where a 
product became defective due to misuse, modification or alteration of a product by a 
party other than the producer after the producer put the product into circulation.  
 
 Like the EU Directive, the ACL932 expressly provides a defence to a section 138 claim if 
the manufacturer establishes that the safety defect in the goods did not exist at the time 
when they were supplied by their actual manufacturer. In the case of electricity, the 
safety defect must not have existed at the time at which the electricity was generated, in 
other words, before it was transmitted or distributed. 
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(iii) Defect not reasonably discoverable 
 The US Restatement (Third)933 recognises that a producer may be able to defend a 
claim of design defect by showing that a product design conforms to industry practice 
and incorporates the most advanced or cutting edge technology or scientific knowledge 
available. In other words, the manufacturer would not have been able to know, based 
on the state of scientific knowledge, that the product had a defect. The Restatement 
(Third) does expressly provide for such a defence, but recognises that evidence of 
industry practice or the state of the art can be relevant to defectiveness in two ways: 
Firstly, the defendant may present such evidence to show that an alternative design 
proposed by the plaintiff was not practicable. Secondly, it may be relevant in 
considering whether the defendant’s failure to adopt the alternative design rendered the 
product 'not reasonably safe'. In general, US courts agree that conformance with the 
state of the art is not an absolute defence. The Restatement (Third) clearly supports an 
approach where evidence of the state of the art can play a role, albeit a limited one, in 
determining defectiveness. However, this defence, commonly known as the 'state of the 
art' or ‘development risk’ defence, could be fatal to a plaintiff's claim where a defendant 
can show that his design maintains the highest degree of safety possible for those 
products within the market. In such a case, although not theoretically impossible, a 
plaintiff would rarely be able to prove that the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design was practical under the circumstances, thereby implying that the prevailing 
industry practice as a whole could have been improved upon.  
 
                                                          
933 3.2.1.7(iii). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 280 
 The EU Directive934 expressly provides for a so-called development risk defence in 
pursuant to which a producer can escape liability by showing that “the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time when the product was put into circulation did not 
enable the producer to discover the defect. It has been held by the CJEU that the 
reference to “scientific and technical knowledge” in this defence does not refer to the 
state of knowledge in the industrial sector within which the producer of the product 
operates, but rather “the state of scientific and technical knowledge, including the most 
advanced level of such knowledge” in general. In other words, it is irrelevant to the 
question of liability under the EU Directive that no-one within the particular class of 
manufacturer takes the necessary steps to eliminate or prevent a defect, if such steps 
can be taken based on the available knowledge. The defence is directed at the 
objective state of scientific and technical knowledge available “of which the producer is 
presumed to have been informed.” However, the CJEU qualified this by stating that the 
relevant knowledge must have been accessible at the time the product was put into 
circulation. The CJEU conceded that the accessibility of knowledge raises difficulties of 
interpretation, but held this is a matter for national courts to resolve. 
 
 By 2002, the practical application of the defence was still extremely limited in reported 
judgments in the EU. Of course, this does not mean the defence was not raised 
frequently and successfully in out of court negotiations. In 2011, a report by the 
European Commission on the application of the EU Directive considered, among other 
things, whether this defence ought to be retained. The report notes that industry and 
insurance representatives believe removal of the defence would stifle innovation and 
raise insurance costs. These stakeholders argue the fact that removal of this defence 
has not had any significant impact in Finland or Luxembourg is due to the size of the 
                                                          
934 3.3.1.7(iii). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 281 
markets in these member states. On the other hand, consumer representatives are in 
favour of removing this defence. EU stakeholders have differing opinions regarding the 
effectiveness of this defence, but recognise that the EU Directive overall strikes an 
appropriate balance between the competing interests of industry and consumers. It 
remains unclear exactly what practical effect the development risk defence has had to 
date in the EU.  
 
 
 The ACL 935  expressly provides a defence if the manufacturer establishes that the 
objective “state of scientific or technical knowledge” at the time when the manufacturer 
supplied the goods, did to enable the manufacturer to discover that safety defect. Since 
introduction of this defence over twenty years ago, there have been only two reported 
judgments in Australia that considered this defence, which may be suggestive of its 
limited impact in practice. 
 
 Accordingly, there is general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions compared that 
the state of the art or state of scientific knowledge at the time the product was put into 
circulation or supplied is relevant to the defectiveness enquiry and/or in establishing a 
state of the art defence. It is unclear to what degree the defence has had an impact on 
strict product liability in the EU to date, but judicial experience up to 2002 suggests its 
impact has been extremely limited. In Australia, the defence has only been raised twice 
in reported judgments in over 20 years. The US experience varies from state to state, 
given that it is recognised as an absolute defence in some states and in others, it can 
be used to support an argument that a reasonable alternative design did not exist at the 
time the product was put into circulation (in other words, no design defect).  
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(iv) Apportionment of liability 
 The US Restatement (Third)936 expressly provides for apportionment of responsibility 
between or among plaintiff, sellers and distributors of defective products and others. 
The manner and extent of the reduction and the apportionment among multiple 
defendants are governed by generally applicable rules regarding apportionment of 
responsibility. A strong majority of US states apply the comparative responsibility 
doctrine, however the rules or developed principles of apportionment of responsibility 
vary among the states. Where a plaintiff’s conduct amounts to misuse, alteration or 
modification of a product, this may be relevant to the question of defectiveness, 
causation or the plaintiff’s contributory responsibility. Some states follow a ‘modified’ 
comparative fault system, whereby the parties’ responsibilities are adjusted in 
accordance with predetermined thresholds of responsibility. For instance, in some 
states a plaintiff’s recovery is fully barred if the plaintiff is found to have contributed 
more than 50% to the harm. The seriousness of the plaintiff’s ‘fault’ or contributory 
conduct and the nature of the product defect are relevant considerations in apportioning 
responsibility between the plaintiff and supplier. 
 
 The EU Directive937 expressly provides that, in circumstances where the harm is caused 
by a defect in the product as well as the fault of the injured person or a person for whom 
the injured person is responsible, the producer's liability may be reduced or disallowed, 
having regard to all the circumstances. However, the liability of the producer will not be 
reduced if the harm is caused by a defect in the product and an act or omission of a 
third party. This provision is subject to the various member states’ national law 
concerning the right of contribution or recourse. For instance, the UKCPA which 
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transposes the EU Directive, expressly provides that, where harm is caused partly by a 
product defect and partly by the fault of the injured person, the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 and section 5 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 
(contributory negligence) apply as if the defect were the fault of every defendant liable 
for the harm caused by the defect. This has the effect of deeming the ‘defect’ in the 
product to be the ‘fault’ of the defendants liable under the UKCPA for harm caused by 
that defect. This is done to address the theoretical problem of apportioning liability as is 
done in negligence claims, under a strict liability regime where fault does not feature. 
 
 The ACL938 expressly provides that, where the loss was caused by both a defect in the 
goods and an act or omission of the person who suffered injury or loss because of the 
defective goods, a court may reduce the amount of compensation by an appropriate 
amount, taking all relevant circumstances into account. The acts or omissions include 
the acts or omissions of another individual for whom the person is responsible. In 
appropriate circumstances, the reduction can amount to a complete disallowance of the 
claim. This provision has a similar effect to the defences of contributory negligence and 
voluntary assumption of risk in a claim brought in negligence. As between suppliers 
inter se, a manufacturer is liable to indemnify a supplier, who supplied the goods to a 
consumer, if the supplier is liable for damages under section 259(4) for loss or damage 
suffered by the consumer and the manufacturer is or would be liable (under section 
271) for damages to the consumer for the same loss or damage. The supplier may bring 
an action against the manufacturer for such legal or equitable relief as the supplier 
could have obtained if that liability had arisen under a contract of indemnity made 
between them. 
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 There appears to be general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions compared that 
responsibility ought to be apportionment between the plaintiff and defendants and 
between defendants inter se. All jurisdictions expressly make provision for 
apportionment of liability or the reduction of damages recoverable where the harm was 
caused both by a product defect and the contributory fault or conduct of the plaintiff. It is 
generally recognised by these jurisdictions that, in extreme cases, a plaintiff’s 
contributory responsibility may be so high that it amounts to a complete disallowance of 
the claim.  
 
(v) Prescription  
 The US Restatement (Third)939 contains no provisions regarding limitation periods for 
bringing a product liability claim. Statutes of limitations in each state govern the time 
limit for bringing product liability claims, which generally varies between two to six years. 
States also impose repose periods by way of statute, which vary from state to state. A 
repose period denotes the number of years that consumers can use a product during its 
useful life before bringing a court proceeding, following expiry of which manufacturers 
are immune from liability. 
 
 The EU Directive940 imposes a 3 year limitation period for bringing an action, which 
commences to run from the day “the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have 
become aware, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer.” The EU 
Directive does not affect member states’ laws regarding suspension or interruption of 
limitation periods. For instance, the UKCPA, which transposes the EU Directive, 
expressly refers to the UK Limitation of Actions Act and provides clarification as to the 
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relevant point in time that the limitation periods commence to run in product liability 
claims under the UKCPA. The EU Directive further imposes a ‘long-stop’ provision 
where all rights conferred on the injured person by the EU Directive are extinguished 
after a 10 year period from the date the producer put the actual product in question into 
circulation, unless the injured person has brought proceedings against the producer in 
the interim. The CJEU has held that this long-stop period should be interpreted as 
commencing from the point at which the product “leaves the production process 
operated by the producer and enters a marketing process in the form in which it is 
offered to the public in order to be used or consumed.” 
 
 The ACL941 expressly provides for a 3 year limitiation period for defective goods actions 
brought under Part 3-5 of the ACL commencing from the time the claimant becomes 
aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of the particular circumstances that 
give rise to the cause of action. The ACL further imposes a 10 year repose period, 
which provides that an action under this part cannot be brought more than 10 years 
after the supply of the goods by the manufacturer. In relation to personal injury claims in 
general under the CCA, including actions relating to Part 3-5 or Division 2 of Part 5-4 of 
the ACL, section 87F of the CCA defines the applicable limitation period as either the 
“date of discoverability” or the “long-stop period” being a period of 12 years from the 
date of the alleged act or omission, whichever is later.  
 
 Accordingly, there appears to be general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions 
compared that a long-stop period ought to be imposed for strict product liability claims. 
In the US, the relevant limitation periods and repose periods are governed by the 
various state laws. The EU Directive and ACL both impose a 3 year limitation period 
                                                          
941 3.4.1.7(v). 
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from the date the plaintiff became aware or should reasonably have become aware of 
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. Further, the EU Directive and ACL both 
impose a general long-stop period of 10 years from the date of supply of the product, 
with the ACL adopting a 12 year period in the case of personal injury claims. 
 
 (vi) Contractual restriction of liability 
 The US Restatement (Third) 942  provides that any contractual limitations, waivers, 
disclaimers or other exclusion clauses by sellers or distributors do not bar otherwise 
valid product liability claims against them for harm caused by new products. There is a 
presumption that the ordinary consumer lacks adequate information and bargaining 
power to agree to a fair contractual limitation of rights clause in a contract of sale. This 
does not prohibit parties within the supply chain from contracting among themselves 
with respect to indemnity.  
 
 
 The EU Directive943 provides that the liability of the producer, in relation to the injured 
person, may not be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his liability or exempting 
him from liability. Any contractual provision which has the effect of limiting or excluding 
the producer's liability would therefore be void and cannot be raised as a defence. 
 
 The ACL944 provides that any consumer guarantees implied by the ACL and any rights 
and remedies affored by the ACL cannot be excluded by way of a contractual restriction 
or exemption clause. The ACL provides that a person may be subject to prosecution 
under the Act for attempting to do so. Section 25 of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 simply lists examples of terms that may be unfair, for instance, a 
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term that limits or has the effect of limiting, one party's right to sue another party. In 
practice, manufacturers and suppliers in Australia would often include a clause in their 
contracts of sale whereby they exclude all implied warranties and liability, in so far as it 
is permitted by the ACL and other fair trade legislation. Such a clause may have the 
effect of excluding common law warranties and liability, however, the manufacturer or 
supplier would still be bound to comply with the ACL and may therefore still be liable 
under the ACL for supplying defective goods. 
 
 There appears to be general consensus among the jurisdictions that contractual clauses 
that have the effect of restricting or excluding the liability of suppliers of defective 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2008 
While the bulk of the Consumer Protection Act 2008 (‘CPA’) came into effect on 31 March 
2011, the strict product liability provisions under the CPA have been in operation since 24 
April 2010.945  
 
In the context of consumer goods, the CPA entrenches fundamental consumer rights and 
imposing duties on the supply chain to supply safe, good quality, defect-free goods. 
Further, section 61 of the CPA imposes strict product liability on the supply chain for harm 
caused by a deficiency in consumer goods. Section 61 enables a harmed consumer to 
recover compensation from the producer, importer, distributor or retailer without having to 
prove fault on the part of the defendant. The claimant need establish the existence of a 
product deficiency, which made the good unsafe or otherwise defective within the meaning 
of section 53, and that the harm was caused wholly or partly by this defect. 
 
This chapter analyses the key elements of the CPA’s strict product liability framework 
against the background of the American, European and Australian position discussed in 
Chapter 3. Where relevant, clarification is sought from foreign law to suggest an 
appropriate interpretation and to clear up potential legal uncertainty arising from the CPA’s 
provisions. In view of the almost complete lack of case law on the CPA, relevant principles, 
arguments or rules drawn from American, European and Australian law are referred to 
extensively for possible consideration by South African lawyers and courts grappling with 
                                                          
945  Schedule 2, Items 2(1) and (2) of the CPA state the following: 
"2(1) Chapters 1 and 5 of this Act, section 120 and any other provision authorising the Minister to make 
regulations, and this Schedule, take effect on the date that is one year after the date on which this Act 
was signed by the President" i.e. 24 April 2009;  
(2) Subject to sub item (3), and items 4 and 5, any provision of this Act not contemplated in sub item (1) 
takes effect on the date that is 18 months after the date on which the Act was signed by the President. 
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interpretation issues. Further, the scope of liability for damages arising from product 
defects under the CPA is compared with pre-existing common law remedies as well as 
with relevant American, European and Australian law.   
 
Throughout the analysis of the CPA in this chapter, the criteria for evaluating the efficacy 
of a strict product liability framework, as outlined above at 1.4.3 are applied, namely: 
 Does the framework achieve the underlying legislative purposes of the CPA including 
the promotion of consumer protection and consumer access to redress?  
 Does section 61 strike a fair balance between competing interests of consumers and 
the supply chain? 
 Does the framework provide adequate legal certainty to consumers, the supply chain 
and courts? 
 Does the framework provide adequate flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing 
consumer marketplace and technological advancements resulting in new products, new 
ways of transacting and increased access to information?    
 
4.1.1 Purpose and policy of the CPA 
The purpose of the CPA, as outlined in section 3, is to promote and advance the social 
and economic welfare of South African consumers by, inter alia: 
 establishing a legal framework for a "consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, 
sustainable and responsible for the benefit of consumers generally"; 
 reducing any disadvantages in accessing the supply of goods or services experienced 
by consumers 
o who are low-income persons or who comprise low-income communities; 
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o who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas; 
o who are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable consumers; or 
o whose ability to read and comprehend any advertisement, agreement, mark, 
instruction, label, warning, notice or other visual representation is limited due to 
low literacy, vision impairment or limited fluency in the language in which the 
representation is made; 
 protecting consumers from trade practices that are unconscionable, unfair, 
unreasonable, unjust or improper and other deceptive, misleading, unfair or 
fraudulent conduct; 
 providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of consensual resolution of 
disputes arising from consumer transactions; and  
 "providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonized, effective and efficient system of 
redress for consumers." 
 
Van Eeden946 notes that the CPA appears to be particularly focused on the position of 
more vulnerable consumers and to reduce any disadvantages experienced by such 
consumers in accessing goods or services. Indeed, the Preamble to the CPA recognises 
the social and economic inequality in South Africa, such as high levels of poverty and 
illiteracy, and the need for a legal framework which promotes a culture of consumer rights 
and responsibilities, business innovation and which can deal with technological changes 
and new methods of trading.  
 
 It is argued that the CPA’s stated aim of establishing a legal framework for the 
achievement and maintenance of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, 
                                                          
946 Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 40. 
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sustainable and responsible, for the benefit of consumers generally is a principal purpose 
of the CPA which “supports and sustains the overall structure and other purposes of the 
Act.”947 It is important to note that, while the overall focus or purpose therefore appears to 
be “for the benefit of consumers generally”, the use of words such as “fair” and 
“sustainable” suggests that the CPA is also concerned with balancing the relevant 
interests of consumers and the supply chain to ensure that the consumer market is 
sustainable. Indeed, if industry becomes overregulated and burdened with excessive 
liability rules, the cost of producing goods may become so high that access to goods are 
reduced, which would not benefit “consumers generally”, particularly vulnerable 
consumers in a developing country such as South Africa.  
 
4.1.2 Interpretation of the CPA 
Section 2(1) provides that the CPA must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to its 
legislative purposes set out in section 3(1). This appears to suggest that the CPA’s 
provisions ought to be interpreted in accordance with the so-called purposive method of 
interpretation, as opposed to a strict literal or textual interpretation.948 However, De Stadler 
points out that, despite the CPA’s clear injunction to interpret its provisions purposively, 
any method of statutory interpretation other than a literal, plain reading of the words is not 
warranted where the language is clear and unambiguous.949 She argues that, in light of the 
legislative purposes in section 3(1), which are generally aimed at promoting the social and 
economic welfare of consumers in South Africa, any ambiguous provisions in the CPA 
                                                          
947 41. 
948 The main theories of statutory interpretation are discussed above at 1.1. 
949 Section 2 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 2-3 to 2-4. 
See also discussion of the purposive method of interpretation above at 1.1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 294 
would be interpreted in favour of the consumer, particularly vulnerable consumers referred 
to in section 3(1)(b).950 
 
Section 4(3) expressly endorses a purposive interpretation where a provision may have 
more than one meaning, as follows: 
“if any provision of this Act, read in its context, can reasonably be construed to 
have more than one meaning, the Tribunal or court must prefer the meaning that 
best promotes the spirit and purposes of this Act, and will best improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights generally, and in particular by 
persons contemplated in section 3(1).” 
 
It is questioned whether an interpretation that favours a consumer would always be in the 
interest of consumers generally. An interpretation that favours a particular consumer may 
create an unfavourable precedent for consumers in a broader sense.951 Van Eeden is in 
favour of a more balanced approach than that prescribed by section 4(3).952 He argues 
that the CPA’s purpose of establishing a legal framework, inter alia, for the achievement 
and maintenance of a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and 
responsible and for the benefit of consumers generally, 953  clearly contemplates a 
“balancing of rights and remedies that will be fair not only to suppliers and consumers, but 
that will also be efficient.”954  
 
Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the CPA provides that the National Consumer Tribunal and courts 
“must promote the spirit and purposes of the Act” in any matter before it “in terms of the 
                                                          
950 Section 2 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 2-4. 
951 De Stadler Section 4 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 4-
8. 
952 Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 39-40. 
953 Section 3(1)(a). 
954 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 40. 
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Act”. Van Eeden argues that the use of the word “spirit” is to indicate that the CPA should 
not be interpreted overly literally, rather the CPA should be interpreted in a manner that 
“facilitates the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights.”955 De Stadler argues that 
this section either suggests the purposes of the CPA should be considered even in 
circumstances where the ordinary meaning of the CPA’s wording is not ambiguous, or it is 
merely a repetition of the injunction to interpret the CPA purposively as stated in section 
2(1).956 If this provision means that courts can deviate from any clear wording of the CPA, 
it would be contrary to the established rules of statutory interpretation.957  
 
Section 2(2) provides that, when interpreting the CPA, a person, court or tribunal or the 
National Consumer Commission may consider appropriate foreign and international law, 
appropriate international conventions, declarations or protocols relating to consumer 
protection and decisions of a consumer court, ombud or arbitrator in terms of the CPA. It is 
argued that any reference to foreign law in the statutory interpretation process should be 
done cautiously, given that there are fundamental differences in legal traditions between 
jurisdictions and unique policy contexts have shaped legislative regimes in those 
jurisdictions. 958  Nevertheless, where ambiguities exist in the wording of the CPA’s 
provisions and a court is required to approach the interpretation in a broader, purposive 
manner, it may be useful to consider similar provisions in comparative foreign regimes for 
guidance as to the meaning of a provision or concept and any past judicial interpretations 
of those provisions by foreign courts, keeping in mind the legislative context of that foreign 
provision and the particular role played by courts in that jurisdiction in statutory 
interpretation and judicial law-making. Even if a South African court does not follow the 
                                                          
955 41. 
956 Section 4 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 4-7. 
957 Ibid.  
958 De Stadler Section 2 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) 2-5. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 296 
approach in a foreign regime, consideration of such foreign law and developments may 
assist South African courts in avoiding interpretations which could create undesired 
precedents or difficulties in the future. 
 
Section 2(10) provides that no provision of the CPA must be interpreted so as to preclude 
a consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law. 959  This 
indicates that the CPA is not intended to revoke or change the common law, but rather to 
co-exist with it. It is argued that section 2(10) should be considered in light of the 
interpretive presumption that the legislature does not intend to affect the existing common 
law, unless this is expressly stated to be the intention in the statute.960 According to Du 
Plessis, this presumption means that “legislation must…be interpreted in the light of the 
common law, must as far as possible be reconciled with related precepts of the common 
law and must be read to be capable of co-existing with the common law.”961  
 
In light of this interpretive presumption and in the interest of legal certainty, an 
interpretation of the CPA in a manner that remains as consistent as possible with the 
existing common law framework for product liability in South Africa is supported.962 
 
4.1.3 Duties and Liability of the Supply Chain  
The duty of the supply chain under the CPA can be seen as two-fold: on the one hand, 
suppliers of goods have a duty to supply safe, good quality goods by ensuring that goods 
                                                          
959 Section 2(10).  
960 De Stadler Section 4 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) 2-9.  
961 Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 178. 
962 See also, for instance: Loubser & Reid  ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A 
Comparative Critique’ (2006) Stell LR 17 at 417 where it is argued that introduction of a strict product 
liability framework should, in the interest of legal certainty, remain as consistent with the existing common 
law framework as possible. 
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comply with relevant safety standards and regulations and implementing adequate safety 
and quality control measures, while on the other hand, withdrawing defective goods from 
the market and compensating those who were harmed by defective goods. 
 
The CPA provides two distinct avenues of redress in circumstances where a defective 
good has been sold. First, the CPA provides remedies not aimed at damages where the 
goods sold do not meet certain requirements or standards prescribed by the CPA.963 
These requirements are discussed further below in this section. At common law, a 
claimant who has purchased defective goods would have to avail himself of the remedies 
under the law of sale, which are only available to claimants in a direct contractual 
relationship to the seller of the goods (privity of contract). 964 
 
Second, the CPA provides in section 61 a remedy aimed at damages where a person has 
suffered harm due to personal injury, property damage or consequential economic loss 
caused by defective, unsafe or hazardous goods or where inadequate warnings or 
instructions accompanied the goods. Under the common law of sale, sellers are not 
subject to such liability, save for circumstances where: 
 the seller breached an express/tacit warranty,  
 the seller made a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation regarding the quality of the 
goods; or  
 where the seller is also a manufacturer or merchant seller who publicly professed to 
have the attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to the kind of goods sold.965  
 
                                                          
963 Sections 20 and 56(1) read with section 55. 
964 These remedies are discussed in Chapter 2. 
965 De Stadler Section 55 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 
55-3. 
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With respect to the first category of remedies for defective goods not aimed at damages, it 
is necessary to briefly discuss the requirements or standards prescribed by the CPA for 
goods. The CPA imposes on the supply chain a duty to supply ‘safe and good quality 
goods’.966 Pursuant to section 56(1), the producer, importer, distributor and retailer each 
warrant that goods comply with four general standards or requirements set out in section 
55. Pursuant to section 55(2), consumers have a right to receive goods that:  
(a) “are reasonably suitable for the purpose for which they are generally intended; 
(b) are of good quality, in good working order and free of any defects; 
(c) will be useable and durable for a reasonable period of time, having regard to 
the use to which they would normally be put and to all the surrounding 
circumstances of their supply; and  
(d) comply with any relevant standards set under the Standards Act, 1993 (Act 29 
of 1993), or any other public regulation.” 
 
Further, section 55(3) provides that, if a consumer specifically informed the supplier of the 
purpose or use for which the consumer intends to acquire the goods, and the supplier 
ordinarily supplies such goods or acts in a way which is consistent with being 
knowledgeable about the use of those goods, the consumer is entitled to receive goods 
are reasonably suitable for the specific purpose that the consumer had disclosed.   
 
In determining whether goods satisfy the requirements of section 55(2) or (3), courts must 
consider all of the circumstances of the supply of the goods, including but not limited to: 
a) “the manner in which, and the purposes for which, the goods were marketed, 
packaged and displayed, the use of any trade description or mark, any 
instructions for, or warnings with respect to the use of those goods; 
                                                          
966 Section 55. 
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b) the range of things that might reasonably be anticipated to be done with or in 
relation to the goods; and  
c) the time when the goods were produced or supplied.”967  
 
For purposes of this test, it is irrelevant whether a product failure or defect was latent or 
patent or whether it could have been detected by a consumer before taking delivery of the 
goods.968 Further, a product failure or defect may not be inferred in respect of particular 
goods solely on the grounds that better goods have subsequently become available from 
the same or any other producer or supplier.969  
 
The standards or requirements in section 55(2)(a) and (b) do not apply in circumstances 
where the consumer was expressly informed that the goods were offered in a specific 
condition, and the consumer expressly agreed to accept the goods in that condition, or 
knowingly acted in a manner consistent with accepting the goods in that condition.970  
 
The implied warranty as to safe, good quality goods applies only to the extent that the 
goods have not been altered contrary to product instructions or after leaving the control of 
the relevant supplier.971 By comparison, the Australian position under the ACL is that 
goods do not fail to be of acceptable quality if the consumer causes them to become of 
unacceptable quality or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent them from becoming of 
unacceptable quality and they are damaged by abnormal use.972 The limitation of the 
equivalent warranty under the CPA only refers to scenarios where products are ‘altered’ by 
consumers and appears to be a narrower limitation of the warranty. However, the words 
                                                          
967 Section 55(4). 
968 Section 55(5)(a).  
969 Section 55(5)(b). 
970 Section 55(6). 
971 Section 56(1).  
972 Section 54(3) and discussion at 3.4.1.6 above. 
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“altered contrary to product instructions” could potentially be interpreted to include any 
misuse by consumers which reduces or “alters” the safety or quality of the goods.    
 
The standards in section 55 do not apply to goods bought at auction. While section 56 
does not expressly exclude goods bought at auction, it is argued that, because section 56 
only applies to goods which do not meet the standards contained in section 55, the 
remedies in section 56 would not be available in respect of goods purchased on auction.973 
Given the exclusion of auctions from section 55, an advisory note of the South African 
Consumer Goods and Services Ombud (‘CGSO’) advises consumers who purchase at 
auctions to inspect goods beforehand, preferably with the assistance of an expert.974  
 
Further, the CGSO advises that section 61 liability for defective goods does not expressly 
exclude goods sold by way of auction, which creates an ‘anomalous’ situation in that a 
seller by auction may be excluded from liability for breaching section 55, but cannot 
escape liability under section 61.975 However, the CGSO advises that the seller by auction 
may be able to rely on the defence in section 61(4)(c) if it was unreasonable to expect the 
seller to have identified the unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, in light 
of that seller's role in marketing the goods.976  
 
The exclusion of auction sales from the standards in section 55 and, arguably by 
implication section 56, is consistent with the Australian position under the ACL, which 
excludes sales by auction from the implied consumer guarantees as to acceptable quality 
                                                          
973 De Stadler Section 55 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 
55-3. 
974 http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Advisory-Note-16-Auctions.pdf?87ab66 at 3. 
975 Ibid. 
976 Ibid. 
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and fitness for purpose.977  Further, similarly to the view held by Australian consumer 
protection bodies,978 consumer transactions via online auction sites in South Africa may be 
subject to section 55 of the CPA in circumstances where the online auctioneer, such as 
eBay, does not act as an agent of the vendor in the traditional auction sense but merely 
provides an online platform for vendors and buyers to communicate.979   
 
Where goods fail to meet the standards or requirements set out in section 55, the 
consumer may, within six months after delivery, return the goods to the supplier without 
penalty and at the supplier's risk and expense. 980  Further, the supplier must, at the 
direction of the consumer, either repair or replace the failed, unsafe or defective goods or 
refund the price paid by the consumer. If the supplier repairs goods or any component in 
the goods and within three months after repair, the failure, defect or unsafe feature has not 
been remedied, the supplier must replace the goods or refund to the price paid by the 
consumer.981 
 
Under the CPA, the consumer is not required to prove that the goods were defective at the 
time of conclusion of the contract, rather at the time the consumer receives the goods.982 
This is a departure from the common law position, where a buyer bringing an aedilitian 
                                                          
977 3.4.3 (i) supra. 
978 3.4.3 (i), particularly the view of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (footnote 378). 
979 It should be noted that online auctions are subject to the general rules governing electronic transactions 
in South Africa contained in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (‘ECTA’). 
Pursuant to section 2(9)(a) of the CPA, the provisions of the CPA and ECTA would apply concurrently to 
online auctions to the extent that it is possible without contravening either act. See: Consumer Goods & 
Services Ombud ‘Advisory Note 16: Auctions’ at 1. 
980 Section 56(2).  
981 Section 56(3).  
982 De Stadler Section 55 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 55-
5. 
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action must show that the goods were defective at the time of conclusion of the contract of 
sale.983  
 
The remedies provided by the CPA for failure of goods to meet the requirements set out in 
section 55(2) are distinct from the remedy provided under section 61. As Naudé correctly 
points out, strict liability for harm arising from a product defect under section 61 is not 
dependent upon proof that the requirements of section 55(2) were not met.984 Further, 
these remedies are aimed at different types of redress (i.e. not damages) as outlined 
above. While the CPA's wording and structure do not, on the face of it, indicate a link 
between the requirements of section 55(2) and section 61 liability, it is argued that there is 
an inevitable conceptual overlap or interrelationship between the section 55(2) standards 
and the various concepts of product defectiveness for purposes of section 61, as defined 
in section 53. For instance, goods that are not ‘free of defects' within the meaning of 
section 55(2)(b) may simultaneously be ‘unsafe' or contain a ‘defect' or ‘hazard' for 
purposes of section 61, and vice versa. Therefore, the section 55(2) requirements and the 
non-exhaustive list of factors in section 55(4) for assessing whether these requirements 
are met, may provide South African Courts with some guidance in determining whether 
goods have a ‘defect', ‘failure', ‘hazard' or an ‘unsafe' characteristic for purposes of section 
61.   
 
By way of comparison with the Australian jurisdiction, there appears to be a similar 
interrelationship between the consumer guarantee as to ‘acceptable quality’985 and the 
                                                          
983 Naudé ‘The consumer’s right to safe, good quality goods and the implied warranty of quality under sections 
55 and 56 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2011) SA Merc LJ at 339. 
984 345. 
985 Section 54 ACL. 
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defectiveness standard for purposes of manufacturer’s strict liability under the ACL.986 The 
guarantee of ‘acceptable quality’ requires, inter alia, that goods be ‘free from defects’ and 
‘safe’. It is arguable that goods which are not ‘free from defects’ and not ‘safe’, in breach of 
the implied consumer guarantees, could simultaneously qualify as goods with a ‘safety 
defect’ for purposes of manufacturer’s strict liability under the ACL.987 This interrelationship 
between breach of consumer guarantees and manufacturer’s liability for goods with a 
‘safety defect’, despite not being expressly stated in the ACL, is reflected in Australian 
legal practice, as discussed in the Case Study below.988 In brief, the plaintiffs brought 
actions for damages under the ACL against a manufacturer and supplier for supplying 
goods containing a ‘safety defect’ and alternatively, goods that breached the consumer 
guarantees as to acceptable quality and fitness for purpose, as well as claims in 
negligence and breach of contract. Where the pleadings alleged that the goods contained 
a ‘safety defect’ for purposes of manufacturer’s strict liability under the ACL, the particulars 
pleaded of that ‘safety defect’ included allegations that the goods supplied were not of 
acceptable quality or reasonably fit for purpose, in breach of the implied consumer 
guarantees under the ACL.  
 
In practice, South African lawyers may similarly seek to particularise the concepts of 
‘defect’, ‘hazard’, ‘failure’ or ‘unsafe’ characteristic for purposes of a section 61 action by 
pleading, inter alia, that the goods failed to comply with the requirements of section 55(2), 
having regard to the manner in which they were marketed, packaged or displayed, any 
instructions or warnings accompanying the goods or the reasonably anticipated uses of 
                                                          
986 Section 138 ACL. 
987 Section 138 ACL. 
988 4.5.3(i). 
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the goods. Any non-compliance of goods with the requirements in section 55(2) may 
support or reinforce the allegation of ‘defectiveness’ for purposes of section 61. 
 
The CPA further imposes a duty on the supply chain to warn consumers of hazards arising 
from, or associated with, the use of goods. This duty arises from the fact that a supplier will 
be liable pursuant to section 61(1)(c) for supplying a good with inadequate warnings of a 
‘hazard' associated with that good. A ‘hazard' is defined in section 53 as a characteristic 
that has been identified as, or declared to be, a hazard in terms of any other law or that 
presents a 'significant risk' of personal injury or damage to property when utilising the 
goods.   
 
In the context of warnings accompanying goods, suppliers of goods have a duty to provide 
consumers with information in plain and understandable language.989 In particular, section 
22 provides that the producer of a notice, document or visual representation that is 
required in terms of the CPA or any other law to be produced, provided or displayed to a 
consumer, must do so in the form prescribed by the CPA or any other legislation, and if no 
form has been prescribed, then in ‘plain language’.990 
 
Section 58(2) provides that a person who packages any hazardous or unsafe consumer 
goods must display on or within that packaging a notice that complies with the 
requirements of section 22 and any other applicable standards and provides the consumer 
                                                          
989 Section 22.  
990 According to section 22(2), ‘plain language’ is language that enables an ordinary consumer (of the class 
of persons for whom a notice, document or visual representation is intended), with average literacy skills 
and minimal experience as s consumer of the relevant goods or services, to understand the content, 
significance and import of a document, notice or visual representation without undue effort, having regard 
to a number of listed factors. For a discussion regarding the meaning of section 22, see Stoop Section 22 
in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 22-1 to 22-11. 
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with adequate instructions for the safe handling and use of those goods. 991  Various 
labelling regulations exist for particular categories of goods, for instance, label regulations 
published under the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act. 992  In addition, 
regulations 6 and 7 of the CPA regulations provide labelling guidelines for textiles, 
clothing, shoes, leather goods and genetically modified organisms. 
 
Further, a person who installs any hazardous or unsafe goods contemplated in section 
58(2), or supplies any such goods in conjunction with the performance of any services, 
must provide the consumer with the original copy of any document required in terms of 
section 58(2) or any similar document applied to those goods in terms of another public 
regulation.993 
 
As contended earlier in this section with respect to the relationship between sections 55 
and 61, the duties imposed on the supply chain by sections 22 and 58(2) and regulations 6 
and 7 regarding product information and packaging, may provide guidance to South 
African courts in assessing whether goods were accompanied by an inadequate warning 
of a hazard for purposes of an action for damages pursuant to 61(1)(c). Further, a claim 
under section 61(1)(c) may, in appropriate circumstances, be supported in pleadings by 
particularising breaches of sections 22, 58(2) or regulations 6 and 7. 
 
 
                                                          
991 Section 58(2). See discussion below at 4.2.6.1(v) in the context of inadequate warnings or instructions. 
See also discussion below at 4.3.1 of a consumer complaint considered by the Consumer Goods and 
Services Ombud: (20131220550) [2014[ ZACGSO (29 April 2014), regarding the adequacy of product 
instructions and warnings accompanying a tub of drain cleaner (caustic soda) in light of section 22 of the 
CPA. See at http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Compendium-of-
cases_30_OCT_2015.pdf?87ab66 at 83. 
992 Act 54 of 1972. The regulations were published in Government Gazette 146 GN 32975, 1 March 2010.  
993 Section 58(4)(a) and (b).  
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4.2. SECTION 61: LIABILITY FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE GOODS  
Against the backdrop of the duties imposed on the supply chain by the CPA, the two 
distinct avenues for redress provided by the CPA where defective goods are sold, (one 
aimed at damages, the other not) and the potential conceptual interrelationships between 
the CPA’s provisions for these avenues for redress and the duties imposed on the supply 
chain, this chapter now turns to a critical, comparative analysis of the legislative framework 
for the remedy aimed at damages under section 61 of the CPA. 
  
4.2.1 Parties Liable  
Section 61(1) of the CPA imposes liability on the producer or importer, distributor or 
retailer for harm arising from deficient goods irrespective of whether these suppliers 
operated ‘on a for profit basis or otherwise’ and whether they were required or licenced by 
statute to provide goods or services.994  
 
Section 61 does not expressly restrict liability to traders operating on a commercial basis. 
However, pursuant to section 1 the term ‘supply’ in the context of goods includes “sell, 
rent, exchange and hire in the ordinary course of business for consideration.” Further, the 
respective definitions of a producer, distributor, retailer and importer in section 1 all involve 
the concept of supplying goods in the ordinary course of business.995 This would exclude, 
for instance, individuals selling second-hand goods privately and not in the course of 
business.  
 
                                                          
994 Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-3.  
995  Ibid. 
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Section 5(5) provides that “if any goods are supplied…to any person in terms of a 
transaction that is exempt from the application of this Act, those goods and the importer or 
producer, distributor and retailer of those goods, respectively, are nevertheless subject to 
sections 60 and 61.” This creates a situation where a seller in a private, once-off sale 
would be exempt from liability under Section 61, but not the producer, importer, distributor 
or retailer, who had supplied the goods in the ordinary course of business prior to that 
private once-off sale.996 De Stadler argues that section 5(5) indicates a retailer (as buyer) 
would have a claim against the distributor (as seller) or the producer and distributor (as 
buyer) against the producer, noting that section 61 liability arises in relation to the entire 
supply chain and is joint and several.997 She points out that section 5(5) may also have the 
(potentially unintended) effect of protecting retailers and distributors who would otherwise 
be liable to the ultimate user of the product, as it makes section 61 applicable to the supply 
transactions between the retailer and producer, or between the distributor and producer.998 
This legal uncertainty could arguably have been avoided if the CPA had expressly 
provided for a right of recourse to retailers and distributors against the producer and the 
circumstances where this would be available.999  
 
By comparison,1000 the ACL imposes strict liability for harm arising from defective goods on 
both ‘manufacturers’ and ‘suppliers’ under various provisions, whereas the EU Directive 
imposes strict liability on a ‘producer’ which includes importers of products into the EU. 
The US Restatement (Third) imposes liability on “one who is engaged in the business of 
selling or otherwise distributing products.” The scope of potential defendants under the 
                                                          
996 Ibid. 
997 De Stadler Section 5 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 5-
40A. 
998 5-40A. 
999 See also discussion below at 4.2.7.4 regarding apportionment of liability. 
1000 3.5.1. 
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CPA therefore appears generally consistent with the Australian and American position. 
The EU Directive’s scope of potential defendants is narrower than the CPA in that its 
definition of ‘producer’ does not include distributors or retailers outright. However, 
distributors or retailers may be held liable under the EU Directive if they are unable to 
identify their own supplier upon request by the plaintiff. No such barrier exists in bringing a 
section 61 claim against a non-manufacturing supplier under the CPA, which arguably 
assists plaintiffs, particularly vulnerable plaintiffs, by not requiring them to first attempt to 
ascertain the identity of the producer. Plaintiffs can simply bring section 61 claims directly 
agains the retailer or another commercial distributor of the product.   
 
A “producer” is defined by section 1 of the CPA as a person who: 
(a) “grows, nurtures, harvests, mines, generates, refines, creates, manufactures 
or otherwise produces the goods within the Republic, or causes any of those 
things to be done, with the intention of making them available for supply in the 
ordinary course of business"; or 
(b) by applying a personal or business name, trade mark, trade description or 
other visual representation to the goods, has created or established a 
reasonable expectation that the person is a person contemplated in paragraph 
(a).”1001  
 
The content of the CPA’s definition of ‘producer’ is very similar to section 7(1)(a)-(d) of the 
definition of ‘manufacturer’ contained in the ACL.1002 However, the ACL includes the word 
‘assembles’, which would cover scenarios where a manufacturer assembles components 
acquired from other suppliers or manufacturers. The reference in the CPA’s definition of 
‘producer’ to “otherwise produces the goods” appears to be a type of catch-all phrase 
                                                          
1001 Section 1 CPA. 
1002 3.4.1.1. 
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which is arguably broad enough, based on the plain meaning of the words, to include 
assembly of components. In any event, it would seem contrary to the spirit and purpose of 
the CPA of protecting consumers against harmful products to exclude assemblers of 
components from strict liability. It is not apparent what justification there could be for 
arbitrarily excluding from liability assemblers of components. While it would have been 
preferable to expressly include ‘assemble’ in the definition of ‘producer’ under the CPA, as 
done by the ACL, the plain wording of the CPA’s definition of ‘producer’ appears to be 
broad enough to include producers who assembled components.  
 
A further difference between the CPA and ACL‘s definitions of ‘producer’ relates to the 
inclusion of importers of goods in the ACL's definition of ‘manufacturer' in circumstances 
where the manufacturer did not have a place of business within Australia at the time of 
importation. 1003  By comparison, section 61 of the CPA directly imposes liability on 
‘importers’, which is defined separately in the CPA, regardless of whether the producer of 
the goods had a place of business in South Africa. An importer of defective goods in South 
Africa is therefore more exposed than an importer in Australia, in that it cannot escape 
strict liability as a ‘producer’ by identifying a South African place of business of an 
overseas producer. The CPA’s position arguably provides greater protection to South 
African consumers in that it creates a stronger safety incentive for importers, faced with 
the risk of strict liability, to ensure they import products from reputable overseas producers.  
 
A 'distributor' means a person who, in the ordinary course of business is supplied with 
those goods by a producer, importer or other distributor, and in turn, supplies those goods 
                                                          
1003  Ibid. 
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to either another distributor or to a retailer. 1004  The imposition of strict liability on 
distributors makes the CPA’s scope of defendants broader than the scope of defendants to 
damages claims for defective products under the ACL. In particular, the ACL only provides 
a remedy to a ‘consumer’ to claim damages against a ‘supplier’ where the latter supplied 
the goods to the ‘consumer’.1005 The only other way an Australian distributor could be 
subject to a damages claim under the ACL would be if it fails to provide details of the 
manufacturer of the goods to the plaintiff within a prescribed time, in which case the 
distributor would be a deemed manufacturer under the ACL.1006 The US Restatement 
(Third) 1007 expressly imposes liability on all distributors in that it refers to persons who 
engage in the business of ‘distributing’ products and is therefore seemingly in line with the 
CPA position. As noted above, distributors are not directly liable under the EU Directive, 
but may be if they are unable to identify their own supplier upon request by the plaintiff.1008 
 
An 'importer' means a person who brings goods, or causes them to be brought, from 
outside the Republic into the Republic, with the intention of making them available for 
supply in the ordinary course of business. 1009  As noted above, the ACL only deems 
importers to be manufacturers in circumstances where the manufacturer did not have a 
place of business in Australia at the time of the importation.1010  The implication of the 
CPA's wording is that an importer would be liable under section 61 irrespective of whether 
the manufacturer had a place of business in South Africa at the time of importation.   
 
                                                          
1004  Section 1 CPA. 
1005  3.4.1.1. 
1006  3.4.3(ii). 
1007  3.2.1.1 
1008  3.3.1.1. 
1009 Section 1 CPA. 
1010 3.4.1.1. 
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A 'retailer' is defined as a person who, in the ordinary course of business, supplies goods 
to a consumer.1011 Imposition of section 61 liability on retailers appears consistent with the 
US position in that the Restatement (Third) which imposes liability on anyone who is 
engaged in the business of ‘selling goods’.1012 It also appears consistent with the ACL 
which imposes liability on ‘suppliers’, albeit under a different section than the action 
against ‘manufacturers’.1013 The EU position differs from the CPA in that the EU Directive 
restricts liability to producers and importers, and only in some instances, other 
suppliers.1014 
 
Section 61-liability is joint and several and is imposed on all parties who participate in the 
retail process, from the producer to the retailer.1015 Joint and several liability of the supply 
chain arguably serves the underlying purpose of the CPA by ensuring that a consumer has 
access to adequate redress, particularly in circumstances where the consumer has 
difficulty locating or identifying the manufacturer of the goods. The consumer may be able 
to recover 100% of damages against the retailer who directly supplied the goods without 
the need to identify the producer. At common law, two or more defendants to an Aquilian 
action, or concurrent wrongdoers, are also jointly and severally liable.1016  
 
                                                          




1015 Section 61(3).  
1016 2.3.1. 
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The scope of potential defendants in a section 61 claim is significantly broader than a 
common law contractual claim for damages, which would be limited to the party with whom 
a consumer-plaintiff had contracted for the supply of the good (privity of contract).1017  
 
The scope of potential defendants under section 61 is also broader than a common law 
delictual claim for damages. The Aquilian action can theoretically be brought against the 
actual manufacturer of the defective good, provided this party can be identified, and 
possibly a subsequent supplier(s) such as a distributor or retailer, provided the plaintiff can 
establish that this party owed a duty of care to the plaintiff with respect to the supply of the 
good. For example, where a non-manufacturing supplier does not have the opportunity to 
open packaged or sealed products and inspect them for defects before supplying them to 
a consumer, a plaintiff may have difficulty establishing that that supplier owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff to do so. Even if products can be inspected, where a supplier is a 
general retailer of a broad range of products and does not possess the expertise to identify 
defects in complex products, it is doubtful that a plaintiff could establish a duty of care 
owed by that retailer. In contrast, the section 61 action simply requires that the defendant 
meets the definition of either ‘producer’, ‘importer’, ‘distributor’ or ‘retailer’ in respect of the 
goods within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, even where the plaintiff cannot identify 
the actual producer of the good, he or she may be able to identify a number of other 
parties in the supply chain against whom the section 61 action can be brought. 
 
4.2.2 Potential Claimants  
The wording of section 61 is ambiguous as to whether it provides a remedy to a 
‘consumer’ as defined in the CPA or whether the remedy extends to persons other than a 
                                                          
1017 2.2.  
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‘consumer’, such as bystanders or other product users. The reason for this is that sections 
61(1)(c) and 61(2) make reference to “the consumer”, whereas sections 61(5)(a)-(b) refer 
to death or illness of, or injury to “any natural person”. 
 
The definition of “consumer” contained in section 1 includes: 
(a) a person to whom goods or services are "marketed in the ordinary course of 
the supplier's business;"  
(b) "a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary 
course of the supplier's business, unless the transaction is exempt from the 
application of the Act by section 5(2) or in terms of section 5(3);"  
(c) "if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods or a 
recipient or beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of whether that 
user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction concerning the 
supply of those particular goods or services; 
(d) ..." 
 
If it is assumed that section 61’s references to “any natural person” were meant to be 
references to “consumer” as defined it is nevertheless unclear, based on the definition of 
“consumer” in section 1, whether a section 61-claimant is required to meet the description 
of a consumer to whom the goods were marketed or who has received the defective good 
pursuant to a transaction with the supplier, as noted in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the 
definition, or whether it will suffice that the claimant is a mere ‘user’ of the goods pursuant 
to paragraph (c). Van Eeden argues that section 61(1) liability would be a circumstance 
where the “context so requires or permits” that a user of a product would be included in the 
definition of “consumer”, pursuant to paragraph (c) of the definition of “consumer”.1018 This 
view is supported, as there appears to be no rational justification for excluding from the 
                                                          
1018 Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 44. 
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protection of section 61 those persons who are not “consumers” within the meaning of 
paragraphs (a) or (b) of the definition of “consumer.” Such an arbitrary limitation on the 
scope of potential claimants under section 61 would certainly not be in the interest of 
advancing the welfare of consumers generally, particularly vulnerable consumers, in South 
Africa.  
 
However, the exact scope of “user” of goods for purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition 
of “consumer” is not clear. For example, in the context of electricity, would this mean when 
a person who actively operates an electrical appliance or switches on a light in his or her 
house? Or would it also include a person who has the use of the electricity “forced” on him 
or her or inadvertently uses the electricity? For instance, an infant whose parent switches 
on an electrical lamp beside the infant’s bed. The infant is arguably making practical use of 
the bedside lamp but does not operate it. Further, if a person accidentally touches an 
electricity line, which by its nature is meant to be distributed or conducted along a tangible 
medium, thereby receiving the electricity in a sense, would that qualify as “using” the 
electricity? Arguably, coming into direct contact with a distribution line thereby suffering an 
electrical shock would not quality as making practical and effective use of the electricity. 
Another example is a client at a hair salon whose hair is being curled by a hairdresser with 
a curling iron. The client is not operating the electrical appliance, but nevertheless receives 
some benefit it.  
 
A further question raised by electricity is whether it could not also be a “service”. As noted 
above, a minority of US courts have held that electricity is not subject to product liability as 
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it is a service, not a product.1019 If we assume that electricity can also qualify as a “service” 
under the CPA, even though it is expressly included under the definition of “goods”, a 
person who is a “recipient or beneficiary” of that electricity would also qualify as a 
“consumer” under paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer”. This then raises the 
question whether a person who inadvertently comes into contact with an electricity line, 
thereby “receiving” the electricity, would be a “consumer” of the electricity.1020 However, on 
balance, the fact that electricity is expressly included under the definition of “goods” and 
the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions compared, electricity should be regarded 
as “goods” as opposed to a “service”. 
 
Section 5(1) of the CPA provides that the Act applies to: 
(a) “every transaction occurring within the Republic, unless it is exempted by 
subsection (2), or in terms of subsections (3) and (4); 
(b) the promotion of goods or services, or of the supply of goods or services, 
within the Republic unless - 
(i) those goods or services could not reasonably be the subject of a 
transaction to which this Act applies in terms of paragraph (1); or  
(ii) the promotion of the goods or services has been exempted pursuant to 
subsection (3) and (4); 
(c) goods or services that are supplied pursuant to a transaction to which this Act 
applies, regardless of whether any of those goods or services are offered or 
supplied in conjunction with, or separate from, other goods or services; and 
(d) goods supplied in terms of a transaction that is exempt from the application of 
this Act, but only to the extent provided in subsection (5).”  
 
                                                          
1019  3.2.1.3. 
1020  As was the case in the recent Halstead-Cleak cases in South Africa, discussed below at 4.5.2. 
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Section 5(2) lists transactions that are exempt from the CPA. These transactions include, 
inter alia, transactions where the State is the consumer or where the consumer is a juristic 
person with an asset value or annual turnover of more than R2 million.  
 
With respect to paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer”, being a person who has 
entered into a “transaction” with a supplier in the ordinary course of the supplier's 
business, the CPA defines “transaction” to mean: 
“(a) in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of business – 
(i) an agreement between or among that person and one or more other 
persons for the supply or potential supply of any goods or services in 
exchange for consideration; or 
(ii) the supply by that person of any goods to or at the direction of a consumer 
for consideration; 
(iii)  the performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any services for 
or at the direction of a consumer for consideration; or   
(b) an interaction contemplated in section 5(6), irrespective of whether it falls 
within paragraph (2).” 
 
“Consideration” is defined to mean “anything of value given and accepted in exchange for 
goods and services” and includes the following: 
“(a) money, property, a cheque or other negotiable instrument, a token, a ticket, 
electronic credit, credit, debit or electronic chip or similar object; 
(b) labour, barter or other goods or services; 
(c) loyalty credit or award, coupon or other right to assert a claim; or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 317 
(d) any other thing, undertaking promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of 
its apparent or intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly, 
or involves only the supplier an consumer or other parties in addition to the 
supplier and consumer; 
 
In other words, to receive goods as a “consumer” within the meaning of paragraph (b) of 
the definition of “consumer” pursuant to a “transaction”, the person must have provided 
something of value in exchange for the goods. This requirement for “consideration” 
pursuant to a “transaction” does not apply in the case of a “consumer” within the meaning 
of paragraph (a) or (c) of the definition of “consumer”.  
 
As noted above at 4.1.2, section 5(5) provides that, even where goods are supplied in 
terms of a transaction that is exempt from the CPA, those goods and the importer, 
producer, distributor and retailer of those goods are nevertheless subject to section 60 
(safety monitoring and recall) and strict liability under section 61. Section 5(1)(d) read with 
section 5(5), arguably highlights the importance placed by the legislature on access to 
redress for consumers harmed by product deficiencies and that they should nevertheless 
have the protection of section 61 even if they did not receive the goods pursuant to a 
“transaction” or as a “consumer” within the meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition of 
“consumer”.   
 
By comparison, the US Restatement (Third) imposes strict liability for harm to ‘persons or 
property’.1021  This wording does not appear to restrict the remedy to consumers in a 
contractual sense, but would include any person who suffers loss as a result of personal 
injury or property damage caused by a defective product. The EU Directive refers to 
                                                          
1021 3.2.1.2. 
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liability to an ‘injured person’ which arguably also provides a remedy to any person who 
suffers ‘injury’ or harm to his or her health or property, not just consumers.1022 The ACL 
restricts the scope of ‘consumers’ for purposes of claims against ‘suppliers’ under section 
272 of the ACL (breach of consumer guarantees) by means of either a monetary cap on 
the value of the goods acquired or by excluding goods that are not goods ‘of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.’ 1023  The 
requirement for goods to be of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption is applied broadly in Australian practice.1024 Actions against 
manufacturers under the ACL for harm caused by goods are available to either ‘an 
individual’, a ‘person’ who suffers loss because of injuries to an individual, (for instance, a 
dependant) or ‘an affected person in relation to the goods’. 1025  The wording of the 
provision relating to actions against manufacturers under the ACL arguably provides scope 
for claims to be brought by product users other than ‘consumers’ who acquired the goods, 
bystanders who are harmed by the use of defective goods or dependants of persons 
harmed by defective goods. The prevailing position in these foreign jurisdictions therefore 
appears to be that strict product liability actions are not only available to persons who are 
‘consumers' in a contractual sense, but rather any person or individual who suffers harm 
due to defective goods which were supplied commercially. 
 
In light of the consumer protectionist policy underlying the CPA, the ambiguity created by 
the wording of section 61 and the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions considered 
in this study, it is argued that section 61 should be interpreted as being available to all 
persons falling within paragraph (c) of the definition of “consumer” under CPA, in other 
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words, including users of goods. This position was recently confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak.1026 Again, as noted above, it 
is unclear exactly when a person would qualify as “using” goods. The SCA did not 
elaborate on this, merely noting that the Concise Oxford Dictionary1027 defines “utilise” as 
“make practical and effective use of.”1028 If a person accidentally touches an electricity line, 
which by its nature is meant to be distributed or conducted along a tangible medium, 
thereby receiving the electricity in a sense, would that qualify as “using” the electricity? 
Arguably, coming into direct contact with a distribution line thereby suffering an electrical 
shock would not qualify as making “practical and effective use” of the electricity and so the 
SCA may be correct on the facts in Halstead-Cleak. However, there are many other 
instances where it is unclear when a person would be considered as “using” electricity as 
discussed above in this section.  
 
Further, it has to be questioned whether electricity could not also be a “service”. As noted 
above, a minority of US courts have held that electricity is not subject to product liability as 
it is a service, not a product.1029 If we assume that electricity can also qualify as a “service” 
under the CPA, even though it is expressly included under the definition of “goods”, a 
person who is a “recipient or beneficiary” of that electricity would also qualify as a 
“consumer” under paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer”. This then raises the 
question whether a person who inadvertently comes into contact with an electricity line, as 
in the Halstead-Cleak scenario, thereby “receiving” the electricity, would be a “consumer” 
of the electricity.1030 However, on balance, the fact that electricity is expressly included 
                                                          
1026 ZASCA [2016] 150 at [15]. This case is discussed in detail below at 4.3.2. 
1027 (2011) 2 ed. 
1028 [24]. 
1029  3.2.1.3. 
1030  As was the case in the recent Halstead-Cleak cases in South Africa, discussed below at 4.5.2. 
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under the definition of “goods” and the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions 
compared, electricity should perhaps be regarded as “goods”. However, it is possible that 
electricity could be regarded as both a “good” and a “service” of supplying a good.   
 
The High Court and SCA in the recent Halstead-Cleak cases had divergent views to the 
scope of application of section 61, which is discussed in detail below at 4.5.2. At first 
instance, the High Court held that an injured person need not be a ‘consumer’ as defined 
in section 1 in order for section 61-liability to arise. The court relied, amongst other things, 
on the reference to ‘any natural person’ in section 61(5)(a) and (b) as opposed to 
‘consumer’ together with section 5(5) in support of its view and found that it would be 
“contrary to the spirit and purpose of the CPA” to exclude from the protection of section 61 
innocent third parties who are harmed by defective goods. The facts of this case 
concerned a plaintiff who sustained severe electrical injuries while riding his bicycle when 
came into contact with a low-hanging live power line spanning across a footpath.  
 
The SCA overturned the High Court’s decision. The SCA noted that the meaning of the 
definition of “consumer” in paragraph (c) of the definition indicates that a person who is a 
user of the goods may also qualify as a “consumer”. However, the SCA stressed the fact 
that there must be a “transaction to which a consumer is a party, or the goods are used by 
another person consequent on that transaction.” The SCA held that when one considers 
the legislative purposes of the CPA, as outlined in section 3, coupled with the definition of 
“consumer” and “transaction”, it is clear that the “whole tenor of the Act is to protect 
consumers.” With respect to section 61, the SCA noted its context within the CPA, namely 
that it falls within Chapter 2 dealing with “Fundamental Consumer Rights”, in particular, 
Part H which deals with the “right to fair value, good quality and safety” and that this 
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indicates “the harm envisaged in section 61 must be caused to a natural person mentioned 
in section 61(5)(a) in his or her capacity as a consumer. This is the only businesslike 
interpretation possible.”  
 
The SCA’s view that the goods must have been supplied pursuant to a  
“transaction” to which a “consumer” was a party appears to be consistent with the 
Australian Federal Court’s position in Cook v Pasminco Ltd.1031 In this case, the plaintiffs 
brought claims in negligence and nuisance, as well as under sections 75AD and 75AG of 
the former TPA (the equivalent of section 138 under the ACL) due to alleged injury to their 
health after being exposed to emissions of noxious fumes from the defendants’ industrial 
plants. For purposes of the TPA claims, the Federal Court had to consider, amongst other 
things, whether the fume emissions were ‘goods’, ‘manufactured’ by the defendants and 
‘supplied in trade or commerce’ within the meaning of the TPA and if so, whether those 
goods contained a ‘defect’. With respect to the claims under section 75AD and 75AG, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the emissions were ‘goods manufactured’ by the defendants and 
‘supplied’ by the defendants to the plaintiffs, that the goods had a ‘defect’, being a harmful 
impact on human health and damaging to safety of land, buildings or fixtures owned by the 
plaintiffs. The court firstly considered the concept ‘supply’, which was defined in section 
4(1) of the TPA as follows: 
“ ‘supply’ when used as a verb, includes: 
"(a) in relation to goods – supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, 
lease, hire or hire-purchase; and 
(b) in relation to services – provide, grant or confer…”   
 
                                                          
1031 [2000] FCA 677 (12 May 2000), discussed at 3.4.1.2. 
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The court held that a necessary element of the “supply” concept is that it is a “bilateral and 
consensual process” which is not the case here as the plaintiffs allege the toxic emissions 
were inflicted on them without their consent.1032 The court found that no evidence could 
establish that the emissions passed from the defendants as part of a “consensual 
transaction or dealing” and therefore, it could not be established that there was a “supply” 
for purposes of section 75AD and 75AG.1033  With respect to the requirement that the 
‘supply’ must have occurred ‘in trade or commerce’, the court held that this expression 
does not only refer to the supplier’s general commercial activities, rather the supply itself 
must form part of an activity or transaction which has a “trading or commercial 
character.”1034  
 
Of course, Cook v Pasminco must be understood in the particular context of the legislative 
provisions it applied. Nevertheless, it is useful to note that the Australian equivalent of 
section 61 of the CPA is only available in cases where the goods were supplied by way a 
commercial transaction or exchange and an individual was harmed by those goods. 
 
The position with respect to bystanders injured by defective goods is not so 
straightforward. On the face of it, the CPA’s definition of “consumer” does not appear to 
include bystanders who are harmed as a result of defective goods being used by another 
person (the consumer or user). However, upon closer consideration of paragraph (c) of the 
definition of “consumer”, there is some ambiguity, at least in the context of electricity as 
discussed above, as to when a person would be considered to “use” the electricity or when 
a person is simply receiving an inadvertent benefit from the electricity as a bystander. 
                                                          
1032 At [24].  
1033 At [27]. 
1034 [28] - [29]. 
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Further, the ordinary, literal meaning of “any natural person” in section 61(5) would appear 
broad enough to include “bystanders” harmed by product use, as opposed to the 
references to “consumer” elsewhere in section 61, and this further creates ambiguity which 
arguably warrants a purposive interpretation. The welfare of consumers generally would 
not necessarily be promoted by imposing strict liability for harm to bystanders caused by 
defective products. The imposition of strict product liability on any bystanders may open 
the floodgates of litigation and impose an excessively onerous burden on industry, thereby 
stifling innovation and resulting in reduced access to consumer goods. The CPA’s purpose 
of estabslishing a framework for a ‘sustainable’ consumer market would perhaps not be 
served by inclusion of bystanders. It may be that the legislature deemed it more 
appropriate for harm to bystanders to be governed by Aquilian liability, which requires the 
bystander to establish the product supplier owed a duty of care to him or her in the 
circumstances, which arguably provides more scope for a fair outcome than strict liability 
in this context. 
 
This argument is further supported if we consider, for example, the case of electricity of 
South Africa. There are millions of illegal connections to the Eskom grid. If a court held that 
Eskom was strictly liable to bystanders harmed by any defective wiring or low-hanging 
power lines arising from these illegal connections, Eskom would not be able to continue 
operating and provide a very essential product to vulnerable consumers. Further, a 
defence of contributory or comparative causation1035  against the bystander would not 
succeed here as the bystander is not the one who had established the illegal connection 
and did not choose to use electricity via an illegal connection, as was the case in Halstead-
                                                          
1035 4.2.7.4. 
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Cleak.1036 On the other hand, this defence would arguably be available against a section 
61 plaintiff who had created the illegal connection or who “used” the electricity through that 
illegal connection.  
 
It is worth noting that no reference was made to bystanders in the draft definition of 
“consumer” in the Consumer Protection Bill either. If it was the legislature’s intention to 
provide bystanders with the protection of section 61, arguably the definition of “consumer” 
would have expressly included bystanders.  
 
As stated above, the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions compared appears to be 
to protect any individual harmed by defective goods, which arguably includes bystanders. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the foreign jurisdictions compared are all 
developed countries, whereas in a developing country such as South Africa it may be too 
onerous on the supply chain and less beneficial to the welfare of consumers generally to 
impose strict product liability for harm to bystanders.  
 
In the interest of legal certainty, it would have been preferable for the legislature to refer 
consistently in section 61 to either “consumers” or “persons” harmed by goods and to 
specifically state whether bystanders harmed by defective goods are protected by section 
61. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently held in Eskom Holdings Limited v 
Halstead-Cleak.1037 that the reference to “natural person” in section 61(5) was merely to 
distinguish it from “person” or a “consumer” which may also include a juristic person.  
 
                                                          
1036 Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP) and Eskom Holdings Limited v 
Halstead-Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150 discussed below at 4.5.2. 
1037 ZASCA [2016] 150 at [15]. This case is discussed in detail below at 4.3.2. 
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In light of the wording of section 61 read with the definition of “consumer” in section 1 and 
the SCA’s decision in Halstead-Cleak, the position in South Africa appears to be that: 
 section 61 would be available to a product user who is harmed by a good that was 
subject of a “transaction” to which a “consumer” (not necessarily the user) is a party; 
 section 61 is not available to a bystander harmed by goods being used by a consumer 
or product user. 
 
The scope of potential claimants in a section 61 action is broader than a contractual claim 
for damages, which is limited to claimants who had entered into a contractual agreement 
with the defendant for supply of the goods in question (privity of contract). A section 61 
claimant need not have entered into a transaction with a supplier of defective goods. 
 
The scope of potential section 61-claimants appears broader and narrower to the scope of 
potential claimants in a delictual damages claim in different respects. Generally speaking, 
the scope of potential claimants under a section 61 claim is broader than the scope of 
claimants under a delictual claim on the basis that a section 61 claimant need not establish 
the supplier of the defective goods owed a duty of care to it. A section 61 claimant merely 
has to show that goods with a deficiency of some kind were supplied by the defendant in 
the ordinary course of business and the claimant was harmed by it. For instance, a product 
user may bring a section 61 claim and alternatively, a delcitual claim provided it can be 
shown the product user was owed a duty of care by the defendant in the circumstances.  
 
In other respects, the scope of potential claimants in a section 61 claim is narrower than 
the common law. A bystander does not appear to have a claim under section 61 as a 
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bystander does not meet the definition of “consumer”, whereas a claim in delict may arise 
if it can be shown that the supplier of the defective product owed a duty of care not to 
cause harm to the bystander, in other words, that the harm to that bystander was 
reasonably foreseeable by the supplier. If we take the example noted above of the millions 
of illegal connections to Eskom’s national electricity grid, it is possible that harm caused by 
illegal connections would be reasonably foreseeable by Eskom. 
 
4.2.3 Goods 
The CPA provides a very broad definition of “goods”, which include:  
 
(a) “anything marketed for human consumption; 
(b) any tangible object not otherwise contemplated in paragraph (a) including "any 
medium on which anything is or may be written or encoded; 
(c) any literature, music, photograph, motion picture, game, information, data, 
software, code or other intangible product written or encoded on any medium," 
or a license to use any such intangible product; 
(d) a legal interest in land or any other immovable property, other than an interest 
that falls within the definition of ‘service’ in this section; 
(e) gas, water and electricity.”1038        
 
The wording of this definition indicates that it is not intended to provide an exhaustive 
list. 1039  However, it is difficult to identify products that would not be covered by this 
extended definition.  
 
By comparison, the ACL similarly provides a non-exhaustive list of items that would qualify 
as ‘goods’ for purposes of the ACL.1040 Interestingly, the only items that are common to 
                                                          
1038  Section 1 CPA. See discussion of Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP) 
and Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150  below at 4.5.2. In this case, Eskom 
was held to be the ‘producer’ and ‘distributor’ of electricity within the meaning of the CPA.  
1039  De Stadler Section 5 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 
5-6. 
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both the CPA and the ACL’s respective definitions are: gas, electricity and software. The 
EU Directive’s definition of ‘product’ does not contain the word ‘include’ and appears to 
provide an exhaustive list of items or categories of items that would constitute a 
‘product’.1041 The EU Directive previously excluded all primary agricultural products and 
game, but included primary agricultural products which have undergone ‘initial processing’. 
Following an amendment in 1999, the EU Directive now applies to “all movables, even if 
incorporated into another movable or into an immovable.” By comparison, the CPA’s 
definition of ‘goods’ contains no express exclusion of any types of products and is broader 
than the EU Directive’s definition in that it also includes legal interests in immovable 
property. The US Restatement1042 contains a more general description of what constitutes 
a “product” without listing a number of items or categories that are included. The 
Restatement defines a ‘product’ as “tangible personal property distributed commercially for 
use or consumption.” Real property and electricity would only be products when the 
context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and use of 
tangible personal property.  
 
The CPA’s definition of “goods” expressly includes electricity, which is consistent with the 
prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions considered.1043 An interesting question is at 
what point in time does electricity becomes a “good” for purposes of product liability. In this 
regard, the majority of US courts have held that electricity would qualify as a product 
subject to strict product liability once it is distributed to the consumer through the meter.1044 
A number of US courts have held that high voltage electricity in distribution lines would not 
be subject to product liability as it has not yet been converted to a form for delivery to a 
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consumer. It is interesting to compare the American approach with the facts considered in 
the South African case of Halstead-Cleak1045 where a plaintiff was injured by high-voltage 
electricity from a low-hanging distribution power line. The majority of American courts 
would not consider the harm-causing electricity in this case to be a product for purposes of 
strict product liability as it was not, at the time of the harm-causing incident, in a form for 
delivery to a consumer. A minority of US courts have held that electricity is not subject to 
product liability as it is a service, not a product.1046 
      
The CPA’s definition of “goods” makes no reference to “component goods” which are later 
integrated into finished goods. However, section 53(1) defines the various types of product 
deficiencies referred to in section 61 and states that these deficiencies apply in respect of 
“any goods” and also “any component of any goods”. Therefore, it seems clear that 
defective component goods are also subject to section 61. By comparison, the definition of 
“goods” under the ACL1047 expressly includes “any component part of, or accessory to 
goods” with the effect that manufacturers of defective component goods are also strictly 
liable. The EU Directive’s definition of ‘product’ makes no reference to component 
products. 1048  However, the definition of ‘producer’ under the EU Directive includes a 
‘manufacturer of a component part’, thereby bringing component products within the scope 
of the EU Directive. Similarly, the US Restatement’s definition of ‘product’ does not refer to 
component products, but the Restatement specifically provides elsewhere for the liability of 
commercial sellers or distributors of product components. 1049  Accordingly, the CPA’s 
                                                          
1045  See discussion of Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP) and Eskom 
Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150  below at 4.3.2. 
1046  3.2.1.3. 
1047  3.4.1.3. 
1048  3.3.2. 
1049  3.2.2. 
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position regarding component goods is consistent with the foreign jurisdictions considered. 
   
The CPA departs from the EU Directive,1050 which has traditionally been considered to 
impose strict liability for defective ‘tangible’ goods, by including in its definition of ‘goods’ 
an open-ended category of intangible, informational or intellectual products. Information or 
data in itself, as obtained and distinguished from the physical medium on which it is 
written, qualifies as a ‘good' under the CPA. Examples would include any data or software 
loaded onto a CD, USB device or computer hard drives, such as support software, e-
books, films, music, online subscription databases, professional support programs such as 
accounting technical design programs or any other data purchased online in downloadable 
format. It would also include any software or applications loaded onto mobile phones or 
tablets and even ‘virtual items' such as purchases made within online games.  
  
  
By comparison, the ACL's definition of ‘goods' includes ‘computer software' but does not 
include the range of other intangible or informational goods as provided in paragraph (c) of 
the CPA's definition of ‘goods'. 1051  Computer software generally includes so-called 
‘application software', being programs that perform specific functions for users (e.g., 
Microsoft Excel or Word), and ‘system software', being operating systems for computers 
and programs that support application software (e.g., Windows or Linux). Using the 
example of a legal database, the program that ‘houses' the data and is used to access and 
search the data (so-called database management system) would be a software ‘good', 
however, the actual data contained in the legal database is not software. It is unclear 
whether the information itself contained on the database would be considered a ‘good'. 
                                                          
1050 3.3.1.3. 
1051 3.4.1.3. 
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The compilation of information on the database is arguably a product or ‘good' which is 
‘supplied’ to consumers by providing access to the database in exchange for a 
subscription fee.    
                                                                               
The US Restatement (Third)1052 defines ‘products’ as “tangible personal property” and 
makes no reference to intangible or informational goods. However, there is scope to read 
intangible, informational products into this definition of ‘products' given that it states ‘other 
items….are products when the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently 
analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property.’1053  
 
Importantly, this information category referred to in the CPA’s definition of “goods: may 
potentially also include the informational content of professional advice, for instance, 
engineering or architectural designs, supplied in electronic format to clients. If this is the 
case, harm caused by a ‘defect' in this professional advice would be subject to strict 
liability. Loubser & Reid point out that, if this was indeed the intention of the legislature, it 
constitutes a ‘radical departure from the common law (Aquilian) basis of professional 
liability.’1054   
    
If it was truly the South African legislature’s intention to impose strict liability on 
professional advisory service providers, this would arguably have been expressed in 
clearer terms in the CPA. An argument against a legislative intention to impose section 61-
liability for the informational content of professional advisory services is the fact that the 
                                                          
1052  3.2.1.3. 
1053  Ibid. 
1054  Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 82-83. 
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CPA expressly and separately regulates services in section 54.1055 Further, section 61(2) 
also suggests the CPA does not intend to impose strict liability on service providers, as it 
only imposes strict liability for defective products supplied in conjunction with those 
services. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the position regarding liability of professional 
service providers could be clarified in the CPA in the interest of legal certainty. For 
instance, the definition of ‘goods’ in section 1 could be amended so as to exclude any 
informational content of any professional advice or other intellectual content (such as 
technical designs or drawings) or section 61 could expressly state that it does not apply to 
any services.  
 
Further, it is possible that the open-ended concept of “information” may cover generally 
disseminated information or knowledge relied upon by an incalculable number of 
consumers or users who have not obtained the information in terms of a particular 
consumer transaction. For instance, incorrect information posted on an internet website 
has a nearly infinite global reach, and millions of people could potentially rely on this 
information to their detriment. The potentially wide-spread harm caused by defective 
information raises concerns of indeterminate liability.1056 For this reason, coupled with the 
policy consideration that the threat of strict liability could “inhibit the socially and 
economically desirable free dissemination of ideas and theories,” Loubser & Reid argue 
that liability should be limited by negligence in such cases.1057  
 
                                                          
1055  A discussion of section 54 is beyond the scope of this study. For a detailed discussion of this provision 
see: De Stadler Section 54 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 54-1 to 54-23. 
1056  Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ 
(2006) 3 Stell LR at 434. 
1057  Ibid. 
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This view is further supported on the basis that neither the EU Directive, nor the ACL nor 
the US Restatement specifically includes a range of intangible, intellectual or informational 
products in their definitions of ‘goods', which suggests that the CPA may be casting the net 
too wide in this respect.1058 As noted above, the US Restatement's definition of “product” is 
arguably broad enough to cover intangible, informational goods, however it is left to 
American courts to assess, on a case by case basis, whether such an item would fall 
under the definition of ‘products' having regard to the context of its distribution. This would 
have been a preferable approach to defining ‘goods’ under the CPA, as it would provide 
South African courts with the discretion to decide whether information supplied in a 
particular instance ought to be subject to section 61 liability given the context of its 
distribution.  
 
Alternatively, strict liability for defective informational goods could, as a minimum, be 
regulated more extensively by defining in clearer terms:     
  
 the types of informational goods covered by the intangible information category; 
 whether the supply of electronic information or advice provided as part of professional 
advisory services is included in the category of informational goods and how this would 
impact on existing industry-specific standards prescribed for professional service 
providers and established common law liability for professional negligence; 
 the extent of liability of the various parties involved in the supply of defective information 
having regard to their respective roles in relation to the information, for instance, 
authors, editors, software design engineers, website or system operators and the 
manufacturers of the physical media on which information is written.  
 
                                                          
1058 3.5.3. 
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The CPA’s definition of ‘goods’ makes no reference to “second-hand goods”. This is 
consistent with the position under the EU Directive1059 and the US Restatement.1060 By 
contrast, the ACL specifically includes second-hand goods in its definition of ‘goods’.1061 It 
would appear that the wording of the EU Directive and US Restatement’s respective 
definitions of ‘product’ is broad enough to read in ‘second-hand goods’. Likewise, it is 
arguable that the wording of paragraph (a) of CPA’s definition of “goods” is equally broad 
enough to read in ‘second-hand goods’, where such goods are marketed for human 
consumption and provided ‘consumption’ is read to mean consumption of goods in the 
economic sense. However, given that the plain meaning of paragraph (a) of “goods” is not 
ambiguous and simply does not refer to second-hand goods, it would seem that a 
deviation from this is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. Therefore, somewhat 
surprisingly, the High Court has held that the CPA applies to second-hand or “used 
goods”.1062 The CPA defines the term “used goods” in section 1, but this term is never 
used in the Act. De Stadler notes that this definition is presumably a remnant of an earlier 
draft of the CPA.1063 In Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors, this definition of 
“used goods” was used to argue that the CPA does not apply to used goods, which was 
rejected by the court. It is questioned whether this judgment is correct, given that the 
definition of “goods” does not raise any ambiguity which justifies a deviation from the plain 
meaning of its words. 
 
If we assume that the definition of “goods” does raise ambiguity as to whether second-
hand goods are included, thereby warranting a purposive interpretation, it is doubtful 
                                                          
1059  3.3.1.3. 
1060  3.2.1.3. 
1061  3.4.3(i) 
1062  Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors (unreported, case no 3878/2013, [2015] ZAECGHC 64 (19 
June 2015).  
1063  Section 5 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 5-6. 
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whether the underlying purpose of the CPA would favour a reading-in of “second-hand 
goods.” While it would extend the scope of protection to consumers where they are 
harmed by such goods, the counter argument to this is that over-regulation and imposition 
of strict liability for harm caused by such goods may reduce consumers’ access to such 
goods. In the unique context of South Africa with its high poverty levels and vulnerable 
consumers, it is doubtful whether imposition of strict liability for second-hand goods would 
promote the welfare of consumers generally.   
 
Section 61 does not exclude goods bought at auction. Accordingly, where goods bought at 
auction cause harm, the buyer may be able to bring a section 61 claim for damages 
against the supplier, but will not be able to rely on section 56(2) to claim repair, 
replacement or a refund.1064 By comparison, the ACL excludes goods bought at auction 
from the consumer guarantees as to acceptable quality and fitness for purpose, but not 
from the provisions relating to liability of a manufacturer for harm caused by defective 
goods.1065 Neither the US Restatement (Third)1066 nor the EU Directive1067 excludes goods 
bought at auction from strict liability for harm. The CPA is therefore consistent with foreign 
jurisdictions in this regard. The welfare of consumers generally would arguably not be best 
promoted by excluding from strict liability those suppliers who sell defective or harmful 
goods via auction.   
 
Pursuant to section 61(2), a supplier of services who, in conjunction with performing those 
services, applies, supplies, installs or provides access to goods, is deemed a supplier of 
                                                          
1064  De Stadler Section 55 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 
55-3. 
1065  3.4.1.3. 
1066  3.2.1.3. 
1067  3.3.1.3. 
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those goods for purposes of section 61 liability.1068 Examples would include healthcare 
professionals supplying or administering pharmaceuticals or installing medical devices 
while performing medical services, or an electrician who installs electrical components 
while repairing or modifying an electrical installation. As a result of this section, suppliers of 
professional services may be held to two different standards: a fault-based standard with 
respect to professional services rendered and strict liability for goods supplied in 
conjunction with the professional services.1069  
 
The scope of “goods” which may be the subject of a section 61-claim is arguably no 
broader than the scope of goods for purposes of a common law contractual or delictual 
claim for damages. However, this is subject to how broadly South African courts will 
interpret the broad categories or items listed in the CPA’s definition of ‘goods’. With 
respect to second-hand goods, the scope of goods under section 61 appears to be 
broader than the common law of delict. It has been held by a South African court that the 
CPA applies to “used goods”. On the other hand, a manufacturer may not owe a delictual 
duty of care to a plaintiff with respect to the safety of second-hand goods where those 
goods had passed through multiple previous owners.  
 
4.2.4 Causation  
Section 61(1) imposes liability for harm “caused wholly or partly as a consequence of” a 
product defect relating to goods. Once a defect is established, a consumer must prove a 
causal link between that defect and the harm suffered. At common law, causation 
                                                          
1068  Section 61(2). 
1069  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-8, citing Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 444. 
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generally involves a two-fold enquiry: factual and legal causation.1070 In the absence of 
further provisions regarding the evidentiary burden of parties to a section 61 action, courts 
are likely to follow the common law test for causation. This is consistent with the approach 
in the foreign strict product liability regimes compared, where the applicable test for 
causation is not expressly prescribed. 1071  Courts in these jurisdictions have therefore 
resorted to applying general principels of causation prevailing in their respective 
jurisdictions, generally involving a factual enquiry and a more normative, legal causation 
question.  
 
For purposes of factual causation, a plaintiff may experience evidentiary difficulties in 
circumstances where, for instance, the defective product has been ingested or destroyed 
or where the plaintiff suffered a non-traumatic injury such as developing a medical 
condition. This is often the case with pharmaceuticals or other substances intended for 
human ingestion. Complex expert evidence is often required regarding the likely cause of 
the medical condition, which places a heavy, and often costly, evidentiary burden on 
plaintiffs. Leading such expert evidence may ultimately not provide an answer to causation 
on a balance of probabilities, due to a myriad of physiological and environmental factors 
that may have played a role or increased the risk of the condition developing in the 
particular consumer. 1072  Stapleton 1073  notes that if environmental factors created a 
background risk for the condition to develop in any event and this does not differ much 
from the risk attributed by the product, a consumer may be unable to establish causation 
on a balance of probabilities.  
                                                          
1070 2.3.1(a)(iii).  
1071 3.5.4. 
1072 Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-7. 
1073 Product Liability (1994) 281. 
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A further example of cases where evidentiary difficulties arise is where defective goods, 
often electrical goods, are alleged to have caused a fire which destroyed property and the 
goods themselves. Unless forensic investigations following the fire can point, on balance 
of probabilities, to a product failure as the root cause or origin of the fire, it may be difficult 
to establish liability against the supplier or manufacturer. From the defendant's 
perspective, it may be equally difficult to defend such claims where the fire occurred years 
prior to commencement of the claim and the damaged property has been repaired or 
rebuilt in the interim. Without sufficient information regarding the product which is alleged 
to have caused the fire, such as serial numbers or other identifying features, it is difficult 
for manufacturers to trace the production of the goods in question, its service history and 
whether there was any prior notification of performance issues suggestive of a defect. 
 
Difficulty often arises in establishing factual causation where there are two or more 
competing, but independent potential causes of the harm and there is insufficient evidence 
to establish, on a balance of probabilities, which of those causes is the cause of the harm. 
The South African Constitutional Court has recently delivered a judgment regarding the 
appropriate test for factual causation in these scenarios in Lee v Minister of Correctional 
Services.1074 It is argued that, in essence, the majority judgment of the CC seems to 
support the so-called ‘material contribution to risk’ approach, recognised by some common 
law jurisdictions as a solution to the inadequacy of the ‘but-for’ test in ambiguous factual 
causation cases.1075 Generally speaking, a ‘material contribution to risk’ approach allows 
factual causation to be made out against a defendant where the plaintiff can show that a 
negligent act by that defendant, out of a number of negligent acts by multiple defendants 
                                                          
1074  2013 (2) SA 144 (CC), discussed in detail at 2.3.1.1(iii). 
1075  Veldsman ‘Factual causation: One size does not fit all’ (2013) De Rebus, where a discussion is provided 
of the application of this approach in the USA, the UK and Canada. 
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or other causes, materially increased the risk of injury, without proving actual ‘but-for’ 
causation. This approach is typically applied in cases where it is impossible to determine 
which defendant(s) or causes, out of a number of defendants or causes, were responsible 
for the harm.  
 
Based on the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Lee it appears that, in ambiguous factual 
causation cases where a plaintiff’s harm may plausibly have been caused by a defective 
product and another, unrelated negligent act or cause, a plaintiff may establish factual 
causation against the defective product supplier simply by showing the defective product 
had increased the risk of harm. However, the Constitutional Court does not make it clear 
whether the contribution to the risk of harm ought to have been a material or substantial 
increase in risk, or whether a minuscule increase in risk would be enough to establish 
factual causation in these cases. Judicial clarification would be welcomed in this regard. 
 
It is worth noting that a ‘material contribution to risk’ doctrine or approach has been applied 
in the US1076 as an alternative to the traditional ‘but for’ test for factual causation in product 
liability cases where there are competing theories of factual causation. However, these 
cases appear to be limited to claims involving asbestos-related diseases due to multiple 
exposures to different asbestos products and/or other non-tortious, 
atmospheric/environmental exposures to asbestos.  The reason for the exception in these 
cases is that medical science is currently not able to ascertain which asbestos fibre or 
fibres caused the asbestos-related disease, which usually develops many years after 
exposure. By comparison, in the UK 1077  a ‘material contribution to harm’ test and a 
‘material contribution to risk of harm’ test have been applied in numerous contexts 
                                                          
1076  3.2.1.4. 
1077  3.3.1.8(i). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 339 
including mesothelioma resulting from asbestos exposure, pneumoconiosis resulting from 
silica dust exposure, dermatitis due to brick dust exposure and in medical negligence 
cases. However, it appears that the material contribution to harm or risk of harm test for 
causation has not yet been applied in any reported product liability case law in the UK. 
Nevertheless, given the numerous instances where this test has been recognised in other 
contexts, it may only be a matter of time before it is extended, in appropriate cases, to 
product liability claims brought under the UKCPA or in negligence.  
 
It remains to be seen whether courts in South Africa would follow the Lee-judgment in 
section 61 claims where there are competing theories of factual causation for the plaintiff’s 
harm as opposed to harm caused by defective goods. Such an approach would arguably 
go a long way to assist plaintiffs in overcoming the inherent difficulties posed by the 
traditional ‘but-for’ test for plaintiffs in product liability cases, as is evident from product 
liability cases under the Aquilian action. 1078  
 
While the CPA does not expressly provide for this, it is argued that courts could allow for a 
presumption or inference of defectiveness, analogous to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine at 
common law, to assist plaintiffs in cases where harm was suffered due to a manufacturing 
defect and that harm was of a kind ordinarily occurring as a result of such a defect.1079 
With such an inference, the evidential burden would then shift to the manufacturer to 
provide an alternative explanation as to the cause of the accident or by establishing one of 
the statutory defences in section 61(4).1080  
 
                                                          
1078   2.3.1(iii). 
1079   Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at at 61-7.  
1080   Ibid. 
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An inference of defectiveness is consistent with the approach in foreign jurisdictions where 
strict product liability applies.1081  For instance, the US Restatement (Third) 1082 provides 
for an inference of defectiveness under the so-called ‘malfunction doctrine.’ This doctrine 
has a similar effect to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine by allowing courts to draw an inference 
of defectiveness when justified by the facts surrounding the harm-causing incident. The 
onus then shifts to the defendant to rebut that inference of defectiveness. The US 
experience indicates that the malfunction doctrine is most often applied in cases involving 
alleged manufacturing defects, but is occasionally applied in design defect cases.  
 
By comparison, the EU Directive simply provides that the onus is on the claimant to prove 
a defect and the causal link between the defect and harm suffered, with no reference to a 
res ipsa loquitur type doctrine.1083 Dutch courts have found that the evidentiary burden 
imposed on plaintiffs under the EU Directive is too heavy and therefore apply a similar 
doctrine to US courts’ malfunction doctrine.1084 If a plaintiff can show that he or she used a 
product normally and did not misuse it, there will be a factual presumption that a defect in 
the product caused the harm. Again, the burden would then shift to the manufacturer to 
establish the product was not defective.  
 
The GPLA1085 similarly provides for an inference of negligence to be drawn in cases where 
the plaintiff can show the damage was caused by an objective safety deficit of the product 
which existed at the time the product was put into commercial circulation, provided the 
                                                          
1081   At 61-6, citing, for example, the US case of Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co v Fresno 24 Cal 2nd 453, 
150 P 2d 436 CA 1944 and the Dutch case of Leebeek/Vrumona BGH 129, 353, NJW 1995, 2162. See 
also the discussion of this approach applied in the US at 3.2.1.4 and Germany at 3.3.1.8(ii) above. 
1082   3.2.1.4. 
1083  3.3.2. 
1084  3.3.1.4.  
1085  3.3.1.8(ii). 
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harm caused is of a kind that would ordinarily be caused by a product defect. If a product 
malfunctions in circumstances where it is expected that the product would not fail, a prima 
facie case of defectiveness is made out. The evidentiary burden is then shifted to the 
defendant who has to establish whether the product malfunction was due to a 
manufacturing or design defect. If there was a manufacturing defect, the defendant is 
strictly liable. If there was a design error, the evidentiary burden shifts back to the plaintiff 
who has to show the possibility of a safer, alternative design. 
 
The ACL 1086  does not provide for a similar inference to be drawn. The ACL merely 
provides that an inference that goods have a safety defect is not to be made by courts 
solely due to the fact that, after they were supplied by the manufacturer, safer goods of the 
same kind were supplied. The ACL also prohibits an inference of a safety defect to be 
drawn solely because the goods complied with a Commonwealth mandatory standard 
which was not the safest possible standard in light of the state of scientific or technical 
knowledge at the time the goods were supplied by the manufacturer. 
 
Alternatively, if South African courts were not inclined to apply a res ipsa loquitur type 
doctrine to assist section 61 plaintiffs, which they have yet to do in a product liability case 
under the Aquilian action1087 it may be necessary for the legislature to intervene here. It is 
suggested that the CPA could expressly provide for a presumption or inference of 
defectiveness for purposes of section 61-claims, like the so-called ‘malfunction doctrine’ 
contained in section 3 of the US Restatement (Third), which could perhaps be worded 
along the following lines: 
                                                          
1086 3.4.1.4. 
1087 2.3.1.1 (iii). 
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It may be inferred that the harm sustained by a person contemplated in section 
61(5)(a) or (b) was caused by a defect, hazard, failure or unsafe characteristic in 
goods existing at the time of supply of the goods by the producer or importer, 
distributor or retailer without proof of a specific defect, hazard, failure or unsafe 
characteristic when the incident that harmed that person, 
(a)  was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a defect, hazard, failure or 
unsafe characteristic of goods; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than a 
defect, hazard, failure or unsafe characteristic of the goods existing at the 
time of supply by the producer, importer, distributor or retailer. 
 
The difficulties arising from the EU Directive’s lack of guidance as to causation is 
illustrated by a series of recent UK judgments applying the UKCPA where differing views 
were expressed on the level of specificity required of a plaintiff with respect to proving 
defectiveness and causation.1088 The position appears to have been settled recently, at 
least in the UK, to the effect that a plaintiff is not required to “specify or identify with 
accuracy or precision the defect in the product. It is sufficient to prove the existence of a 
defect in broad or general terms,” for instance “a defect in the electrics of the Lexus (motor 
car).” If this position is to be followed by English courts in the future without qualification, it 
would arguably assist claimants substantially in establishing defectiveness as well as 
causation for purposes of a UKCPA claim.  
 
                                                          
1088 3.3.1.8(ii). 
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A factor that may be relevant to causation in a delictual product liability claim against a 
manufacturer is whether there was intermediate examination by a subsequent party in the 
supply chain after leaving the control of the manufacturer. For instance, if a packaged 
product leaves the premises of a manufacturer and the distributor or retailer opens the 
packaging before supplying it to a consumer, the manufacturer may seek to argue that 
there is a possibility of tampering with the product after leaving its control and before use 
by the plaintiff.  A manufacturer may also seek to argue that intermediate inspection was 
required by a distributor or retailer and that such an inspection was either not done or not 
adequately done, thereby failing to detect any flaws. This would of course be subject to the 
product having a flaw that is visually detectable and not a latent manufacturing defect.  
 
For purposes of strict liability under section 61, an argument by a producer that there was 
inadequate intermediate inspection by a distributor or retailer would arguably not absolve 
the producer from liability. However, it may provide the producer with scope to argue that 
the court ought to apportion responsibility for the harm in a way which reflects the failure 
by that distributor or retailer, pursuant to section 61(6)(c). 
 
In the case of design defects, the plaintiff would need to establish the defective character 
of the product and that this character was the cause of the alleged harm. In determining 
whether a design defect exists, relevant considerations may include the existence of a 
feasible alternative design, the risk presented by the product and the cost of reducing 
those risks having regard to price and utility of the product.1089 Causation may, therefore, 
involve establishing not only that the product was defective in design, but also that 
                                                          
1089  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-6. 
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implementation of a feasible alternative design would have significantly reduced the risk of 
harm.1090 
 
In the context of instructional or warning defects, the plaintiff would need to establish a 
causal link between the harm suffered and the lack of adequate instructions or warnings, 
which has rendered the product defective. This requires the plaintiff to prove: proper 
instructions or warnings could have been provided, the instructions or warning would have 
been observed by the consumer, and finally, that adherence to the instruction or warning 
would have prevented or reduced the risk of harm.1091 The second element of this enquiry 
is problematic in that consumer responses to instructions or warnings will inevitably vary.  
 
In order to determine the consumer’s hypothetical response and to balance the respective 
expectations of the manufacturer and the consumer, it is suggested that two rebuttable 
inferences may be drawn from the statutory wording1092: Firstly, where a warning is given, 
the seller may reasonably assume it will be read and heeded.1093 Secondly, if no warning 
has been provided, it may be assumed that a warning, had it been present, would have 
been read and heeded. Loubser & Reid point out that courts should apply these rebuttable 
presumptions having regard to the likely consumers of the product.1094 For instance, if a 
product contains instructions in complicated technical language and that product is 
                                                          
1090  Ibid.  
1091  At 61-6, citing Bowbeer, Lumish & Cohen ‘Warning! Failure to read this article may be hazardous to 
your failure to warn defence’ 2000 Wm Mitchell L Rev at 444.  
1092  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at At 61-7, citing Miller & Goldberg Product Liability 2 ed (2004) at 474 - 475. 
1093  This presumption is derived from comment (j) to Section 204A of the US Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
1094  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-7. 
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marketed in rural areas where literacy levels vary, these presumptions may be 
rebutted.1095 
 
Legal causation may play an important role in limiting section 61 liability, particularly in the 
context of pure economic loss arising from injury or property damage under section 61(5), 
which could be much greater than the physical effects of a product defect. 1096  Legal 
causation would require courts to make a value judgment to assess whether it is 
reasonable to impute harm to the defendant, having regard to the proximity between the 
wrongdoer’s conduct and the harm as well as policy considerations based on 
reasonableness, fairness and justice.1097   
 
In conclusion, the general principles of causation as developed in the common law of 
delict, are likely to be applied by South African courts in determining section 61-liability. 
The question of causation in the context of a section 61 claim has unfortunately not yet 
been subject to proper judicial consideration. In light of the prevailing practice in foreign 
jurisdictions where an inference of defectiveness is drawn in appropriate cases, South 
African courts may follow a similar approach and allow for an inference that goods 
contained a ‘defect’, ‘hazard’ or ‘unsafe’ characteristic, akin to the res ipsa loquitur rule at 
common law, where the circumstances of the harm-causing incident warrant this. 
However, as noted above, South African courts have been reluctant to apply this doctrine 
in delictual claims and has to date not applied the doctrine in a product liability case under 
the Aquilian action. It would certainly be in the spirit of protecting vulnerable consumers to 
                                                          
1095  Ibid. 
1096  61-8. 
1097  S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A) 40-41; International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 
(A); Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 (2) paras [38]-[41], [46]-[53], 
[68]-[74]. 
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allow for such a doctrine to assist plaintiffs in establishing factual causation where the facts 
surrounding the harm-causing incident justify it. The onus would then shift to the defendant 
to rebut the inference that a product defect caused the harm.  
 
Further, South African courts may seek guidance from English case law applying the 
UKCPA where it has on numerous occasions been considered what standard of proof is 
required to establish defectiveness and causaction. If South African courts were to follow 
the approach in the most recent cases on this point,1098 then section 61 plaintiffs would 
merely need to prove the existence of a defect in broad or general terms, such as “a defect 
in the electrics of the vehicle” and a court would simply have to determine that the loss 
was caused by that defect and not another cause. 
 
4.2.5 Harm and damages 
In terms of section 61(6), harm for which a person may be held liable in terms of this 
section includes: 
 
“(a) the death of, or injury to, any natural person; 
(b) an illness of any natural person; 
(c) any loss of, or physical damage to, any property, irrespective of whether it is 
movable or immovable; and 
(d) any economic loss that results from harm contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or 
(c).”    
          
Section 61 provides no further clarification as to how these categories of damages are to 
be assessed and what heads of damages would be included in each category. It is likely 
                                                          
1098  Hufford v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2014] EWHC 2956 (TCC); Ide v ATB Sales [2008] EWCA Civ 
424; [2009] RTR 8. 
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that the courts will apply the general principles for assessing damages as they have 
developed under the common law of delict.1099 Accordingly, section 61 does not appear to 
extend the scope or damages that may be recoverable under the common law of delict. It 
is contended that the scope or damages recoverable under section 61 is broader than the 
scope of damages recoverable by means of a common law claim for breach of contract as 
pain and suffering damages cannot be recovered under an action for breach of contract 
but would be recoverable under a Section 61 action. 
 
With respect to “injury to any natural person” under section 61(5)(a), the implication is that 
this would include harm to the body, pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, emotional 
distress and disfigurement.1100 Economic loss resulting from injury to any natural person 
for purposes of section 61(5)(d) may include past medical and like expenses such as 
hospital and doctor expenses, medication, rehabilitation and home care assistance 
(whether by a family member or professional) and any future medical and like expenses if 
it is shown there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ of this being incurred.1101 Further, economic 
loss resulting from injury to any natural person may include past loss of income and future 
loss of earning capacity.1102 Similar heads of economic loss would be recoverable as a 
result of ‘illness of any natural person’ referred to in section 61(5)(b).1103   
 
A section 61 claimant can recover economic loss resulting from the death of any natural 
person,1104 for instance, a breadwinner or person on whom the claimant was otherwise 
                                                          
1099Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-23. See also discussion of general principles of harm and damages in the context of the 
Aquilian action at 2.3.1(a)(ii) above. 
1100  Ibid.  
1101  Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A) 785. 
1102  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-23 to 61-24. 
1103  61-25. 
1104  Section 61(5)a). 
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financially dependent. The claimant would need to establish that he or she suffered 
patrimonial loss, having taken into account losses and benefits (for instance, 
inheritances).1105  
 
With respect to “loss of or damage to any property” under section 61(5)(c), the general 
common law principles for quantifying a claim for property damage is to assess the 
reduction in the market value of the property.1106 The reduction in market value may be 
evidenced by the reasonable cost of repair of the damage. 1107  In the case of total 
destruction of property, the loss may include the reasonable cost of replacement and the 
cost of hiring a temporary replacement.1108 The range of economic losses that could result 
from property damage is extensive. In the context of property used by a business, the 
economic loss may arise from business interruption and loss of profits.    
 
It is unclear from the wording of section 61(5) whether pure economic loss is recoverable 
under section 61. Section 61(5) appears to provide a non-exclusive list of types of harm for 
which a person may be liable by using the word ‘includes’, but does not specifically list 
pure economic harm. It is argued that, in light of the consumer protectionist policy 
underlying the CPA, courts are likely to interpret section 61(5) broadly so as to include any 
pure economic loss suffered by consumers as a result of defective goods. 
 
Given that the economic consequences of harmful conduct may be so widespread and 
unpredictable, South African courts have traditionally sought to limit liability for such harm 
                                                          
1105  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-23, citing Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict (2005) 143-166. 
1106   2.3.1.1(ii).  
1107  Ibid. 
1108  Ibid. 
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by means of reasonableness “so as not to stifle initiative and enterprise.”1109 Section 61(5) 
does not restrict the extent of economic losses that may be recoverable, which exposes 
section 61 - defendants to significant liability.  
 
By comparison, the EU Directive1110 imposes liability for harm caused by death or personal 
injuries and damage or destruction to property, other than the defective product. The 
Directive’s definition of ‘damage’ does not include economic loss and leaves this to 
individual member states’ national laws to determine. 
 
The ACL imposes liability on a manufacturer where a product with a safety defect causes 
personal injury, loss suffered by another person where the product injures or kills a person 
(for instance, dependants), damage or destruction to other property (of a kind ordinarily 
acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption) or damage or 
destruction of land, buildings or fixtures (ordinarily acquired for private use).1111 
 
The US Restatement (Third)1112 similarly imposes liability for harm to the plaintiff’s person 
or the person of another when harm to that other person interferes with an interest of the 
plaintiff protected by tort law, and harm to the plaintiff’s property, other than the defective 
product itself. The inclusion of harm to the person of someone other than the plaintiff 
would arguably be for the benefit of dependants or persons who have a duty to support the 
injured person.  
 
                                                          
1109  Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 224. 
1110  3.3.1.5. 
1111  3.4.1.5. 
1112  3.2.1.5. 
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Section 61(5) appears to be substantially consistent with the European, Australian and 
American position in relation to the type of harm for which strict liability is imposed.1113 The 
main difference lies in the fact that the CPA does not appear to exclude strict liability for 
harm to the defective goods themselves. The reason for this exclusion in foreign 
jurisdictions is that the remedy for harm to the defective good itself is the concern of 
contract law. Section 61(5)(c) imposes liability for “any loss of, or physical damage to any 
property, irrespective of whether it is movable or immovable.” The plain, ordinary meaning 
of the words “any property” could arguably be interpreted as including damage to the 
defective product itself and any economic loss resulting from its replacement.1114  
 
If, however, the words “any property” are ambiguous in this respect, a purposive 
interpretation of this provision would arguably dictate that section 61-plaintiffs who stood in 
a contractual relationship with a supplier be entitled to recover the damage to the product 
itself by way of a section 61-claim as this interpretation favours consumers, as opposed to 
requiring such plaintiffs to make out a separate claim for breach of contract or consumer 
guarantees under section 56 of the CPA. Whilst this interpretation would mean that section 
61 provides an overlapping or additional means of obtaining compensation over and above 
any contractual remedies that may be available to the section 61-plaintiff,1115 it would 
arguably promote the welfare of consumers generally, particularly vulnerable consumers, 
to facilitate recovery of such loss by means of one action. The counter-argument to this 
would of course be based on legislative context, namely that remedies for loss resulting 
from damage to a product due to an unsafe feature, defect or substandard quality are 
already provided in section 56. 
                                                          
1113  3.5.5. 
1114  Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ 
(2006) 3 Stell LR at 439. 
1115  Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 251. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 351 
In comparison, the ACL only entitles a claimant to recover damages for damage caused by 
the defective good to other goods. 1116  Similarly, the EU Directive 1117  and the US 
Restatement (Third)1118 explicitly exclude liability for loss resulting from damage to the 
defective product itself. However, it was recently held by the CJEU in Boston Scientific 
Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt and Others,1119 that the costs of the removal 
and replacement of a defective implanted medical device constituted damage caused by a 
personal injury within the meaning of article 9 of the EU Direcive. The CJEU adopted a 
broad interpretation of the meaning of “damage”, holding that the EU Directive allows for 
damages that are necessary “to eliminate harmful consequences and to restore the level 
of safety which a person is entitled to expect”. Therefore, in the case of the defective 
implanted medical device, the EU Directive covers damages for the cost of replacement of 
the defective product and the costs of the replacement surgery. This broad interpretation 
of “damage” appears to be in conflict with the wording of article 9 of the EU Directive, 
which expressly excludes the cost of replacement of the defective product itself. It is 
argued that plaintiffs’ lawyers in the EU are likely to rely on this ruling by the CJEU to 
argue that all losses and expenses relating to the use of a defective product, such as the 
cost of so-called ‘medical monitoring’ where a medical device has not yet caused injury but 
may in the future, are recoverable, regardless of how remote that loss may be. 1120 
Recovery of medical monitoring expenses may also be possible in cases involving a 
defective pharmaceutical product, where a rare side effect related to it may only manifest 
many years after use.1121   
 
                                                          
1116  3.4.1.5. 
1117  3.3.1.5. 
1118  3.2.1.3. 
1119  Joined cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 (5 March 2015), discussed at 3.3.1.6 above. 
1120  Dodds-Smith & Brown ‘Recent Developments in European Product Liability’ (2016) International 
Comparative Legal Guides at 2. 
1121  Ibid. 
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In the interest of legal certainty, it would be preferable for the South African legislature to 
clarify this point by expressly stating in section 61(5)(c) whether “physical damage to any 
property” includes damage to the defective goods themselves.  
 
With respect to assessment of damages, section 61(6)(b) provides that nothing in section 
61 limits the authority of the court to “determine the extent and monetary value of any 
damages, including economic loss.” Loubser & Reid argue that this paragraph indicates 
the general principles for assessing damages as developed under the common law of 
delict, will apply to section 61 damages.1122  In light of section 2(10) of the the CPA and the 
interpretive presumption that legislation does not intend to affect the existing common law, 
this view is supported. Further, it would be in the interest of legal certainty to interpret the 
CPA in a manner that remains as consistent as possible with the existing common law 
framework for product liability. The general principles for assessment of delictual damages 
are discussed above.1123  
 
Section 61(6)(a) provides that nothing limits the court’s authority to assess whether any 
harm has been proven and adequately mitigated. This appears to suggest that courts may 
apply the common law mitigation rule, namely that plaintiffs must take reasonable steps to 
mitigate the harm caused by the defective goods, either by limiting the initial loss or further 
accumulation of loss.1124 At common law, a plaintiff cannot recover damages for harm that 
arose due to an act or omission of the plaintiff rather than the defective goods.1125 While a 
                                                          
1122  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at at 61-27. 
1123  2.3.1.1(ii). 
1124  Ibid. 
1125  Loubser & Reid at 61-27 citing: Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 (3) SA 123 (A) 145; Burger v Union National 
South British Insurance Co 1975 (4) SA 72 (W) 74-75. 
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plaintiff is entitled to recover costs incurred in taking steps to mitigate the harm, the plaintiff 
should take the less expensive method of mitigating the harm.1126 
 
Finally, section 61(c) empowers the court to apportion liability among persons who are 
found to be jointly and severally liable. This appears to be similar to the court’s power to 
apportion liability among joint wrongdoers in an Aquilian action. This provision is discussed 
in further detail below.1127 
 
4.2.6 Concept of Defectiveness 
4.2.6.1 Categories of Product Deficiencies  
Section 61(1) imposes strict liability where one of three main categories of defectiveness in 
a product has been the sole or partial cause of harm. These categories include: 
“61(1) (a) supplying any unsafe goods; 
          (b)  a product failure, defect or hazard in any goods; or 
          (c) inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the consumer  pertaining 
to any hazard arising from or associated with the use of any goods,”  
 
Section 61 is to be read with section 53(1), which defines the concepts ‘defect’, ‘failure’, 
‘hazard’ and ‘unsafe’ as they apply to any goods, component of any goods or services 
under Part H1128 of the Act. These concepts, and their definitions in section 53, give rise to 
                                                          
1126  Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A) 784. 
1127 4.2.7.4. 
1128 Chapter 2: Fundamental Consumer Rights, Part H: Right to Fair Value, Good Quality and Safety. 
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many questions of interpretation and legal uncertainty due to vagueness and overlapping 
as discussed below.  
 
(i) ‘Defect’  
The CPA provides in section 53(1)(a) a two-pronged definition of “defect” and employs an 
expectations test, which resembles the so-called ‘consumer expectations test’ contained in 
the EU Directive1129 and the ACL.1130 Section 53(1)(a) defines “defect” as: 
“(i) any material imperfection in the manufacture of the goods or components, or in 
performance of the services, that renders the goods or results of the service 
less acceptable than persons generally would be reasonably entitled to expect 
in the circumstances; or 
(ii) any characteristic of the goods or components that renders the goods or 
components less useful, practicable or safe than persons generally would be 
reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances;” 
 
The plain meaning of the words defining “defect” clearly includes manufacturing defects 
and defects in components. However, the definition is silent on whether design defects are 
included. It may be possible to argue that the words “any characteristic” in the second 
definition of “defect” is broad enough on its plain meaning to refer to design characteristics, 
and therefore, design defects. This interpretation is further supported if one considers that 
legislature has provided separately for manufacturing defects in paragraph (i), thereby 
implying that paragraph (ii) relates to other types of defects unrelate to manufacturing, 
such as design defects. In any event, there appears to be no logical reason why design 
defects would be excluded from the definition of “defect”. However, it would perhaps have 
                                                          
1129 3.3.1.6. 
1130 3.4.1.6. 
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been preferable for the legislature to expressly include the word “design” in the formulation 
of paragraph (ii) in the interest of legal certainty. For example, paragraph (ii) could have 
read: “any characteristic of the goods or components, including the design of the goods…” 
Van Heerden also supports the view that design defects ought to be expressly included in 
the definition of ‘defect.’1131  
 
With respect to manufacturing defects in paragraph (i), it is not clear when an imperfection 
will be considered “material” and therefore “less acceptable”, but this will arguably require 
consideration of the manufacturer’s own standards for those products, particularly as 
regards the characteristics which make them useful or valuable, and to what extent the 
product deviates from the particular product line norm in one of those respects.1132  
 
It is noted that a “material imperfection” in a good may also have the potential to render the 
good “unsafe” or “hazardous” as defined separately in section 53. Also, it is not clear 
whether “less acceptable” should be understood to mean that the manufacturing defect 
has rendered the product “less useful or practicable”, or whether it could also relate to 
safety of the good. Indeed, when compared to the words “less useful, practicable or safe” 
in section 53(1)(a)(ii), it is not certain what “less acceptable” would cover and whether the 
standards differ in any way. If a product is “less useful, practicable or safe than a person 
generally would reasonably be entitled to expect”, arguably those persons may also regard 
that product as “less acceptable”. Moreover, products that “fail” in their intended function, 
or pose an “extreme risk” would arguably also qualify as “less acceptable”. There seems to 
                                                          
1131  Product Liability Notes at 4, cited in Strydom A Critical Analysis of Strict Product Liability in South Africa 
(2012). 
1132  Loubser & Reid Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 53-2. 
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be no way to rationalise these terminological variances and it creates considerable 
confusion. 
 
In the recent decision of the High Court in Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited,1133 
which is discussed in detail below,1134 the court held that Eskom was liable as ‘producer’ 
and ‘distributor’ of electricity under section 61 for conducting electricity via a low-hanging 
line across a footpath, in circumstances which constitute a ‘defect’ within the meaning of 
both section 53(1)(a)(i) and (ii). Unfortunately, the judgment does not provide any analysis 
of the two definitions of ‘defect’ to assist in differentiating between them or the respective 
factors that would be relevant to the test for each type of “defect”. On appeal, the SCA1135 
held that the electricity did not contain a “defect”, “hazard”, “unsafe characteristic” nor was 
it subject to a “failure”. Again, the SCA did not provide any further guidance of substance 
as to the meaning of these various definitions of defectiveness. Unfortunately, both 
Halstead-Cleak judgments are quite brief in their analysis of the various definitions of 
defectiveness for purposes of section 61. The judgments do not offer any real assistance 
in differentiating between the two definitions of “defect” in section 53(1)(a) or the other 
definitions of ‘hazard’, ‘unsafe’ and failure’. The court a quo seemed to suggest that 
electricity “which is not required or used to supply any other consumer”, would always be 
‘defective goods’. In response to the judgment at first instance, it was argued by Loubser & 
Reid1136 that it is not the generation (‘manufacture’) of the electricity, but rather the manner 
and place of distribution of the electricity in this case, being along a low-hanging line 
across a footpath, that rendered the electricity dangerous. Accordingly, the authors argued 
that the definition of “defect” under section 53(1)(a)(i) did not apply here, but rather section 
                                                          
1133 [2015] JOL 33332 (GP). 
1134 4.5.2 
1135 Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150. 
1136 Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 53-2. 
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53(1)(a)(ii) and Eskom was liable, as “distributor” of electricity in a manner and in 
circumstances which rendered it less safe than persons generally would be reasonably 
entitled to expect. On appeal, the SCA simply commented, without any elaboration, that 
the harm in this case cannot be said to be due to the electricity failing or due to a “defect” 
in it. The court explained that a “failure” of the electricity would be if the electricity was 
unable to perform in its intended manner, which was not the case here. The author agrees 
with this position. The electricity had done exactly what it was supposed to do, which is 
why the plaintiff was harmed. This is arguably a very limited view of electricity - focusing 
on the electrical current only, whereas the commercial sense of electricity is that of a 
current being conducted along a line, which in this case presented a significant risk of 
injury. 
 
Further, the SCA held that there was no defect in the electricity as it did not suffer from a 
“material imperfection in the manufacture of it”. This relates to the first definition of “defect” 
in section 53(1)(a)(i). The author agrees with this position as there was no evidence that 
there had been any issue with the generation of the electricity. What is disputed is the 
SCA’s conclusion that the electricity did not have a characteristic that “rendered it less 
useful or safe than a person would generally expect in the circumstances” within the 
second meaning of “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(ii). As Loubser & Reid argued, the fact that 
the electricity was being distributed via a low-hanging line, thereby exposing persons to its 
harmful effects, rendered the electricity less safe than a person would generally expect in 
the circumstances.  
 
The SCA also held that the electricity did not have a “characteristic” that presented a 
“significant risk of injury” to any person when the goods are utilised within the definition of 
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“hazard” in section 53(1)(c)(ii). This conclusion is supported. While the electricity did 
present a significant risk of injury, that risk was arguably not presented at a time when the 
electricity was being “utilised”, rather when a person accidentally came into contact with 
the low-hanging power line, as the plaintiff did. 
 
Curiously, the SCA did not seem to refer to the definition of “unsafe” in section 53(1)(d) 
which includes a “characteristic” in the goods that presents “an extreme risk of personal 
injury or property damage to the consumer or to other persons.” It would seem clear that 
high-voltage electricity being conducted via a low-hanging power line would present an 
“extreme risk of personal injury” if the “consumer” or “other persons” came into contact 
with it, thereby rendering it “unsafe”. Perhaps the SCA chose not to apply this definition as 
it raises some confusion due to its reference to both “consumer” and “other persons”, 
which would not support the SCA’s conclusion that section 61 is only available to 
“consumers” as defined. It is certainly puzzling that “other persons” form part of the 
definition of “unsafe”, yet such persons do not appear to have a remedy under section 
61.1137 Nevertheless, this definition of “unsafe” could perhaps be read as being available 
only to section 61 claims brought by “consumers” as it merely defines the “unsafe” 
characteristic as one that would pose a significant risk to persons, whether the consumer 
or others. 
 
It is interesting to note, by comparison, that the majority of US courts take the position that 
electricity does not become a “product” for purposes of strict liability until it is converted to 
a form for delivery to a consumer and that the supply only occurs once it passes through 
the consumer’s meter. In other words, high-voltage electricity in a distribution line, such as 
                                                          
1137 4.2.1. 
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in the Halstead-Cleak scenario, would not be considered a “product” subject to strict 
liability in the US. 
 
The difficulties presented by the multiple definitions of product defectiveness in section 61 
is also illustrated by the decision of the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud (CGSO) in 
2014 regarding a consumer complaint involving personal injury allegedly caused by 
inadequate warnings on a drain cleaner product, which is discussed in detail below at 
4.3.1.  
 
The expectations test for “defect”, namely what “persons generally would be reasonably 
entitled to expect in the circumstances” is broadly based on the consumer expectations 
test adopted by the EU Directive1138, the ACL1139 and a host of other jurisdictions, including 
China, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Peru and Quebec. The EU Directive 1140  provides that a 
product is defective if it “does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect.” 
Like the EU Directive, the ACL1141 provides that goods have a “safety defect” if their safety 
is not such as “persons generally are entitled to expect.” The tests employed by the EU 
Directive and ACL do not refer to “consumer” or “consumers”, but rather “person” or 
“persons”, which could arguably be interpreted as referring to the public’s expectations in 
general, rather than a particular consumer who was harmed or consumers forming part of 
the target market of the product, or consumers in general. The CPA’s reference to 
“persons generally” appears to be similar to the wording of this test in these foreign 
jurisdictions.  
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The expectations test has been subject to significant academic criticism due to its 
vagueness, circularity and potential to readmit negligence to the test for defectiveness, 
with Stapleton1142 frankly branding it as “impenetrable to analysis.” She points out that 
people routinely miscalculate risks and that a legal standard cannot coherently or fairly be 
based on such a volatile standard.1143 Indeed, as explained above at 1.3.2, the field of 
behavioural economics show that there are a number of cognitive biases and heuristics 
that impact on human decisionmaking, suggesting that consumers or product users 
systematically make judgement errors and suboptimal decisions when assessing product 
risks and safety.  
 
Further, Loubser & Reid1144 point out that the consumer expectations test purports to be 
an objective, normative standard, but ultimately it involves a value judgment by courts. In 
the US, 1145  the ‘expectations test’ has been rejected by a majority of courts in favour of a 
reasonableness standard, which involves a balancing act closely resembling the traditional 
negligence enquiry and in which consumer expectations is but one relevant factor. Some 
US states have supplemented or replaced the consumer expectations test with a ‘risk-
utility test’, involving a balancing of certain objective factors. It is argued that the risk-utility 
test ultimately comes down to a similar value judgment querying whether the product 
presented an unreasonable risk to consumers.1146 
 
 
                                                          
1142 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective 2000 (39) Washburn 
Law Journal 376. 
1143 377. See discussion of this test in the context of the EU Directive at 3.3.1.6. 
1144 Loubser & Reid ‘Commentary on the Draft Consumer Protection Bill’ (2006) 17 Stell LR at 428-429. 
1145 See discussion of defectiveness under the US Restatement (Third) at 3.2.1.6. 
1146 Loubser & Reid ‘Commentary on the Draft Consumer Protection Bill’ 2006 17 Stell LR 426.  
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It is argued that a reasonableness standard is better suited for design defects than a 
consumer expectation standard, on the basis that it is conceptually difficult to determine 
what expectations an ordinary consumer may have with respect to the technical design 
characteristics of a particular product.1147 This is particularly so in cases involving products 
of a complex or technical nature. For this very reason, many US courts have rejected the 
consumer expectations test as the sole test for defective design.1148  
 
In a commentary on the draft Consumer Protection Bill, Loubser & Reid suggested that the 
CPA’s definition of “defect” be amended to move away from a “consumer expectations” 
test for defectiveness and to provide instead for the assessment of defectiveness and 
wrongfulness in terms of a general standard of reasonableness assessed with hindsight. 
The use of a hindsight approach means that the supply chain cannot avoid liability by 
arguing the defect was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of manufacture or 
supply.1149 Van Eeden argues that, while Loubser & Reid’s suggestion has considerable 
merit, the expectations test as formulated in the definition of “defect” has the benefit of 
utilising language not used in the test for negligence at common law and which is more 
consistent with the language employed in existing international instruments, namely the 
EU Directive and the UKCPA.1150 Nevertheless, having regard to the US experience in the 
context of design defects, to which Van Eeden does not refer, and what the author 
considers to be valid academic criticism of an “expectations standard”, Loubser & Reid’s 
proposal is supported. 
 




1150 Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 376. 
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As the wording of the “defect” test currently stands, it could still be argued that what 
persons generally would be “reasonably” entitled to expect “in the circumstances” points to 
a reasonableness approach traditionally used in the wrongfulness enquiry, involving an ex 
post facto evaluation of all relevant factors. Neither the EU Directive1151 nor the ACL1152 
make reference to “reasonable” expectations in their respective formulations of the 
expectations test. The reason for the omission of the word “reasonable” from the European 
and Australian definitions is presumably due to criticism that it would reintroduce a 
negligence element or standard to the enquiry.   
 
What is common to the CPA, EU Directive and ACL is that the test for “defect” requires a 
court to consider “the circumstances” relevant to the particular case. However, unlike the 
EU Directive and ACL which list examples of circumstances that are relevant, the CPA 
provides no further guidance in this regard. It will therefore be in South African courts’ 
discretion as to what circumstances they will take into account and the weight that ought to 
be attributed to each of them.   
 
The US Restatement departs radically from other jurisdictions and the CPA in relation to 
its definitions and standards for determining manufacturing, design and warning 
defects.1153 In fact, the Restatement (Third) has returned to a reasonableness standard 
closely resembling negligence for design and warning defects, whereas ‘true’ strict liability 
applies in relation to manufacturing defects. The rationale for this is that strict liability is not 
suitable in the case of design and warning defects, which requires a form of risk-utility 
balancing. 
                                                          
1151 3.3.1.6. 
1152 3.4.1.6. 
1153 3.2.1.6 (i) - (iii). 
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In the context of manufacturing defects, the US Restatement imposes strict liability where 
it can be shown that a product departed from its intended design, regardless of whether all 
possible care was taken in producing and marketing the product.1154 By contrast, the test 
for determining whether a product has a warning or instruction defect under the US 
Restatement requires American courts to consider whether the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or circumvented by providing reasonable 
instructions or warnings, the failure of which rendered the product “not reasonably 
safe.”1155 Similarly, in the case of design defects, the US Restatement requires courts to 
consider whether the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced or avoided by 
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design, the failure of which rendered the product 
not reasonably safe.1156 The references to foreseeability and avoidability of harm and 
reasonableness in both these tests point to traditional concepts used in the negligence 
enquiry.  
 
The reference to “reasonableness” in section 53(1)(a) of the CPA does not necessarily 
refer to reasonableness in the sense employed by the US Restatement for purposes of 
design and warning defects. In order to preserve the ‘strictness’ of liability under the CPA, 
Loubser & Reid propose that the test for defectiveness under section 53(1)(a) should in 
each case be determined by applying the traditional wrongfulness standard used in the 
common law of delict, i.e. the legal convictions of the community, boni mores and general 
reasonableness. In the absence of a negligence test done with foresight, the general 
reasonableness involved in the wrongfulness test (assessed with hindsight) would then act 
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as an important filter in determining the existence of liability.1157 A risk-utility analysis for 
defectiveness, as an alternative to the consumer expectations test, is considered to be 
more consistent with the current wrongfulness approach followed by South African courts, 
involving an investigation, with hindsight, into whether the product was unreasonably 
dangerous or the instructions or warnings accompanying the product were unreasonably 
deficient.1158 The authors argue that the CPA ought to provide a non-exhaustive list of 
factors for consideration by courts in assessing defectiveness, including: 
 the standard intended for the product by the producer; 
 standards or duties prescribed by legislation for the product; 
 the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the product by an alternative 
manufacturing process or design; 
 the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the product; 
 the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed; 
 the use of any mark, instructions or warnings in relation to the product; and 
 what might reasonably be expected to be done with the product, for instance when 
supplying inherently dangerous goods such as electricity;1159  
 the time when the product was manufactured or supplied.1160 
 
The weight to be attributed to the various factors would be within the courts’ discretion. 
Further, the factors to be considered would also depend on the type of defect that is 
alleged to have caused to the harm.  For instance, the US experience in relation to design 
defect cases illustrates this point.1161 In some design cases, courts would adopt a risk-
                                                          
1157 Loubser & Reid Commentary on the Draft Consumer Protection Bill (2006) 17 Stell LR at 421. 
1158 429. 
1159 See discussion of the Halstead-Cleak cases at 4.5.2 below. 
1160 428-429. 
1161 3.2.3(iii). 
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utility approach to assessing defectiveness taking into account the availability of a 
reasonable alternative design.1162 By comparison, in cases where the design of a product 
was so ‘manifestly unreasonable’ that the product should never have been put into 
circulation, the existence of a reasonable, safer alternative design is considered 
irrelevant.1163 
 
A test for defectiveness under section 53(i)(a) akin to the delictual wrongfulness enquiry, 
involving consideration of reasonableness with hindsight would be consistent with the test 
for “safety defect” as applied in practice in Australia under the ACL. In the author’s 
personal experience practising in product liability claims in the State of Victoria, Australia, 
the question of whether a product has a “safety defect” can be assessed without having 
regard to what the manufacturer could have foreseen and prevented, but rather objectively 
assessing the characteristics of the product, the manner in which it was marketed, the 
instructions provided with the product and what might generally be expected to be done 
with the product by consumers in general. The case study discussed below1164 illustrates 
how these factors are applied in an objective ‘risk-utility’ approach, as opposed to focusing 
on the conduct of the manufacturer at the time of producing the goods. 
 
Australian case law highlights other factors, which are not specifically listed in the ACL, as 
considerations relevant to determining the existence of a “safety defect”. For instance, the 
role of intermediaries may be relevant in the case of complex products such as 
prescription pharmaceuticals, where medical professionals and pharmacists are provided 
with detailed information regarding the product by manufacturers. It has been held by an 
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Australian court that the duty to warn a consumer of harmful side-effects of such products 
rests with the treating physician, not the manufacturer or distributor.1165 A similar learned 
intermediary doctrine has been recognised by a majority of courts in the US, particularly in 
the context of pharmaceuticals and medical devices.1166 The application of this factor in 
South Africa may arguably be different than in developed countries such as America and 
Australia, given the high levels of poverty and illiteracy among consumers. This defence is 
based on the presumption that the learned intermediary, whether a treating physician or a 
pharmacist, would explain the risks of a particular product in clear and understandable 
terms to the consumer. However, there is the real risk in South Africa that consumers may 
not always fully comprehend instructions or warnings provided verbally to them, whether 
due to illiteracy or language barriers. Therefore, it is arguable that manfuacturers of such 
products owe a higher duty in South Africa to provide instructions and warnings in clear, 
plain and simple language and cannot escape liability by complete reliance on learned 
intermediaries. 
 
Further, the recent Australian High Court case of Robinson Helicopter Company 
Incorporated v McDermott, 1167  considered the adequacy of instructions provided by a 
helicopter manufacturer in a maintenance manual and the extent to which manufacturers 
can rely on the expertise of qualified maintenance persons in interpreting the instructions. 
This case indicates that the foreseeable reader of instructions/warnings accompanying a 
product, whether it be a lay consumer or technically qualified person, is a relevant factor 
when determining whether a “safety defect” exists. In the South African context, this factor 
would necessarily have to take into account the high levels of illiteracy in assessing 
                                                          
1165 Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros and Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 853, discussed at 3.4.1.6 above. 
1166 3.2.1.6 (ii). 
1167 3.4.4(i). 
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whether the particular instructions or warnings accompanying a product is adequate in the 
circumstances. 
 
Another factor which has been noted as potentially being relevant to considering a “safety 
defect” in Australia, is the price of the goods.1168 It is argued that a consumer should not 
expect that a cheaper product contains any additional or special safety features which may 
be associated with a more expensive version of the product. Further, safety expectations 
of a product may also depend on the nature of the product and community knowledge of 
that product. Again, in the South African context, these factors may be applied differently 
than in a developed country such as Australia. Given the high levels of poverty and 
illiteracy, South African consumers are unlikely to be able to assess the varying risks of 
products of a particular type based on price range as they may have always been forced to 
purchase products at the lower end of the price range. 
 
An important development in relation to the interpretation of the defectiveness standard 
under the EU Directive is a decision by the CJEU in In Boston Scientific Medizintechnik 
GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt and Others.1169 For the first time since the EU Directive was 
enacted, the CJEU provided some guidance as to the definition of defectiveness in article 
6 of the EU Directive. The German Supreme Court referred a question to the CJEU as to 
whether a product (such as an implanted medical device) is defective under article 6 if it 
forms part of a group of products that have a significantly increased risk of failure, but 
where a defect has not been identified in each specific product within that group.  
 
 
                                                          
1168 3.4.1.6. 
1169 Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13, discussed above at 3.3.1.6. 
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In interpreting article 6, the CJEU referred to the sixth recital in the preamble to the EU 
Directive, stating that this meant that consumer expectations ought to be assessed “in the 
abstract” with regard to the expectations of the “public at large”.1170 The CJEU held that, 
while the notion of “legitimate expectation” is particularly difficult to define, the expected 
degree of safety must be determined by taking into account various factors, including the 
intended purpose of the product, the nature of the product and the requirements of the 
group of users for whom the product is intended.1171 In other words, while the consumer 
expectations test is expressed as taking account of the expectations of the public at large, 
in practice, the test compasses the specific requirements and expectations of the group of 
users for whom the product is intended.  
 
 
The CJEU ruled that, where products belonging to the same production series have been 
shown to have a “significantly higher than normal risk of failure”, or in which a “significant 
number of failures have already occurred,” all products in that production series can be 
classified as defective for purposes of article 6 without proof that a specific product was 
defective. The CJEU noted that, on the facts before it, the affected patients were entitled to 
expect a particularly high level of safety given that these products are implanted devices 
which can lead to cardiac failure or death if they failed. The CJEU held that this 
interpretation of article 6 is consistent with the objectives of the EU Directive to ensure a 
fair apportionment of risks between the injured person and the manufacturer.  
 
In the context of the CPA, it may similarly be argued in the future that, while the definition 
of “defect” refers to the reasonable expectations of “persons generally” suggesting the 
expectations of the public at large, South African courts should take into account the 
                                                          
1170 [29]. 
1171 [45]. 
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specific requirements and expectations of the group of users for whom the product is 
intended.   
 
It could be argued that the fact that section 53(i)(a) of the CPA lists no particular factors 
that must be taken into account in determining the reasonable expectations of persons 
generally for purposes of a “defect”, provides courts with the necessary latitude to consider 
a broad range of reasonableness factors, some relating to a risk-utility analysis of the 
product and some relating to a broader value judgment as to whether it was objectively 
unreasonable (and therefore wrongful) to put the product into commercial circulation, 
within the unique context of what South African consumers generally could reasonably 
expect. While South African courts may draw on foreign case law for guidance as to 
relevant factors to be considered in the defectiveness enquiry, they should always keep in 
mind that those factors have crystallised in a foreign society where, for example, 
consumers generally and industry may be more sophisticated than in a developing country 
such as South Africa.  
 (ii) Failure 
Pursuant to Section 53(1)(b), a ‘failure’ means: 
“…the inability of the goods to perform in the intended manner or to the intended 
effect”; 
 
The references to “intended manner” or “intended effect” appear to refer to the intention of 
the producer or manufacturer of those goods. Accordingly, it is argued that the concept of 
“failure” seems to refer to what is generally known as a “manufacturing defect” product 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 370 
liability law, being a deviation from what the manufacturer intended for that product.1172 
Where this category of defect is in issue, the test is simply whether the goods fail to meet, 
or deviate from the producer’s own standards. No value judgment is required by the court. 
 
This is consistent with the test to determine manufacturing defects under the US 
Restatement, which refers to departure of a product from an intended design. 1173  By 
comparison, the EU Directive 1174  and ACL 1175  do not provide a similar test for 
defectiveness as these regimes do not differentiate between categories of defect, i.e. 
manufacturing, design and warning defects. In the English case of A v National Blood 
Authority,1176 the court also rejected the categorisation of types of defects and simply 
distinguished between standard and non-standard products, defining non-standard 
products as products that are ‘different from the norm which the producer intended for use 
by the public’.1177 However, it is worth noting that this distinction between standard and 
non-standard products does not appear to have been applied subsequently in English 
case law. 
 
It should be borne in mind that a product may malfunction for a variety of reasons, 
including misuse, mishandling, tampering or alteration of the product by product users. It is 
not necessarily due to a manufacturing or design error that the product is unable to 
perform as intended by its manufacturer. Evidence by a Section 61-defendant that a 
product was misused, mishandled, tampered with or otherwise altered after leaving the 
control and possession of that defendant, which resulted in the malfunction may give rise 
                                                          
1172  See eg. discussion of manufacturing defects in US law at 3.2.1.6(i) above. 
1173  3.2.1.6(i). 
1174  3.3.1.6. 
1175  3.4.1.6. 
1176  (2001) 3 All ER 289, discssued at 3.3.1.8(i) above. 
1177  3.3.5(i). 
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to a defence under section 61(4)(b)(i). Loubser & Reid point out that a product may also 
fail to perform in the manner intended by the producer due to a ‘natural impurity’ rendering 
them dangerous, such as a virus in blood products or a pathogen in food products.1178 
 
Where a product failure presents “significant” or “extreme” risk, it seems that it would also 
qualify as “unsafe” or “hazardous” within the meaning of section 53(1)(b)(ii) or 53(1)(d), 
and could simultaneously attract liability under both section 61(a) and (b). Unfortunately, 
the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in the recent Halstead-Cleak cases1179 which 
are discussed in detail below,1180 did not provide any substantial guidance to differentiating 
between the tests for a “defect”, “hazard”, “unsafe characteristic” or when a product is 
subject to a “failure”.   
 
 (iii)   Hazard 
Section 53(1)(c) defines a “hazard” as a characteristic that: 
“(i) has been identified as, or declared to be, a hazard in terms of any other law; or                      
(ii) presents a significant risk of personal injury to any person, or damage to 
property, when the goods are utilised.” 
 
With respect to the first of the two alternate definitions, the reference to “any other law” 
would include national, provincial and any other subordinate legislation as well as any 
                                                          
1178  Loubser & Reid Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 53-8. 
1179  Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP); Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-
Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150, discussed below at 4.5.2. 
1180  4.5.2 
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notices, proclamations or ordinances.1181 However, it is unclear when a hazard will have 
been “identified as or declared to be” a hazard for purposes of section 53(1)(c). 
 
The second of the alternate definitions of “hazard” refers to a characteristic presenting a 
“significant risk” of personal injury or damage to property. This characteristic could 
arguably relate to the manufacturing, design, quality or functionality of the product.  
 
The provision provides no guidance as to how courts are meant to assess “significant risk”. 
It is argued that this will require a value judgment by the court, having regard to various 
factors relevant to a flexible reasonableness enquiry, similar to the reasonableness 
enquiry courts are likely to follow in applying the expectations test’ prescribed for “defect” 
under section 53(1)(a).1182 
 
Arguably, where a product failure presents ‘significant’ or ‘extreme’ risk, it seems that it 
would also qualify as “unsafe’ or “hazardous” within the meaning of section 53(1)(b)(ii) or 
53(1)(d), and could simultaneously attract liability under both section 61(a) and (b). 
Unfortunately, the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in the recent Halstead-Cleak 
cases1183 which are discussed in detail below,1184 did not provide any substantial guidance 
to differentiating between the tests for a “defect”, “hazard”, “unsafe characteristic” or when 
a product is subject to a “failure”.   
 
                                                          
1181  Loubser & Reid Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 53-9. 
1182 53-10 and discussion of reasonableness and the ‘expectations test’ at 53-5. 
1183 Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP); Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-
Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150, discussed below at 4.5.2. 
1184 4.5.2 
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(iv) Unsafe goods 
Pursuant to section 53(1)(d), “unsafe” means that: 
“due to a characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, particular goods present an 
extreme risk of personal injury or property damage to the consumer or to other 
persons.”  
 
This definition raises a number of questions. Firstly, the overlap between the concept of 
“unsafe”, “defect” and “hazard” is confusing and somewhat circular. Arguably, a product 
that is “unsafe” is also “hazardous” and “defective”. Further, it is questioned why the CPA 
draws a distinction between “hazardous” and “unsafe” products by requiring an “extreme” 
risk of injury to have been present in the case of an “unsafe: product, but merely a 
“significant” risk where a “hazardous” product is concerned. It is unclear when a section 61 
claimant would ever elect to prove the patently higher standard of “extreme risk” when the 
claimant would succeed in establishing defectiveness by proving a “significant” risk, i.e. 
that the product was “hazardous”. It is also unclear whether there are any consequences 
for purposes of section 61 liability where a product posed an “extreme risk” as opposed to 
a “significant risk”. Finally, it is unclear how courts are meant to assess an “extreme risk”. It 
is argued that the extent of the risk of harm posed would need to be assessed on a case 
by case basis, like the South African courts’ approach to the delictual enquiry of 
wrongfulness. 
 
By comparison, the ACL similarly employs a single concept of defectiveness, referring to a 
“safety defect” as opposed to a “defect” under the CPA.1185 The factors listed under the 
test for “safety defect” in the ACL may provide some guidance to South African courts in 
                                                          
1185 3.4.1.6. 
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assessing whether a product was “unsafe” for purposes of section 53(1)(d).1186 The test for 
a “safety defect” in section 9(1) of the ACL provides that goods have a safety defect if their 
safety is not such as “persons generally are entitled to expect”, taking into consideration all 
relevant circumstances, which includes: 
“(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the goods have been marketed; 
and 
(b) the packaging of the goods; and 
 (c) the use of marks, instructions or warnings in relation to the goods; 
 (e) what might reasonably be expected to be done with the goods; and  
 (f) the time when the manufacturer supplied the goods.”1187 
 
The application of these factors in the South African context may of course be different to 
the application in Australian case law. For example, the manner in which goods were 
marketed and the use of marks, instructions or warnings would have to be considered in 
the context of how South African consumers, particularly vulnerable consumers with low 
literacy skills or proficiency in a particular language, would interpret such marketing, 
marks, instructions or warnings. A different level of comprehension might generally be 
expected of consumers in a developed country such as Australia. 
 
Loubser & Reid1188 point out that the incorporation of the concepts ‘failure’, ‘defect’ or 
‘hazard into the definition of ‘unsafe’ in section 53(1)(d) potentially requires multiple further 
enquiries: 
                                                          
1186 Ibid. 
1187 Section 9(2). 
1188 Loubser & Reid Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 53-10 to 53-11. 
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 If the ‘extreme risk’ relates to a ‘failure’ in the good, the question will be whether the 
inability of the goods to perform in the intended manner or to the intended effect created 
‘an extreme risk of personal injury or property damage’.  
 If the ‘extreme risk’ relates to a ‘defect’ in the good, the question then becomes whether: 
o The goods contain a ‘material imperfection in the manufacture of the goods’ which 
renders them ‘less acceptable’ than personal would be reasonably entitled to expect; 
or 
o The goods have ‘any characteristic’ which renders them ‘less useful, practicable or 
safe’ than persons generally would be reasonably entitled to expect. 
 If the ‘extreme risk’ relates to a ‘hazard’ in the good, the question becomes whether: 
o The good contains a characteristic that has been identified as, or declared to be, a 
hazard by or in terms of any other law; or 
o The goods contain a characteristic that presents a significant risk of personal injury to 
any person, or damage to property, when the goods are utilized. 
 
If this was the intention of the legislature, the test for “unsafe” is highly convoluted, 
confusing and unhelpful. In the absence of clear guidelines on how to assess “extreme 
risk” other than to apply the definitions of “failure”, “defect” and “hazard”, which are unclear 
themselves, courts may ultimately resort to a general, reasonableness standard similar to 
the consumer expectations test prescribed for “defect” under section 53(1)(a). In other 
words, courts may assess what level of safety persons generally are reasonably entitled to 
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(v) Inadequate warnings or instructions 
Pursuant to section 61(1)(c), goods may have a so-called ‘informational defect’, being that 
they were accompanied by inadequate instructions or warnings to the consumer pertaining 
to any “hazard” arising from or associated with the use of the goods. As noted above,1189 a 
“hazard” is defined as a characteristic that has been identified as, or declared to be, a 
hazard in terms of any law, or ‘presents a significant risk of personal injury to any person, 
or damage to property, when the goods are utilised.’1190 
 
It is argued that section 61(1)(c) will impose strict liability upon producers, importers, 
distributors or retailers where the person who has packaged the goods failed to provide 
instructions or an adequate warning of the risk posed by the product, irrespective of 
whether the defendants themselves had any direct involvement in the packaging 
operation.1191  
 
Section 61(1)(c) does not provide any guidance in terms of how courts are meant to 
assess the adequacy of the warnings and instructions. In the absence of any guideline, it 
is possible that courts may resort to applying a type of reasonableness standard, possibly 
akin to the consumer expectations standard prescribed for “defect” under section 53(1)(a). 
However, this test would be problematic in that it is often difficult to determine what 
persons generally are reasonably entitled to expect in terms of technical information 
accompanying a product. As Loubser & Midgley1192 point out: 
                                                          
1189  4.2.6.1(iii). 
1190  Section 53(1)(c)(i)-(ii). 
1191  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 2014 at 61-4.  
1192  The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 249. 
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“when courts are required to apply such vague standards….there may be an 
understandable tendency by courts to resort to looking at the general 
reasonableness of the producer’s behaviour.”  
 
Strydom1193 suggests that section 49(2) of the CPA could provide a workable guideline to 
determine which risk ought to be covered by warnings, namely risk: 
 of an unusual character or nature; 
 the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware of 
or notice, or which an ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to 
notice or contemplate in the circumstances; or  
 that could result in serious injury or death. 
 
When determining the adequacy of product instructions or warnings, their layout and 
position on packaging may be highly relevant.1194 Another relevant consideration is the 
obviousness of the danger or risk associated with the product. The less obvious the 
danger, the more visible the notice ought to be to the consumer.1195  
 
It is relevant to note here that section 58 requires that a person packaging any hazardous 
or unsafe goods to display on the packaging a notice that complies with the requirements 
                                                          
1193  ‘A Critical Analysis of Strict Product Liability in South Africa’ (2012) at 101.  
1194  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-4, citing e.g. the English case of Worsley v Tambrands [2000] PIQR P95 that considered 
the adequacy of a warning leaflet inside a box of tampons, warning consumers of the risk of toxic shock 
syndrome. The consumer argued that the warning ought to have been printed more prominently on the 
outside of the box. The court held that the manufacturers had done all that the consumer was ‘entitled 
to expect’ in the circumstances. By comparison, in the US case of Spruill v Boyle-Midway 308 F 2d 79 
(CA Va 1962) the court held a warning as to the potentially lethal consequences of ingesting furniture 
polish, which was tucked away in a label attached to the back of the bottle, in fine print of only 1/32 inch 
in height, to be inadequate. 
1195  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-4. 
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set out in section 22 relating to plain language. A discussion of the requirements of section 
22 is beyond the scope of this study.1196  
 
Other relevant considerations include the severity of the harm which consumers run the 
risk of suffering and the number of consumers who are exposed to the risk. 1197  For 
instance, Loubser & Reid1198 provide the example of a consumer suffering harm in the 
form of an allergic or other idiosyncratic reaction to a product. In determining whether the 
absence of a warning regarding the potential allergic reaction rendered the product unsafe, 
it should be considered whether a significant number of consumers would be at risk of 
such a reaction or whether the plaintiff alone was at risk, as well as the severity of the 
allergic reaction, i.e. whether it is potentially fatal. Instructions for use or warnings should 
address the reasonably foreseeable uses to which the product is likely to be put and it is 
argued that a pragmatic approach should be followed here.1199 A manufacturer or other 
supplier cannot be expected to provide instructions or warnings for every possible use, or 
potential abuse, to which a consumer might put the product. The authors1200 cite the 
example of a consumer who bathes his pet and places it in a microwave oven to dry. This 
use may not be reasonably foreseeable by the supplier(s) of the microwave. However, the 
supplier arguably would be required to warn consumers of the risk of cooking food in 
metallic containers in the microwave.  
 
                                                          
1196  See discussion by Van Zyl Section 58 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer 
Protection Act (2014) at 58-  
1197  Ibid. 
1198  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-5.  
1199  Ibid. 
1200  Ibid.  
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In 2014, the CGSO considered, inter alia, section 61(1)(c) in the context of a consumer 
complaint regarding alleged inadequate warnings or instructions accompanying a drain 
cleaner product which resulted in personal injury. This case is discussed in detail 
below.1201 The findings of the CGSO highlight the difficulty presented by the numerous, 
alternate definitions of product defectiveness contained in section 61(1). For instance, a 
product, particularly an inherently hazardous product, which is not accompanied by 
sufficient warnings or instructions in plain, clear language, may simultaneously be ‘unsafe’ 
goods, or have a ‘defect’ or hazard’. Further, the case highlights that failure by a consumer 
to follow the instructions for safe use of a product may provide a novus actus interveniens 
for purposes of causation, thereby relieving the producer of Section 61-liability. 
 
Section 61(1)(c) does not refer to hazards arising from or associated with the “reasonably 
foreseeable use” of any goods, it simply refers to “the use of any goods.” This wording, 
coupled with the underlying consumer protectionist policy of the CPA, arguably imposes a 
heavy burden on suppliers to warn of all risks that may be associated with any use of the 
goods. As argued by Loubser & Reid, in the absence of clear guidelines to assess the 
adequacy of warnings or instructions, courts may revert to a form of reasonableness, 
involving consideration, amongst other things, of the reasonably foreseeable” uses of the 
goods. It may however be argued that consideration of “reasonably foreseeable” uses 
reverts to negligence and that South African courts would tend to steer clear of such 
language in an effort to distinguish section 61 liability from Aquilian liability. This approach 
is seen in UK case law where courts have been at pains to distinguish between the two 
                                                          
1201  4.3.1.. 
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forms of liability. 1202  Perhaps South African courts would rather consider “reasonably 
expected” uses in an objective manner having regard to the nature of the product and the 
group of consumers to which it is marketed, so as to distinguish it from uses that could 
reasonably have been foreseen by the supplier of the product.  
 
The adequacy of instructions and warnings accompanying a product were considered in 
the Australian case of ACCC v Glendale Chemical Products1203, the only case brought 
under Part VA of the former Trade Practices Act where liability was imposed. The case 
involved a plaintiff who sustained chemical burns while using a drain cleaner (caustic 
soda). The caustic soda had reacted with hot water within the shower drain, burning the 
plaintiff's face and eyes. The court considered whether the instructions and warnings 
accompanying the product adequately warned consumers of the risk of injury if the product 
comes into contact with hot water in a drain. The court held that the manufacturer was well 
aware of this risk attendant to pouring the caustic soda down a drain containing hot water 
and that consumers are entitled to be warned of risks in respect of a use to which goods 
“might reasonably be expected to be put.” Therefore, the manufacturer ought to have 
included a specific warning to this effect.  Applying this approach in the South African 
context, it is arguable that the use to which goods “might reasonably be expected to be 
put” should also take into account the potential misuse of products due to vulnerable 
consumers with low literacy skills misunderstanding or misinterpreting product instructions 
or warnings.   
 
                                                          
1202  See for instance, discussion of A v National Blood Authority (2001) 3 All ER 289 at 3.3.1.8(i) above, 
where the court held that “avoidability of risk” is not a factor to be considered in determining 
defectiveness under the UKCPA, so as to distinguish it from negligence. 
1203  40 I.P.R. 619 (1998) (Austl.Fed.Ct.), discussed at 3.4.1. 
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Further, the recent Australian High Court case of Robinson Helicopter Company 
Incorporated v McDermott,1204 which considered the adequacy of instructions provided by 
a helicopter manufacturer in a maintenance manual, indicates that the foreseeable reader 
of instructions/warnings accompanying a product, whether it be a lay consumer or 
technically qualified person, is a relevant factor when determining whether an instructional 
defect exists in goods. In the South African context, this factor would necessarily have to 
take into account the high levels of illiteracy in assessing whether the particular 
instructions or warnings accompanying a product is adequate in the circumstances. 
 
By contrast, the US Restatement (Third)1205 has returned to a reasonableness standard for 
inadequate warnings or instructions, which closely resembles the test for negligence. 
Section 2(c) of the Restatement provides that a product: 
"is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, 
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe." 
The Reporters’ commentary on section 2(c) of the Restatement states that, as a general 
rule, the manufacturer or seller’s duty to inform or warn about inherent risks accompanying 
a product arises whenever a reasonably foreseeable consumer or use would consider 
such risks material in deciding whether to use the product or not. This duty normally does 
not extend to obvious and generally known risks, as inclusion of warnings about such risks 
would seldom result in higher levels of product safety and could even lead to consumers 
disregarding warnings, which may also contain information about non-obvious risks. In 
                                                          
1204 3.4.4(i). 
1205 3.2.1.6(ii).  
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determining the reasonableness of instructions or warnings, a number of factors are 
balanced by US courts, including content and comprehensibility, intensity of expression 
and characteristics of expected user groups.  
 
In determining the correct level of instructions or warnings that should accompany a 
product, the effects of information overload on consumers’ decisionmaking should be 
borne in mind. The notion of ‘cognitive capacity limits’ in the field of behavioural economics 
recognises that persons have limited capacity to process any amount of information in a 
given time and not all information persons are confronted with will enter their working 
memory.1206 According to this concept, if consumers are overwhelmed with instructions 
accompanying products, the quality of their decision-making may be reduced. Further, 
consumers may tend to pay less attention to an excessive amount of instructions or 
warnings accompanying a product. In other words, more instructions or warnings are not 
always better.   
 
Having regard to the Australia, European and US approach to assessing instruction or 
warning defects, 1207  it is suggested that South African courts could adopt a flexible 
reasonableness test, akin to the wrongfulness enquiry at common law, to determining the 
adequacy of warnings or instructions accompanying goods for purposes of Section 
61(1)(c). Assessing the adequacy of warnings or instructions should be done with 
hindsight taking into account all relevant circumstances including:  
 the uses to which the good might reasonably be expected to be put; 
 the degree of risk posed by the good and the severity of harm should the risk eventuate; 
                                                          
1206  See discussion at 1.3.2. 
1207  3.5.6. 
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 the obviousness of the risk posed by the good; 
 the layout and positioning of instructions or warnings on packaging or otherwise 
accompanying the good; and 
 the content and comprehensibility of instructions or warnings. 
 
4.2.6.2 Utility of categorising product deficiencies 
The EU Directive contains no formal distinction between different types of product defects, 
however certain member states1208 have included categories in their national laws. In A v 
National Blood Authority1209 the UK High Court rejected the formal distinction between 
manufacturing and design defects in favour of a distinction between ‘non-standard’ and 
‘standard’ products. 1210  The ACL also does not categorise different types of product 
deficiency, simply referring to goods having a “safety defect” if their safety is not such as 
personals generally are entitled to expect. 1211  By contrast, the US Restatement 1212 
distinguishes between the three types of product defects generally acknowledged in 
literature, namely manufacturing, design and warning defects, and imposes strict liability 
for manufacturing defects and a type of fault-based liability for design and warning 
defects. 1213  Stapleton 1214  criticises this distinction between different forms of product 
defects, stating it is ‘founded on a dubious reading of history and on an attitude about what 
                                                          
1208  E.g. Section 5(3) of the Italian Decree 224 of 1988 provides that: "A product shall be considered 
defective if it does not provide for the safety which is usually provided for by other models or the same 
type." Article 3(2) of Spanish Law 22/94 of 1994 provides that: "In any case, a product is defective if it 
does not offer the safety normally offered by models in the same line." Furthermore, in a much-criticised 
case involving an exploding bottle, the German Federal Court has held that the development risk 
defence in the Products Liability Directive does not apply to manufacturing errors. Hodges ‘The Case of 
the Exploding Bottle of Water’ (1996) 73 Product Liability International at 18. 
1209  (2001) 3 All ER 289. 
1210  Micklitz, Stuyck & Terryn Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law (2010) 462. 
1211  3.4.1.6. 
1212  3.2.1.6. 
1213  3.2.3. 
1214  Stapleton ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ (2000) 39 
Washburn Law Journal 379-380. 
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might legitimately outweigh norms of fairness, which can be regarded as both strange and 
inconsistent.” 
 
In South African common law of delict, no separate rules have crystallised in respect of 
different types of product defects. It is argued that there should be no rigid differentiation 
between manufacturing, design and warning defects in the CPA as the categories will 
inevitably overlap, giving rise to legal uncertainty.1215 The difficulty of the various concepts 
of defectiveness in section 61 have already been illustrated in the Halstead-Cleak 
cases1216 and the 2014 CGSO decision regarding the allegedly defective drain cleaner.1217 
However, it is argued that different approaches are likely to be followed by South African 
courts depending on the type of alleged defect in issue, like the US experience.1218 For 
instance, with respect to manufacturing defects, the intended design and performance of 
comparable product types are likely to carry the most weight, whereas a cost-benefit-utility 
approach will likely be followed in assessing design or warning defects. 
 
In South African common law of delict, the concept of ‘defect’ in the context of product 
liability is linked to the delictual element of wrongfulness, consisting of a legal duty owed 
by the manufacturer not to expose persons harm by ‘putting into circulation potentially 
harmful things.’1219 This element involves consideration, in hindsight, of all the relevant 
                                                          
1215  Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ 
(2006) 3 Stell LR 429.  
1216  Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Limited [2015] JOL 33332 (GP); Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-
Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150, discussed below at 4.3.2. 
1217  4.3.1. 
1218  Loubser & Reid ‘Liability for Products in the Consumer Protection Bill 2006: A Comparative Critique’ 
(2006) 3 Stell LR at 429. 
1219  Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562, 1932 SC (HL) 31, as cited by the South African Appellate 
Division in Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) 486F.  
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circumstances, to determine whether the harm caused by the defendant’s product was 
objectively unreasonable.1220  
 
It is the author’s view that the classification of different types of product deficiencies in 
sections 53 and 61 of the CPA serves no real practical purpose and gives rise to 
significant legal uncertainty and confusion. It is suggested that the various definitions could 
be replaced with a single concept of “defect” for goods as is done in the EU Directive, the 
UKCPA and the ACL. However, it is suggested that the ‘expectations test’ for 
defectiveness of goods, similar to that employed by these foreign regimes, could be 
abandoned due to the criticism regarding its circularity and vagueness and potential for 
readmitting negligence to the enquiry. Instead, this test could be replaced with an objective 
reasonableness standard for determining defectiveness of goods, similar to the 
wrongfulness enquiry in the common law of delict.1221 The reasonableness of a product’s 
safety can be assessed with hindsight having regard to all the relevant circumstances, 
without reintroducing negligence to the enquiry. 
 
It is suggested that the reasonableness test be expressly supported by a non-exhaustive 
list of relevant considerations to provide a guideline to courts when assessing 
defectiveness. The particular weight attaching to each factor will arguably depend on the 
type of alleged defect in question, which would be at the court’s discretion. To this end, 
section 61(1) could perhaps be amended as follows: 
                                                          
1220  Boberg The Law of Delict I (1984) 269-70. 
1221  As suggested by Loubser & Reid Commentary on the Draft Consumer Protection Bill (2006) 17 Stell LR 
at 421. 
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"61(1) Except to the extent contemplated in subsection (4), the producer or importer, 
distributor or retailer of any goods is liable for any harm, as described in subsection (5), 
caused wholly or partly as a consequence - of a defect in the goods, 
(a) supplying any unsafe goods; 
(b) a product failure, defect or hazard in any goods; or 
(c) inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the consumer pertaining to any 
hazard arising from or associated with the use of any goods; 
irrespective of whether the harm resulted from any negligence on the part of the producer, 
importer, distributor or retailer, as the case may be." 
Further, it is suggested that “defect” with respect to goods that are the subject of a section 
61-claim could perhaps be defined as follows by the CPA: 
"(1) For purposes of Part H, goods have a ‘defect' if they are not reasonably safe. 
(2)  In determining the extent of the safety of goods, regard is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances, including: 
(a) the manner in which, and the purposes for which, they have been marketed; and 
(b)  the standard intended for the product by the producer; 
(c)  standards or duties prescribed by legislation for the goods; 
(b)  their packaging; and 
(c)  the use of any mark in relation to them; and 
(d)  any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or refraining from doing, 
anything with or in relation to them; and 
(e)  what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to them; and 
(f)   the time when the goods were manufactured or supplied; 
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(g) the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the goods by alternative 
manufacturing process or design; 
(h)  the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the goods. 
(i) the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the goods by alternative 
manufacturing process or design;" 
 
From a practical perspective, a single concept of defect, as employed by the ACL and EU 
Directive, would make it easier and less confusing for consumers to plead their case under 
section 61 and would provide courts with the necessary freedom to develop principles for 
determining defectiveness that are suitable to the particular type of alleged defect in 
question, whether manufacturing, design or warning related or in some cases, a 
combination.  
 
4.2.7 Defences / Restriction of Liability of the Supply Chain  
While a section 61-claimant may succeed in establishing defectiveness and the causal link 
with the harm suffered, liability will not necessarily follow. A section 61-defendant may 
invoke one of the following statutory defences: 
 
"61(4) Liability of a particular person in terms of this section does not arise if - 
(a)  the unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard that results in harm is 
wholly attributable to compliance with any public regulation; 
(b)  the alleged unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard - 
(i)  did not exist in the goods at the time it was supplied by that person to another 
person alleged to be liable; or 
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(ii)  was wholly attributable to compliance by that person with instructions provided 
by the person who supplied the goods to that person, in which case 
subparagraph (i) does not apply; 
 (c)  it is unreasonable to expect the distributor or retailer to have discovered the unsafe 
product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, having regard to that person’s role 
in marketing the goods to consumers; or 
(d) the claim for damages is brought more than three years after the - 
(i)  death or injury of a person contemplated in subsection (5)(a); 
(ii)  earliest time at which a person had knowledge of the material facts about an 
illness contemplated in subsection (5)(b); or 
(iii) earliest time at which a person with an interest in any property had knowledge of 
the material facts about the loss or damage to that property contemplated in 
subsection (5)(c); or 
(iv) the latest date on which a person suffered any economic loss contemplated in 
subsection (5)(d)." 
 
4.2.7.1 Compliance with public regulation 
Pursuant to section 61(4)(a) a defence is available where the unsafe or defective feature 
of goods is “wholly attributable to compliance with a public regulation.”  
 
For instance, if a supplier’s product complies with legislation aimed at regulating and 
promoting the safety of certain categories of products, such as the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics 
and Disinfectants Act 1222  or the Medicines and Related Substances Act 1223  and such 
                                                          
1222  54 of 1972. 
1223  101 of 1965. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 389 
compliance is established to be the sole cause of the product’s defectiveness, then section 
61 liability would not arise.1224 Compliance with voluntary standards or codes of practice 
relating to the product in question would not in itself entitle a supplier to the defence under 
section 61(4)(a).1225 
 
The EU Directive’s equivalent of this defence provides a defence to the producer where a 
product defect is “due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued by 
public authorities.”1226 This defence in the EU Directive is arguably broader than section 
61(4)(a) in that it does not specify whether the defect ought to be wholly attributable to 
compliance with a mandatory regulation. The implication of the Directive's wording would, 
therefore, be that it is possible for a producer to escape liability where the defect is partly 
caused by compliance with a mandatory regulation.  
 
The ACL provides a narrower defence than the EU Directive, more consistent with the 
CPA’s version, where the sole reason for the product defect is due to compliance with a 
mandatory standard.1227 Further, if a manufacturer succeeds with this defence, the ACL 
provides that the Commonwealth Government of Australia will be liable to compensate the 
plaintiff. Where a regulation provides a minimum safety standard and the manufacturer 
was free to exceed the minimum requirement without sanction, it cannot be argued that 
compliance with the regulation was the sole cause of the product defect.1228  
 
                                                          
1224  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-10. 
1225  Ibid.  
1226  3.3.4(i). 
1227  3.4.1.7(i). 
1228  Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. 1991. Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 1991 at par 53. [Online] Available: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/tpab21991266/memo_0.html. 
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Curiously, the US Restatement does not contain a similar defence.1229 A study by the 
American Law Institute in 1991 recommended that courts recognise a ‘government 
standards’ or ‘regulatory compliance’ defence, however, this was not pursued any further 
and American courts do not appear to have moved in this direction since then.1230  
 
This defence is unlikely to be of great practical use in South Africa as regulations are 
generally aimed at making products safer and would rarely force a manufacturer to 
produce an unsafe product. This is supported by the apparently limited reliance on this 
defence in the EU. In 2011 it was reported that the equivalent of this defence contained in 
article 7(d) of the EU Directive had rarely been raised in case law.1231  
 
It is suggested that consideration could be given by the South African legislature to 
providing Section 61 plaintiffs with a right of recourse, as is done by the ACL,1232 against 
the public authority responsible for the regulation where it is established by the defendant 
supplier that the product was defective solely due to compliance with that regulation under 
section 61(4)(a). However, there may well be valid policy reasons for the CPA not holding 
public authorities strictly liable in these circumstances. For instance, the view may be that 
public authorities should not be strictly liable for issuing product safety standards that do 
not provide the safest and most comprehensive information available, based on scientific 
knowledge at the time, given the financial restrictions within which these authorities 
operate. This policy argument would be particularly relevant in the context of a developing 
                                                          
1229  3.2.1.7(i). 
1230  Hammond, McGarity, Sachs, Shapiro and Wagner ‘The Role of Health & Safety Evidence in Regulation 
and the Civil Justice System: Preserving Protection of the Public’ (2014) CPR Issue Alert #1401 at 5. 
1231  European Commission ‘Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 
1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999. 
1232  3.4.1.7(i). 
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country such as South Africa. Further, an allocation of risk argument may dictate that, 
despite public safety regulations, it is those parties who put into circulation products for 
profit who should bear the primary and ultimate responsibility for ensuring their safety.  
 
4.2.7.2 Absence of defect at time of supply 
Section 61(4)(b)(i) provides a defence if a defendant can show a product defect did not 
exist in the goods at the time it was supplied by that defendant to another person alleged 
to be liable. “Supply” for purposes of the CPA includes selling, renting, exchanging and 
hiring for consideration.1233 It is not clear from the wording of this provision when exactly 
the supply is deemed to have occurred. Loubser & Reid 1234  favour a pragmatic 
interpretation, being that supply occurs when the defendant relinquishes possession or 
control of the goods. They argue that the purpose of this provision appears to be that a 
defendant should not be held liable if the defect in goods arose after the goods left that 
defendant’s control, perhaps due to mishandling or incorrect storage by a subsequent 
supplier, the consumer or another party.1235  
 
Section 61(4)(b)(i) appears to be similar to the approach in the EU. The EU Directive 
provides a defence if it can be shown that it is probable, in light of the circumstances, that 
the defect did not exist at the time when the producer put the product into circulation or 
that the defect came into being afterwards. 1236  The equivalent of this defence in the 
transposing provision under the UKCPA was applied in the case of Terence Piper v JRI 
                                                          
1233 Section 1. 
1234 Product Liability in South Africa 132. 
1235  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-10. 
1236  3.4.1.7(ii). 
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(Manufacturing) Limited.1237 In this case, the court had to consider whether a defective hip 
prosthesis, which fractured after implantation, was defective at the time it was supplied by 
the manufacturer to the hospital. Based on the manufacturer’s evidence regarding its 
quality control processes and inspections, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that any 
defect in the surface of the prosthesis would have been identified by the manufacturer 
prior to delivery, even though there was no proof of inspection of the specific prosthesis 
that failed. The court held that it was not necessary for the manufacturer to prove the 
actual cause of the defect and when it arose in order to succeed with this defence.  
 
It is unclear from the wording of section 61(4)(b)(i) of the CPA what level of proof a 
defendant supplier would have to meet in order to succeed with this defence. In the 
absence of any legislative clarification in this regard, the onus would arguably rest with 
defendant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the defect did not exist at it time it 
left that defendant’s possession or control. Presumably, if the defendant can adduce 
sufficient evidence regarding its quality control measures to justify a prima facie case that 
the defect arose after leaving the defendant’s possession or control, the onus would then 
shift to the plaintiff to rebut this. It is doubtful whether a South African court would allow the 
defence to succeed where the defendant cannot provide proof of inspection of the 
particular product that allegedly caused harm, as done by the English Court of Appeal in 
Terence Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Limited.1238 In the interest of assisting vulnerable 
consumers in the particular context of South Africa who are often unable to produce the 
same level of expert evidence as sophisticated manufacturers at trial, South African courts 
may be inclined to require stricter proof from the defendant as to the absence of a defect in 
the particular product for purposes of sction 61(4)(b)(i). 
                                                          
1237  [2006] 92 BMLR 141, discussed at 3.3.1.8(i) aboce. 
1238  [2006] 92 BMLR 141, discussed at 3.3.1.8(i) aboce. 
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The ACL provides a similar defence where a safety defect did not exist at the time when 
the goods were supplied by their actual manufacturer. 1239 In the case of electricity under 
the ACL, the defect must not have existed at the time when the electricity was “generated”; 
in other words, before it was transmitted or distributed.  Further, the ACL provides an 
express defence to manufacturers of “finished goods” where a defect in a finished good is 
caused or contributed to by a component.1240 
 
 
While the US Restatement (Third) does not provide for a general defence based on the 
absence of a defect at the time of supply, it provides an implied defence to this effect. In 
the case of design and warning defects, it is a defence where the consumer or user 
misuses, modifies or alters the product. 1241  Further, the US Restatement specifically 
provides for liability of commercial sellers or distributors of defective product components 
for harm caused by another product into which that defective component was 
integrated.1242  
 
In practice, section 61(4)(b)(i) of the CPA will arguably provide a defence to the producer 
or supplier of a component good if that producer or supplier of the component can show 
that the component was not defective at the time of supply to the manufacturer of the 
finished product.1243 For instance, if A manufactures and supplies a component based on 
(incorrect) technical specifications provided by B, the component in itself is not necessarily 
defective at the time of supply. It may be that the component only becomes defective when 
incorporated into the final product produced by B. Arguably, in these circumstances A 
                                                          
1239  3.4.1.7(ii). 
1240  3.4.1.7(ii). 
1241  3.2.4(iii). 
1242  3.2.2. 
1243  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-10. 
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should be able to successfully raise the defence under section 61(4)(b)(i) and B should be 
liable for a defect in the ultimate complex product, over which the latter had control.  
 
Section 61(4)(b)(ii) of the CPA provides a defence to a person where the unsafe product 
characteristic, failure, defect or hazard is "wholly attributable to compliance by that person 
with instructions provided by the person who supplied the goods to that person." The 
wording of this section is by no means a model of drafting clarity. However, the plain 
meaning of the wording would appear to cover the scenario where a supplier (A) provided 
goods to another person (B) together with instructions, for instance in relation to 
maintenance, storage or use. Where the unsafe characteristic, failure, defect or hazard 
arises solely due to compliance with A's instructions, this subsection provides B with a 
defence and precludes A from raising the defence in section 61(4)(b)(i). This defence was 
arguably introduced as recognition of the reality that retailers are often unfamiliar with the 
technicalities of certain products and that they should not be held strictly liable for merely 
following the instructions provided to them by their supplier. In reality, the party providing 
instructions with a product would in the majority of cases be the producer of that product 
or, at least, a supplier with more sophisticated knowledge of the product than subsequent 
suppliers. Section 61(4)(b)(ii) therefore seems to allocate the risk of liability to that party 
with more sophisticated knowledge of the product as opposed to generalist and/or small, 
unsophisticated retailers. This defence therefore seems to strike a fair balance between 
the interests of parties in the supply chain thereby promoting a “fair” and “sustainable” 
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4.2.7.3 Defect not reasonably discoverable 
Section 61(4)(c) provides that the liability of a “particular person” does not arise if it was 
“unreasonable to expect the distributor or retailer to have discovered the unsafe product 
characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, having regard to that person's role in marketing the 
goods to consumers.” The circumstances where this defence could be raised may include 
so-called ‘development risks,’ being risks that are only discovered as the goods are being 
used by consumers and which were not be known or detectable at the time of supply.  
 
In comparison, the US Restatement (Third)1244 does not expressly provide a development 
risks defence but recognises in commentary to the provision defining “design defects” that 
a manufacturer may seek to avoid liability for an alleged design defect by arguing that the 
product conforms to industry practice and incorporates the most advanced or cutting edge 
technology or scientific knowledge available. It is generally agreed by US courts that 
conformance of a design with the state of the art is not an absolute defence. In some 
states, compliance with industry practice is considered to be a relevant factor to 
determining defectiveness and may create a rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness. 
A small number of states allow for an absolute defence based on compliance with industry 
practice, judging the product design against the state of the art existing either at the time of 
design or at the time the product was made available on the market. 
 
The ACL1245 expressly provides for a development risks defence in circumstances where 
the manufacturer can show the “state of scientific or technical knowledge” at the time the 
goods were supplied did not make it possible to discover the safety defect. Australian case 
                                                          
1244  3.2.1.7(iii). 
1245  3.4.1.7(iii). 
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law indicates this defence has only been raised successfully once, under the equivalent 
provision in the former Trade Practices Act.  
 
The EU Directive1246 similarly provides an express defence to producers where “the state 
of scientific and technical knowledge at the time the producer put the product into 
circulation” did not allow the defect to be discovered.1247  
 
This defence has been subject to extensive academic criticism. For instance, Stapleton1248 
doubts the supposed ‘strictness’ of liability when it is supported by a ‘development risk’ 
type defence: she points out that by allowing the producer or supplier to escape liability on 
the ground that it acted reasonably, in effect amounts to re-admittance of negligence or 
fault-based liability. However, industry pressure and policy reasons such as the rise in 
insurance costs of businesses and inhibition of innovation, have been central to the 
inclusion of this defence in foreign jurisdictions.1249 Consumers and businesses would lose 
out if useful new products are kept off the market because they might pose a development 
risk. These considerations have outweighed the counter argument that inclusion of the 
defence would emasculate strict liability and re-introduce elements of fault.1250  Stapleton 
is of the view that strict product liability in Australia, which is modelled on the EU Directive 
with its development risk defence, provides little more exposure to liability than could be 
generated under a demanding negligence standard. 1251 
 
                                                          
1246  3.3.1.7(iii). 
1247  3.3.1.7(iii). 
1248  ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ (2000) 39 Washburn 
LJ 369. 
1249  Clark Product Liability (1989) 152. 
1250  147-148. 
1251  ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’ (2000) 39 Washburn 
LJ 369. 
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The ACL and EU Directive’s formulations of this defence differ from the CPA’s version in 
that the ACL and EU Directive’s defences are based on “scientific and technical 
knowledge” at the time the producer supplied or put the product into circulation whereas 
the CPA makes no reference to these words. Interestingly, section 61(4)(c) of the CPA in 
its final form differs from the formulation in the draft Bill in that ‘the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time the good was under the control of that person” has been 
removed as a consideration along with the “person’s role in marketing the goods to 
consumers.” Section 68(5)(c) of the Draft Consumer Protection Bill 2007 (8 September 
2006) provided that: 
“it is unreasonable to expect the distributor or retail supplier to have discovered the 
unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, having regard to - (i) that 
person’s role in marketing the goods to consumers; and (ii) the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time the goods were under the control of that 
person.” 
 
It is argued that the ‘development risks’ wording used in the EU Directive was removed 
from the final CPA due to widespread academic criticism that this defence readmits fault-
based liability.1252 However, the omission of these words in the final CPA would arguably 
make no difference to the ultimate test for this defence, since general reasonableness 
from a hindsight perspective would in any event require that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the relevant time be taken into consideration.   
 
It has been held by the CJEU that the reference to “scientific and technical knowledge” in 
article 7(e) of the EU Directive does not refer to the state of knowledge in the industrial 
                                                          
1252  Botha & Joubert ‘Does the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 Provide for Strict Product Liability? - A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 74 THRHR at 315.  
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sector within which the producer of the product operates, but rather “the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge” in 
general.1253 In other words, it is irrelevant to the question of liability under the EU Directive 
that no-one within the particular class of manufacturer takes the necessary steps to 
eliminate or prevent a defect, if such steps can be taken based on the available 
knowledge. Section 7(e) is directed that the objective state of scientific and technical 
knowledge available, “of which the producer is presumed to have been informed.”1254 
However, the CJEU did qualify this by stating that the relevant knowledge must have been 
accessible at the time the product was put into circulation. The CJEU conceded that the 
‘accessibility’ of knowledge raises difficulties of interpretation, but held this is a matter for 
national courts to resolve.1255  
 
If South African courts were inclined to consider the “scientific knowledge and technical 
knowledge” as a relevent factor, they would have to consider this in the particular context 
of distributors and retailers in South Africa and the knowledge reasonably available and 
accessible to them or that they could reasonably be expected to possess. It is unlikely that 
courts would expect general distributors and retailers to be aware of the most advanced 
and latest scientific and technical knowledge reasonably accessible to enable detection of 
a defect, rather general knowledge that such suppliers could reasonably be expected to 
possess having regard to their role in marketing the goods. It could perhaps also be 
relevant to consider whether a retailer is provided with any training or education by a 
producer regarding the product prior to being able to sell it.  
 
                                                          
1253  European Commission v United Kingdom [1997] All E.R. (EC) 481 at [20]; [26]. 
1254  [27]. 
1255  Ibid. 
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Based on the plain wording of the defence in section 61(4)(c), it therefore appears that 
section 61 provides a true form of strict liability for manufacturers and importers but a 
‘modified’ strict liability for distributors and retailers who can avail themselves of the 
section 61(4)(c) defence by showing it was unreasonable in the circumstances to expect 
them to have discovered the "unsafe product characteristic, failure, defect or hazard” 
having regard to their role in marketing the goods to consumers.1256  
 
It is questioned whether the omission of producers and importers from this defence was a 
legislative oversight given that section 61(4) refers at the outset to the liability of a 
“particular person”. The draft Bill similarly referred only to distributors and retailers in 
section 61(4)(c). While the plain meaning of subsection 61(4)(c) creates no ambiguity in 
itself as being limited to distributors and retailers, when read with the words “a particular 
person” at the start of section 61(4), there is ambiguity, which arguably warrants a 
purposive interpretation here. It was perhaps the legislature’s intention to provide this 
defence to retailers since they often do not have the opportunity to inspect products prior 
to on-sale, such as sealed products that would become unmarketable once opened, nor 
do they necessarily possess the knowledge or skill to detect defects. This would appear to 
strike a fair balance between the liability of suppliers in the distribution chain where the 
producer was closer to the product and had the opportunity to conduct proper quality 
controls prior to packaging. The omission of “importers” from this defence presumably 
serves to prevent a situation where a plaintiff has no recourse against the retailer and 
distributor based on this defence and the producer is overseas. In this scenario, fairness 
would perhaps dictate that the importer of the harmful product into South Africa should 
                                                          
1256 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 376. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 400 
bear liability towards the plaintiff, regardless of whether that importer could reasonably 
have detected the defect, in other words true strict liability.  
 
Botha and Joubert1257 argue that this defence defeats the purpose of true strict product 
liability as only manufacturers and importers will be strictly liable under section 61. Loubser 
& Reid1258 are similarly of the view that this defence has the potential to readmit fault-
based Aquilian liability through the back door by using a reasonableness test which judges 
the conduct of distributors and retailers and “removes liability for risks which could not 
reasonably have been anticipated.” Therefore, the authors argue that the reasonableness 
test for purposes of this defence should be a “high, although not unattainable standard of 
reasonableness.”1259 The conduct of the distributor or retailer should be assessed in light 
of the “highest level of good practice in the relevant industry.”1260 However, the authors 
caution that, even with such high standards, there are numerous types of defects that “one 
could not reasonably expect even a highly responsible distributor or retailer to 
discover.”1261  
 
The reference to retailers’ and distributors’ “role in marketing the goods to consumers” 
would arguably require courts to consider, for instance, whether they had the opportunity 
to open packaging and inspect the goods. There are numerous consumer goods that are 
packaged and sealed in such a way that distributors and retailers are unable to inspect 
those products for defects prior to on-sale without rendering them unmarketable. Even if 
                                                          
1257 ‘Does the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 Provide for Strict Product Liability? - A Comparative 
Analysis’ (2011) 74 THRHR at 318.  
1258  Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-11.  
1259  Ibid. 
1260  61-12. 
1261  Ibid.  
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intermediate inspection by these suppliers is possible, it would hardly be practically and 
economically feasible to require distributors and retailers to do so for every single product 
they supply. Therefore, the question may be what level of sampling for quality control 
purposes would be reasonable to expect of a distributor or retailer. There are also 
products which are of a highly technical or complex nature which means distributors or 
retailers could not be expected to psosess the knowledge or skill to conduct testing. The 
question may then become whether they are reasonably expected to outsource to 
independent testing. As this illustrates, the reasonableness standard would require a 
balancing of the interests of distributors and retailers and the protection of consumers, 
having regard to the particular circumstances, such as the nature of the product and the 
parties involved.   
 
In light of the academic criticism of this defence and in the interest of creating a legal 
framework for a “fair” and “sustainable” consumer market while protecting vulnerable 
consumers, it is the author’s view that section 61(4) should not be available to producers 
and importers, as it has the potential to severely undermine the strictness of section 61 
liability. However, its availability to retailers and distributors is supported as it strikes a fair 
balance between the interests of the supply chain inter se and the supply chain vis-à-vis 
the section 61 plaintiff.  
 
It is unclear what practical impact this defence will have in South Africa or to what extent it 
will ‘weaken’ the strictness of section 61 liability. It is noteworthy that, since the 
introduction of this defence in Australia in 1992, it has only been considered twice in 
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reported case law.1262 Further, by 2002, the practical application of this defence under the 
EU Directive was still extremely limited in reported case law despite being available for 17 
years.1263 In 2011 a report by the European Commission on the application of the EU 
Directive1264 noted that stakeholders1265 have differing opinions regarding the effectiveness 
of this defence, but recognise that the EU Directive overall strikes an appropriate balance 
between the competing interests of industry and consumers. The report noted that industry 
and insurance representatives believe removal of the defence would stifle innovation and 
raise insurance costs. They argue the fact that exclusion removal of this defence has not 
had any significant impact in Finland or Luxembourg is due to the size of the markets in 
these member states. On the other hand, consumer representatives are in favour of 
removing this defence. It remains unclear exactly what practical impact the development 
risk defence has had to date on strict product liability claims in the EU. However, it is 
considered important in order to maintain an appropriate balance between producers and 
persons harmed by defective products and has had a limited economic impact in at least 
two member states. That much is clear. Of course, the fact that it has not been applied 
much in EU case law does not mean that the defence has not been raised frequently and 







                                                          
1262  Ryan v Great Lakes Council [1999] FCA 177; Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd 
[2010] FCA 180. 
1263  Ibid. 
1264  Fourth report on the application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
10 May 1999  
1265 Member States’ national authorities and members of informal advisory groups in the EU.  
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4.2.7.4 Apportionment of liability 
Section 61-liability is joint and several and is imposed on all parties who participate in the 
retail process, from the producer to the retailer.1266 Section 61(6)(c) provides that there is 
no limitation on the authority of the court to apportion liability among “persons who are 
found to be jointly and severally liable.” This provision does not elaborate further on the 
basis for apportionment, perhaps to allow courts to develop rules suitable to section 61 
liability. 
 
Since section 61-defendants are jointly and severally liable, they are arguably ‘joint 
wrongdoers’ for purposes of the Apportionment of Damages Act,1267 which provides a right 
of recovery between joint wrongdoers. 1268  However, the difficulty with applying 
apportionment in strict liability claims is that apportionment is based on the notion of 
comparative degrees of fault, whereas strict liability is by nature faultless. It is, therefore, 
unclear whether courts will apply the Apportionment of Damages Act for purposes of 
section 61 liability. To date, courts have not applied this Act in other strict liability actions 
such as the actio de pauperie, rather adopting an all or nothing approach, however, the 
possibility of applying apportionment in strict liability actions has not been ruled out by 
courts.1269 
 
Further, the plain literal meaning of section 61(6)(c), particularly “persons who are found to 
be jointly and severally liable” does not appear to provide for apportionment in respect of 
the plaintiff-defendant relationship. The draft provision in the Consumer Protection Bill, 
                                                          
1266 Section 61(3).  
1267 Act 34 of 1954, s 2.  
1268 Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-9.  
1269 Svamvur v Portwood 1970 (1) SA 144 (R) 145; Swart v Honeyborne 1981 (1) SA 974 (C) 976B. 
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previously in section 61(7) of the draft Bill mirrors the final version. This omission appears 
to have been an unfortunate oversight by the legislature. The CPA’s purpose of 
establishing a legal framework for a “fair” and “sustainable” consumer market would dictate 
that section 61 liabilities should take note of the actions of a plaintiff who recklessly ignores 
safety warnings or instructions or misuses goods, thereby contributing to their harm and 
that the defendant’s liability be reduced accordingly. If suppliers are held liable for a 
plaintiff’s conduct that contributed to the harm, it would drive suppliers out of the market 
and reduce consumer access to goods, which would not promote the welfare of 
consumers generally. However, it is doubtful that courts would stray from the plain 
meaning of section 61(6)(c) to read it as including apportionment of liability between 
defendants and the plaintiff. This omission would need to be rectified by the legislature. 
 
By comparison, the EU Directive expressly provides for reduction of damages on the basis 
of “the fault of the injured person.” The UKCPA which transposes the EU Directive, 
expressly provides that, where harm is caused partly by a product defect and partly by the 
fault of the injured person, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 and 
section 5 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (contributory negligence) apply as if the defect 
were the fault of every defendant liable for the harm caused by the defect. This has the 
effect of deeming the “defect” in the product to be the “fault” of the defendants liable under 
the UKCPA for harm caused by that defect. This is done to address the theoretical 
problem of apportioning liability as is done in negligence claims, under a strict liability 
regime where fault does not feature. 
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The ACL1270  provides that, where the loss was caused by both a defect in the goods and 
an act or omission of the person who suffered loss, the court will reduce the amount of 
compensation by an appropriate amount, taking all relevant circumstances into account.  
 
The US Restatement (Third)1271  expressly provides for apportionment of responsibility 
based on a plaintiff’s conduct which “fails to conform to generally applicable rules 
establishing appropriate standards of care.” The rules for apportionment in this regard, and 
between defendants, are governed by the relevant state laws.  
 
Given the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions considered to allow apportionment 
of responsibility between the parties to a strict product liability action and in the interest of 
establishing a consumer market that is “fair” and “sustainable” that promotes the welfare of 
consumers generally, it is the author’s view that the section 61 claim ought to allow 
apportionment of liability having regard to both the plaintiff and defendant(s) contribution to 
the causation of harm. One solution suggested to the theoretical problem of applying 
apportionment in a strict liability claim is to assess apportionment on the basis of 
comparative causation, rather than comparative fault.1272 In other words, courts would 
need to objectively assess to what degree the harm was caused by the product defect, the 
actions of the plaintiff and the actions of the defendant(s). Loubser & Reid point out that 
there is some authority at common law for apportionment on the basis of comparative 
causation. 1273  Another solution would be to follow the approach in the UKCPA by 
expressly stating in Section 61 that the Apportionment of Damages Act applies and that 
                                                          
1270 3.4.1.7(iv). 
1271 3.2.1.7(iv). 
1272 Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-29.  
1273 Ibid, citing General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 (4) SA 228 (A) 235. 
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the “defect”, “hazard”, “failure” or “unsafe” characterstic of the goods that caused harm is 
deemed to be the “fault” of the section 61 defendant(s). 
 
In the interest of removing any legal uncertainty regarding the basis for apportionment and 
whether apportionment applies with respect to the plaintiff’s contribution to the harm, it is 
suggested that the CPA should expressly prescribe rules for apportionment or 
alternatively, expressly state that the rules under the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 
1954 apply to section 61 claims. 
 
4.2.7.5 Prescription 
Pursuant to subsection 61(4)(d), liability does not arise if a section 61 claim is brought 
more than 3 years after- 
 the death or injury of a person referred to in subsection (5)(a); 
 the earliest time at which a person had knowledge of the material facts about an illness 
contemplated in subsection (5)(b); or 
 the earliest time that a person with an interest in property had knowledge of the material 
facts about loss or damage to that property contemplated in subsection (5)(c); or 
 the latest date on which a person suffered economic loss referred to in subsection 
(5)(d). 
 
Section 61(4) appears to provide for a prescription period in respect of section 61 liability, 
however it does not use the established terminology contained in the Prescription Act 68 of 
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1969.1274 It is therefore queried to what extent the prescription provisions under the CPA 
are intended to co-exist with the Prescription Act. Section 16 of the Prescription Act states 
that provisions of the Act shall apply to: 
“any debt arising after the commencement of this Act’, save in so far as they are 
"inconsistent with the provisions of any Act of Parliament which prescribes a 
specified period within which a claim is to be made or an action is to be instituted 
in respect of a debt or imposes conditions on the institution of an action for the 
recovery of a debt.” 
 
Further, section 11(d) of the Prescription Act provides that the general 3-year prescription 
period applies to all debts not otherwise provided for in section 11 “save where an Act of 
Parliament provides otherwise.” The question is therefore whether section 61-liability 
constitutes a “debt” for purposes of the Prescription Act, and if so, whether section 61(4)(d) 
of the CPA is inconsistent with the Prescription Act. Loubser & Reid1275 identify various 
interpretation problems or uncertainties arising from the wording of section 61(4)(d) 
relating, for instance, to the calculation of the time limit, interruption and delay of the 
running of time and aspects which may indicate inconsistencies between section 61(4)(d) 
and the Prescription Act. A discussion of these interpretive problems is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
In essence, the authors state that all of these interpretative problems and uncertainties 
could have been avoided if section 61(4)(d) had simply stated that section 61-liability 
constitutes a “debt” for purposes of the Prescription Act. The authors suggest that section 
61(4)(d) be interpreted to reflect this position. Whether such an interpretation is possible 
                                                          
1274 Loubser & Reid Section 61 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(2014) at 61-14. 
1275 Ibid, see discussion at 61-14 to 61-22. 
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based on the rules of statutory interpretation requires a detailed discussion of the 
interpretive problems presented by section 61(4)(d), which is beyond the scope of this 
study. If the interpretation suggested by these authors is not possible, it is suggested that 
the legislature amend section 61(4)(d) to confirm that section 61 liability constitutes a 
“debt” for purposes of the Prescription Act or alternatively, provide detailed prescription 
rules for section 61 which addresses the uncertainties identified by these authors.  
 
It is further noted that the CPA does not impose a so-called ‘long-stop’ provision such as 
employed by the ACL1276 and the EU Directive,1277 which provides that a claim cannot be 
brought more than 10 years after the supply of the goods by the manufacturer or the time 
when the product was put into circulation. The reason for this repose period in these 
jurisdictions presumably relate to concerns over procedural fairness and evidentiary 
difficulties. A manufacturer is unlikely to retained detailed production or quality control 
records relating to a product supplied more than 10 years ago. Further, the product may 
have been subject to considerable use, wear and tear and changed ownership multiple 
times.  
It is unclear whether this was a legislative oversight or whether such a long-stop period 
was intentionally omitted. The draft version of section 61 in the Consumer Protection Bill 
made no reference to a long-stop period. In the interest of establishing a legal framework 
for a “fair” consumer market, procedural fairness and in light of the prevailing practice in 
the foreign jurisdictions considered, it is suggested that the legislature give consideration 
to providing for a ‘long-stop’ prescription period in the CPA for purposes of section 61 
claims.  
                                                          
1276 3.4.1.7(v). 
1277 3.3.1.7(v). 
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4.2.7.6 Contractual restriction of liability 
Section 49(1) allows for “consumer agreements” that purport to limit the risk or liability of 
the supplier or another person, amounts to an assumption of risk or liability by the 
consumer, imposes a duty on consumers to indemnify suppliers or other persons; or 
provide for an acknowledgement of facts by the consumer. However, section 49 requires 
that notice be given to consumers of such terms. Any notice to consumers or a term of a 
consumer agreement of this nature must be drawn to the attention of the consumer in a 
manner and form that satisfies the formal requirements of subsections (3) to (5). In 
addition, section 49(2) provides that, if a provision or notice concerns any activity or facility 
that is subject to any risk -  
 of an unusual character or nature; 
 the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware or 
notice, or which an ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonable be expected to notice 
or contemplate in the circumstances; or 
 that may cause serious injury or death, 
 
 
then the supplier must "specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to 
the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the requirements of 
subsections (3) and (5), and the consumer must have assented to that provision or notice 
by signing or initialling the provision or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision." 
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Such a provision, condition or notice must be written in plain language, as described in 
section 22.1278 Further, the provision or notice must be drawn to the consumer's attention 
in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert 
consumer in the circumstances; and before the consumer enters into the transaction or 
agreement or is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or 
agreement. The consumer must be given an adequate opportunity in the circumstances to 
receive and comprehend the provision or notice.1279 
 
Section 48(1)(b) prohibits a supplier from marketing, negotiating or entering into a 
transaction for the supply of goods in a manner that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. A 
supplier is also prohibited from requiring a consumer to waive any rights, assume any 
obligation, or waive any liability of the supplier, on unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms.1280  
Section 48 provides a general description of ‘unfair, unjust or unreasonable transactions, 
agreements, terms or conditions or notices’, namely if:1281  
 it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or other 
person to whom goods or services are to be supplied; 
 the terms are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable; 
 the consumer relied on a false, misleading or deceptive representation, within the 
meaning of section 41, or an opinion provided by or on behalf of the supplier, to the 
consumer's detriment; or 
 the agreement was subject to a term, condition or a notice contemplated in section 
49(1), and the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or 
                                                          
1278For a detailed discussion of the requirements of plain language, see:  Stoop Section 22 in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 22-1 to 22-13 
1279Section 49(5). 
1280 Section 48(1)(c). 
1281 Section 48(2)(a)-(d).  
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unconscionable; or that term, condition or notice was not drawn to the consumer's 
attention in a manner that complies with section 49. 
 
There are varying views in literature as to whether section 61-liability can be contractually 
excluded, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is 
necessary to refer to the main arguments put forth in this regard. 
 
Strydom argues that the supply chain would not be able to exclude section 61 liability 
altogether as a full exclusion of liability would contravene section 51 and consequently be 
void.1282 Section 51 prohibits, inter alia, any terms that have the effect of depriving a 
consumer of a right in terms of the Act, set aside the effect of any provision of the Act or 
otherwise defeat the purposes and policy of the Act. It is argued that a supplier may, at 
most, be able to limit the amount of damages it is liable for, but the limitation must not be 
such as to amount to an unfair contract term in terms of section 48.1283 Accordingly, so it is 
argued, it appears the CPA has adopted a balanced approach whereby the supply chain 
cannot contract out of strict product liability but can limit the extent of liability by means of 
contractual provisions that meet the requirements of sections 22, 48, 49 and 51.1284  
 
The author does not support Strydom’s view in relation to liability for death or personal 
injury. As Naudé1285 correctly argues, the grey listing of exemption clauses in respect of 
liability for death and personal injury “precludes any conceivable argument that section 
49(2)(c) permits such exemption clauses and that that provision protects them from a 
fairness review provided they comply with the formal requirements of that provision.” It is 
argued that section 49(2)(c) provides a minimum threshold which any provision relating to 
                                                          
1282 ‘A Critical Analysis of Strict Product Liability in South Africa’ (2012) at 121. 
1283 Ibid. 
1284 122.  
1285 Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-12. 
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such risks must comply with, but exemption clauses relating to bodily injury or death are 
likely to be unfair, regardless of whether they are initialled or signed.1286 
 
It is contended that case law preceding the CPA on exemption clauses relating to bodily 
injury and death remain relevant as the CPA does not affect any consumer rights afforded 
by common law.1287  Therefore, the question of whether a clause is “unfair” for purposes of 
section 48 may set a lower standard than illegality or public policy.1288 Naudé contends 
that the grey listing of these clauses will indicate to courts that such clauses would 
normally be unfair, unless there are good reasons to uphold them. At common law, the 
point of departure is that the party alleging an indemnity clause is contrary to public policy 
carried the risk of not being able to establish this. 1289  Case law preceding the CPA 
provided some indications that a court considering the common law standard of “public 
policy” might in the future consider all terms limiting or excluding liability for at least death, 
but possibly also personal injury, to be contrary to public policy due to these clauses 
infringing the consumer’s constitutional rights to life and bodily integrity.1290 
The effect of grey listing certain exemption clauses is that the onus will rest with the 
supplier to persuade the court that the term is fair by leading evidence that it has legitimate 
reasons for limiting or excluding its liability.1291 Such reasons may relate to the prohibitive 
cost of insurance, the fact that the goods are inherently dangerous, or there is a high risk 
of failure which is well known to the consumer, or the goods were produced in accordance 
                                                          
1286 Ibid. 
1287 44-13. Section 2(10).  
1288 Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-12. 
1289  44-13. 
1290  44-13, citing sections 11 and 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. See also 
discussion of case law at 44-13 and 44-15. 
1291  Naudé ‘The consumer's right to fair, reasonable and just terms under the new Consumer Protection Act 
in comparative perspective’ (2009) SALJ at 520-521. 
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with the consumer's particular specifications.1292 The consumer's interest should also be 
taken into consideration to determine the fairness of an exemption clause, particularly in 
cases where it is realistic to expect the consumer to insure against the loss in question.1293 
Other relevant factors may include the extent of negotiation and whether the consumer 
was aware of the clause well in advance prior to contracting with the supplier.  
 
It is worth noting that, while the EC Unfair Terms Directive grey-lists exemption clauses 
relating to bodily injury or death, the majority of EU member states prohibit such exemption 
clauses.1294 The EC Proposal on a Common European Sales Law and EC Proposal for 
Directive on Consumer Rights propose to blacklist these types of exemption clauses.1295 In 
comparison, the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 simply lists examples of 
terms that may be unfair, for instance, a term that limits or has the effect of limiting, one 
party's right to sue another party.1296  
 
In light of the grey-listing of contractual exemptions for personal injury and death arising 
from defective goods, the pre-CPA case law regarding the validity of such clauses, the 
constitutional rights of the consumer to life and bodily integrity, coupled with the underlying 
policy of the CPA to advance the welfare of consumers generally, it is unlikely a court will 
uphold exemption clauses that attempt to limit the supply chain’s section 61-liability to the 
plaintiff for bodily harm or death caused by defective products.   
 
                                                          
1292  Naudé Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-20. 
1293  44-21. 
1294  44-15 and examples provided at footnote 7.  
1295  44-15, citing Article 84(a) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Common European Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011; Annex II to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COMS 
(2008) 614 final, submitted on 8 October 2008. 
1296  Section 25(k). 
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With respect to an exemption clause for liability arising out of non-bodily harm caused by a 
defective product, it is noted that regulation 44 does not expressly grey list a term which 
purports to exclude or restrict the supply chain’s liability for harm other than personal injury 
or death. Regulation 44(3)(b) does however provide that a term is presumed unfair if it 
“has the purpose or effect of excluding or restricting the legal rights or remedies of the 
consumer against the supplier or another party in the event of total or partial breach by the 
supplier of any of the obligations provided for in the agreement…” Naudé explains that this 
means all exemption clauses which are not void for purporting to deprive the consumer of 
his or her rights under the CPA are presumed to be unfair. 1297  An example of an 
exemption clause which will be void for purporting to exempt the seller from liability under 
the Act is a clause “purporting to deprive the buyer of the right to claim damages under 
Section 61 for bodily injury, death or damage caused to property and resultant economic 
loss caused by defective goods, insofar as the defences provided for in section 61(4) are 
not available to the supplier.”1298 
 
Naudé argues that the CPA does not provide an express prohibition on exemption clauses 
in respect of damages claims for loss caused by defects in the goods of which the retailer 
could not reasonably have been aware and possibly, pure economic loss caused by 
defective goods,1299 provided that such loss did not arise as a result of the supplier’s gross 
negligence. 1300 Such exemption clauses would have to comply with the formal 
requirements in Section 49 and may be voided for being unfair pursuant to section 48. 
Further, an exemption clause in respect of liability for breach of contract which is not 
                                                          
1297  Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-17. 
1298  44-18. 
1299  The wording of section 61(5) creates uncertainty as to whether pure economic loss is recoverable under 
section 61. See discussion at 4.2.2(v). 
1300  Naudé Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-19. 
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prohibited will be presumed to be unfair for purposes of section 48 given the grey listing of 
such clauses in regulation 44(3)(b). An example would be a term providing that a supplier 
is not responsible for the economic interests of a consumer, thereby purporting to exclude 
liability for any pure economic loss sustained by the consumer.1301  
 
In the author’s view, courts are likely to interpret the CPA so as to prohibit exemption 
clauses in respect of the supply chain’s liability to the plaintiff for pure economic loss on 
the basis that the wording of section 61(5) is broad enough to include pure economic loss. 
Section 61(5)’s only reference to “economic loss” relates to economic loss that results from 
death, injury or illness or damage to property and does not expressly include “pure 
economic loss”. However, section 61(5) does not prescribe a numerus clausus of types of 
harm that may be recoverable and is broad enough, on the plain meaning of the wording, 
to include pure economic loss. Accordingly, allowing exemption clauses for pure economic 
loss would effectively amount to depriving consumers of a right under the CPA. 
 
As noted above at 4.2.1, it is argued that section 5(5) may extend section 61 liability to the 
transactions between the parties in the supply chain. For instance, a section 61 claim may 
potentially be brought by a retailer against a producer relating to the defective goods, loss 
of profit and to recover compensation for any claims brought against the retailer by the 
consumer. It is questioned whether this extended section 61 liability could be excluded 
contractually by parties in the supply chain inter se. De Stadler offers a number of 
arguments in this regard. 1302  Firstly, she contends that, where the transaction is not 
exempt from the CPA’s application, section 51 would prohibit the parties from excluding 
                                                          
1301  44-19 to 44-20. 
1302  Section 5 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 5-41 to 5-
42. 
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any liability under the CPA. The counter argument to this is that section 51 expressly 
refers to “transaction or agreement”. It follows that, if a transaction is exempt from 
application of the CPA, it is difficult to see how section 51 would apply to it.  
 
 
De Stadler further argues that, even if section 51 is not applicable to exempted 
transactions, it is arguable that section 61 in itself prevents exclusion of the liability 
imposed by it. She bases this argument on the common law requirement of lawfulness for 
validity of contracts. If a contractual agreement is in direct contradiction to an express or 
implied prohibition on excluding section 61 liability, there is a presumption that it is void ab 
initio.1303 Finally, it is suggested that section 61 perhaps implies that its liability cannot be 
excluded, even in cases where section 51 does not apply to a transaction. According to De 
Stadler, it is at least arguable that a purpose interpretation of section 61 would not prevent 
exclusion of its liability in cases where transactions are exempt from application of the 
CPA, such as transactions involving consumers who are large juristic persons or the State. 
The basis for this is that the CPA’s purpose focuses on the protection of vulnerable 
consumers, not sophisticated persons with stronger bargaining power. On the other hand, 
section 5(5) appears to protect the right of retailers to recover losses due to defective 
goods from distributors, and the right of distributors to recover losses against the producer 
or importer. It is argued that it would be an unjust position if the retailer did not have a 
recourse against any party higher in the supply chain who had the most control over the 
product’s safety and quality. This argument is supported in light of the legislative purpose 
of the CPA to establish a legal framework for a consumer market that is “fair” and 
“sustainable” and that strikes a fair balance between the parties in the supply chain.  
 
                                                          
1303  Ibid, citing Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 at 109; Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 
1986 (3) SA 181 (A) at 188 A-B. 
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By comparison, the EU Directive1304 expressly provides that the liability of the producer 
may not, in relation to the injured person, be limited or excluded by a provision limiting its 
liability or exempting it from liability.1305 This does not however affect the ability of the 
producer to limit its liability vis-à-vis subsequent suppliers. 
 
The US Restatement (Third) 1306  similarly provides that “any disclaimers, waivers or 
contractual limitations of product sellers or other distributors would not bar or reduce 
otherwise valid product liability claims for harm caused by new products to persons.’1307 
The reference to “new products” suggests that contractual limitations for second-hand 
products may be valid. The US Restatement (Third) does not prohibit the supply chain to 
limit their liability inter se.  
The ACL1308 provides that any consumer guarantees implied by the ACL and any rights 
and remedies affored by the ACL cannot be excluded by way of a contractual restriction or 
exemption clause. In fact, the ACL provides that a person may be subject to prosecution 
under the Act for attempting to do so. The Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
simply lists examples of terms that may be unfair, for instance, a term that limits or has the 
effect of limiting, one party's right to sue another party. In the author’s experience, 
manufacturers and suppliers in Australia would often include a clause in their contracts of 
sale whereby they exclude all implied warranties and liability, in so far as it is permitted by 
the ACL and other fair trade legislation. Such a clause may have the effect of excluding 
common law warranties and liability, however, the manufacturer or supplier would still be 
bound to comply with the ACL and may still be liable under the ACL for supplying defective 
                                                          
1304  3.3.1.7(vi). 
1305  3.3.4(iii). 
1306  3.2.1.7(vi). 
1307  3.2.4(vi). 
1308  3.4.1.7(vi). 
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goods. The ACL does not prohibit parties in the supply chain to contractually regulate 
liability inter se.  
 
There seems to be general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions considered that 
contractual clauses that have the effect of restricting or excluding the liability of suppliers 
of defective products, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, are prohibited or void. There also appears to 
be consensus that suppliers are generally free in these jurisdictions to contractually agree 
among themselves who would bear strict product liability in the event that a defective 
product causes harm.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that any contractual clause that has the effect of restricting or 
excluding the liability of the supply chain vis-à-vis the section 61 plaintiff for any type of 
harm envisaged in section 61(5) would be void for purporting to deprive a consumer of a 
right under the CPA. This would be consistent with the prevailing position in the foreign 
jurisdictions considered and more importantly, the underlying purpose of the CPA to 
protect vulnerable consumers who are generally in a much weaker bargaining position in 
respect of the terms of supply of consumer goods. As noted by the drafters of the US 
Restatement (Third), there is a presumption that the ordinary consumer lacks adequate 
information and bargaining power to agree to a fair contractual limitation of rights clause in 
a contract of sale.1309   
 
In the interest of legal certainty for both consumers and industry, it is suggested that the 
legislature expressly state the position regarding validity of contractual exemption clauses 
for strict product liability under section 61 in the CPA, particularly whether the supply chain 
                                                          
1309  3.2.1.7(vi). 
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can limit the extent of liability at all, rather than leaving it to the supply chain to interpret 
and apply the multitude of formal and substantive requirements for fair contract terms.  
 
From a practical perspective, pending further clarification from the legislature or courts 
regarding the validity of contractual exemption clauses in the context of section 61, it 
would be prudent for all South African suppliers of goods to revise their standard supply 
contracts with consumers to ensure conformance, as far as possible, with the 
requirements of fair contract terms under the CPA. Further, it is suggested that South 
African suppliers review their business insurance cover and consider obtaining specific 
product liability insurance. 
 
4.3 SECTION 61 IN PRACTICE 
Section 4(1) of the CPA provides that any of the persons listed in subsection 1 may, in the 
manner provided for in the CPA, approach a court, the National Consumer Tribunal 
(‘NCT’) or the National Consumer Commission (‘NCC’) when that person alleges that a 
consumer's rights under the CPA have been infringed, impaired or threatened, or that 
prohibited conduct is occurring. Section 69 provides that any person contemplated in 
section 4(1) may seek to resolve any dispute with a supplier by either: 
 referring the matter directly to the NCT, if permitted by the CPA in the case of the 
particular dispute;1310 
 referring the matter to the applicable ombud with jurisdiction, if the supplier is subject to 
the jurisdiction of that ombud;1311 
 if the supplier is not subject to the jurisdiction of a specific ombud:1312  
                                                          
1310 Section 69(a). 
1311 Section 69(b). 
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o referring the matter to the applicable industry ombud; or 
o applying to the consumer court of the province with jurisdiction over the matter if such 
a court exists and the rules governing that court so permits; or 
o referring the matter to another alternative dispute resolution agent contemplated in 
section 70; or 
o filing a complaint with the NCC pursuant to section 71; 
 approaching a court with jurisdiction, if all other remedies available to that person under 
national legislation have been exhausted.1313 
 
From a practical perspective, a section 61-plaintiff’s access to civil courts is restricted by 
section 69(d), which provides that a plaintiff may only approach a civil court (other than a 
consumer court) “if all other remedies available to that person in terms of national 
legislation have been exhausted.” This section suggests that a plaintiff would have to 
satisfy a civil court that he or she had attempted to obtain redress by way of other 
remedies, such as alternative dispute resolution and approaching the various entities listed 
in section 69 “Enforcement of rights by consumer” including the National Consumer 
Commission, the National Consumer Tribunal, ombuds with jurisdiction and consumer 
courts.  
 
Section 69(d) creates legal uncertainty and practical problems for plaintiffs. It is unclear 
from this provision whether a plaintiff would literally be required to exhaust “all other 
remedies” available under national legislation, which would be very onerous, particularly 
on vulnerable, impecunious and unsophisticated plaintiffs, and would significantly restrict 
access to civil courts. A detailed discussion of the implications of section 69(d) for access 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1312 Section 69(c). 
1313 Section 69(d). 
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to civil courts is beyond the scope of this study.1314 However, it is clear that this aspect 
should be clarified by legislature.  
 
 
4.3.1 Semi-judicial or administrative consideration of Section 61 
The NCC, established under section 85 of the CPA, is charged with the role of national 
regulator of consumer transactions under the auspices of the Department of Trade and 
Industry. 1315  Part of the NCC’s responsibilities include consumer education, research, 
registering and assessing consumer complaints and establishing institutions to enforce 
and implement regulatory instruments.1316 Further, the NCC conducts investigations into 
trade practices that may be in breach of the CPA and makes recommendations to the 
Minister for Trade and Industry in this regard.1317  
 
The NCC does not have the power to conciliate or adjudicate on disputes between 
consumers and suppliers; its powers are limited to investigating complaints.1318 Due to 
limited resources, it is impossible for the NCC to investigate all complaints received and it 
therefore refers complaints to alternate dispute resolution agencies1319 for resolution.1320  
                                                          
1314  For a discussion of the problems presented by section 69(d) and the routes to redress implied by 
section 69, see: Van Heerden Section 69 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer 
Protection Act (2014) at 69-15 to 69-20; Van Eeden Consumer Protection in South Africa (2013) 452 - 
454. 
1315  http://www.thencc.gov.za/content/about-ncc. 
1316   http://www.thencc.gov.co.za/content/overview-national-consumer-commission; Van Heerden Section 
85 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 85-1. The 
enforcement functions of the NCC are outlined in section 99 of the CPA and include, inter alia, 
promoting information dispute resolution. 
1317   For instance, the recent investigations into the nationwide meat industry which resulted in the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry issuing new labelling regulations.  
1318   http://www.thencc.gov.co.za/content/overview-national-consumer-commission. 
1319   For instance, provisional consumer affairs authorities and relevant ombudsman schemes, such as the 
National Consumer Goods and Services Ombud (CGSO). The NCC is working towards establishing 
further alternate dispute resolution mechanisms to facilitate quick and efficient resolution of consumer-
supplier disputes. 
1320   http://www.thencc.gov.co.za/content/overview-national-consumer-commission; 
http://www.thencc.gov.za/content/about-ncc. The NCC encourages consumers to first approach the 
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The National Consumer Goods & Services Ombudsman (‘CGSO’) is an independent non-
profit company established in March 2013 and is an accredited dispute resolution agent 
under the CPA.1321 The CGSO receives consumer complaints, makes recommendations 
and where necessary, refers matters to the NCC for further investigation, for instance 
where prohibited trade practices are suspected. The CGSO issues annual reports 
regarding the complaints it handles and enforces the Consumer Goods and Services 
Industry Code of Conduct.1322 The CGSO is not empowered by the Code to make binding 
rulings. However, section 3(2)(c) of the CPA provides that, when applying or interpreting 
provisions of the CPA, a person, court or Tribunal or the NCC may take into consideration 
any decision of an ombud. 
 
When the CGSO receives a complaint, it will as a point of departure forward the complaint 
to the relevant supplier as a last opportunity to resolve the complaint directly with the 
consumer.1323  If the complaint remains unresolved, the CGSO considers whether to refer 
the matter to formal mediation or whether to handle the complaint through more informal 
third party facilitation.1324 The majority of consumer complaints received by the CGSO are 
resolved through these processes, with the outcome in the complainant’s favour.1325 The 
CGSO's processes are informal with no formal pleadings or hearings, and the ombudsman 
is guided by the law and principles of fairness.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
relevant provincial consumer protection authority in their province or the relevant industry ombud, if a 
dispute cannot be resolved directly with the supplier. 
1321   CGSO Annual Report 2015/16 at 4 [Online] Available: http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/CGSO_2015_16_AnnualReportISpreads.pdf?87ab66. 
1322   Launched on 29 May 2015. 
1323  CGSO Compendium of Cases 2014-2015 at 4. [Online] Available: http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Compendium-of-cases_30_OCT_2015.pdf?87ab66. 
1324  Ibid. 
1325  Ibid. 
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In the financial year ended February 2016, the CGSO received 14,599 calls at its call 
centre with a total of 3,495 cases opened. Of these cases, 43% related to goods.1326 A 
compendium of cases publishes by the CGSO for the year 2014-2015 indicates that the 
majority goods complaints relate to claims for refunds, repair or replacement of goods. 
Since the CGSO's inception, there have been only two reported decisions regarding 
personal injury allegedly caused by defective goods where the complainants claimed 
damages under section 61.   
 
A decision by the CGSO titled “Injury caused by Defective Sandals” 1327  involved a 
complainant who sustained injury after she fell on the road due to a sandal that was 
allegedly unsafe to wear on the road. She submitted a claim to the supplier who denied 
liability as it did not agree there was any quality issue and also given that the shoes 
showed a fair amount of wear and tear. The complainant sent a claim to the supplier’s 
insurer, who rejected the claim. The insurer refused to provide the complainant with a copy 
of their investigations. The complainant then referred the matter to the CGSO. In its 
findings, the CGSO refers to the remedy provided by section 61 of the CPA, noting that 
consumers:  
“no longer have the onerous burden of proving fault. A consumer must however 
still prove that the product had some sort of flaw that made it unsafe or otherwise 
defective in terms of the definitions set out in the CPA, and the damage was 
caused wholly or partly by this defect.”1328 
 
                                                          
1326  CGSO Annual Report 2015/16 at 8 [Online] Available: http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/CGSO_2015_16_AnnualReportISpreads.pdf?87ab66. 
1327 (201503-0183) [2015] ZACGSO 3 (18 August 2015). 
1328 Ibid, under heading “Assessment”. 
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The CGSO arranged for the shoes to be returned to the supplier to be inspected and to 
determine if there are any defects or flaws that caused the complainant to fall. The supplier 
provided the CGSO with the inspection report completed when they first received the 
shoes (presumably from the manufacturer/distributor). The report indicated that the 
necessary quality checks were done before it was sent to various stores. The report also 
shows that the shoes passed the checks and tests performed on the shoes. The supplier 
confirmed that there had been no other returns of this particular sandal.  
 
The supplier returned the sandals to its quality department for further inspection. The 
quality department confirmed there had been considerable wear and tear on the shoes, 
especially the back of the heel tip and the forepart of the sole bottom, and the moulded 
grip lines and grip pattern had worn away. This would result in the sandal having reduced 
grip on wet, smooth surfaces. However, on normal paved, concrete or tar road surfaces, it 
would still perform its “normal intended purpose”.  
The CGSO’s findings were as follows: 
“Taking into account that there are various contributory factors that can cause one 
to fall, it is of paramount importance that we determine with certainty that the 
shoes were defective and that the defect caused the complainant to fall, before we 
can instruct the store to take responsibility for the complainant's injury. In this 
instance, we have not received any proof that the shoes are defective, and the 
reports returned from the supplier indicate that the shoes do not have any flaws 
and are not defective. Based on the facts of this case, the information and 
evidence furnished to this office and on the principles of reasonableness and 
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fairness, there is no reasonable prospect of this office making a recommendation 
in the complainant's favour.”1329 
 
The CGSO in this case appears to have required a high standard of proof of defectiveness 
and factual causation, namely “with certainty”. It is unclear whether this was with due 
consideration accepted as a higher standard than “on balance of probabilities.” The 
difficulty in this case is that there was simply no evidence suggestive of defectiveness. 
There were no competing theories of factual causation, only an allegation of defectiveness 
without any proof versus proof of considerable wear and tear and evidence by the 
producer of proper quality controls conducted.  
 
In determining defectiveness, the CGSO did not refer to any specific definition in section 
53, simply stating in somewhat informal terms that the complainant had to prove there was 
“some sort of flaw that made it unsafe or otherwise defective in terms of the definitions set 
out in the CPA.” By noting the sandals had been subject to considerable wear and tear 
which would impair its ability to perform its “normal intended purpose” the CGSO were 
perhaps suggesting that the sandals did not have any characteristic that rendered it “less 
useful, practicable or safe than persons generally would be reasonably entitled to expect in 
the circumstances” within the meaning of “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(ii)   
 
It also appears that the CGSO will apply general principles of reasonableness and fairness 
in assessing section 61 complaints. This is perhaps reference to the normative value 
judgment conducted in the context of wrongfulness (and defectiveness) as to whether 
liability should arise in a particular case.    
                                                          
1329   At 2. 
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A further complaint heard by the CGSO in 2014 titled “Burns caused by drain cleaner: 
warnings adequate” involved a consumer who had sustained serious chemical burns when 
he spilled drain cleaner (caustic soda) on his foot. 1330  The consumer sought 
reimbursement for medical expenses and pain and suffering damages from the supplier 
and distributor. The CGSO considered whether the complainant can establish a claim 
under any of the causes of action in section 61(1) by assessing the adequacy of warnings 
on the product. It was found by the CGSO that the consumer's failure to read and heed the 
warnings by using the product when his feet were unprotected and failure to immediately 
wash the product off with water was the immediate cause of the injury. The CGSO found 
that the warnings complied with the prescribed labelling standards and that the consumer 
is unable to prove a claim against the distributor or the supplier on any of the potential 
causes of action in section 61(1).  
 
The distributor denied liability, asserting that the labelling provided adequate warnings of 
the hazards and provided clear instructions as to how to remedy exposure of the product 
to skin. In particular, the labelling warns that consumers should wear protective gloves and 
eye protection and, in the event of skin contact, it should be‘immediately washed well with 
soap and water.  
 
The CGSO considered the relevant provisions of the CPA, in particular sections 22(2), 
58(2), 53(1)(c) relating to the meaning of ‘hazard’ and 61(1) as well as the SANS 10234 
(2007) regarding hazard symbols, hazard statements and signal words required to be 
included on labels of hazardous products. 
                                                          
1330  (20131220550) [2014] ZACGSO (29 April 2014). [Online] Available: http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Compendium-of-cases_30_OCT_2015.pdf?87ab66 at 83 - 90. 
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In determining whether the warnings accompanying the product were adequate, for 
purposes of section 61(1)(c), the CGSO considered section 58(2) of the CPA, which 
requires a person who packages any hazardous or unsafe goods to display on the goods, 
or within the packaging, a notice that meets the requirements of any other public regulation 
that is substantially similar to the requirements of section 22, in this case SANS10234 and 
SANS10265. 
 
The CGSO considered an expert report provided by the distributor and examined 
photographs of the product’s container. The CGSO noted that the pictogram on the 
container that warns of the corrosive nature of the product is the Globally Harmonized 
System corrosion symbol, depicted inside a square set at a point. This differs from the 
requirement in SANS10265 that the pictogram be “in the shape of a square”. The CGSO 
found that all that is required is “substantial similarity” to the requirements of section 22 
CPA and that the pictogram used is adequate. While the product label only mentions 
protective gloves and eye protection with no mention of protective footwear the GCSO 
found that, when this is read with the other warnings regarding the corrosive nature of the 
product: 
“it appears self-evident that a reasonable person would understand this to convey 
the advisability of handling the product with extreme caution and protecting all 
exposed areas of skin with suitable protective clothing.”1331 
 
With respect to the advice on the label regarding treatment in the event that skin is 
exposed to the product, the CGSO considered the equivalent treatment advice provided by 
                                                          
1331  (20131220550) [2014] ZACGSO (29 April 2014). [Online] Available: http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Compendium-of-cases_30_OCT_2015.pdf?87ab66 at 88. 
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the largest manufacturer of caustic soda in the world, 1332  which also advises that 
“immediate first aid is required, including flushing the area with running water…” The 
distributor's expert opined that the consumer's injuries indicate he did not immediately 
wash off the caustic soda after exposure. The CGSO noted that it is beyond the scope of 
its responsibility to make a definitive finding on this point, but did note that the facts point 
to the “probability” that the consumer did not follow the instructions.  
 
The CGSO found that the absence of advice on the container to seek medical attention in 
the case of skin exposure did not render the instructions inadequate as it is a matter of 
common sense to seek medical attention in the event of serious injuries of whatever 
nature. Further, the GCSO pointed out that, the more information is provided on the label, 
the smaller the text will become, suggesting that the warnings will be less visible or less 
likely to be read by consumers. The CGSO therefore concluded that the warnings are, as 
a whole, adequate, and a claim under section 61(1)(c) would not be successful. 
 
The next question was whether the product was otherwise “unsafe” within the meaning of 
section 61(1)(a) or contained a “hazard” within the meaning of section 61(1)(b). The CGSO 
raises concern that these subsections appear to be alternatives to section 61(1)(c) given 
the use of the word “or” between them, which: 
“could give rise to an absurd result: that the suppliers of hazardous goods such as 
petrol, paint stripper, pool acid and pesticides would be liable for all injuries or 
losses suffered no matter what precautions they took or warnings they gave. This 
would very soon result in suppliers discontinuing the supply of such products.” 
 
                                                          
1332  The Dow Chemical Company. 
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However, the CGSO considers this problem is addressed to some extent by the fact that a 
plaintiff would need to establish that the harm was caused “wholly or partly” by the supply 
of the goods or the hazard. This provides scope for a novus actus interveniens argument, 
in that failure by the consumer to heed the warnings on the product container to wear 
protective clothing and failure to follow the instructions to rinse skin immediately following 
exposure, were the immediate causes of the harm, not the hazardous nature of the 
product. The CGSO cited authority for the view that this novus actus by the consumer may 
relieve the supplier of liability.1333  
 
Ultimately the CGSO concluded that the plaintiff is not able to establish a claim against the 
distributor or the supplier on any of the grounds in section 61(1).  
 
The CGSO’s finding highlights the fact that consumers are expected to take reasonable 
care for their own safety and apply “common sense” when using goods, seemingly 
measured against the “reasonable person” standard at common law. Therefore, in 
assessing the defectiveness of a product, the reasonableness of the complainant’s 
conduct, the reasonably expected uses by consumers generally and “common sense” 
would be relevant factors.  
 
The CGSO’s finding further indicates that a relevant factor in the defectiveness enquiry in 
the context of inadequate warnings or instructions is the consideration that information 
overload could make instructions or warnings less effective. This links in with the concept 
of “cognitive capacity limits” of consumers, as identified in the field of behavioural 
                                                          
1333  http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Compendium-of-cases_30_OCT_2015.pdf?87ab66 
at 90, citing Visser & Potgieter ‘Law of Damages’ 2012 at 226 fn 226. 
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economics.1334 Further, the CGSO appears to suggest that the section 22 requirements for 
labelling need not be complied with in the strictest terms, rather “substantial similarity” is 
sufficient seemingly to protect industry from an excessive onerous strict liability standard. 
 
The main issue highlighted by the CGSO’s finding is the difficulty presented by the 
numerous alternate and seemingly overlapping definitions of product defectiveness 
contained in section 61(1). For instance, a product, particularly an inherently hazardous 
product, which is not accompanied by sufficient warnings or instructions in plain, clear 
language, may also be “unsafe” goods, or have a “defect” or “hazard”. More importantly, 
the finding highlights that the implications of the word “or” between section 61(1)(a), (b) 
and (c) raise concerns that suppliers of hazardous, unsafe or defective goods may be held 
liable for all harm caused by such goods, irrespective of the adequacy of warnings or 
instructions provided. Such an interpretation and application of these sections would 
certainly not promote a legal framework for a consumer market that is “fair”, “sustainable” 
or promotes the welfare of consumers generally as it would drive suppliers out of the 
market or increase the cost of goods, thereby reducing consumer access to goods. It is yet 
to be seen how courts will approach this potentially unfair result created by the wording of 
section 61.  
 
One potential solution to this issue an argument that, when courts assess defectiveness in 
terms of section 61(1)(a) or (b), the general “fairness” and “sustainable” consumer market 
principles underlying the CPA’s purposes would dictate that a product be considered in its 
entirety, in other words, taking all of its aspects into account. This would necessitate 
consideration of the adequacy of instructions or warnings accompanying the product, 
                                                          
1334  Discussed above at 1.3.2. 
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irrespective of whether section 61(1)(c) is pleaded. Whether such a purposive method of 
interpretation is justified in circumstances where the definitions of “unsafe”, “failure” and 
“hazard” in section 53 make no express reference to the word “reasonable” (as done in the 
definition of “defect”), is doubtful. Nevertheless, the CGSO’s repeated references to 
principles of “fairness” and “reasonableness” in this case and the case above dealing with 
the defective sandals, suggest that courts may in the future seek to interpret section 
61(1)(a) to (c) in a way that allows defectiveness to always be assessed, in the final 
instance, based on general principles of reasonableness and fairness, regardless of what 
type of defectiveness is pleaded. This would be consistent with the general 
reasonableness considerations applied in the context of wrongfulness in delictual claims.  
 
4.3.2 Judicial consideration of section 61 
The National Consumer Tribunal (‘NCT’), which was established under the National Credit 
Act,1335 is an independent adjudicative entity that has jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, matters 
arising under the CPA.1336 A finding by the NCT has the same status as a decision of the 
High Court of South Africa.1337 The NCT has the power to make any applicable order 
contemplated in the CPA or in sections 150 or 151 of the National Credit Act.1338 The NCT 
may hear matters referred to it by the NCC after the NCC has completed an investigation 
into a complaint,1339 where a complainant has obtained leave from the NCT to refer a 
matter to it directly after receiving a notice of non-referral by the NCC,1340 or where a 
matter has been transferred from a consumer court to the NCT in terms of section 
                                                          
1335  34 of 2005. 
1336  http://www.thenct.org.za/mandate. The NCT's initial mandate was to hear matters arising under the 
National Credit Act, but was later extended to include matters under the CPA. 
1337  Ibid. 
1338  Van Heerden Section 85 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
‘Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act’ (2014) at 75-5. 
1339  Section 73(2), which relates to complaints regarding prohibited conduct. 
1340  Section 75(1)(b), other than a notice of non-referral issued in terms of section 116. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 432 
73(3)1341 or section 75(2)1342 of the CPA. To date, there have been no reported decisions 
by the NCT regarding section 61. 
 
To date, there have been only two reported court judgments regarding the application of 
section 61, namely the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal judgments in the 
Halstead-Cleak cases, which are discussed in detail below. 
 
In Halstead-Cleak v Eskom Holdings Ltd1343 the plaintiff had sustained severe electrical 
burns while riding his bicycle when he came into contact with a low-hanging live power line 
spanning a footpath. It was common causes that Eskom had conducted electricity through 
the subject power line and was the ‘producer' and ‘distributor' of the electricity within the 
meaning of the CPA. The matter proceeded to trial on the limited issue of whether Eskom 
is strictly liable pursuant to section 61 of the CPA.1344  
 
It was argued by Eskom that section 61 does not apply in the present case on the basis 
that the CPA is concerned with protection of consumers and the plaintiff, in this case, had 
not been injured as a result of utilising the supply of electricity as a consumer. Further, it 
was contended that an analysis of the wording of section 61 and section 53 within the 
                                                          
1341  Section 73(3) provides that, where the NCC refers a matter to a consumer court after issuing a notice of 
non-referral, any party to that referral may apply to the NCT for an order that the matter be referred to 
the NCT. 
1342   Section 75(2) provides that, where a matter is referred directly to a consumer court by the complainant 
after receiving a notice of non-referral from the NCC, the respondent may apply to the NCT for an order 
that the matter be referred to the NCT and the provisions of section 73(4) apply to such an application. 
Section 73(4) provides that the NCT must conduct a hearing into any matter referred to it under this 
Chapter and may make any applicable order contemplated in the CPA or in sections 150 or 151 of the 
NCA.  
1343  [2015] ZAGPPHC 632. 
1344 The plaintiff’s claim in delict and the assessment of quantum were postponed sine die. 
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context of the CPA indicates that section 61, in particular, was not intended to apply to 
factual scenarios such as this one.1345 
 
The High Court considered the wording of section 61 read with the definitions of “defect” 
contained in section 53 and the definitions of “consumer”, “distributor”, “goods”, “market”, 
“producer”, “supplier” and “supply” under the CPA. The court also noted section 25 of the 
Electricity Regulation Act1346  which provides as follows: 
“Liability of licensee for damage or injury 
In any civil proceedings against a licensee arising out of damage or injury caused 
by induction or electrolysis or in any other manner by means of electricity 
generated, transmitted or distributed by a licensee, such damage or injury shall be 
presumed to have been caused by the negligence of the licensee, unless there is 
credible evidence to the contrary.” 
 
The court noted that the preamble to the CPA recognises that “it is necessary to develop 
and employ innovative means to…(b) protect the interests of consumers, to ensure 
accessible, transparent and efficient redress for consumers who are subject to abuse or 
exploitation in the market place and (c) to give effect to internationally recognised custom 
rights.”1347  
 
The court noted that various provisions of the CPA provide protection to and redress for 
“any person”, as opposed to only “consumers.”1348 Further, the court stated that section 
5(5) provides that sections 60 and 61 are applicable even to transactions that are exempt 
                                                          
1345 [14]. 
1346 4 of 2006. 
1347 [16]. 
1348 [17]. 
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from the provisions of the CPA. On this basis, the court rejected Eskom’s argument that an 
innocent third party, who is not strictly a “consumer” within the definition of the CPA, who 
suffers loss, such as a dependant of a breadwinner who is killed by a defective product, 
cannot seek redress under the CPA as this would be “contrary to the spirit and purpose of 
the CPA.”1349  
 
The High Court then proceeded to consider whether “goods” or “services” as defined 
under the CPA are involved, if so, the capacity in which Eskom and the plaintiff stand in 
relation to such “goods” or “services”. The court held that the definition of “goods is clearly 
intended to include “electricity” given that subsection (e) of the definition expressly 
includes electricity. 1350  The court found that Eskom qualifies as a “producer” of the 
electricity as it is common cause Eskom generated the electricity for purposes of 
distribution with the intention, at all times, to supply the electricity in the ordinary course of 
business.1351 Further, it was held that Eskom also qualifies as a “retailer” as it supplied the 
electricity to consumers in general. According to the court, the definitions of “supplier” and 
“supply” do not require the “consumer” to be the injured party in this case as such an 
interpretation would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the CPA.1352 The court noted 
that “supplier” means a person who markets any goods or services, with “market”, when 
used as a verb, being defined to mean “to promote or supply any goods or services”. 
Further, section 1 defines “supply”, when used as a verb in relation to goods, to include 
selling “…in the ordinary course of business for consideration” The court held that these 
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definitions indicate the CPA is applicable and rejected Eskom’s argument to the 
contrary.1353  
 
Further, the High Court held that section 61(5)(a) indicates that liability is not limited to 
“consumers” as defined in the CPA or consumers generally, but to “any natural 
person.”1354 Accordingly, it is not a pre-requisite for section 61-liability that the plaintiff be a 
“consumer” within the contractual sense as defined under the CPA for section 61-liability to 
arise.1355  
 
The next question to be considered was whether the electricity contained a “defect” within 
the meaning of section 53(1). The court held that electricity conducted along a line which is 
not required or used to supply any other consumer, qualifies as “goods or results of the 
services less acceptable than persons generally would be reasonably entitled to expect in 
the circumstances” as per the definition of “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(i).1356Further, the 
court held that, given the inherent dangerous nature of electricity, by permitting such a 
danger to exist also qualifies as “goods or components less…safe than persons generally 
would be reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances” as per the definition of 
“defect” in section 53(1)(a)(ii).1357 The court held that Eskom should be liable for these 
defects on the basis that: 
“logic accordingly dictates that the defendant cannot introduce a source of danger 
and thereafter seek exoneration when injury is caused as a result thereof.”1358 
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The court noted that, after Eskom had learned of the incident, it acted immediately by 
switching off the electricity and having the lines dismantled. Applying the principle used in 
Coppejans v Bosman1359 the High Court held that Eskom’s conduct after the incident 
“reinforce the notion that it had introduced the source of danger which led to the plaintiff’s 
injuries for which it would be held liable.”1360 
 
The High Court found Eskom to be 100% liable to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained 
pursuant to section 61. 
 
Comment: 
There are numerous difficulties with the High Court’s interpretation and application of the 
section 61 provision.  
 
Admittedly, the words “any natural person” in section 61(5) as opposed to “consumer” in 
other subsections of section 61 does create ambiguity as to whether section is only 
available to a “consumer” as defined or any natural person harmed by goods. This 
ambiguity arguably warrants a purposive interpretation “in line with the spirit and purpose 
of the CPA.” The High Court’s statement that “logic accordingly dictates that the defendant 
cannot introduce a source of danger and thereafter seek exoneration when injury is 
caused as a result thereof” is an incredibly oversimplified statement of a much more 
complex problem. Not all dangerous products that cause harm should give rise to legal 
                                                          
1359  [2014] ZAGPHC 1833, a case involving an actio de pauperie for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when 
the defendant’s dog allegedly attacked the plaintiff. While the defendant denied liability on the basis that 
the dog was a stray dog, the defendant rescued the plaintiff from the attack, took her to hospital and 
visited her in hospital, paid her medical expenses and eventually put the dog down. The court held that, 
if the defendant was not responsible, he would not have incurred these expenses. 
1360  [23]. 
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liability. In this regard, it is argued that the welfare of consumers generally would not 
necessarily be promoted by imposing strict liability for harm to “any natural person” caused 
by defective products. The imposition of strict product liability on “any natural person” may 
open the floodgates of litigation and impose an excessively onerous burden on industry, 
thereby stifling innovation and resulting in reduced access to consumer goods. The CPA’s 
purpose of estabslishing a framework for a “sustainable” and “fair” consumer market would 
perhaps not be served by such a broad scope of section 61 claimants. It may be that the 
legislature deemed it more appropriate for harm to persons who fall outside the scope of 
the definition of “consumer”, such as dependants of breadwinners harmed by goods and 
bystanders harmed by goods, to be governed by Aquilian liability, which requires courts to 
consider whether a duty of care was owed by the defendant in the circumstances. This 
arguably provides more scope for a balanced, fair outcome than strict liability.   
 
The High Court relies on the fact that various provisions in the CPA provide protection to 
“any person” as opposed to “consumers” and that section 5(5) subjects even exempt 
“transactions” to section 60 and 61 as a basis for finding that section 61 is not limited to 
plaintiffs who are “consumers” within the definition of the CPA. However, the High Court 
does not appear to attach any weight to the contextual location of section 61 within the 
CPA, being located under “Chapter 2: Fundamental Consumer Rights, Part 1: Suppliers’ 
Accountability to Consumers.”  
 
Further, section 5(5) relates to “transactions” that are exempt from the application of the 
CPA. Only one out of the three categories of “consumer”, namely paragraph (b) of the 
definition, requires there to have been a “transaction” between the consumer and supplier. 
In other words, section 5(5) would have the effect that, where a consumer under 
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paragraph (b) entered into a transaction with the supplier for the goods and that 
transaction is exempt from the application of the CPA, for whatever reason, the goods and 
the supplier would still be subject to section 61. In other words, there would still have to be 
a “transaction” between the plaintiff and the supplier for section 61 to apply. Section 5(5) 
does not have the effect of extending the application of section 61 to situations where 
there was no “transaction” for the goods and neither of the other categories of “consumer” 
apply either. In any event, it is argued that, had the legislature intended to extend section 
61 to persons other than those falling within the three categories of “consumer”, it would 
have expressly stated this. 
In the author’s view the High Court’s approach to interpretation of section 61, while 
seemingly aimed at achieving a just outcome for the plaintiff in this instance, may create 
an undesirable precedent that would not promote the welfare of consumers generally nor 
promote a “fair” and “sustainable” consumer market.  
 
Eskom subsequently appealed this judgment.1361 In considering the provisions of the CPA, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the principles of statutory interpretation as stated 
by it in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality1362 and Novartis SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd,1363 namely that statutory interpretation is aimed at 
determining “the intention of the legislature but considers the words used in the light of all 
relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which the legislation came 
                                                          
1361  Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150. 
1362  [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) par 18. 
1363  [2015] ZASCA 111; 2016 (1) 518 par 27.  
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into being.” Further, courts should prefer a sensible meaning to one that leads to 
“insensible or unbusinesslike results.”1364  
 
As a point of departure, the SCA referred to the long title of the CPA which states that it is 
intended to promote a: 
“fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and services 
and for that purpose to establish national norms and standards relating to 
consumer protection, to provide for improved standards of consumer information, 
to prohibit certain unfair marketing and business practices, to promote responsible 
consumer behaviour, to promote a consistent legislative and enforcement 
framework relating to consumer transactions and agreements…”1365 
 
The SCA further noted that the Green Paper discussion of the CPA indicates that there 
was a need for protection of a broad range of consumers in South Africa.1366 In particular, 
the Green Paper notes that: 
“Perhaps one of the greatest pitfalls in most consumer protection laws in South 
Africa, is the absence of a uniform definition of “a consumer”. This has resulted in 
a difficulty for enforcers to accurately identify individuals that the State seeks to 
protect. Consumers must be defined broadly as individuals who purchase goods 
and services, and must include third parties who act on behalf of the 
consumer…”1367 
 
                                                          
1364  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) 
par 18. 
1365  [10]. 
1366  [14]. 
1367  Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework, GN 1957, GG 26774 of 9 September 2004 at 
25. 
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The SCA noted that section 2(1) of the CPA directs courts to interpret the CPA in a 
manner that gives effect to its purpose as outlined in section 3, namely to promote and 
advance the social and economic welfare of consumers, particularly vulnerable 
consumers. This legislative purpose is also reflected in the preamble of the CPA.  
 
With respect to application of the CPA, the SCA notes that section 5 provides that section 
61 applies to every transaction within South Africa for the supply of goods or services or 
promotion of goods or servies. In circumstances where goods are supplied to any person 
in terms of an exempt transaction, section 5(5) provides that those goods and the producer 
are nevertheless subject to section 61. The SCA referred to the definition of “transaction” 
in section 1, being an agreement between two or more persons for the supply of goods or 
services for consideration in the ordinary course of business.1368  
 
As to the definition of “consumer” in section 1, namely a person to whom goods are 
marketed in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business, or who has entered into a 
transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business, the SCA noted 
that the definition includes a person who is a user of the goods regardless of whether that 
person was a party to the transaction for the supply of the goods. In other words, a person 
who receives the goods as a gift from a “consumer” would also be deemed a “consumer” 
for purposes of the CPA. The SCA stressed the fact that there must be “a transaction to 
which a consumer is a party, or the goods are used by another person consequent on that 
transaction.”1369 
 
                                                          
1368 [14]. 
1369 [15]. 
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In light of the CPA’s legislative purposes, as stated in the Preamble and section 3, coupled 
with the definitions of “transaction” and “consumer” in section 1, the SCA stated that the 
“whole tenor of the Act is to protect consumers” and that the CPA must be interpreted 
keeping this in mind.1370 With respect to section 61 itself, the SCA noted its context within 
the CPA, namely that it falls within Chapter 2 dealing with “Fundamental Consumer 
Rights”, in particular, Part H which deals with the “Right to fair value, good quality and 
safety.” 
 
The SCA took note of the CPA’s definitions of “goods”, “supply”, “market” and “producer” in 
section 1. “Producer” is defined as a person who generates or otherwise produces the 
goods within South Africa “with the intention of making them available for supply in the 
ordainry course of business.” 
 
The SCA noted that the phrase “ordinary course of business” is not defined by the CPA 
but has been judicially interpreted in other contexts, for instance, insolvency proceedings. 
The SCA referred to the case of Van Zyl & others NNO v Turner & another NNO,1371 where 
it was held that determining whether a disposition was made in the ordinary course of 
business is an objective test taking into account all the circumstances including the 
conduct of both parties to the transaction. 
 
Based on all the definitions of concepts relevant to section 61 as well as the wording of 
section 61, the SCA held that the plaintiff was required to show that the harm resulted, 
wholly or partly, from Eskom selling electricity which was “unsafe” or had a product 
                                                          
1370 [16]. 
1371 See 4.3 above. 
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“failure”, “defect” or “hazard”, in the ordinary course of business for consideration. Given 
that section 61 is found in Chapter 2 of the CPA which deals with “Fundamental Consumer 
Rights”, the SCA stated it is: 
“…clear that the harm envisaged in section 61 must be caused to a natural person 
mentioned in section 61(5)(a) in his or her capacity as a consumer. This is the only 
businesslike interpretation possible. The reason why reference is made to a 
‘natural person’ is clearly to distinguish it from ‘person’ which may include a ‘juristic 
person’ or a ‘consumer’ which may also include a ‘juristic person’.” 
 
Therefore, the SCA held that the court a quo had erred in finding that the wording of 
section 61(5) makes it clear that section 61 liability is not limited to claims by “consumers” 
as defined in section 1 but to “any natural person.” The SCA explained that the court a quo 
had failed to keep in mind that the CPA’s purpose is to protect “consumers” and that this 
requires a supplier and consumer relationship. On the facts of this case, the SCA held that 
the plaintiff was not a consumer in relation to Eskom on the basis that the plaintiff had not 
entered into a transaction with Eskom as supplier or producer of electricity in the ordinary 
course of Eskom’s business and further, the plaintiff was not using the electricity, nor was 
he a recipient or beneficiary of the electricity.1372 
 
With respect to section 61(1)(c), which imposes liability for goods with inadequate 
instructions of any hazard in goods, the SCA notes that it is limited to inadequate 
instructions provided to a consumer who had entered into a transaction with Eskom. With 
respect to section 61(1)(b) which imposes liability for a failure, defect or hazard in goods, 
the SCA simply reiterated that it is clear in the context of the CPA that liability is restricted 
to a supplier and consumer relationship.   
                                                          
1372 [22]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 443 
 
While the plaintiff therefore failed in relation to the requirement of a consumer-
supplier/producer relationship for application of section 61, the SCA nevertheless went on 
to comment in very brief terms on the question of whether the electricity in this case was 
“unsafe” or had a “failure”, “hazard” or “defect”. The SCA held that the cause of the harm in 
this case cannot be said to be due to the electricity failing or due to a defect in it. The court 
explains that a “failure” of the electricity would be if the electricity was unable to perform in 
its intended manner, which was not the case here. Further, the SCA held that there was no 
defect in the electricity as it did not suffer from a “material imperfection in the manufacture 
of it” nor did it have a characteristic that “rendered it less useful or safe than a person 
would generally expect in the circumstances”. The electricity also did not have a 
characteristic that presented a significant risk of injury to any person when the goods are 
utilised within the definition of “hazard”. The SCA again noted that the plaintiff was not 
utilising the electricity. This is arguably a very limited view of electricity - focusing on the 
electrical current only, whereas the commercial sense of electricity is that of a current 
being conducted along a line, which in this case presented a significant risk of injury.  
 
The appeal decision has completely overturned the court a quo’s interpretation of the CPA 
with respect to the scope of application of section 61. In light of the author’s criticism of the 
High Court decision above relating to the scope of application of section 61, the SCA’s 
position in this regard is supported. However, the SCA’s conclusion regarding the 
defectiveness of the electricity in this case is not supported.  
 
Unfortunately, both Halstead-Cleak judgments are quite brief in their analysis of the 
various definitions of defectiveness for purposes of section 61. The judgements do not 
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offer any real assistance in differentiating between the two definitions of “defect” in section 
53(1)(a) or the other definitions of ‘hazard’, ‘unsafe’ and failure’. The court a quo seemed 
to suggest that electricity “which is not required or used to supply any other consumer”, 
would always be ‘defective goods’. In response to the judgment at first instance, it was 
argued by Loubser & Reid1373 that it is not the generation (‘manufacture’) of the electricity, 
but rather the manner and place of distribution of the electricity in this case, being along a 
low-hanging line across a footpath, that rendered the electricity dangerous. Accordingly, 
the authors argued that the definition of “defect” under section 53(1)(a)(i) did not apply 
here, but rather section 53(1)(a)(ii) and Eskom was liable, as “distributor” of electricity in a 
manner and in circumstances which rendered it less safe than persons generally would be 
reasonably entitled to expect. On appeal, the SCA simply commented, without any 
elaboration, that the harm in this case cannot be said to be due to the electricity failing or 
due to a defect in it. The court explained that a “failure” of the electricity would be if the 
electricity was unable to perform in its intended manner, which was not the case here. The 
author agrees with this position. The electricity had done exactly what it was supposed to 
do, which is why the plaintiff was harmed.  
 
Further, the SCA held that there was no defect in the electricity as it did not suffer from a 
“material imperfection in the manufacture of it”. This relates to the first definition of “defect” 
in section 53(1)(a)(i). The author agrees with this position as there was no evidence that 
there had been any issue with the generation of the electricity. What is disputed is the 
SCA’s conclusion that the electricity did not have a characteristic that “rendered it less 
useful or safe than a person would generally expect in the circumstances” within the 
second meaning of “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(ii). As Loubser & Reid argued, the fact that 
                                                          
1373 Section 53 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 53-2. 
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the electricity was being distributed via a low-hanging line, thereby exposing persons to its 
harmful effects, rendered the electricity less safe than a person would generally expect in 
the circumstances.  
 
The SCA also held that the electricity did not have a “characteristic” that presented a 
“significant risk of injury” to any person when the goods are utilised within the definition of 
“hazard” in section 53(1)(c)(ii). This conclusion is supported. While the electricity did 
present a significant risk of injury, that risk was not presented at a time when the electricity 
was being “utilised”, rather when a person accidentally came into contact with the low-
hanging power line, as the plaintiff did. For a discussion of “used” or “utilised” in this 
context, see the discussion at 4.2.2 above. 
 
Curiously, the SCA did not seem to refer to the definition of “unsafe” in section 53(1)(d) 
which includes a “characteristic” in the goods that presents “an extreme risk of personal 
injury or property damage to the consumer or to other persons.” It would seem clear that 
high-voltage electricity being conducted via a low-hanging power line would present an 
“extreme risk of personal injury” if the “consumer” or “other persons” came into contact 
with it, thereby rendering it “unsafe”. Perhaps the SCA chose not to apply this definition as 
it raises some confusion due to its reference to both “consumer” and “other persons”, 
which would not support the SCA’s conclusion that section 61 is only available to 
“consumers” as defined. Nevertheless, this definition of “unsafe” could still be read as 
being available only to section 61 claims brought by “consumers” as it merely defines the 
“unsafe” characteristic as one that would pose a significant risk to persons, whether the 
consumer or others. 
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It is interesting to note, by comparison, that the majority of US courts take the position that 
electricity does not become a “product” for purposes of strict liability until it is converted to 
a form for delivery to a consumer and that the supply only occurs once it passes through 
the consumer’s meter. In other words, high-voltage electricity in a distribution line, such as 
in the Halstead-Cleak scenario, would not be considered a “product” subject to strict 
liability in the US. 
 
A further interesting comparison to the Halstead-Cleak judgments is the approach of the 
Australian Federal Court in Cook v Pasminco Ltd.1374 In this case, the plaintiffs brought 
claims in negligence and nuisance and alternatively under sections 75AD and AG of the 
former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for harm to their health arising from the emission of 
allegedly noxious fumes from the defendants' industrial plants. It was held that the 
emissions were not ‘supplied' to the plaintiffs in trade or commerce within the meaning of 
the TPA.1375 Relevantly, the court found that a necessary element of the ‘supply' concept is 
a ‘bilateral and consensual process' or a ‘consensual transaction or dealing' pursuant to 
which ‘goods' are passed from the defendants to the plaintiffs. 
 
This is in stark contrast to the High Court’s view in Halstead-Cleak that the definitions of 
‘supplier’ and ‘supply’ under the CPA do not require the ‘consumer’ to be the injured party 
as such an interpretation would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the CPA.1376 
However, Cook v Pasminco appears consistent with the approach by the South African 
SCA in Halstead-Cleak on the basis that the defective goods ought to have been supplied 
                                                          
1374  [2000] FCA 677. See discussion at 3.4.3.    
1375  While the TPA imposes liability where an ‘individual suffers injuries', the concept of ‘supply' in relation to 
goods, is defined by the TPA as ‘supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or 
hire-purchase' and Australian courts interpret this to mean the goods have to be supplied by the 
defendant through an activity or transaction which has a ‘trading or commercial character'.   
1376  Ibid. 
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through a “consensual transaction or dealing,” whether to the plaintiff or another 
consumer.  
 
Cook v Pasminco is factually distinguishable from Halstead-Cleak in that the emissions 
were a by-product of manufacturing processes and were never intended to be supplied by 
the defendants in trade or commerce to any consumers. In Halstead-Cleak, Eskom did 
generate electricity with the intention of supplying it to consumers and did supply electricity 
to consumers in general. Further, Cook v Pasminco must also be understood in the 
particular context of the legislation it applied. Nevertheless, it is useful to note that the 
Australian equivalent of section 61 of the CPA is only available in cases where the goods 
were supplied by way a commercial transaction or exchange and an individual was 
harmed by those goods. 
 
It is contended that, if the CPA was applied to the factual scenario in Cook v Pasminco, 
the defendants would not qualify as ‘retailers’ or ‘distributors’ of the emissions on the basis 
that the emissions were not goods ‘supplied’ by the defendants ‘in the ordinary course of 
business’, whether to the plaintiff or consumers in general.  
 
Conversely, if the Australian TPA or ACL were applied to the Halstead-Cleak factual 
scenario, it is doubtful whether Australian courts would find there was a ‘supply’ in the 
absence of a ‘consensual transaction or dealing’ pursuant to which Eskom conducted the 
electricity in question. The electricity was not required or used to supply any consumer in 
this case. It is submitted that, conducting electricity along a low-hanging line across a 
footpath in these circumstances which causes injury to a member of the public, would 
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rather fall within the domain of public liability in Australia and a claim would have to be 
brought by the injured party in negligence. 
 
Although case law regarding section 61 is very limited at this stage, the section 61 action 
has likely been raised as a matter of course in most claims arising from harm caused by 
defective products since this remedy came into effect. Further, given the range of informal 
consumer redress avenues, which are promoted by consumer protection bodies, the 
steadily increasing number of complaints received by the NCGSO and presumably other 
industry ombud schemes, as well as the desirability of out of court settlements for cost 
reasons, it is likely that judicial consideration of section 61 claims by courts will remain 
limited. This is further supported by the fact that section 69(d) appears to restrict section 
61-plaintiffs’ access to civil courts (other than a consumer court) until “all other remedies 
available to that person in terms of national legislation have been exhausted.”1377 
 
4.3.3 Comparative case study: South Africa / Australia 
The following case study offers a practical example of a litigated strict product liability 
claim in Australia in which the author personally acted for a defendant retailer. The case 
study demonstrates how strict product liability causes of action are pleaded in the 
alternative to delictual or contractual causes of action and how contributory responsibility is 
negotiated between defendants and plaintiffs.  
 
 
                                                          
1377 See below at 4.3.4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 449 
Case study: Electrical lamp causing burns to an infant 
In this case, the author acted for an Australian retailer in defence of a claim for damages 
arising from personal injury caused by a defective electrical lamp. The retailer had sold a 
ceramic animal-shaped lamp, which has a light bulb fitted inside the ceramic shape, to a 3 
year old child’s mother. The mother placed the lamp on a bedside table next to the child’s 
bed. During the night, the child pulled on the electric cable, causing the lamp to fall onto 
her bed and the light bulb dislodging from the ceramic shade, resulting in significant burn 
injuries.  
 
The manufacturer had imported the ceramic, animal-shaped lamp shades to Australia and 
engaged an Australian electrical company to design and produce an electrical ‘cord kit’ 
(cable and light bulb socket) to be used with the lamp shade. The manufacturer sold the 
lamps to various retailers across Australia. When sold, the lamp shade and cord kit were 
packaged and sold separately, but were marketed as complimentary products. The 
manufacturer’s physical and online store displayed the lamps lit, with the lamp kit in place 
inside the shade.  
 
The child and her mother brought separate proceedings against the manufacturer, who 
subsequently joined the retailer as a third party to the proceedings. Pain and suffering 
damages were claimed on behalf of the child. The mother claimed economic loss 
damages resulting from the physical and psychological injuries sustained by the child as 
well as loss of earnings for having to cease working to take care of the child. In the primary 
proceedings, the plaintiffs’ alleged that: 
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 the manufacturer operated a business importing and selling household and decorative 
wares and imported a bone china, animal-shaped lamp from an overseas manufacturer 
who did not have a place of business in Australia. Therefore, it was alleged that the 
manufacturer is deemed by section 7 of the ACL to be the manufacturer of the lamp.  
 the manufacturer marketed the lamp as being safe for use as an electrical lamp and/or 
a child’s night light and knew, or ought to have known, that the retailer would similarly 
market and sell the lamp to the public.  
 the guarantees implied into consumer transactions by sections 54 and 55 of the ACL 
applied to the supply of the lamp. Pursuant to these sections, the manufacturer is 
alleged to have guaranteed that the lamp was of acceptable quality and reasonably fit 
for the purpose of being an electrical lamp and/or a child’s night light.  
 The injuries sustained by the child were caused by reason of the lamp: 
o Containing a ‘safety defect’ within the meaning of section 9 of the ACL; 
o Failing to comply with relevant safety standards; 
o Not being of acceptable quality;  
o Not being reasonably fit for the purpose it was supplied;  
o Containing a ‘major failure’ within the meaning of section 260 of the ACL.  
 
The plaintiffs particularised the defectiveness of the lamp by arguing it had insufficient 
ventilation, causing the bulb to become dangerously hot during use, and the socket into 
which the bulb was positioned did not properly secure the bulb, meaning it could easily 
come free. For these reasons, the lamp and others like it had been recalled by Product 
Recall Australia shortly after the incident. 
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Damages were claimed pursuant to sections 139, 271, 272 and 273 of the ACL, being the 
provisions relating to strict manufacturer’s liability and liability of product suppliers for 
breach of consumer guarantees. In the alternative, the plaintiffs pleaded a claim in 
negligence, alleging the manufacturer owed a duty to take reasonable care in the design, 
manufacture and supply of the lamp to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to the child. 
Particulars of negligence or breach of duty pleaded against the manufacturer included: 
 Designing and/or manufacturing and/or distributing and/or supplying into the Australian 
market an electrical lamp that was unsafe by reason of the lamp having the ‘defects’ 
listed above in relation to the claim under the ACL.  
 Failing to provide any warning in relation to these defects in the lamp; 
 Failing to subject the lamp to any or any adequate form of hazard identification or risk 
assessment before supplying it into the Australian market; 
 Failing to ensure that the lamp complied with Australian Standards;  
 Marketing the lamp as suitable for a child’s night light when it knew or ought to have 
known that it was not.  
 
In its defence, the manufacturer denied that it was the deemed manufacturer or a supplier 
of the ‘lamp’. Instead, the manufacturer admitted that it was the deemed manufacturer of 
the ceramic lamp shades and stated that it had purchased the lamp cord kits from an 
Australian manufacturer. The manufacturer sought to argue that it did not manufacture or 
supply a ‘lamp’ as it sold the shades and cord kits as separate items in separate 
packaging to retailers. Further, the manufacturer denied that it marketed or guaranteed the 
‘lamp' to be safe for use as an electrical lamp and/or a child's night light, but admitted that 
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it knew retailers might assemble some of the lamp kits and shades into lamps and sell 
them to consumers. As to the claim in negligence, the manufacturer denied that it owed a 
duty to take reasonable care in the design, manufacture and supply of the ‘lamp' as it did 
not manufacture or supply a ‘lamp'. 
 
The manufacturer issued third party proceedings against the retailer, alleging that: 
 The retailer was the manufacturer of the ‘lamp’ within the meaning of the ACL as it 
assembled the lamp shade and cord kit before selling it to the plaintiff’s mother. 
 by reason of the sale of the ‘lamp’ by the retailer to the plaintiff’s mother, the retailer 
gave consumer guarantees pursuant to sections 54 and 55 of the ACL, that the lamp 
was of acceptable quality and reasonably fit for use as an electrical lamp and/or child’s 
night light. Therefore, if the lamp breached the consumer guarantees and/or had a 
safety defect, the retailer is liable for any resultant harm or loss. 
 Further, it was alleged that it was a common law implied term of the contract of sale 
between the retailer and the plaintiff’s mother that the lamp would be of merchantable 
quality and/or reasonably fit for use as a child’s night light. 
 In the alternative, the manufacturer alleged that the retailer owed a common law duty in 
negligence to take reasonable care in assembling and supplying the lamp to ensure that 
the lamp did not pose a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury. If the lamp did not comply 
with relevant safety standards, had insufficient ventilation causing the bulb to become 
dangerously hot and/or the socket into which the bulb was positioned did not properly 
secure the bulb, then the retailer breached its duty of care to the plaintiffs. 
 
At mediation of this matter, the arguments in the retailer’s defence were as follows: 
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 The retailer was a small shop trading in a variety of homeware products and had no 
involvement in the design, manufacture or testing of the lamp components. The retailer 
simply on-sold the components in the condition they were supplied by the manufacturer. 
The retailer had placed the plastic bag containing the cord kit inside the box containing 
the lamp shade for ease of packaging when sold to customers - did not physically 
assemble the lamp prior to sale. Further, the retailer did not apply its own brand name 
to the components or hold itself out as the manufacturer of the lamp or either 
component to the public. 
 
 The manufacturer is a deemed manufacturer of the cord kit. Prior to selling the cord kit 
to the retailer, the manufacturer had added the light bulb, a rubber fitting and assembly 
instructions to the plastic bag containing the electrical cord and light bulb socket. 
Arguably, this would qualify as ‘assembling’ the cord kit product for purposes of section 
7 of the ACL. 
 
 Irrespective of the technical arguments that could be made regarding ‘assembly’ of the 
lamp components to determine the true manufacturer of the ‘lamp’, the reality is that the 
lamp components were purposely designed or acquired by the manufacturer to be used 
together. The manufacturer also marketed the components as a ‘lamp’ on its website 
and in its physical store.  
 
 Assuming for argument’s sake that both defendants are deemed manufacturers of the 
‘lamp’, it was argued that the manufacturer ought to bear the brunt of liability for the 
following reasons:           
o the manufacturer had obtained electrical certifications for the cord kit but not the 
assembled lamp. It obtained advice from an electrical safety consultant that, as long 
as the cord kit and lamp shade were sold separately and not marketed as a lamp, the 
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product would not be required to undergo further testing and certification as an 
electrical appliance for purposes of compliance with Australian Standards. In order to 
speed up the approval process, the manufacturer did not bother to have the ‘lamp’ 
tested and certified. 
o The manufacturer's attempt to avoid further safety testing by packaging the 
components separately was outside the knowledge of the retailer. The retailer did not 
specialise in electrical goods and was entitled to rely (to a large degree), on the 
manufacturer selling electrical products that are safe for its intended use and 
compliant with relevant safety regulations and standards.    
 
 The retailer denied that it purposely marketed the lamp as safe for use as a child's night 
light. Although the animal-shaped lamp shade may be appealing to a child, it was made 
from bone china, not a heat resistant, shatterproof material. Common sense dictates 
that a ceramic object ought to be placed out of reach of a 3 year old infant due to the 
obvious risk of injury. 
 
 
Ultimately, following some negotiation it was agreed between the defendants that the 
retailer would contribute 33% towards joint settlement offers to the plaintiffs.  
 
Comparison to position under CPA 
If the facts of the above case study were to form the basis for a section 61 claim in South 
Africa, it seems clear that the retailer who sold the lamp to the consumer would be 
considered a “retailer” for purposes of section 61. Whether the retailer would be 
considered a “producer” within the meaning of section 1, is unlikely. The retailer had no 
part to play in the production of the lamp shade or cord kit. The fact that the retailer placed 
the cord kit inside the packaging containing the lamp shade when delivering it to the 
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plaintiff is unlikely to amount to ‘producing’ the lamp for purposes of the definition of 
“producer” as the retailer had not applied, for instance, a personal or business name, trade 
mark or other visual representation to the goods that created a reasonable expectation 
that the retailer had manufactured the lamp.      
 
The section 61 plaintiff may seek to argue that the lamp had a “defect” within the meaning 
of section 61(1)(b) and section 53(1)(a) in that the mechanism which fails to properly 
secure the light bulb inside the lamp shade amounts to a “material imperfection in the 
manufacture” of the lamp or its components that renders it “less acceptable than persons 
generally would be reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstance.” 
 
Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek to argue that the lamp contained a “hazard” within the 
meaning of section 61(1)(c) and section 53(1)(c)(ii) in that the mechanism which fails to 
properly secure the light bulb inside the lamp shade presents a “significant risk of personal 
injury” when the goods are utilised. In this regard, the court would arguably look at the 
intended or expected uses of the lamp. Whether a court would consider placing a lamp 
next to an infant’s bed within reach of that infant, who then pulls hard on the cord, may not 
be considered a normal use of the lamp. However, the definition of “hazard” simply refers 
to when the goods are “utilised”, not when the goods are “utilised in a normal or intended 
manner.” Therefore, a risk of harm presented by the lamp while switched on (‘utilised’) 
may be sufficient. Arguably, the requirement of “significant risk of personal injury” would be 
satisfied in this case given that burns by an electrical lamp could be severe.  
 
It may be possible to argue that the lamp had a “failure” within the meaning of section 
61(1)(b) and section 53(1)(b) on the basis that it failed to “perform in the intended manner 
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or to the intended effect.” While the lamp as a whole was still working to the intended 
effect of providing light, it could be argued that the lamp was intended to provide light in 
such a manner that the light bulb would remain secure within the lamp shade when 
utilised, even when the cord is pulled. However, this seems to be a laboured interpretation 
of the “failure” concept and is unlikely to succeed. 
 
It would be open to a plaintiff to argue that the lamp was “unsafe” in that, due to the 
problematic mechanism which inadequately secures the light bulb inside the lamp shade, 
the lamp had a characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, which presents an extreme risk of 
personal injury to the consumer or to other persons. It is unclear why a plaintiff would seek 
to establish that the lamp posed an “extreme” risk of harm to establish it was “unsafe” if the 
plaintiff could succeed by merely proving the lamp presented a “significant” risk of harm 
and therefore contained a “hazard”.  
 
The retailer may be able to invoke the defence under section 61(4)(c) on the basis that it 
was unreasonable to expect the retailer to have discovered the unsafe product 
characteristic, failure, defect or hazard  in light of the retailer's role in marketing the lamp to 
consumers. While the retailer may argue that it had simply on sold the lamp shade and 
cord kit in its original packaging without assembling them, the retailer did display sample 
lamps in its store which it had assembled. A court may, therefore, find that the design flaw 
causing the light bulb to sit very loosely inside the lamp shade could reasonably have been 
discovered by the retailer while assembling the display lamps. 
 
The party who had supplied the lamp shade and component to the retailer would arguably 
be considered an “importer” and “distributor” of the lamp shade within the meaning of the 
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CPA on the basis that it had imported the lamp shade to South Africa and sold the shade 
to a retailer. This same party would arguably be considered a “manufacturer” of the cord 
kit in that it had caused some cord kit components to be produced by another party and 
added further items to the cord kit bag (light bulb, a rubber fitting and assembly 
instructions), thereby playing a part in “producing” the cord kit product. Although the CPA’s 
definition of “producer” does not include a reference to “assembly” of components, as the 
ACL does in its definition of “manufacturer”, the reference in the CPA’s definition of 
producer to ‘otherwise produces the goods’ is arguably broad, on the plain meaning of 
these words, to include” assembly of components.”  
 
The question is whether the supplier of the shade and cord kit would qualify as a 
‘producer’ of the ultimate lamp product. A South African court may apply the definition of 
“producer”, particularly the phrase “otherwise produces” here to include the fact that this 
party coordinated the design and manufacture of both components and had intended for 
them to be supplied together to consumers as lamps. It follows that this party would not be 
able to avail itself of the defence in section 61(4)(c) which would arguably achieve a fair 
result as it was best placed to discover any design defect in the ultimate lamp product 
during the design or manufacturing stage.  
 
Comparative import of case study 
This case study illustrates how a person harmed by defective goods can in practice pursue 
a strict product liability claim in addition to a common law claim in negligence and breach 
of contract (implied guarantees/warranties) by pleading these claims in the alternative. The 
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Australian example shows an interesting interaction and overlap in the pleadings between 
the strict liability claim under the ACL, common law of negligence and contract, namely: 
 The particulars of negligence pleaded against the manufacturer and retailer include the 
same allegations of defectiveness used for the claim under the ACL, i.e. the product 
contained a ‘safety defect’ within the meaning of the ACL, failed to comply with safety 
standards, containing a ‘major failure’ within the meaning of the ACL and not being of 
acceptable quality or reasonably fit for purpose.  
 
 The implied guarantees of acceptable quality and reasonable fitness for purpose are 
implied by the common law of contract into contracts of sale are also implied by the ACL 
into the supply of consumer goods. Breach of these implied guarantees are then 
pleaded as one of the particulars of negligence. 
 
It is possible that, similarly to the practice in Australia, plaintiffs in South Africa would plead 
all possible causes of action to claim consequential damages for harm arising from a 
product defect, in order to optimise their prospects of recovery. Depending on the facts of 
the particular case, the plaintiff could potentially bring a damages claim for breach of 
contract (breach of statutorily implied warranty or other contractual terms relating to the 
quality of the goods supplied), and/or an Aquilian action and/or a section 61-claim. 
However, there are certain practical restrictions on a section 61 plaintiff in approaching a 
civil court, discussed briefly below at 4.3.4. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible to 
plead these causes of action in the alternative.  
 
Finally, the case study illustrates how contributory responsibility between defendants could 
in practice be argued in a strict product liability claim in much the same way as 
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apportionment of fault between defendants, having regard to the role of each supplier in 
the supply chain and all other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the good. 
For instance, a retailer who had the opportunity to open a product’s packaging, inspect the 
product and display an operating sample model of the product in its store, arguably has a 
greater exposure to liability, as between defendants, than a supplier who simply on-
supplies a product that would be spoiled or otherwise become unmarketable once opened 
and inspected. 
 
With respect to apportionment of liability, a South African retailer may similarly argue that 
the manufacturer ought to bear a greater share of section 61 liability, by relying on section 
61(6)(c) of the CPA. As discussed above, 1378  this section provides that there is no 
limitation on the authority of the court to apportion liability among persons who are found 
jointly and severally liable.  
 
Where an Australian court has determined that liability arises on more than one cause of 
action pleaded, the plaintiff has to elect a cause of action pursuant to which the court is to 
assess quantum of damages, before final judgment is entered by the court. 1379  By 
contrast, South African courts are likely to apply the rules of the cause of action under 
which the plaintiff would be awarded the greatest amount of damages, if the measure of 
damages does indeed differ.1380 Nevertheless, a plaintiff in both jurisdictions would need to 
give consideration to the legal and evidentiary requirements and the scope of damages 
recoverable in relation to each concurrent cause of action prior to commencing 
proceedings.  
                                                          
1378  4.2.7.4. 
1379  3.4.1.5. 
1380  Pockets Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Lobel’s Holdings (Pvt) Ltd 1966 4 SA 238 (SR); Van der Walt Delict (1979) 
at 7-8. 
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4.3.4 Concurrence of common law actions for damages and Section 61   
It would appear from section 2(10)1381 read with section 76 of the CPA that statutory 
remedies afforded by the CPA are intended to co-exist with common law remedies and 
cannot limit or restrict the scope of existing common law protection afforded to 
consumers.1382  However, from a practical perspective, a plaintiff’s access to civil courts 
under the CPA is restricted by section 69(d), which provides that a plaintiff may only 
approach a civil court (other than a consumer court) “if all other remedies available to that 
person in terms of national legislation have been exhausted.” This section suggests that a 
plaintiff would have to satisfy a civil court that he or she had attempted to obtain redress by 
way of other remedies, such as alternative dispute resolution and approaching the various 
entities listed in section 69 “Enforcement of rights by consumer” including the National 
Consumer Commission, the National Consumer Tribunal, ombuds with jurisdiction and 
consumer courts.  
 
Section 69(d) creates legal uncertainty and practical problems for plaintiffs. It is unclear 
from this provision whether a plaintiff would literally have to exhaust “all other remedies” 
available under national legislation, which would be very onerous, particularly on 
vulnerable, impecunious and unsophisticated plaintiffs, and would significantly restrict 
access to civil courts. A detailed discussion of the implications of section 69(d) for access 
to civil courts is beyond the scope of this study.1383 However, it is clear that this aspect 
should be clarified by legislature.  
 
                                                          
1381  See discussion of section 2(10) above at 4.1.2. 
1382  See 1.2.1 supra. The effect of the application provisions of the CPA are discussed in further detail in  
1383  For a discussion of the problems presented by section 69(d) and the routes to redress implied by 
section 69, see: Van Heerden Section 69 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer 
Protection Act (2014) at 69-15 to 69-20; Van Eeden Consumer Protection in South Africa (2013) 452 - 
454. 
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Leaving the practical aspects of obtaining redress under the CPA aside, it is theoretically 
possible for a section 61 action to arise in concurrence with common law actions. It follows 
that liability for damages for harm caused by defective goods may arise from breach of 
contract and/or delict and/or section 61 of the CPA, depending on which actions’ legal 
requirements are met. Whether a concurrent delictual claim for damages arises in 
circumstances where the supplier of a defective product and the plaintiff had a contractual 
relationship will still be governed by the common law principles regarding concurrence of 
contract and delict as developed by courts.1384  
Drawing distinctions between remedies are of significant practical importance where the 
facts simultaneously give rise to a common law contractual and delictual claim for 
damages, providing the claimant with a choice of action. In these circumstances, the 
claimant should consider the following when choosing how to pursue his or her claim: 
 the respective purposes of these actions;  
 the type of damages recoverable under each action; 
 whether proof of fault is required;  
 apportionment of damages; and  
 limitation periods.1385 
 
For instance, Aquilian damages are aimed at restoring the claimant to the position he or 
she would have been in had the harm never been suffered (negative interesse).1386 By 
                                                          
1384  For general discussion see: Neethling & Potgieter ‘Borderline between the Law of Contract and the Law 
of Delict’ (2012) THRHR, (75) 115; Hutchison & Van Heerden ‘The tort/contract divide seen from the 
South African Perspective’ (1997) Acta Juridica 102. For case law, see for instance: Lillicrap, Wassenaar 
& Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A); Pinshaw v Nexus Securities (Pty) Ltd 
2002 (2) SA 510 (C); Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank Ltd 2008 (5) SA 630 (SCA). 
1385  Loubser & Midgley The Law of Delict in South Africa (2012) 185-6.  
1386  2.3.1.1(ii). 
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contrast, damages for breach of contract are intended to put the claimant in the position he 
or she would have been had the contract been properly performed (positive interesse).1387 
 
Further, under the law of delict, patrimonial loss is recoverable by means of the Aquilian 
action, while compensation for non-patrimonial loss may be claimed with either the actio 
iniuriarum or the action for pain and suffering.1388 By contrast, a damages claim based on 
breach of contract is limited to recovery of patrimonial loss.1389 Any non-patrimonial loss 
resulting from the breach, such as pain and suffering or loss of amenities, would have to 
be recovered by means of a separate, delictual claim.1390  
 
Consideration of these differences between concurrent actions is equally important where 
a claimant is presented with a choice of common law remedies and an action under 
section 61 of the CPA. For instance, there may be cases where it would be more beneficial 
for a contractual party to pursue a claim in delict or under section 61, as opposed to a 
contractual claim for damages as the contract in question may limit the amount of 
damages recoverable in the event of harm caused by product defects. Further, a 
contractual party may be able to pursue a claim against numerous parties in the supply 
chain with a delictual claim or section 61 claim, whereas a claim for contractual damages 
could only be pursued against another contractual party who breached the contract by 
supplying a harm-causing, defective product.  
 
There may be scenarios where a plaintiff would not have a section 61 claim but a claim in 
delict does arise. Examples may include circumstances where: 
                                                          
1387  2.2.1.3(iii). 
1388  2.3.1.1(ii). 
1389  2.2.1.3(iii). 
1390  Hutchison & Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 314-315. 
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 the plaintiff fails to meet the definition of “consumer” as defined in the CPA.1391 For 
instance, it appears that bystanders to product use are not protected by section 61.1392 
 the plaintiff was not a “consumer” within the meaning of product user in paragraph (c) of 
the definition of “consumer”, but a party to whom the defendant marketed the goods1393 
or with whom the defendant entered into a transaction, 1394  and that marketing or 
transaction did not occur “in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business.” For 
example, a once-off sale of goods by a supplier.  
 where the goods that caused harm do not fall within the definition of “goods” as defined 
in section 1. However, it is difficult to conceive of goods that would not fall within the 
broad definition of “goods” as defined by the CPA. 
 where the plaintiff cannot show the goods are “unsafe”, contained a “hazard”, “defect” or 
had “inadequate instructions or warnings” or “failed” within the meaning of section 
61(1)(a)-(c) read with section 53. The plaintiff may still be able to show that the goods 
were defective or harmful and had caused loss for which delictual liability should arise.    
 where the prescription period for purposes of a section 61 claim has expired but not a 
claim in delict, provided prescription runs differently for these two actions. There is legal 
uncertainty in this regard.1395 
 
There may also be circumstances where the prospect of succeeding with a contractual 
claim for damages is greater than a section 61 claim or delictual claim. For example, 
where goods are sold which do not clearly fall within any of the categories of product 
deficiencies listed in section 61, but nevertheless breaches certain specifications 
                                                          
1391  As held by the SCA in Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150 discussed above at 
4.5.2. 
1392  See discussion regarding bystanders above at 4.2.2. 
1393  Paragraph (a) of the definition of “consumer”. 
1394  Paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer”. 
1395  4.2.7.5. 
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contractually agreed upon by the claimant and supplier. Establishing that a product 
supplied breached contractual specifications may be easier than proving the supplier is 
guilty of negligent conduct during the manufacturing or distribution process or that the 
goods meet any of the alternative definitions of defectiveness for purposes of section 61. 
 
In conclusion, section 61 may certainly provide an additional avenue for redress, over and 
above common law remedies, where harm is caused by defective goods. However, due to 
various theoretical and practical restrictions to this remedy, the remedies founded in delict 
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5.1 SCOPE OF LIABILITY: DIFFERENT ACTIONS AND CONCURRENCE 
5.1.1 Section 61 and delictual damages 
 The scope of parties liable under a section 61 claim is arguably broader than a 
common law delictual claim for damages.1396 The Aquilian action can theoretically be 
brought against the actual manufacturer of the defective good and possibly a 
subsequent supplier(s) such as a distributor or retailer, provided the plaintiff can 
establish that the subsequent supplier owed a duty of care to the plaintiff with respect to 
the supply of the goods. In contrast, the section 61 action simply requires that the 
defendant meet the definition of either “producer”, “importer”, “distributor” or “retailer” as 
defined by the CPA, irrespective of whether a duty of care was owed by that defendant.  
 
 The scope of potential claimants under a section 61 claim appears broader and 
narrower than the scope of potential claimants in a delictual claim in different 
respects.1397 Generally speaking, the scope of potential claimants under a section 61 
claim is broader than the scope of claimants under a delictual claim on the basis that a 
section 61 claimant need not establish the supplier of the defective goods owed a duty 
of care to it. A section 61 claimant merely has to show that goods with a deficiency as 
defined in section 53 were supplied by the defendant in the ordinary course of business 
and the claimant was harmed by it. In other respects, the scope of potential claimants in 
a section 61 claim is narrower than a delictual claim. A bystander does not appear to 
have a claim under section 61 as a bystander does not meet the definition of 
“consumer”, whereas a claim in delict may arise if it can be shown that the supplier of 
                                                          
1396 4.2.1. See conclusions below at 5.2.1. 
1397 4.2.2. See conclusions below at 5.2.2. 
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the defective product owed a duty of care not to cause harm to the bystander, in other 
words, that the harm to that bystander was reasonably foreseeable by the supplier.    
 
 
 The scope of ‘goods’ which may be the subject of a section 61-claim is arguably no 
broader than the scope of goods for purposes of a common law delictual claim for 
damages.1398 However, this is subject to how broadly South African courts will interpret 
the wide-ranging categories or items listed in the CPA’s definition of ‘goods’. With 
respect to second-hand or used goods, the scope of goods under section 61 appears to 
be broader than the common law of delict. It has been held by the High Court that the 
CPA applies to “used goods”. On the other hand, a manufacturer may not owe a 
delictual duty of care to a plaintiff with respect to the safety of second-hand goods, for 
instance, where those goods had passed through multiple previous owners.  
 
 Suppliers of professional services may be held to two different standards: a fault-
based standard with respect to professional services rendered and strict liability for 
defective goods supplied in conjunction with those services.1399 
 
 The general principles of causation, as developed in the common law of delict, are 
likely to be applied by South African courts in determining section 61-liability.1400 It is 
argued that South African courts are likely to follow a similar approach and allow for an 
inference that goods contained a ‘defect’, ‘hazard’ or ‘unsafe’ characteristic, akin to the 
res ipsa loquitur rule at common law, where the circumstances of the harm-causing 
incident warrant this.1401 Courts may also apply a ‘material contribution to risk’ approach 
                                                          
1398 4.2.3. See conclusions below at 5.2.3. 
1399 Ibid. 
1400 4.2.4. See conclusions below at 5.2.4. 
1401 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 469 
in circumstances where there are competing theories of factual causation, as recently 
recognised by the Constitutional Court in Lee v Minister of Correctional Services.1402   
 
 It is contended that section 61 does not extend the scope or damages that may be 
recoverable under the common law of delict.1403 Refer to the conclusions below at 5.2.5. 
 
5.1.2 Section 61 and contractual damages 
 It is argued that the scope of parties liable and potential claimants in a section 61 
claim is significantly broader than a common law contractual claim for damages, which 
is generally limited to the party with whom the plaintiff had contracted for the supply of 
the good (privity of contract).1404  
 
 The scope of ‘goods’ which may be the subject of a section 61-claim is arguably no 
broader than the scope of goods for purposes of a common law contractual claim for 
damages.1405  
 
 It is contended that the scope or damages recoverable under section 61 is broader 
than the scope of damages recoverable by means of a common law damages claim for 
breach of contract on the basis that pain and suffering damages cannot be recovered 




                                                          
1402 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). 
1403 4.2.5. See conclusions below at 5.2.5. 
1404 4.2.1; 4.2.2. See conclusions below at 5.2.1; 5.2.2. 
1405 4.2.3. See conclusions below at 5.2.3. 
1406 4.2.5. See conclusions below at 5.2.5. 
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5.1.3 Concurrence of section 61 and common law actions 
 Similar to the strict product liability regimes in the EU, the US and Australia, section 61 
of the CPA does not replace common law remedies, it simply provides an additional 
cause of action.1407 From a practical perspective, a section 61-plaintiff’s access to civil 
courts is restricted by section 69(d), which provides that a plaintiff may only approach a 
civil court (other than a consumer court) “if all other remedies available to that person in 
terms of national legislation have been exhausted.” This provision may place a very 
onerous duty on plaintiffs if it is interpreted literally as requiring every possible 
alternative remedy to be exhausted before approaching a civil court. Nevertheless, it is 
theoretically possible for a plaintiff to have alternative causes of action in contract, delict 
and under section 61 for harm caused by defective goods.  
 
 In scenarios where a section 61 action and common law actions for damages under 
delict and contract are concurrently available, a plaintiff has a choice of actions and may 
bring these actions in the alternative.1408 Where a plaintiff has a choice of actions, it is 
important to consider the requirements for each action and the relief available under 
each action. For instance, Aquilian damages are aimed at restoring the claimant to the 
position he or she would have been in had the harm never been suffered (negative 
interesse).1409 By contrast, damages for breach of contract are intended to put the 
claimant in the position he or she would have been had the contract been properly 
performed (positive interesse).1410 Further, under the law of delict, patrimonial loss is 
recoverable by means of the Aquilian action, while compensation for non-patrimonial 
loss may be claimed with either the actio iniuriarum or the action for pain and 
                                                          
1407 4.3.4. 
1408 4.3.4. 
1409  2.3.1.1(ii). 
1410  2.2.1.3(iii). 
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suffering.1411 By contrast, a damages claim based on breach of contract is limited to 
recovery of patrimonial loss.1412 Any non-patrimonial loss resulting from the breach, 
such as pain and suffering or loss of amenities, would have to be recovered by means 
of a separate, delictual claim. 
 
 Consideration of these differences between concurrent actions is equally important 
where a claimant is presented with a choice of common law remedies and an action 
under section 61 of the CPA. For instance, there may be cases where it would be more 
beneficial for a contractual party to pursue a claim in delict or under section 61, as 
opposed to a contractual claim for damages as the contract in question may limit the 
amount of damages recoverable in the event of harm caused by product defects. 
Further, a contractual party may be able to pursue a claim against numerous parties in 
the supply chain with a delictual claim or section 61 claim, whereas a claim for 
contractual damages could only be pursued against another contractual party who 
breached the contract by supplying a harm-causing, defective product.  
 
 There may be scenarios where a plaintiff would not have a section 61 claim but a claim 
in delict does arise. Examples may include circumstances where: 
o the plaintiff fails to meet the definition of “consumer” as defined in the CPA.1413 For 
instance, it appears that bystanders to product use are not protected by section 
61.1414 
                                                          
1411  2.3.1.1(ii). 
1412  2.2.1.3(iii). 
1413  As held by the SCA in Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead Cleak ZASCA [2016] 150 discussed above at 
4.5.2. 
1414  See discussion regarding bystanders above at 4.2.2. 
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o  the plaintiff was not a “consumer” within the meaning of product user in paragraph 
(c) of the definition of “consumer”, but a party to whom the defendant marketed the 
goods1415  or with whom the defendant entered into a transaction, 1416  and that 
marketing or transaction did not occur “in the ordinary course of the supplier’s 
business.” For example, a once-off sale of goods by a supplier.  
o where the goods that caused harm do not fall within the definition of “goods” as 
defined in section 1. However, it is difficult to conceive of goods that would not fall 
within the broad definition of “goods” as defined by the CPA. 
o where the plaintiff cannot show the goods are “unsafe”, contained a “hazard”, 
“defect” or had “inadequate instructions or warnings” or “failed” within the meaning 
of section 61(1)(a)-(c) read with section 53. The plaintiff may still be able to show 
that the goods were defective or harmful and had caused loss for which delictual 
liability should arise.    
o where the prescription period for purposes of a section 61 claim has expired but 
not a claim in delict, provided prescription runs differently for these two actions. 
There is legal uncertainty in this regard.1417 
 
 There may also be circumstances where the prospect of succeeding with a contractual 
claim for damages is greater than a section 61 claim or delictual claim. For example, 
where goods are sold which do not clearly fall within any of the categories of product 
deficiencies listed in section 61, but nevertheless breaches certain specifications 
contractually agreed upon by the claimant and supplier. Establishing that a product 
supplied breached contractual specifications may be easier than proving the supplier 
                                                          
1415  Paragraph (a) of the definition of “consumer”. 
1416  Paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer”. 
1417  4.2.7.5. 
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is guilty of negligent conduct during the manufacturing or distribution process or that 
the goods meet any of the definitions of defectiveness for purposes of section 61. 
 
 Similarly to the practice in Australia illustrated by the case study above1418 based on 
the author’s personal experience in legal practice in Australia, South African plaintiffs 
are likely to plead all possible causes of action to claim damages for harm arising from 
a product defect, which may include any combination of a contractual claim, delictual 
claim and a section 61 claim, depending on which actions’ requirements are met. 
 
 Where a South African court has determined that liability arises on more than one 
cause of action pleaded, the court is likely to apply the rules of the cause of action 
under which the plaintiff would be awarded the greatest amount of damages, if the 
measure of damages does indeed differ. 1419  This is in contrast to the Australian 
position where the plaintiff who succeeds on more than one alternative causes of 
action, has to elect a cause of action pursuant to which the court is to assess the 
quantum of damages, before final judgment is entered by the court.1420  
 
 It is argued that, like the Australian practice illustrated by the case study above,1421 
contributory responsibility between defendants could in practice be argued in a section 
61 strict liability claim in much the same way as apportionment of fault between 
defendants at common law, having regard to the role of each supplier in the supply 
chain and all other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the good in 
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question. 1422  Alternatively, courts may apply a doctrine of comparative causation, 
taking into account to what degree the plaintiff and defendant(s)’ actions contributed to 
the harm.  
 
 In conclusion, section 61 may certainly provide an additional avenue for redress, over 
and above common law remedies, where harm is caused by defective goods. 
However, due to various theoretical and practical restrictions to this remedy, the 
remedies founded in delict and contract remain relevant.   
 
5.2 SCOPE OF LIABILITY: INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 61 OF THE CPA  
5.2.1 Parties liable 
 Section 61 imposes liability on the “producer”, “importer”, “distributor” or “retailer” was 
defined in section 1 of the Act, whether these suppliers operated on a “for profit basis 
or otherwise” and irrespective of whether they were required or licenced by statute to 
provide goods. 1423 Where the plaintiff cannot identify the actual producer, he or she 
may be able to identify a number of other parties in the supply chain against whom the 
section 61 action can be brought. 
 
 The scope of potential defendants under the CPA is generally consistent with the 
Australian and American position.1424 The EU Directive’s scope of potential defendants 
is narrower in that its definition of “producer” does not include distributors or retailers, 
                                                          
1422 4.2.7.4. See conclusions below at 5.2.7.4. 
1423 4.2.1. 
1424  Ibid.  
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only producers and importers.1425 However, distributors or retailers may be held liable 
under the EU Directive if they are unable to identify their own supplier. 
 
 Similar to the position at common law, section 61-liability is joint and several and is 
imposed on all parties who participate in the retail process, from the producer to the 
ultimate retailer.1426 
 
 Section 5(5) of the CPA may have the (perhaps unintended) effect that a retailer (as 
buyer) may have a section 61 claim against the distributor (as seller) or the producer 
and the distributor (as buyer) against the producer.1427 
 
5.2.2 Potential claimants 
 The wording of section 61 is ambiguous as to whether a section 61-claimant is 
required to meet the description of a “consumer” as defined in the CPA, or whether the 
remedy extends to persons other than a “consumer” such as bystanders. Further, it is 
unclear from the wording of the CPA whether a product user, as defined in paragraph 
(c) of the definition of consumer, would be entitled to bring a claim under section 
61.1428 
 
 The prevailing position in foreign jurisdictions appears to be that strict product liability 
actions against manufacturers are not only available to persons who are “consumers”, 
                                                          
1425  Ibid. 
1426  Ibid. 
1427  4.2.1. See conclusions at 5.2.2. 
1428 4.2.2. 
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but any person or individual who suffers personal injury or property damage due to 
defective goods.1429 
 
 In light of the consumer protectionist policy underlying the CPA, the ambiguity created 
by the wording of section 61 and the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions 
considered in this study, it is argued that section 61 should be interpreted as being 
available to all persons falling within paragraph (c) of the definition of “consumer” 
under CPA, in other words, including users of goods. This position was recently 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-
Cleak.1430 However, there is legal uncertainty as to when when a person would qualify 
as “using” goods within the meaning of paragraph (b) of the definition of “consumer” 
and whether this could, in some instances, include a bystander.  
 
 
 The position with respect to bystanders harmed by defective goods is not clear under 
section 61. On the face of it, the CPA’s definition of “consumer” does not appear to 
include bystanders who are harmed as a result of defective goods being used by 
another person (the consumer or user). However, upon closer consideration of 
paragraph (c) of the definition of “consumer”, there is some ambiguity, at least in the 
context of electricity as discussed above, as to when a person would be considered to 
“use” the electricity or when a person is simply receiving an inadvertent benefit from 
the electricity as a bystander. Further, the ordinary, literal meaning of “any natural 
person” in section 61(5) would appear broad enough to include “bystanders” harmed 
by product use, as opposed to the references to “consumer” elsewhere in section 61, 
and this further creates ambiguity which arguably warrants a purposive interpretation.  
 
                                                          
1429 3.5.2. 
1430 ZASCA [2016] 150 at [15]. This case is discussed in detail below at 4.3.2. 
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 It is argued that the welfare of consumers generally would not necessarily be 
promoted by imposing strict liability for harm to bystanders caused by defective 
products. The imposition of strict product liability on any bystanders may open the 
floodgates of litigation and impose an excessively onerous burden on industry, thereby 
stifling innovation and resulting in reduced access to consumer goods. The CPA’s 
purpose of estabslishing a framework for a ‘sustainable’ consumer market would 
perhaps not be served by inclusion of bystanders. It may be that the legislature 
deemed it more appropriate for harm to bystanders to be governed by Aquilian liability, 
which requires the bystander to establish the product supplier owed a duty of care to 
him or her in the circumstances, which arguably provides more scope for a fair 
outcome than strict liability in this context. 
 
 The prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions compared appears to be to protect 
any individual harmed by defective goods, which arguably includes bystanders.1431 
However, it should be borne in mind that the foreign jurisdictions compared are all 
developed countries, whereas in a developing country such as South Africa it may be 
too onerous on the supply chain and less beneficial to the welfare of consumers 
generally to impose strict product liability for harm to bystanders.  
 
 In the interest of legal certainty, it would have been preferable for the legislature to 
refer consistently in section 61 to either “consumers” or “persons” harmed by goods 
and to specifically state whether bystanders harmed by defective goods are protected 
by section 61. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently held in Eskom 
                                                          
1431 3.5.2. 
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Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak.1432 that the reference to “natural person” in section 
61(5) was merely to distinguish it from “person” or a “consumer” which may also 
include a juristic person.  
 
 
 In light of the wording of section 61 read with the definition of “consumer” in section 1 
and the SCA’s decision in Halstead-Cleak, the position in South Africa appears to be 
that: 
o section 61 would be available to a product user who is harmed by a good that was 
subject of a “transaction” to which a “consumer” (not necessarily the user) is a 
party; 
o section 61 is not available to a bystander harmed by goods being used by a 
consumer or product user. 
 
5.2.3 Goods 
 The definition of “goods” in section 1 makes no express reference to component goods 
which are later integrated into finished goods.1433 However, section 53(1) defines the 
various types of product deficiencies referred to in section 61 and states that these 
deficiencies apply in respect of “any “good” and also “any component of any goods”. 
Therefore, it is clear that section 61 applies to defective component goods that cause 
harm.  
 
 The definition of “goods” makes no reference to second-hand or used goods. This is 
consistent with the position under the EU Directive1434 and the US Restatement.1435 It 
                                                          
1432  ZASCA [2016] 150 at [15]. This case is discussed in detail below at 4.3.2. 
1433  4.2.3. 
1434  3.5.3. 
1435  3.5.3. 
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is arguable that the wording of paragraph (a) of CPA’s definition of “goods” is equally 
broad enough to read in ‘second-hand goods’, where such goods are marketed for 
human consumption and provided ‘consumption’ is read to mean consumption of 
goods in the economic sense. However, given that the plain meaning of paragraph (a) 
of “goods” is not ambiguous and simply does not refer to second-hand goods, it would 
seem that a deviation from this is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. 
However, the the High Court has held that the CPA applies to second-hand or “used 
goods”.1436 It is questioned whether this judgment is correct, given that the definition of 
“goods” does not raise any ambiguity which justifies a deviation from the plain 
meaning of its words. Further, it is argued that the imposition of strict liability on 
second-hand or used goods may not promote the welfare of consumers generally, 




 The definition of “goods” under the CPA includes an open-ended category of 
intangible, informational or intellectual products.1437 Information or data in itself, as 
distinguished from the physical medium on which it is written, would qualify as “good.” 
This is a departure from the foreign jurisdictions considered in this study where strict 
product liability is generally applied to tangible goods. 1438  The boundaries of this 
category are unclear and may include generally disseminated information relied upon 
by an incalculable number of users, for instance via digital or cyber networks, giving 
rise to concerns of indeterminate liability. 
 
                                                          
1436  Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors (unreported, case no 3878/2013, [2015] ZAECGHC 64 (19 
June 2015).  
1437  4.2.3. 
1438  3.5.3. 
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 Given the potentially wide-spread harm caused by defective information coupled with 
the policy consideration that the threat of strict liability could “inhibit the socially and 
economically desirable free dissemination of ideas and theories,” the argument in 
favour of a negligence standard for defective informational goods put forth by Loubser 
& Reid is supported.1439  
 
 Alternatively, it is suggested that strict liability for defective informational good could be 
regulated more extensively by defining in clearer terms: 
 
o the types of informational goods covered by the intangible information category; 
o whether the supply of electronic information or advice provided as part of 
professional advisory services is included in the category of informational goods 
and how this would impact on existing industry-specific standards prescribed for 
professional service providers and established common law liability for 
professional negligence; 
o the extent of liability of the various parties involved in the supply of defective 
information having regard to their respective roles in relation to the information, for 
instance, authors, editors, software design engineers, website or system operators 
and the manufacturers of the physical media on which information is written.  
 
 There is a possibility that the informational goods may include the informational 
content of professional advice, for instance, engineering or architectural designs, 
supplied in electronic format to clients.1440 If this is the case, harm caused by a ‘defect’ 
in this professional advice would give rise to strict liability, which would be a significant 
departure from the traditional Aquilian basis of professional liability. However, it is 
                                                          
1439  4.2.3. 
1440 4.2.3. 
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argued that, if it was the legislature’s intention to impose strict liability on professional 
advisory service providers, this would have been expressed in clearer terms in the 
CPA. This view is supported by the fact that services are regulated separately in 
section 54 of the CPA.   
 
 In the interest of legal certainty, it is suggested that the position regarding liability of 
professional service providers could be clarified in the CPA. For instance, the definition 
of “goods” in section 1 could be amended so as to exclude any informational content 
of any professional advice or other intellectual content (such as technical designs or 
drawings) provided as part of a professional advisory service.  
 
5.2.4 Causation 
 The CPA does not expressly prescribe a test for causation to be applied in relation to 
section 61.1441 In the absence of any legislative clarification, it is suggested that South 
African courts will apply the common law principles for establishing causation as they 
apply in the law of delict. This is consistent with the approach in foreign jurisdictions 
considered.1442  
 
 In light of the prevailing practice in foreign jurisdictions where an inference of 
defectiveness is drawn in appropriate cases, South African courts may follow a similar 
approach and allow for an inference that goods contained a ‘defect’, ‘hazard’ or 
‘unsafe’ characteristic, akin to the res ipsa loquitur rule at common law, where the 
circumstances of the harm-causing incident warrant this. However, South African 
                                                          
1441 4.2.4. 
1442 3.5.4. 
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courts have been reluctant to apply this doctrine in delictual claims and it has to date 
not been applied in a product liability case under the Aquilian action. It is argued that 
the underlying consumer protectionist policy of the CPA in introducing strict product 
liability would arguably be better served by allowing for an inference of defectiveness 
to assist claimants in discharging the evidentiary burden of establishing defectiveness 
and causation in circumstances where the facts clearly justify such an inference.1443 
 
 Where factual causation involves consideration of two or more competing, but 
independent potential causes of the harm and there is insufficient evidence to 
establish, on a balance of probabilities, factual causation, South African courts may 
apply the so-called ‘material contribution to risk’ doctrine, as recently adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in Lee v Minister of Correctional Services.1444 Where a section 61 
plaintiff’s harm may plausibly have been caused by defective goods and another, 
unreleated negligent act or cause, the plaintiff may be able to establish factual 
causation against the defective goods supplier by simply showing the defective goods 
had increased the risk of harm. It remains to be seen whether the increase in risk 
ought to have been material or substantial. This approach would greatly assist 
plaintiffs in overcoming the inherent difficulties posed by the traditional “but-for” test for 
factual causation, as is evident from product liability cases under the Aquilian action. 
 
 South African courts may seek guidance from English law English case law applying 
the UKCPA where it has on numerous occasions been considered what standard of 
proof is required to establish defectiveness and causation.1445 If South African courts 
                                                          
1443 4.2.2 (iv). 
1444 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). See 4.2.4. 
1445 4.2.4. 
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were to follow the approach in the most recent cases on this point, then section 61 
plaintiffs would merely need to prove the existence of a defect in broad or general 
terms, such as “a defect in the electrics of the vehicle” and a court would simply have 
to determine that the loss was caused by that defect and not another cause. 
 
5.2.5 Harm and damages 
 Section 61(6)(b) provides that nothing in section 61 limits the authority of the court to 
‘determine the extent and monetary value of any damages, including economic 
loss’.1446 It is argued that, in the absence of any further legislative clarification as to the 
method for assessing damages under section 61, this section suggests the general 
principles for assessing damages as developed under the common law of delict will 
apply to section 61 damages. This is supported in light of section 2(10) of the the CPA 
and the interpretive presumption that legislation does not intend to affect the existing 
common law. Further, it would be in the interest of legal certainty to interpret the CPA 
in a manner that remains as consistent as possible with the existing common law 
framework for product liability. 
 
 Section 61(5) is substantially consistent with the European, Australian and American 
position in relation to the categories of harm for which strict product liability is imposed, 
being personal injury, property damage and any consequential loss flowing from the 
personal injury or property damage.1447 
 
 
                                                          
1446 4.2.5. 
1447 3.5.5. 
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 Section 61(5)(c) imposes liability for “any loss of, or physical damage to any property, 
irrespective of whether it is movable or immovable.” The plain meaning of the words 
“any property” can be interpreted as including damage to the defective product itself 
and any economic loss resulting from its replacement. If this was the legislature’s 
intention, the CPA differs from the foreign strict liability regimes considered, which 
expressly exclude liability for harm to the defective product itself.1448 If, however, the 
words “any property” are ambiguous in this respect, a purposive interpretation of this 
provision would arguably dictate that section 61-plaintiffs who stood in a contractual 
relationship with a supplier be entitled to recover the damage to the product itself by 
way of a section 61-claim as this interpretation favours consumers, as opposed to 
requiring such plaintiffs to make out a separate claim for breach of contract or 
consumer guarantees under section 56 of the CPA. Whilst this interpretation would 
mean section 61 provides an overlapping or additional means of obtaining 
compensation over and above any contractual remedies that may be available to the 
section 61-plaintiff, it would arguably promote the welfare of consumers generally, 
particularly vulnerable consumers, to facilitate recovery of such loss by means of one 
action. A counter-argument to this is based on legislative context, namely that 
remedies for loss resulting from damage to a product due to an unsafe feature, defect 
or substandard quality are already provided for in section 56 of the CPA. In the interest 
of legal certainty, it would be preferable for the legislature to clarify this point by 
expressly stating in section 61(5)(c) whether “physical damage to any property” 
includes damage to the defective goods themselves.  
 
                                                          
1448 Ibid. 
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 Section 61(6)(c) empowers the court to apportion liability among persons who are 
found to be jointly and severally liable.1449 It is argued that this is similar to the court’s 
power to apportion liability among joint wrongdoers in an Aquilian action. See 
conclusions below at 5.2.7.4 regarding the basis for apportionment. 
 
5.2.6 Concept of defectiveness  
 It is argued that the categorisation of different types of product deficiencies in section 
53 and 61 of the CPA serves no practical purpose and gives rise to significant legal 
uncertainty due to overlapping notions employed by these provisions. 1450  The 
difficulties presented by the various categories of defectiveness in section 53 and 61 
are illustrated by the Halstead-Cleak cases and the decision of the Consumer Goods 
and Services Ombud (CGSO) in 2014 regarding a consumer complaint involving 




 The various definitions of product deficiency in sections 53 and 61 could be replaced 
with a single definition of “defect”, as is done in the EU Directive, the UK and 
Australia.1452  
 
 It is suggested that the ‘expectations test’ for determining “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(i) 
and (ii), which is similar to the test employed in the EU Directive and ACL, be 
abandoned altogether in the CPA due to significant academic criticism of this test’s 
                                                          
1449 4.2.7.4. See conclusions below at 5.2.7.4. 
1450 4.2.6.2. 
1451 4.3.1; 4.3.2. See also 4.2.6.1(i). 
1452 3.5.6. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 486 
circularity and vagueness and potential for readmitting negligence to the enquiry.1453 
This test has been rejected by the majority of courts in the US and replaced with a 
reasonableness standard involving a risk-utility analysis of a product.1454  
 
 It is suggested that South African courts could adopt an objective reasonableness 
standard for determining defectiveness of goods for purposes of section 61, similar to 
the wrongfulness enquiry in the common law of delict.1455 The reasonableness of a 
product’s safety can be assessed with hindsight having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances, without reintroducing negligence to the enquiry. This would, in 
essence, involve a ‘risk-utility' analysis, which is more consistent with the current 
wrongfulness approach followed by South African courts. 
 
 The reasonableness test could be supported by a non-exhaustive list of relevant 
considerations expressly listed in the CPA to provide guidance to courts when 
assessing defectiveness.1456 The particular weight attaching to each factor would be at 
the court’s discretion. It is further submitted that South African courts could draw on 
the vast amount of foreign case law on strict product liability, in addition to existing 
South African case law on delictual product liability, in identifying factors that may be 
relevant to determining whether a ‘defect’ exists in particular goods or categories of 
goods. However, such foreign case law and the factors considered there must be 
understood in the context of that unique jurisdiction and may, upon application, 
achieve a different result in South Africa.   
 
                                                          
1453 4.3.1. 
1454 3.2.1.6(ii); 3.2.1.6(iii). 
1455 4.2.6.1(i). 
1456 4.3.1(i). 
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 If a single definition of “defect” were to be employed by the CPA, it is suggested that 
section 61(1) could perhaps read as follows: 
'61(1) Except to the extent contemplated in subsection (4), the producer or importer, 
distributor or retailer of any goods is liable for any harm, as described in subsection (5), 
caused wholly or partly as a consequence - of a defect in the goods, 
(a) supplying any unsafe goods; 
(b) a product failure, defect or hazard in any goods; or 
(c) inadequate instructions or warnings provided to the consumer pertaining to any 
hazard arising from or associated with the use of any goods; 
irrespective of whether the harm resulted from any negligence on the part of the 
producer, importer, distributor or retailer, as the case may be.' 
 
 It is suggested that the single concept of “defect” for purposes of a section 61 claim 
could be defined as follows by the CPA: 
'(1) For purposes of Part H, goods have a ‘defect' if they are not reasonably safe. 
(2)  In determining the extent of the safety of goods, regard is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances, including: 
(a)  the manner in which, and the purposes for which, they have been marketed; 
and 
(b)  the standard intended for the product by the producer; 
(c)  standards or duties prescribed by legislation for the goods; 
(b)  their packaging; and 
(c)  the use of any mark in relation to them; and 
(d)  any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or refraining from doing, 
anything with or in relation to them; and 
(e)  what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to them; and 
(f)   the time when the goods were manufactured or supplied; 
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(g) the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the goods by alternative 
manufacturing process or design; 
(h)  the risk, benefit, utility and cost of the goods. 
(i) the possible prevention of the harmful effect of the goods by alternative 
manufacturing process or design;' 
 
 From a practical perspective, a single concept of defect would make it easier for section 
61-plaintiffs to plead their case and would provide courts with the necessary freedom to 
develop principles for determining defectiveness that are suitable to the particular type 
of alleged defect in question, whether manufacturing, design or warning related or in 
some cases, a combination. 
 
 In the absence of legislative amendment, it is argued that the current test for “defect” 
employed by section 53(1)(a)(i) and (ii), which refer to what persons generally would be 
“reasonably” entitled to expect “in the circumstances” could be interpreted so as to 
mean a reasonableness standard, akin to the wrongfulness enquiry in the law of delict, 
involving an assessed of defectiveness with hindsight in light of all the relevant 




 The plain meaning of the definition of “defect” in section 53(1)(a)(i) clearly includes 
manufacturing defects. However, the wording in section 53(1)(a) is silent on whether a 
“design” defect is included. It is argued that the plain meaning of the words “any 
characteristic” that renders the goods less useful, practicable or safe, as used in section 
53(1)(a)(ii) could be construed to include “design characteristics”.1457  
 
 
                                                          
1457 4.2.6.1(i). 
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 In the context of “inadequate warnings or instructions” within the meaning of section 
61(1)(c), the role of intermediaries may be relevant.1458 For instance, the majority of US 
courts have recognised a so-called ‘learned intermediary doctrine’ in the context of 
pharmaceutical products and medical devices, pursuant to which a producer may 
escape liability where it relied on a learned intermediary, such as a treating doctor, to 
advise and warn consumers of the risks of a product. The application of this factor in 
South Africa may arguably be different than in developed coutnries such as the United 
States, given the high levels of poverty and illiteracy among consumers. This doctrine is 
based on the presumption that the learned intermediary would explain the risks of a 
particular product in clear and understandable terms to the consumer. However, there is 
a real risk in South Africa that consumers may not always fully comprehend instructions 
or warnings provided verbally to them, whether due to illiteracy or language barriers. 
Producers in South African arguably owe a higher duty to provide instructions and 
warnings in clear, plain and simple language and cannot escape liability by complete 
reliance on learned intermediaries. 
 
 With respect to assessing the adequacy of instructions or warnings accompanying 
goods within the meaning of section 61(1)(c), it is argued that courts should keep in 
mind the effects of information overload on consumers’ decisionmaking ability, 
particularly in the context of South African consumers. Behavioural economics suggest 
that, due to consumers’ cognitive capacity limits, a product that contains too many 




                                                          
1458 4.2.6.1(i). 
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5.2.7 Defences 
5.2.7.1 Compliance with public regulation 
 Section 61(4)(a) provides a defence where a defendant can show the product defect 
was "wholly attributable to compliance with a public regulation.”1459 
  
 This defence may not be of much practical use as regulations are generally aimed at 
making products safer and would rarely force a manufacturer to produce an unsafe 
product. This is supported by the apparently limited experience of this defence in the 
EU. In 2011, it was reported that the equivalent of this defence contained in article 7(d) 
of the EU Directive had rarely been raised in case law.1460  
 
 The Australian legislature is of the view that, where a regulation provides a minimum 
safety standard, and the manufacturer was free to exceed the minimum requirement 
without sanction, it cannot be argued that compliance with the regulation was the sole 
cause of the product defect.1461 It is contended that South African courts are likely to 
take a similar view when interpreting the defence in S 61(4)(a).  
 
 It is suggested that consideration could be given to providing section 61 plaintiffs with a 
right of recourse, as is done by the ACL, against the public authority responsible for the 
regulation where it is established by a section 61-defendant that the product was 
defective solely due to compliance with that regulation.1462 However, it is argued that 
there may well be valid policy reasons for the CPA not holding public authorities strictly 
                                                          
1459 4.2.7.1. 
1460 3.3.1.7(i). 
1461 3.4.1.7(i).  
1462 Ibid. 
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liable in these circumstances. For instance, the view may be that public authorities 
should not be strictly liable for issuing product safety standards that do not provide the 
safest and most comprehensive information available, based on scientific knowledge at 
the time, given the financial restrictions within which these authorities operate. This 
policy argument would be particularly relevant in the context of a developing country 
such as South Africa. Further, an allocation of risk argument may dictate that, despite 
public safety regulations, it is those parties who put into circulation products for profit 
who should bear the primary and ultimate responsibility for ensuring their safety. 
 
5.2.7.2 Absence of defect at time of supply 
 Section 61(4)(b)(i) provides a defence if the defendant can show the product defect did 
not exist in the goods at the time it was supplied by that defendant to another 
defendant.1463  
 
 This defence is of particular importance to suppliers of component goods who can 
establish that the component was not defective at the time it was supplied to the 
manufacturer of the final defective good.1464  
 
 The defence provided by section 61(4)(b)(i) is similar to the Australian and European 
approach.1465  While the US Restatement does not provide for a defence in similar 
wording, it provides a defence in the context of design and warning defects where the 
consumer or user misuses, modifies or alters the product.1466   
 
 
                                                          
1463 4.2.7.2. 
1464  4.4.2. 
1465  3.5.7(ii). 
1466  Ibid. 
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 It is unclear from the wording of section 61(4)(b)(i) what level of proof a defendant 
supplier would have to meet in order to succeed with this defence.1467 In the absence of 
any legislative clarification in this regard, the onus would arguably rest with defendant to 
establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the defect did not exist at it time it left that 
defendant’s possession or control. Presumably, if the defendant can adduce sufficient 
evidence regarding its quality control measures to justify a prima facie case that the 
defect arose after leaving the defendant’s possession or control, the onus would then 
shift to the plaintiff to rebut this. It is doubtful whether a South African court would allow 
the defence to succeed where the defendant cannot provide proof of inspection of the 
particular product that allegedly caused harm, as done by the English Court of Appeal in 
Terence Piper v JRI (Manufacturing) Limited.1468 In the interest of assisting vulnerable 
consumers in the particular context of South Africa who are often unable to produce the 
same level of expert evidence as sophisticated manufacturers at trial, South African 
courts may be inclined to require stricter proof from the defendant as to the absence of 
a defect in the particular product for purposes of sction 61(4)(b)(i). 
 
 Section 61(4)(b)(ii) provides a defence to a defendant if the defect was wholly 
attributable to compliance with instructions provided by the person who supplied the 
good to the defendant.1469 This defence would assist a supplier who has no expert 
knowledge of a product acquired from another supplier and simply followed the 
instructions of that other supplier, for instance, relating to care or storage of that 
product, resulting in a defect. This defence was arguably introduced as recognition of 
the reality that retailers are often unfamiliar with the technicalities of certain products 
                                                          
1467  4.2.7.2. 
1468  [2006] 92 BMLR 141, discussed at 3.3.1.8(i) aboce. 
1469 4.4.2. 
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and that they should not be held strictly liable for merely following the instructions 
provided to them by their supplier. In reality, the party providing instructions with a 
product would in the majority of cases be the producer of that product or, at least, a 
supplier with more sophisticated knowledge of the product than subsequent suppliers. 
Section 61(4)(b)(ii) therefore seems to allocate the risk of liability to that party with more 
sophisticated knowledge of the product as opposed to generalist and/or small, 
unsophisticated retailers. This defence therefore seems to strike a fair balance between 
the interests of parties in the supply chain thereby promoting a “fair” and “sustainable” 
marketplace pursuant to the legislative purposes of the CPA. 
 
5.2.7.3 Defect not reasonably discoverable 
 Section 61(4)(c) provides a defence where a defect was not reasonably discoverable by 
the distributor or retailer, having regard to that person’s role in marketing the goods to 
consumers.1470 The circumstances where this defence could be raised may include so-
called ‘development risks’, being risks that are only discovered as the goods are being 
used by consumers and which were not known or detectable at the time of supply.  
 
 On the face of it, section 61(4)(c) appears to be available to distributors and retailers of 
defective goods only, and not manufacturers or importers. However, it is questioned 
whether this was a legislative oversight given that section 61(4) refers at the outset to 
the liability of a “particular person”. This creates ambiguity which arguably warrants a 
purposive interpretation. It was perhaps the legislature’s intention to provide this 
defence to retailers since they often do not have the opportunity to inspect products 
prior to on-sale, such as sealed products that would become unmarketable once 
                                                          
1470 4.2.7.3. 
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opened, nor do they necessarily possess the knowledge or skill to detect defects. This 
would appear to strike a fair balance between the liability of suppliers in the distribution 
chain where the producer was closer to the product and had the opportunity to conduct 
proper quality controls prior to packaging. The omission of “importers” from this defence 
presumably serves to prevent a situation where a plaintiff has no recourse against the 
retailer and distributor based on this defence and the producer is overseas. In this 
scenario, fairness would perhaps dictate that the importer of the harmful product into 
South Africa should bear liability towards the plaintiff, regardless of whether that 
importer could reasonably have detected the defect, in other words true strict liability. In 
light of these policy considerations, it is is argued that the defence in section 61(4)(c) 
should not be available to producers and importers. 
 
 There is widespread academic criticism of the equivalent of this defence in foreign 
jurisdictions.1471 It is argued that, by allowing the producer or supplier to escape liability 
on the ground that it acted reasonably, in effect amounts to re-admittance of negligence 
or fault-based liability.  
 
 Given the policy reasons for introducing strict product liability under the CPA, some 
authors argue that the reasonableness test for purposes of this defence should be a 
‘high, although not unattainable standard of reasonableness’, akin to the 
reasonableness standard under the element of wrongfulness in the law of delict, taking 
into account the ‘highest level of good practice in the relevant industry”.1472 This view is 
                                                          
1471 3.3.1.7(iii); 4.2.7.3. 
1472 4.2.7.3. 
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supported in light of the theoretical criticism of this defence in the context of a strict 
liability regime.1473 
 
 The reasonableness test imposed by this defence would arguably require courts to take 
into consideration the ‘state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time the good 
was under the control of that person’, despite the fact that this phrase was removed 
from the final wording of section 61(4)(c).1474 If South African courts were inclined to 
consider the “scientific knowledge and technical knowledge” as a relevant factor, they 
would have to consider this in the particular context of distributors and retailers in South 
Africa and the knowledge reasonably available and accessible to them or that they 
could reasonably be expected to possess. It is unlikely that courts would expect general 
distributors and retailers to be aware of the most advanced and latest scientific and 
technical knowledge reasonably accessible to enable detection of a defect, rather 
general knowledge that such suppliers could reasonably be expected to possess having 
regard to their role in marketing the goods. It could perhaps also be relevant to consider 
whether a retailer is provided with any training or education by a producer regarding the 
product prior to being able to sell it. 
 
 The reference in section 61(4)(c) to retailers and distributors’ “role in marketing the 
goods to consumers” would arguably require courts to consider, for instance, whether 
they had the opportunity to open packaging and inspect the goods. 1475  There are 
numerous consumer goods that are packaged and sealed in such a way that 
distributors and retailers are unable to inspect those products for defects prior to on-sale 
without rendering them unmarketable. Even if intermediate inspection by these 
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suppliers is possible, it would hardly be practically and economically feasible to require 
distributors and retailers to do so for every single product they supply. Therefore, the 
question may be what level of sampling for quality control purposes would be 
reasonable to expect of a distributor or retailer. There are also products which are of a 
highly technical or complex nature which means distributors or retailers could not be 
expected to psosess the knowledge or skill to conduct testing. The question may then 
become whether they are reasonably expected to outsource to independent testing. As 
this illustrates, the reasonableness standard would require a balancing of the interests 
of distributors and retailers and the protection of consumers, having regard to the 
particular circumstances, such as the nature of the product and the parties involved.   
 
 It is unclear what practical impact this defence will have in South Africa or to what extent 
it will ‘weaken’ the strictness of section 61 liability.1476 It is noteworthy that, since the 
introduction of this defence in Australia in 1992, it has only been considered twice in 
reported case law.1477 Further, by 2002, the practical application of this defence under 
the EU Directive was still extremely limited in reported case law despite being available 
for 17 years.1478 In 2011 a report by the European Commission on the application of the 
EU Directive noted that stakeholder have differing opinions regarding the effectiveness 
of this defence, but recognise that the EU Directive overall strikes an appropriate 
balance between the competing interests of industry and consumers. The report noted 
that stakeholders considered the defence important to maintain an appropriate balance 
between producers and persons harmed by defective products. However, removal of 
the defence in two EU states was reported to have had a limited economic impact. Of 
course, the fact that the defence has not been applied much in EU case law does not 
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mean that it has not been raised frequently and successfully in out of court negotiations 
and settlements. 
 
5.2.7.4 Apportionment of liability 
 Section 61(6)(c) provides for apportionment of liability among defendants who are jointly 
and severally liable.1479 This provision does not provide any guidance as to the basis for 
apportionment. It is unclear whether section 61-liability constitutes a ‘debt’ for purposes 
of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1954.  
 
 Section 61 does not provide for apportionment in respect of the plaintiff-defendant 
relationship, contrary to the EU Directive, the UKCPA and the ACL.1480 It is argued that 
this appears to be a legislative oversight.1481 It is argued that the CPA’s purpose of 
establishing a legal framework for a “fair” and “sustainable” consumer market would 
dictate that section 61 liabilities should take note of the actions of a plaintiff who 
recklessly ignores safety warnings or instructions or misuses goods, thereby 
contributing to their harm and that the defendant’s liability be reduced accordingly. If 
suppliers are held liable for a plaintiff’s conduct that contributed to the harm, it would 
drive suppliers out of the market and reduce consumer access to goods, which would 
not promote the welfare of consumers generally. However, it is doubtful that courts 
would stray from the plain meaning of section 61(6)(c) to read it as including 
apportionment of liability between defendants and the plaintiff. It is argued that, in light 
of the prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions considered and in the interest of 
estabslihing a legal framework for a consumer market that is “fair” and “sustainable”, 
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section 61 ought to allow for apportionment of liability having regard to both the plaintiff 
and defendant(s) contribution to the causation of harm. It is argued that this omission 
should be rectified by the legislature.1482 
 
 A solution to the theoretical problem of applying apportionment in a strict liability claim is 
to assess apportionment on the basis of comparative causation, rather than 
comparative fault.1483 In other words, courts would need to objectively assess to what 
degree the harm was caused by the product defect, the actions of the plaintiff and the 
actions of the defendant(s). Another solution would be to follow the approach in the 
UKCPA by expressly stating in Section 61 that the Apportionment of Damages Act 
applies and that the “defect”, “hazard”, “failure” or “unsafe” characterstic of the goods 
that caused harm is deemed to be the “fault” of the section 61 defendant(s).1484 
 
 In the interest of removing any legal uncertainty regarding the basis for apportionment 
and whether apportionment applies with respect to the plaintiff’s contribution to the 
harm, it is suggested that the CPA expressly prescribe rules for apportionment or 
alternatively, expressly state that the established rules under the Apportionment of 
Damages Act 34 of 1954 apply to section 61 claims. 
 
5.2.7.5 Prescription 
 Section 61(4) appears to provide for a three year prescription period in respect of 
section 61 claims, however, it does not use the established terminology contained in the 
                                                          
1482 Ibid. 
1483 4.2.4; 4.2.7.4. 
1484 4.2.7.4; 3.3.1.8(i). 
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Prescription Act 68 of 1969.1485  It is, therefore, unclear whether, and to what extent, the 
prescription provisions under the CPA are intended to co-exist with the Prescription Act. 
Section 61(4)(d) gives rise to numerous interpretive problems and uncertainties relating, 
for instance, to the calculation of the time limit, interruption and delay of the running of 
time and aspects which may indicate inconsistencies between this provision and the 
Prescription Act.  
 
 It is suggested by some authors that section 61(4)(d) could be interpreted so as to 
mean that prescription for purposes of section 61-liability is governed by the established 
principles of the Prescription Act. 1486  Alternatively, if such an interpretation is not 
permitted based on the rules of statutory interpretation, it is suggested that the 
legislature amend section 61(4)(d) to confirm section 61 liability constitutes a ‘debt’ for 
purposes of the Prescription Act or alternatively, provide detailed prescription rules for 
section 61.  
 
 The CPA does not impose a so-called ‘long-stop’ provision such as employed by the 
ACL and the EU Directive, which provides that a product liability claim cannot be 
brought more than 10 years after the supply of the good by the manufacturer.1487 It is 
contended that the reason for this long-stop limitation presumably relates to concerns 
over procedural fairness and evidentiary difficulties. A manufacturer is unlikely to have 
retained detailed production or quality control records relating to a product supplied 
more than 10 years ago. Further, the product may have been subject to considerable 
use, wear and tear and changed ownership multiple times. It is unclear whether 
omission of a long-stop limitation period from the CPA was a legislative oversight or 
                                                          
1485  4.2.7.5. 
1486  Ibid. 
1487  4.2.7.5; 3.5.7(v). 
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intentional. No reference is made to such a provision in the draft Consumer Protection 
Bill. In the interest of establishing a legal framework for a consumer market that is “fair”, 
procedural fairness and in light of the prevailing practice in the foreign jurisdictions 
considered, it is recommended that the legislature give consideration to providing for a 
‘long-stop’ prescription period in the CPA for purposes of section 61-claims. 
 
 
5.2.7.6 Contractual restriction of liability 
 The CPA does not expressly prohibit exemption clauses in respect of damages claims 
for loss caused by defects in the goods of which the retailer could not reasonably have 
been aware, and possibly, pure economic loss caused by defective goods,1488 provided 
such loss did not arise as a result of the supplier’s gross negligence. 1489  Such 
exemption clauses would have to comply with the formal requirements in section 49 and 
may be voided for being “unfair” pursuant to section 48. Further, such exemption 
clauses would have to comply with the formal requirements in section 49 and may be 
voided for being unfair pursuant to section 48. Further, an exemption clause in respect 
of liability for breach of contract which is not prohibited will be presumed to be unfair for 
purposes of section 48 given the grey listing of such clauses in regulation 44(3)(b). An 
example would be a term providing that a supplier is not responsible for the economic 
interests of a consumer, thereby purporting to exclude liability for any pure economic 
loss sustained by the consumer. 
 
 With respect to liability for death and personal injury, it is argued by Naudé that the grey 
listing of exemption clauses for such harm “precludes any conceivable argument that 
                                                          
1488  The wording of section 61(5) creates uncertainty as to whether pure economic loss is recoverable under 
section 61.  
1489  4.2.7.6. 
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section 49(2)(c) permits such exemption clauses and that that provision protects them 
from a fairness review provided they comply with the formal requirements of that 
provision.” 1490 She argues that section 49(2)(c) provides a minimum threshold which 
any provision relating to such risks must comply with, but exemption clauses relating to 





 In light of the grey-listing of contractual exemptions for personal injury and death arising 
from defective goods, the pre-CPA case law regarding the validity of such clauses, the 
constitutional rights of the consumer to life and bodily integrity, coupled with the 
underlying purpose of the CPA to advance the welfare of consumers generally, it is 
unlikely a court will uphold exemption clauses that attempt to limit the supply chain’s 
liability to the plaintiff under section 61 for bodily harm or death caused by defective 
products.   
 
 Regulation 44 does not expressly grey list a term which purports to exclude or restrict 
the supply chain’s liability for harm other than personal injury or death.1491 However, 
regulation 44(3)(b) does provide that a term is presumed unfair if it “has the purpose or 
effect of excluding or restricting the legal rights or remedies of the consumer against the 
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial breach by the supplier of any of 
the obligations provided for in the agreement.” According to Naudé, this means all 
exemption clauses which are not void for purporting to deprive the consumer of his or 
her rights under the CPA are presumed to be unfair.1492 It is argued that an example of 
                                                          
1490  Ibid. 
1491  Ibid. 
1492  Reg 44 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 44-17. 
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an exemption clause which will be void for purporting to exempt the seller from liability 
under the CPA is a clause “purporting to deprive the buyer of the right to claim damages 
under section 61 for bodily injury, death or damage caused to property and resultant 
economic loss caused by defective goods, insofar as the defences provided for in 
section 61(4) are not available to the supplier.”1493 
 
 It is submitted that courts are likely to interpret the CPA so as to prohibit exemption 
clauses in respect of the supply chain’s liability to the plaintiff for pure economic loss on 
the basis that the wording of section 61(5) is broad enough to include pure economic 
loss. Section 61(5)’s only reference to “economic loss” relates to economic loss that 
results from death, injury or illness or damage to property and does not expressly 
include “pure economic loss”. However, section 61(5) does not prescribe a numerus 
clausus of types of harm that may be recoverable and is broad enough, on the plain 
meaning of the wording, to include pure economic loss. Accordingly, allowing exemption 
clauses for pure economic loss would effectively amount to depriving consumers of a 
right under the CPA. 
 
 It is argued that section 5(5) may extend section 61 liability to the transactions between 
the parties in the supply chain. For instance, a section 61 claim may potentially be 
brought by a retailer against a producer relating to the defective goods, loss of profit and 
to recover compensation for any claims brought against the retailer by the consumer. It 
is questioned whether this extended section 61 liability could be excluded contractually 
by parties in the supply chain inter se. De Stadler offers a number of arguments in this 
                                                          
1493  44-18. 
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regard.1494 Firstly, she contends that, where the transaction is not exempt from the 
CPA’s application, section 51 would prohibit the parties from excluding any liability 
under the CPA. The counter argument to this is that section 51 expressly refers to 
“transaction or agreement”. It follows that, if a transaction is exempt from application of 
the CPA, it is difficult to see how section 51 would apply to it. De Stadler further argues 
that, even if section 51 is not applicable to exempted transactions, it is arguable that 
section 61 in itself prevents exclusion of the liability imposed by it. She bases this 
argument on the common law requirement of lawfulness for validity of contracts. If a 
contractual agreement is in direct contradiction to an express or implied prohibition on 
excluding section 61 liability, there is a presumption that it is void ab initio.1495  
 
 Alternatively, it is suggested by De Stadler that section 61 perhaps implies that its 
liability cannot be excluded, even in cases where section 51 does not apply to a 
transaction. It is at least arguable that a purpose interpretation of section 61 would not 
prevent exclusion of its liability in cases where transactions are exempt from application 
of the CPA, such as transactions involving consumers who are large juristic persons or 
the State. The basis for this is that the CPA’s purpose focuses on the protection of 
vulnerable consumers, not sophisticated persons with stronger bargaining power. On 
the other hand, section 5(5) appears to protect the right of retailers to recover losses 
due to defective goods from distributors, and the right of distributors to recover losses 
against the producer or importer. It is argued that it would be an unjust position if the 
retailer did not have a recourse against any party higher in the supply chain who had 
the most control over the product’s safety and quality. This argument of De Stadler is 
supported in light of the legislative purpose of the CPA to establish a legal framework 
                                                          
1494  Section 5 in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2014) at 5-41 to 5-
42. 
1495  Ibid. 
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for a consumer market that is “fair” and “sustainable” and that strikes a fair balance 
between the parties in the supply chain.  
 
 There seems to be general consensus among the foreign jurisdictions considered that 
contractual clauses that have the effect of restricting or excluding the liability of 
suppliers of defective products, vis-à-vis the plaintiff, are prohibited or void.1496 There 
also appears to be consensus that suppliers are generally free in these jurisdictions to 
contractually agree among themselves who would bear strict product liability in the 
event that a defective product causes harm.1497  
 
 It is argued that any contractual clause that has the effect of restricting or excluding the 
liability of the supply chain vis-à-vis the section 61 plaintiff for any type of harm 
envisaged in section 61(5), including pure economic loss, would be void for purporting 
to deprive a consumer of a right under the CPA.1498 This would be consistent with the 
prevailing position in the foreign jurisdictions considered and more importantly, the 
underlying purpose of the CPA to protect vulnerable consumers who are generally in a 
much weaker bargaining position in respect of the terms of supply of consumer goods. 
As noted by the drafters of the US Restatement (Third), there is a presumption that the 
ordinary consumer lacks adequate information and bargaining power to agree to a fair 
contractual limitation of rights clause in a contract of sale.1499   
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 In the interest of legal certainty for both consumers and industry, it is suggested that the 
legislature expressly state the position regarding validity of contractual exemption 
clauses for strict product liability under section 61 in the CPA. 
 
5.3 IMPACT OF WIDER LIABILITY  
 To date, there are only two reported judgments regarding the application of section 61, 
being the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal decisions in the Halstead-Cleak 
cases. 1500  These judgments highlight the difficulties presented by the numerous 
definitions of product defectiveness in sections 61 and 53. Unfortunately, the judgment 
do not provide any clarification as to the difference between the two concepts of “defect” 
employed by section 53(1)(a). The difficulties presented by the various definitions of 
product defectiveness in section 61 and 53 are also highlighted by decisions of the 
Consumer Goods and Services Ombud.1501 
 
 While case law regarding section 61 remains very limited, it is likely that this statutory 
remedy has been raised as a matter of course in most product liability claims since its 
introduction. Administrative or semi-judicial handling of section 61 complaints, by bodies 
such as the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud and other industry ombud 
schemes, will play a key role in providing consumer redress in South Africa. This is due 
to section 69(d) which provides that a plaintiff may only approach a civil court (other 
than a consumer court) “if all other remedies available to that person in terms of national 
legislation have been exhausted.” This provision creates legal uncertainty  and practical 
problems for section 61 claimants in that is unclear whether the provision means 
claimants must literally exhaust “all other remedies” under national legislation  which 
                                                          
1500 Discussed above at 4.3.2. 
1501 4.3.1. 
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would be very onerous, particularly on vulnerable, impecunious and unsophisticated 
claimants and would significantly restrict access to civil courts. It is suggested that this 
aspect of section 69(d) be clarified by the legislature. The key role to be played by 
administrative or semi-judicial bodies in relation to section 61 claims is evidenced by the 
rapidly increasing number of reported consumer complaints received by this national 
ombud scheme.1502  
 
 It is likely that section 61 will impact on the basis on which insurance is offered to 
producers, importers, distributors and retailers in South Africa with respect to conditions 
for coverage and premiums, similar to the European experience.1503  In light of the 
extended scope of liability under section 61, is suggested that South African suppliers 
review their existing insurance coverage and consider obtaining separate product 
liability insurance.  
 
5.4 FINAL REMARKS 
 The introduction of strict product liability in South Africa has undoubtedly been a 
significant step in the right direction in aligning South African consumer law with that of 
its international trading partners. The risk of strict liability for placing harmful products 
into circulation in South Africa will inevitably have a positive impact on the consumer 
market by prompting higher levels of product safety, whether through testing, quality 
control or clearer instructions or warnings. 
 
 It is argued that courts and other consumer redress bodies will seek to continue to 
balance the interests of consumer protection and industry development and innovation 
                                                          
1502 Ibid. 
1503 Ibid. 
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in order to develop and achieve a legal framework that is fair, efficient, and sustainable 
and which promotes the welfare of consumers generally. As argued in this study, the 
test for the key concept of defectiveness of goods is likely to be applied by following a 
reasonableness test akin to the wrongfulness element at common law, which would play 
an important normative and limiting role in determining whether causation of harm 
should give rise to strict liability under section 61 of the CPA. 
 
 Regrettably, the strict product liability provisions of the CPA, as currently worded, give 
rise to legal uncertainty in numerous respects, as outlined in this study. In the interest of 
providing legal certainty to consumers, businesses and other industry stakeholders as 
to the extent of protection afforded by, and liability imposed by section 61, it is 
suggested that various aspects of the CPA’s product liability framework be addressed 
through legislative review and amendment or through a purposive interpretation of the 
provisions, in so far as this is permitted by the principles of statutory interpretation, 
having regard to the legislative purposes and policyunderpinning the CPA and having 
regard, where appropriate, to the experience of foreign strict product liability regimes.  
 
 Based on the comparative analysis conducted in this study of the various CPA 
provisions relevant to section 61 liability and the experience of the Consumer Goods 
and Services Ombud in handling section 61 claims to date, it is contended that section 
61 is likely to increase the number of product liability claims against producers, 
importers, distributors and retailers due to the extended scope of liability; and that the 
new judicial, semi-judicial and administrative bodies created under the CPA will deal 
with the vast majority of section 61 claims. However, it is the duty of the courts and the 
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